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ABSTRACT 
Business model transformation influenced by 
Germany’s Energiewende 
A comparative case study analysis of business model 
innovation in start-up and incumbent firms 
Sven Oliver Hoffmann 
Keywords: Business Model Transformation, Business Model Innovation, 
Business Model, German Energy Transition, Disruptive Innovation, Incumbent 
Utility Firms, Clean-Tech Start-up Firms, Distributed Renewable Generation 
This thesis investigates the performance of business model innovation (BMI) by 
incumbent power utility and clean-tech start-up firms influenced by the German 
Energiewende. It emphasises the factors that impact BMI from a managers’ 
perspective, examines success factors for managers to overcome BMI 
challenges, and addresses contingencies to perform BMI in a more structured 
way. 
The research is driven by the German Energiewende. It has been chosen as 
Germany is considered one of the world’s leading markets for renewable 
energies and a transformation of the power sector is currently underway. 
Therefore, established power utility firms face severe changes, which have the 
characteristics of a potential disruption to their business model (BM). At the 
same time, new players are challenging these incumbents with new BMs. The 
research is underpinned by the extant literature on BMs and BMI. 
The research approach is based on two case studies; the incumbent power 
utility and the clean-tech start-up sector. The qualitative study comprises of 24 
semi-structured interviews conducted with top tier managers, from 18 firms, 
responsible for BMI within these firms. 
Key findings: This study extends our knowledge of BMI in both a start-up and an 
incumbent environment that is influenced by various contingent events. It 
portrays barriers to BMI and depicts critical success factors for BMI that point 
out solutions on how to overcome these barriers. It provides a structured BMI 
framework for established firms and illustrates future BM archetypes in this 
sector. It clearly documents the German Energiewende is regarded as a 
disruptive threat from the perspective of incumbent power utility managers. 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is a process framework including all 
identified drivers and challenges for BMI in both established and start-up firms. 
Contributions to practice include critical success factors for BMI, 
recommendations to overcome barriers to BMI and future BM archetypes within 
the newly evolving Energiewende industry based on sustainable technologies. 
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1 Chapter: Introduction 
1.1 Power utility industry in Germany 
Two relatively recent developments characterise the power utility industry in 
Germany. Firstly, the liberalisation of the market in 1998 and the 
implementation of the German Energy Transition via the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) in 2000 (Helms, 2016; Kungl, 2015; Wainstein and Bumpus, 
2016). Previously, monopolistic structures characterised the German power 
utility industry for decades. Moreover, investments were relatively safe following 
long-term investment plans as firms could rely on “a steady monopoly rent” 
(Hahn and Lülfs, 2015, p. 145). 
The major deregulation and liberalisation of the German power utility industry in 
1998 has changed the energy landscape enormously and led to a wave of 
mergers. One outcome is the ‘big four’ multinational utility (MNU) firms “RWE 
AG”, “EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG”, “E.ON SE” and “Vattenfall 
GmbH” ultimately having emerged as the four largest actors (Kungl, 2015). 
Besides these big MNUs, large regional power utilities (RPU) such as “EWE 
AG” or “RheinEnergie AG”, which are either largely or entirely owned by 
municipalities, have developed through mergers and acquisitions. Today these 
firms generate revenues larger than €1 billion (see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1: Revenues of 13 largest German power utility firms 
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These firms are referred to as incumbent power utility firms (Helms, 2016). 
Incumbent power utility firms can be defined as former monopolistic firms that 
operate in a vertically-integrated value chain based on generation, trading, 
transmission, distribution and consumption (Richter, 2013b; see Figure 2 
below). These vertically-integrated power utility firms have dominated the 
industry in recent years. They have owned large assets, including power plants, 
transmission and distribution power grids, to supply customers (Hahn and Lülfs, 
2015). In so doing, their dominant industry logic has been based on the 
configuration of large assets, particularly large-scale conventional generation 
from fossil-fuel and nuclear sources (Richter, 2013a). 
 
Figure 2: Vertically-integrated value chain of incumbent power utility firms 
Overall, and in comparison to other European electricity markets, the German 
power utility market is fragmented in nature. After liberalisation, when electricity 
customers were free to choose their electricity supplier, 1,190 electricity 
suppliers emerged (BDEW, 2016). In addition, the market currently comprises 
of 70 large-scale electricity producers, 130 electricity trading firms, four 
transmission and 920 distribution network operators (BDEW, 2016).  
Other than the MNU and RPU firms mentioned, there are also a number of 
multinational firms from outside Germany. There are middle-sized players as 
well as an abundance of smaller municipal power utility firms (approximately 
800), smaller privately owned electricity suppliers (approximately 200) and 
distributors specialising in green electricity supply (approximately 150) (BDEW, 
2016; VKU, 2016a). Often power utility firms perform different value-adding 
steps in parallel. To illustrate, 11 of the featured 13 largest incumbent firms 
perform all the value-adding steps of the power utility industry’s value chain 
except transmission grid operations. The two firms that generated the highest 
revenues in Germany in 2015, “RWE AG” and “EnBW AG”, remained actively 
engaged throughout the entire power utility value chain. 
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1.2 German Energy Transition (Energiewende) 
In global discourse on the reduction of greenhouse gases and the shift toward 
sustainable electricity production, the German Energy Transition or German 
Energiewende has attracted widespread interest (Kungl, 2015). 
It describes Germany’s state-mandated transition towards a sustainable energy 
system (Helms, 2016). As both terms German Energy Transition and 
Energiewende can be used interchangeably, from this point onwards German 
Energy Transition will be referred to as German Energiewende or simply as 
Energiewende. It is a long-term transition process, started in the late 1990s and 
will continue to progress as far forward as 2050 (Richter, 2013b). The aims of 
German Energiewende are threefold. Firstly, to develop a low-carbon energy 
system with 80% of its power produced from renewable sources by 2050. 
Secondly, to improve energy efficiency, thirdly, to realise the electrification of 
the fossil-fuel-based economy (BMUB, 2016). This process is subject to a great 
deal of political influence having already undergone numerous turnarounds. 
Different governments have changed regulatory policies several times and 
amendments were not always congruent. One reason for the ongoing changes 
was the great success of the EEG, the main regulatory structure behind the 
Energiewende (Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). It has bolstered the roll-out of 
renewable energies in Germany. As from 2000 to 2015, the quota of renewable 
energy of total energy consumption increased from 6.2 to 32% (BMWi, 2016a).  
 
Figure 3: Development of renewable energies in Germany 
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Based on the EEG’s great success, two stakeholder groups have been 
negatively affected - the domestic customers and power producers. On the one 
hand, this has led to an increase in total electricity prices, as the fixed 
compensation rate for renewable energies was financed by allocating the costs 
to the domestic customer. Between 2006 and 2016 the average household 
electricity price has increased on average by 51% to 30 cent/kWh for private 
households in the basic tariff (BDEW, 2016; Bundesnetzagentur, 2016). 
Consequently, only 21.3% of the electricity price in 2016 was determined by the 
market, however, 54.1% was state-induced costs and 24.6% grid fees (BDEW, 
2016).  
On the other hand, wholesale prices of large-scale conventional electricity 
producers determined on the spot market, have significantly declined due to the 
extensive supply of renewable energies. This can be explained by the merit-
order effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008). The merit order ranks energy sources 
according to their short-term marginal costs of production. The production 
sources with the least marginal cost are the first to satisfy demand. Marginal 
costs of renewable energies are close to zero, as, once they are built, they do 
not need fuel to run (Hahn and Lülfs, 2015). As a consequence, the EEG saw 
several changes, mainly in terms of reduced rates for the fixed compensation 
for green energy fed into the distribution grid. These fixed rates were also first 
introduced in 2000 to improve predictability for investors (Agora Energiewende, 
2016). 
A further example of the changes to regulatory policies was the different dates 
of the nuclear power-phase out, set by various German governments. Initially 
announced by a coalition of the “Social Democratic Party” and the “Greens” in 
2002 as the “Atomic Energy Act”, nuclear power plants were supposed to shut 
down in roughly 20 years’ time (Hahn and Lülfs, 2015). At the end of 2010 
however, the “Conservative-Liberal” coalition decided to significantly postpone 
the nuclear phase out (Hahn and Lülfs, 2015). The nuclear catastrophe in 
Fukushima (Japan) in March 2011 led to yet another sudden change in energy 
policy. In this instance, the government abandoned their previous decision, 
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deciding on a definite exit by 2022. Additionally, eight nuclear power plants 
were immediately shut down (Lehr and Lutz, 2016). 
The German Energiewende is considered to be one of the most advanced 
energy transition policy projects in the world (Wainstein and Bumpus, 2016). 
Germany is the largest power generator in Europe and renewable energies 
currently represent over 50% of the installed capacity (Wainstein and Bumpus, 
2016). Renewable energy is defined as an energy source derived by natural 
means, which are replenished at a faster rate than they are consumed. In its 
various forms, it originates directly or indirectly from the sun, or from heat 
generated from deep within the earth. Included in its definition, is energy 
generated from solar, wind, biofuels, geothermal, hydropower and ocean 
resources, and biofuels and hydrogen derived from renewable resources (IEA, 
2016). The biggest renewable generation sources in Germany in 2015 were 
onshore wind with 41 gigawatts (GW) and solar photovoltaics (PV) with 40 GW 
installed production capacity (BMWi, 2016a). Solar PV accounted for 6% of total 
German electricity production in 2015 (BMWi, 2016a). In addition, Germany has 
also been the biggest solar PV market in the world, with nearly one quarter of 
the world’s entire production capacity in 2015 (REN21, 2015). 
While onshore wind generation technologies have been predominantly utilised 
on a utility-scale model, distributed solar PV generation has usually been 
applied on rooftops as the main technology for decentralised, small-scale 
customer-sided models in Germany (Richter, 2013b). 
Distributed renewable generation can be defined as renewable technologies 
that rely on smaller networks of power generation sources close to the point of 
consumption. They are consumed on-site or distributed locally through a low- or 
medium-voltage community network (Hannes and Abbott, 2013).  
Until recently, electricity generation was almost exclusively in the domain of 
incumbent power utilities. This monopoly is changing dramatically with the 
increase in renewable energies. This significant growth has been aided by 
government incentives to the EEG, which bridged the gap between actual cost 
and grid parity. Grid parity occurs when a renewable energy source can 
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generate electricity at a levelised cost of energy (LCOE) that is less than or 
equal to the price of purchasing power from the electricity supplier. As a 
consequence, the old centralised systems, which delivered a one-way supply of 
electricity to customers, will be increasingly replaced by decentralised 
generation (Klose et al., 2010; Richter, 2012; Richter, 2013a; Servatius et al., 
2012). Up until now, the ownership structure of renewable energy sources has 
largely depended on private investors. Incumbent power utility firms have been 
slowly adapting to the Energiewende, as their share of the total installed 
capacity of renewable energies in Germany accounted for only 12% in 2012 
(Trendresearch, 2013; see Figure 4 below). In more dramatic terms, power 
utilities have already lost 88% of the distributed renewable generation market to 
institutional and private investors. It is worth emphasising here that incumbent 
power utility firms, compared with their challengers, were 10 years too late in 
substantially reacting to the governmental promotion of renewable energies 
(Kungl, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Ownership structure of renewable energies in Germany 
Furthermore, legislation has supported the feed-in to the grid (fixed feed-in tariff 
per kilowatt hour fed into the grid) in the last few years (Richter, 2013b). 
Recently, new EEG regulations have encouraged the direct use of electricity 
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from distributed energy resources (DER) for consumers’ own power (Kolks et 
al., 2012; Richter, 2013b).  
Additionally, Hannes and Abbott (2013) argue how rising retail electricity prices 
over the past decade make it advantageous to produce one’s own power. As a 
consequence, consumers are themselves increasingly producing energy 
through DERs such as solar PV and have become ‘prosumers’ (Shen, 2012; 
Shomali and Pinkse, 2016). 
Industry experts consider small-scale, DERs such as solar PV and stationary 
batteries to be a disruptive threat to the incumbent business models (Hannes 
and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010). The experts see distributed solar PV 
generation as the most disruptive energy technology, as it allows consumers of 
all sizes to produce power themselves (Aanesen et al., 2012; Schleicher-
Tappeser, 2012). Based on the intermittent character of solar PV, the current 
technology will not be able to replace large-scale conventional generation 
sources completely. However, this is expected to change when distributed PV 
battery storage capacities become economically advantageous (Pieper et al., 
2013). 
In this way, Germany has a key role as a forerunner in the global transition to 
an energy system based on renewable energy sources. It is spearheading 
research, development and the implementation of sustainable technologies 
(Mayrhofer and Römer, 2013).  
1.3 Business model transformation of the power utility 
industry influenced by Energiewende 
From the end of the 2000s, German incumbent power utility firms were 
increasingly confronted with challenges such as falling wholesale prices and 
competition from renewable energies. Then, in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in 2011, the incumbents, with their established business model, 
were plunged into a major crisis. Eight nuclear power plants were shut down in 
Germany following the disaster (Richter, 2013a). It must also be noted, de-
centralised renewables had already undermined the volume based business 
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model of incumbent power utilities at the generation end of the electricity value 
chain (Hall and Roelich, 2016). 
Therefore, incumbents themselves acknowledged that their traditional, utility-
scale business model had been eroded. “EnBW” CEO, Dr Frank Mastiaux 
stated: “I see a paradigm shift in the energy landscape in that the traditional 
business models of many power supply firms are increasingly being 
questioned.” (Mastiaux translated by Kungl, 2015, p. 19) In a similar way, 
“RWE” was also becoming increasingly gloomy. In 2013, in a confidential 
document entitled “RWE Corporate Story”, the firm stated that the “massive 
erosion of the wholesale prices caused by the growth of German photovoltaics 
constitutes a serious problem for RWE which may even threaten the company’s 
survival.” (Energy Post, 2015). Furthermore, German power utility firms listed on 
the stock exchange have lost more than three quarters of their firm value since 
2006 (Handelsblatt, 2016a). As a consequence, incumbent power utility firms in 
Germany are currently in the process of a major transition towards more 
sustainable generation based on renewable energies (Aichele 2012; Kolks et al. 
2012; Noam et al., 2013).  
As power utility firms look to the future, it is vital they question how they can 
transform their current business model and innovate new business models to 
capitalise on this newly distributed renewable generation landscape (Richter, 
2013a). Business model innovation has been recognised as a vehicle for 
corporate transformation (Helms, 2016). Therefore, incumbent power utility 
firms have to experiment with business model innovation in the search for a 
new viable business model, as “the right business model is largely apparent 
early on in emerging industries.” (Teece, 2010, p. 187). Notwithstanding, they 
need to find strategies for business model innovations that fit to their existing 
business models and find ways to overcome limiting factors (Richter, 2013a). 
While business model innovation research to date has largely focused on the 
antecedents of the business model concept and tried to position itself as it’s 
own research domain (Zott et al., 2011), the conduct of business model 
innovation of established firms in an environment undermined by changes has 
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been an under-researched field. Previous studies within the German power 
utility industry have found incumbents lack innovative capabilities and 
experience with business model innovation. The studies highlight how the 
incumbents rely on the existing configuration of large assets following the 
dominant logic of the prevailing utility-scale business model (Helms, 2016; 
Richter, 2012, 2013a and 2013b). Studies in other industries have shown that 
experimenting and trial-and-error learning approaches are crucial for successful 
business model innovation activities (McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). 
In short, German power utility firms face a profound need to conduct business 
model innovation activities and to transform their existing business models 
having experienced a severe crisis brought on by the Energiewende. 
In the existing literature, no studies exist that have developed an advanced 
understanding of beneficial and limiting factors to business model innovation in 
established power utility firms and, at the same time, have presented 
approaches on how to overcome those potentially limiting factors to business 
model innovation in these firms. 
1.4 Research aim and objectives 
This thesis endeavours to analyse how business model innovation is managed 
under the influence of the Energiewende and how incumbent power utility firms 
can approach business model innovation more effectively and overcome 
potential constraints. Therefore, the overall objective is: 
 To learn from existing business model innovation activities and to develop a 
conceptual model for business model innovation in established power utility 
firms, influenced by the German Energiewende 
To achieve this overall aim, the research objectives seek to: 
 Explore business model innovation practices influenced by German 
Energiewende and the specific outcomes  
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 Understand beneficial and limiting factors impacting on business model 
innovation influenced by the German Energiewende 
 Comprehend the underlying possibilities of business models innovation 
influenced by German Energiewende 
1.5 Introduction of thesis method 
This study applies a comparative case study approach. It focuses on business 
model innovation influenced by the German Energiewende and analyses two 
case studies from divergent industries affected by the Energiewende. 
The first case study comes from the incumbent power utility industry. This 
industry was selected because its underlying value configuration of large-scale 
conventional generation assets has been greatly affected by Energiewende. 
Incumbent power utility firms are being forced to renew their business models 
and perform business model innovation to survive the potentially disruptive 
threat of Energiewende. 
The second case study emanates from the clean-tech start-up sector. This 
sector was selected because clean-tech start-ups are highly innovative and 
have already introduced several new business models based on sustainable 
technologies such as distributed solar PV generation or distributed PV storage. 
In contrast to incumbent firms which regard Energiewende as a threat, these 
start-up firms see only opportunity. 
As a main method, semi-structured interviews with top tier managers of 
incumbent power utility and founders from clean-tech start-ups firms have been 
employed. Complementary information has been largely based on firm 
documentations, press articles, conference visits and videos and observations. 
1.6 Research scope 
This thesis has five key boundaries: theoretical, geographical, industrial, 
temporal and stakeholder scope. 
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Theoretical scope 
This research explores business model transformation in an industry from the 
perspective of the business model concept and business model innovation in 
relation to innovation management. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
apply other related concepts. 
Geographical scope 
Based on the spearheading role of the German Energiewende in transforming 
the German energy system towards more sustainable technologies, this study 
only focuses on Germany. German incumbent power utility firms face 
challenges and limitations based on this energy transition unseen in other 
electricity markets. Whereas German clean-tech start-up firms have the ideal 
environment to experiment with new sustainable business models. 
Industrial scope 
This thesis focuses on the incumbent power utility industry due to its strong 
need to transform their business models and the clean-tech start-up sector due 
to its innovative character. In addition, personal interest and data accessibility 
have also been considered. 
Temporal scope 
The German Energiewende is an ongoing process, predicted to continue till 
2050. This research shows the latest developments on business model 
innovation influenced by the Energiewende. Findings will be highly tentative, as 
this does not take an ex-post facto perspective. 
Stakeholder perspective 
The thesis focuses on top tier managers from incumbent power utility firms and 
clean-tech start-up founders conducting business model innovation. Hence, it 
aims to give insights from a managerial perspective. It is beyond the scope of 
this research to include perspectives from other stakeholder groups. 
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1.7 Domains of contributions 
This thesis makes a contribution to both academia and business practice. In the 
following paragraph both contributions are presented. 
1.7.1 Contribution to theory 
The study aims to contribute to the growing, but as yet under-researched, area 
of business model innovation in established firms that are undermined by 
changes in their external environment. It provides an exciting opportunity to 
advance our knowledge of the beneficial and limiting factors concerning 
business model innovation in incumbent firms. In contrasting incumbent and 
start-up business model innovation activities within the Energiewende it offers 
some highly interesting findings on how business model innovation can be 
approached differently. It also provides first insights into the business model 
archetypes of the Energiewende. Finally, all findings and learnings of the cross-
case analysis are transferred into the ‘BMI-6-framework’. In so doing, it fosters a 
new theory by developing a process framework for business model innovation 
in established firms that have an existing business model in place, which is still 
generating revenues.  
1.7.2 Contribution to practice 
This study presents 13 practical recommendations for incumbent power utility 
firms on how to manage business model innovation more effectively. In so 
doing, it has built on, and extended, initial contributions on various challenges 
associated with business model innovation in an incumbent firm. It does this by 
providing a comprehensive list of the challenges and potential solutions on how 
to overcome these limiting factors. Furthermore, it has built on the experience of 
the clean-tech start-up firms involved in this research and has transferred the 
key success factors to incumbent firms. Finally, it offers an outlook on viable 
business models including business model archetypes for the newly evolving 
Energiewende industry, summarising the findings from the clean-tech start-up 
and incumbent power utility case studies. 
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1.8 Thesis structure 
This section provides an overview of the dissertation’s structure including a 
visualisation (see Figure 5, p. 15). 
Chapter 1 introduces the content of this research study. It presents the power 
utility industry and the key challenges this industry faces from the German 
Energiewende. It portrays business model innovation as a potential solution for 
incumbent power utility firms’ problems and introduces the research gap. It 
outlines the aims and objectives of this research and summarises method and 
scope. Finally, it explains both the theoretical and practical contribution. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review of this dissertation. It describes the 
business model concept and its emergence. It further portrays the different 
roots of the business model concept, various existing definitions and presents a 
business model definition for this study. In the next step, it introduces the 
subject of business model innovation applying the ‘synthesizing meta-
framework’ of Massa and Tucci (2014, p. 433). Finally, studies on the 
management of business model innovation are presented placing particular 
emphasis on the German power utility industry. The chapter ends with an 
explanation of the research scope and a presentation of the research questions. 
Chapter 3 presents and justifies the applied methodology in this research. 
Firstly, it introduces post-positivism - the philosophical perspective this research 
is based on. Next the qualitative, exploratory research design, applying a 
comparative case study, is described and also a case is made for this research. 
In the next step, the identified themes of this research are presented. Then, 
data collection and data analysis methods are explained and justified. This 
chapter concludes with a presentation of limitations of the research approach 
and underlines potential alternative research methods. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of this research, focusing on the two case 
write-ups of incumbent power utility and clean-tech start-up firms. Both case 
write-ups are similarly structured to facilitate case comparison. They each start 
with the presentation of an overarching process, in which strategies, 
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organisational measures and applied processes to business model innovation 
are examined. It goes on to present the findings of this research, focusing on 
three key areas, based on the application of the framework of Teece (2010): 
value creation, value delivery and value capture. 
Chapter 5 analyses the findings of both case studies in a case comparison. It 
further discusses and bases the findings, providing a theoretical approach to the 
existing literature.  
The final chapter, Chapter 6, draws upon the entire thesis, tying up the various 
theoretical and empirical strands to present the contribution to academia and 
business practice. Within the theoretical contribution, a conceptual model for 
business model innovation in established firms, undermined by changes in the 
external environment, the ‘BMI-6-framework’, is presented. This framework 
adds to new theory in drawing on all findings and learnings of the cross-case 
analysis in this thesis. In addition, the practical contribution presents 13 
recommendations based on this research for an effective handling of business 
model innovation in incumbent power utility firms. 
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Figure 5: Visualisation of research thesis structure 
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2 Chapter: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Trends such as increasing customer centricity (Teece, 2010), digitalisation (Al-
Debei et al., 2008), Web 2.0 (Wirtz et al., 2010), the Internet of Things (Chui et 
al., 2010), and new forms of research and development (R&D) such as open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2012) have revolutionised entire industries. New 
business models are emerging and, at the same time, these trends are driving 
incumbent firms to transform their established business models (Johnson et al., 
2008; Johnson, 2010).  
On a general level, these factors also have an influence on incumbent power 
utility business models. More specifically, this influence extends to the 
transformation of electricity consumers to ‘prosumers’ within Energiewende 
(Shomali and Pinkse, 2016). These ‘prosumers’, not only consume energy, but 
also, through their adoption of distributed renewable power generation, produce 
electricity for their own consumption (Shen, 2012). This shift represents a 
disruptive threat to incumbent power utility firms and their established business 
models (Boscherini et al., 2012; Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; 
Richter, 2013a). Through the so-called feed-in tariffs and other measurements, 
the regulator supports the rise of distributed renewable generation and can also 
be regarded as a disruptor of established business models of incumbent power 
utility firms (Richter, 2013b; Servatius et al., 2012).  
As a result of this potential disruption, incumbent power utility firms face the 
possible challenge of dual business model transformation (Markides and 
Charitou, 2004; Servatius, 2013). Dual business model transformation in the 
power utility industry can be described as two business model innovation 
activities that have become intertwined. In business model transformation A, the 
established business model is at risk due to external influences, for example 
changing regulatory policies, new competition in the market and incremental 
technology innovations. Incumbents must incrementally improve and redesign 
their established business models, for example, via general re-organisation and 
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cost reduction and the reconfiguration of their business models. In parallel, 
business model transformation B takes place where new business models 
require development (e.g. disruptive technologies such as distributed renewable 
generation and digitalisation) and then are successfully established in the 
market. These new business model design activities are often performed in an 
independent business unit or spin-off firm that operates separately form the 
core business (Christensen, 1997). The act of transformation A and B in 
combination (exploitation of the old business model and exploration of a new 
business model at the same time) can be regarded as dual business model 
transformation (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Servatius, 2013). 
Before further introducing these concepts I wish to give a brief overview of my 
literature search strategy. As a starting point I searched the EBSCOhost online 
research databases. I searched the database for peer-reviewed academic 
articles containing the terms ‘business model innovation’, ‘dual business model 
transformation’ and ‘power utilities’. My search revealed research on dual 
business models is limited - indeed there are no academic studies on dual 
business model transformations in the power utility industry whatsoever. To 
date, including other industries, only two authors have academically researched 
dual business model transformations (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 
2013). Three further studies exist by the same author (Richter, 2012, 2013a and 
2013b) on business model innovation in the German power utility industry. 
These studies discuss renewable generation and business model innovation in 
general with a specific focus on small- and large-scale distributed renewable 
generation. Moreover, looking at the wider literature available (including books 
and managerial publications) there are only a few studies analysing business 
model innovation in established firms (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2010; Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). I 
will go on to discuss all the above-mentioned publications later in this chapter.  
Both dual business model transformations and business model innovation have 
foundations in the business model concept. The business model concept refers 
to a firm’s value creation and value delivery to its customers and the conversion 
of their payments to profit (value capture) (Teece, 2010). The business model 
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concept rose to prominence in management literature with the rise and fall of 
the internet industry and ‘dot.com bubble’ in 1998-2001 (Afuah and Tucci, 2001; 
Amit and Zott, 2001; Timmers, 1998), and subsequently has received 
increasing attention from both academics and practitioners (Massa and Tucci, 
2014; Zott et al., 2011). In the last two decades the interest in the business 
model concept “virtually exploded” (Zott et al., 2011, p. 1022) with 2,229 out of 
2,253 academic publications published after 1995 containing the term ‘business 
model’ on the EBSCOhost online research databases. In addition, there are 
three academic journals with special issues entirely devoted to the concept 
(International Journal of Innovation management, Vol. 17, 2013; International 
Journal of Product Development, Vol. 18, 2013; Long Range Planning, Vol. 43, 
2010). According to Lambert and Davidson (2013) the rising prominence of the 
business model concept and its specific features could make it worthy of its own 
research program, or as the authors describe, a “distinct management research 
topic in its own right” (Lambert and Davidson, 2013, p. 670). Nevertheless, 
there are currently few business model or business model innovation research 
studies that have appeared in top-rated academic journals (Schneider and 
Spieth, 2013).  
Furthermore, the business model concept can be regarded as a multifaceted, 
“elusive concept”, allowing for “considerable interpretative flexibility” (Massa and 
Tucci, 2014, p. 6). Similarly, Zott et al. (2011) emphasise a disagreement 
among researchers on a universal business model definition along with a 
development of business model research largely in “silos” (Zott et al., 2011, p. 
1020). A comprehensive literature review was recently published in a top-
ranking journal portraying how different notions of the business model exist and 
how often these differing ideas serve the scope of the particular area of interest 
to the researcher (Zott et al., 2011). According to Zott et al. (2011, p. 1020) the 
business model literature is divided into three thematic “silos”. They can be 
grouped around the literature streams on e-business, business strategy, and 
technology and innovation management. Currently there is little overarching 
connection between these “silos” (Zott et al., 2011, p. 1020). Within the e-
business stream, researchers largely describe new internet-based ways of 
doing business and try to classify business models into archetypes or patterns. 
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In the business strategy stream, researchers explain new network and activity 
system-based value creation, delivery and capture mechanisms and sources of 
competitive advantage, meanwhile, in the technology and innovation 
management stream, researchers are trying to understand how technology is 
converted into market outcomes through the development of business models 
(Zott et al., 2011). This ambiguity is supported by Schneider and Spieth (2013, 
p. 2) who emphasise the “vague” understanding” of the business model 
concept, which can build on neither a theoretical foundation nor a well-
structured, unambiguous literature base. 
The industry focus in empirical business model studies indicates most firms are 
located in the manufacturing industry, covering computer and consumer 
electronics, motor vehicles, semiconductors, chemical, and pharmaceuticals 
(Höflinger, 2014). The information and communication technology (ICT) industry 
represents the second largest group covering e-business, software, and 
telecommunications (Höflinger, 2014). The ICT industry is followed by the 
media industry covering motion pictures as well as music (Zott et al., 2011). 
Another set of studies has addressed professional, scientific, and technical 
services, such as biotechnology, life science, and consulting (Höflinger, 2014; 
Massa and Tucci, 2014). Some studies have examined transportation 
(especially airlines) and warehousing, finance and insurance, food services, oil 
and gas extraction, and health care (Höflinger, 2014, Zott et al., 2011). Amongst 
others, post-industrial technologies (e.g. the intellectual property revolution, 
institutionalisation of open innovation) and business strategy (e.g. the 
disintegration of the value chain) have been key triggers within these studies 
(Johnson, 2010; Lambert and Davidson, 2013; Massa and Tucci, 2014). 
As mentioned, the third business model research stream deals with technology 
and innovation management. Therefore, the business model concept has two 
complementary roles in fostering innovation. On the one hand, it helps firms to 
commercialise new ideas or technologies in connecting innovative products and 
services to a realised output in the market. On the other hand, the business 
model concept stands for a source of innovation in and of itself (Massa and 
Tucci, 2014; Schneider and Spieth, 2013).  
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Therefore, business model innovation can be regarded as a new dimension of 
innovation alongside product, process or organisational innovation (Mitchell and 
Coles, 2003). At the time of writing, the primary focus of business model 
innovation research has been on the antecedents and mechanisms (largely 
elements and building blocks) of the background to business model innovation. 
However, so far, only a few studies have been based on the consequences of 
business model innovation (Massa and Tucci, 2014). This means, a large part 
of research focuses on explaining what a business model actually is, it’s 
importance, and what are the constituent elements. Therefore, a minor part 
deals with the effective management of business models within firms, 
conducting and implementing business model innovation activities. So, research 
studies on business models and their archetypes in start-up-contexts have been 
the largest part of the research, while business models and business model 
innovation in established firms have a minor part. 
Well-known examples from the literature of business model innovations for 
start-up business model new designs are e-business models such as “Amazon” 
and “eBay” in the retail sector, and “Dell” in the computer industry (Baden-Fuller 
et al., 2010; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010; Gassmann et al., 2013). 
Business model reconfiguration examples can be found in the airline industry 
with “Southwest Airlines”, or “Apple’s iPod/iTunes” in the music industry, and 
“Nespresso” in the retail industry (McGrath, 2010; Markides, 2013; Matzler et 
al., 2013). Old-economy business model reconfigurations are “Hilti” in 
manufacturing or “Dow Corning” with “Xiameter” in the raw materials industry 
(Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010).  
The aims and objectives of this literature review are fourfold: Firstly, to offer a 
comprehensive overview of the emerging topic of business model innovation, 
and its closely related business model concept as well as the new topic of dual 
business model transformation (e.g. reconfiguration of business models) in 
established firms. This review will also offer links to related research streams 
such as to organisational ambidexterity literature - an area which could be 
helpful when it comes to dual business model transformation. Secondly, based 
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on the divergent body of existing studies and definitions of the business model 
concept, it wants to come up with a clear business model and business model 
innovation definition including the elements and building blocks of the business 
model. Thirdly, this review wants to show the facets of the business model 
concept/business model innovation already explored from the background of 
business model innovation within established, power utility firms, in particular 
those influenced by Energiewende. It is here where the most important research 
gap for this thesis lies. Finally, it will explore if the focus on business model 
innovation influenced by Energiewende and the development of a framework for 
business model innovation for established firms will be suitable as the main 
research objective for this thesis. 
In terms of structure, Section 2 presents the emergence of the business model 
concept and its various definitions. Consequently, this section aims for a 
common understanding of the business model concept and its underlying 
building blocks in providing specific definitions of both the business model 
concept and business model innovation for this thesis. In the next step, an 
attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for the business model concept will 
be made. Concepts such as the resource-based view, the dynamic-capabilities 
perspective, the strategic entrepreneurship perspective and transaction cost 
economics are used in Section 2.3 to base the business model concept in 
theory for this study better (Schneider and Spieth, 2013; Shomali and Pinkse, 
2016). 
As the business model concept and business model innovation are interlinked 
to business strategy and innovation, in the next step, the relationship of the 
business model concept with these areas will be further explored and defined in 
Section 4. In the next section, following Massa and Tucci’s (2014, p. 433) 
‘synthesizing meta-framework’, the different levels of abstraction, such as the 
business model narratives, archetypes, and graphical frameworks of the 
business model concept will be further described and explained in Section 
Five’s ‘theory and practice of business model innovation’. Then, the most 
important aspects on managing business model innovation will be outlined. At 
this stage, conceptual and empirical research will be further discussed. This 
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includes dual business model transformation, organisational ambidexterity, 
business model innovation processes, and barriers to business model 
innovation. Finally, in Section 7, existing studies on power utility business 
models and business model innovation within the German Energiewende will be 
presented. Existing literature will be described and this chapter will be summed 
up with a critical reflection and alignment of the current state of the business 
model concept and business model innovation. Based on this, I will provide a 
clear definition of the research gap and introduce the research questions for this 
DBA thesis. 
2.2 Emergence of the business model concept and definitions  
Following Zott et al. (2011), the business model concept does not consist of one 
core concept, rather, it is composed of many. For example, the business model 
concept has been used as a source of disruption (Christensen, 1997) and an 
entity that changes the logic of entire industries (Magretta, 2002). It has been 
put forward as a new form in which to compete (Casadesus-Massanell and 
Ricart, 2007). In addition, there are a vast number of publications providing 
various definitions, components and classifications on business models 
(Lambert and Davidson, 2013). This limited degree of cumulative 
conceptualisation of the business model has led to a relatively diverse 
understanding of the concept and its constituent elements. Nevertheless, four 
recent articles, portraying an overview of this multifaceted concept, constitute 
important steps towards overcoming these limitations. These articles, published 
in academically respected and peer-reviewed journals, offer comprehensive 
reviews about the business model concept (Lambert and Davidson, 2013; 
Massa and Tucci, 2014; Schneider and Spieth, 2013; Zott et al., 2011). 
Zott et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive review of both the conceptual and 
empirical academic research on business models in a top-ranked journal. They 
have reviewed 103 articles on business models published between 1995-2010 
in peer-reviewed journals (Zott et al., 2011). According to them, business 
models “embody a holistic and systemic perspective on how firms do business.” 
(Zott et al., 2011, p. 2) They also regard the business model as a non-linear 
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concept for value creation and not merely a concept for value capture (Zott et 
al., 2011). From their perspective, it is a completely new unit of analysis, located 
between the firm and its network levels (Zott et al., 2011). Thereby, activities 
performed in a network of exchange partners play an important role either as 
activities, processes, functionalities or transactions (Zott et al., 2011). According 
to Zott et al. (2011), the business model concept has been employed in three 
main fields; e-business, strategic management, and innovation and technology 
management. As interconnections between these fields are rare, the authors 
also refer to the notion of “silo” to separate the different, thematic areas (Zott et 
al., 2011). 
Lambert and Davidson (2013) provide a meta-analysis in their research paper 
focused entirely on existing empirical research studies in the field of business 
models. They have reviewed 69 studies on business models that have been 
published between 1996-2010 in peer-reviewed journals (Lambert and 
Davidson, 2013). In general, these studies are exploratory or test conceptual 
research (Lambert and Davidson, 2013). According to the authors, the business 
model concept has been adopted by business and/or management researchers 
and particularly employed in the European ICT, media and manufacturing 
industries (Lambert and Davidson, 2013). They have classified three different 
areas of empirical study: firstly, the classification/elements of business models; 
secondly the relationship between business models and enterprise 
performance; and thirdly business model innovation (Lambert and Davidson, 
2013). The latter has been the subject of more recent empirical research. This 
research focused on the prerequisites of conducting business model innovation, 
along with elements and processes that determine the ability of a firm to 
effectively innovate its business model (Lambert and Davidson, 2013).  
In a similar vein, Schneider and Spieth (2013), have systematically analysed the 
business model innovation literature. They have reviewed 35 articles published 
between 1981-2012 in peer-reviewed journals focusing on business model 
innovations in established firms (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). According to 
Schneider and Spieth this research stream is in a very early stage. They identify 
how few empirical findings have been achieved in studies following widely 
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explorative research designs with extensive use of qualitative case studies 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013). The studies range from in-depth studies of one 
firm (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009; Kuratko and Mathews, 2004), to 
multiple firms and business models (Sabatier et al., 2010; Yunus et al., 2010), 
to longitudinal studies of single and multiple firms (Garnsey et al., 2008; 
Kodama, 2010). Thereby the aim of the qualitative empirical works is to 
understand what constitutes a ‘good’ business model. This research approach 
includes considerations of how the business model is designed, advanced, and 
applied in various contexts (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). 
The fast rise in the number of publications between 2010 and 2012 indicates a 
strong interest in the topic (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). And so, the research 
on business model innovation spreads out across different domains. This 
spread is similar to the business model concept mentioned by Zott et al. (2011), 
which includes entrepreneurial, innovation, and strategic management 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013). According to the authors, empirical studies have 
been conducted in various industries including retail and airline industries 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013). They have identified three distinct research 
streams addressing the identification of challenges and the ways firms can 
overcome obstacles related to business model innovation. These are, firstly, the 
exploration of processes and elements that constitute business model 
innovations. Secondly, the analysis of effects and thirdly, results achieved 
through the carrying out of business model innovation (Schneider and Spieth, 
2013). 
Massa and Tucci (2014) provided a further comprehensive review of business 
model innovation, where they analysed business model innovation following 
three different objectives: business model designs in newly formed 
organisations (start-ups), business model reconfigurations in incumbent firms, 
and business model innovation with sustainability issues. To overcome the 
unstructured nature of business model innovation research and to establish a 
better understanding, the authors have conceptualised a so-called ‘synthesizing 
meta-framework’. It structures the complementary nature of various 
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perspectives on business model innovation in one framework (see Figure 6 
below) (Massa and Tucci, 2014, p. 433). 
 
Figure 6: ‘Synthesizing meta-framework’ of Massa and Tucci (2014) 
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Thus, as stated by the authors, existing tools and frameworks supporting 
business model innovation are “structured into several levels of decomposition 
with varying depth and complexity depending on the degree to which they 
abstract from the reality they aim to describe” (Massa and Tucci, 2014, p. 431). 
In the Section 2.5 I will use this ‘synthesizing meta-framework’ to build on its 
structure to describe the different subdomains related to business model 
innovation. 
Despite the highly valuable contributions to business model research, all 
reviews fail to provide a detailed conceptual framework for the business model 
construct, its antecedents and its consequences. Indeed, Zott et al. (2011) even 
call for “more clarity about the theoretical building blocks of the business model, 
its antecedents and consequences, and the mechanisms through which it 
works” (Zott et al., 2011, p. 1038). Significantly, all papers underscore the great 
need to resolve conceptual ambiguities in the literature from the background of 
the relatively diverse understanding of the concept. The papers also show 
knowledge of the business model construct and its potential implications, after 
15 years of research, it is still beginning to evolve and build its theoretical base. 
Definitions of the business model concept 
Although an increasing interest both in management practice and academia 
exists, no generally accepted definition in academia of what a business model 
actually is, has been established yet (Zott et al., 2011). Multiple empirical 
studies and conceptual works have developed various definitions of the 
business model concept, representing a widely dispersed field of research 
(Höflinger, 2014; Lambert and Davidson, 2013). However, only a few definitions 
have been adopted in further works, for example, Amit and Zott (2001), 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), and Teece (2010). 
In general, the centrality of the notion of value in the business model definitions 
is apparent. This is because a large quantity of business model definitions 
focuses on value creation, value delivery or value capture (Massa and Tucci, 
2014; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). There is 
strong consensus that the business model revolves around customer-centric 
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value creation (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Mansfield and Fourie, 
2004; Zott et al., 2011). Thus Linder and Cantrell (2000, p. 1) describe the 
business model as “the organisation’s core logic for creating value.” Thereby, 
value creation can be interpreted as both value for the firm’s customers, and at 
the same time, financial profits for the firm itself (‘value capture’). As stated by 
Zott et al. (2011, p. 1037) business models “seek to explain both value creation 
and value capture.” This is supported by Teece (2010, p. 179) who states that 
the business model “articulates the logic, the data and other evidence that 
support a value proposition of the customer, and a viable structure of revenues 
and costs for the enterprise delivering that value.” Afuah (2014, Ebook, Pos. 
405), in a similar vein, regards the business model as “a framework or recipe for 
making money – for creating and capturing value”. Johnson (2010, p. 7) argues 
the business model “defines the way the company delivers value to a set of 
customers at a profit.” Hence, the total amount of value a firm captures, 
depends on the pricing strategy or revenue model of a firm (Zott and Amit, 
2010). This underlines the idea that business models and revenue models are 
conceptually distinct (although concepts are quite closely and sometimes even 
intertwined, e.g. ‘razor and blade’ or ‘freemium’ business model archetypes 
(Gassmann et al., 2013; Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Some definitions regard the business model concept as a new unit of analysis 
that is aligned with the core business logic of a firm (Frankenberger et al., 2013; 
Magretta, 2002; Osterwalder et al., 2005; Zott et al., 2011). As Frankenberger et 
al. (2013, p. 3) state, “the business model can be defined as a unit of analysis to 
describe how the business of a firm works.” Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005, p. 
17) have supported this by emphasising the business model “[…] allows the 
expression of the business logic of a specific firm.” 
Another common element in business model definitions is the focus on 
interlinked components and elements of business models and their descriptions 
that regard the business model as an overarching concept (Johnson et al., 
2008; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). Thus, Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005, 
p. 17) define the business model as “a conceptual tool that contains a set of 
elements and their relationships […].” Complementing this definition, Johnson et 
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al. (2008, p. 52) state the business model “consists of four interlocking 
elements, that, taken together, create and deliver value. These four elements 
are: customer value proposition, profit formula, key resources, and key 
processes.” Abdelkafi et al. (2013, p. 12) state that “the different forms of value 
and business model components are interlinked”, for example, value creation 
comprises key resources, partnerships, activities and processes, value delivery 
includes customers, channels and relationships, and value capture contains 
cost structures and revenue streams.  
Other definitions stress the notion of the competitive advantage of the business 
model (Afuah and Tucci, 2001; Morris et al., 2005). According to Morris et al. 
(2005, p. 727) business models should “create sustainable competitive 
advantage in defined markets” or as Afuah and Tucci (2001, p. 3) put it should 
“offer its customers better value than competitors.” 
While the notion of ‘value’ stands as a common denominator in many 
definitions, same elements focus exclusively on the firm (Afuah and Tucci, 
2001; Frankenberger et al., 2013) while others include the network-level view 
(Massa and Tucci, 2014; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005; Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Thereby, the majority of definitions restrict themselves to individual firms (Zott et 
al., 2011). Massa and Tucci (2014, p. 423) which have advocated the network-
level view in stating the business model “[…] depicts the rationale of how an 
organisation creates, delivers, and captures value in relationship with a network 
of exchange partners.” These value networks can include suppliers, partners, 
distribution channels, and coalitions that extend the firm’s resources (Massa 
and Tucci, 2014). Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005, p. 17) support this in 
stressing the business model “is a description of […] the architecture of the firm 
and its network of partners […]”.  
Zott and Amit (2010, p. 216) add the activity perspective to this network-level 
view in stating that a firm’s business model is “a system of interdependent 
activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries. The activity 
system enables the firm, in concert with its partners, to create value and also to 
appropriate a share of that value.” According to Schneider and Spieth (2013), 
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this holistic perspective allows managers to take an integrated view on the 
firm’s activities.  
In summary, although most of the definitions differ in their specific focus, they 
can be categorised by their general scope (firm or network level) and 
conceptual focus, activity-based or not. As the business model concept has its 
roots within e-business, a quarter of definitions are related to this interest area 
(Shafer et al., 2005; Timmers, 1998; Zott et al., 2011). In so doing, these 
definitions restricted their general scope to an individual firm (Afuah and Tucci, 
2001; Linder and Cantrell, 2000; Magretta, 2002; Timmers, 1998). In contrast, 
more recent definitions include the whole value network and introduce a 
perspective on the activity system of the firm (Massa and Tucci, 2014; Zott and 
Amit, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). Thereby, these publications also opened the 
business model concept to other industries. 
Taking into account the existing definitions, the business model concept can be 
understood as a firm’s comprehensive “design or architecture of the value 
creation, delivery, and capture mechanisms” (Teece, 2010, p. 172). Its main 
objective is to aid a firm to commercialise its ideas and innovations by enabling 
firms to deliver the value of a product, service or process innovation to their 
customers while capturing the related revenues (Chesbrough, 2010; Schneider 
and Spieth, 2013; Teece, 2010). Based on this understanding, the business 
model concept contains all relevant elements, centred on activities, and 
connected to the value offering provided to the firm’s target customers, the 
firm’s internal and external value creation as well as its underlying resources, 
capabilities and its network of partners, and the revenue generation logic 
applied by the firm. The business model can be seen as a new unit of analysis 
in addition to the product, firm, industry, or network levels (Zott et al., 2011). 
This new unit of analysis sits between the firm and its network of exchange 
partners (Zott et al., 2011). 
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Definitions of business model innovation 
Similar to the business model concept, the new field of research focusing on 
business model innovation cannot build on an establishing common definition 
(Schneider and Spieth, 2013). Although regarded as a vehicle for corporate 
transformations and renewal, as well as a crucial organisational competence for 
firms exposed to high environmental volatility, no precise definition of business 
model innovation has emerged yet (Amit and Zott, 2010; Demil and Lecocq, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2008; Sosna et al., 2010). To date, consulting firms have 
often used the notion of business model innovation for marketing initiatives that 
rarely go beyond simple process changes (DaSilva and Trkman, 2014). Most of 
the publications on business model innovation have adopted a rather static 
view, disregarding that business models may be subject to change and must be 
treated as dynamic concepts (Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Frankenberger et al., 
2013; McGrath, 2010; Morris et al., 2005; Sosna et al., 2010). 
An early definition is provided by Henderson and Clark (1990) who initially 
conceived business model innovation as ‘architectural innovation’ that are 
complex innovations requiring a systemic reconfiguration of existing 
organisational and technological capabilities.  
Massa and Tucci (2014, p. 420) define business model innovation “as the 
activity of designing (i.e. creating, implementing and validating) a new business 
model.” Thereby, the process of business model innovation can be 
differentiated into business model reconfiguration, when an existing business 
model is already in place, and business model new design when it requires new 
development (Massa and Tucci, 2014), for instance with start-up firms. In a 
similar way, Björkdahl and Holmén (2013, p. 214) define business model 
innovation as “the implementation of a business model that is new to the firm.” 
Thereby, the authors regard business model innovation in a newly integrated 
logic of value creation and value capture, which can comprise “a new 
combination of new and old products or services, market position, processes 
and other types of changes” (Björkdahl and Holmén, 2013, p. 215). 
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Markides (2006, p. 20) focuses on business model innovation in established 
firms and defines business model innovation as “the discovery of a 
fundamentally different business model in an existing business.” Amit and Zott 
(2010, p. 2) follow their business model system-level concept of how a firm 
orchestrates its system of activities for value creation in stating that business 
model innovation can be defined as the “process of designing a new, or 
modifying the firm’s extant activity system.” In another study, the authors have 
identified novelties, efficiencies, lock-ins and complementarities as key aspects 
for value-creation and to reinforce a firm’s competitive position during the 
process of business model innovation (Amit and Zott, 2008). While the focus on 
efficiencies is reducing the costs of existing transactions, complementarities 
focus on existing complementary assets to create the aforementioned cost 
efficiencies. Novelties highlight new ways of conducting transactions, and lock-
ins create the high switching costs for customers and makes them dependent 
on a firm’s products and services (Amit and Zott, 2008).  
Recent studies emphasise business model innovation and sustainability issues 
(Bocken et al., 2014; Bohnsack et al., 2014; Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009; 
Shomali and Pinkse, 2016; Sommer, 2012). Johnson and Suskewicz (2009) 
suggest business model innovation represents shifting the focus away from 
developing individual technologies towards creating new systems. This is 
further supported by Sommer (2012) who states business model innovation 
does not only have a firm focus, but involves a wider set of shareholders, 
necessitating a broader value-network perspective for innovating and 
transforming a business model. Bocken et al. (2014, p. 44) explain business 
model innovation in the sustainability field as “innovations that create significant 
positive and/or significant reduced negative impacts for the environment and/or 
society, through changes in the way the organisation and its value-network 
create, deliver and capture value or change their value propositions.” 
In summary, the new research stream of business model innovation is strongly 
connected to the business model concept as almost all definitions of business 
model innovation build on it (Massa and Tucci, 2014; Schneider and Spieth, 
2013). Thereby, business model innovation does not focus on a single 
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innovation of the product, service or process, but on the change of the 
integrated logic of the design or architecture of value creation, delivery, and 
capture mechanisms and their relevant elements and underlying activities and 
resources that are connected to the value offering (Amit and Zott, 2010; 
Björkdahl and Holmén, 2013; Teece, 2010). 
2.3 Grounding theory of the business model concept 
The literature on business models has emerged with scant regard to a 
theoretical foundation (Morris et al., 2005). This has resulted in a lack of well-
defined theoretical grounding, impacting in a similar way on the business model 
concept and business model innovation (Bock et al., 2012; Zott et al., 2011).  
Business models and business model innovations can be regarded as a 
comprehensive concept, representing the features of a research programme, 
but not as yet a theory in its own right (Lambert and Davidson, 2013; Schneider 
and Spieth, 2013; Teece, 2010). According to Schneider and Spieth (2013) 
business model and business model innovation have their roots in three 
theoretical constructs, the resource-based view, the dynamic-capabilities 
perspective, and the strategic entrepreneurship perspective. Shomali and 
Pinkse (2016) have added to this view with their perspective of the theoretical 
construct of transaction cost economics.  
The resource-based view attempts to answer the question of “how to employ 
extant resources and competencies?” (Schneider and Spieth, 2013, p. 19). The 
resource-based view acknowledges a firm’s unique, rare, non-imitable, non-
substitutable resources as a source of competitive advantage (Schneider and 
Spieth, 2013). Aligned to this, Morris et al. (2005) emphasise a business model 
potential to mobilise and coordinate a firm’s resources. As already emphasised 
in the presentation of the business model concept itself, the resource-based 
view also supports the need to consider resource-capability combinations (each 
by itself might not be rare or valuable but in combination within a business 
model might turn into sustainable value for a firm) (Miller, 2003; Newbert, 2008).  
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The dynamic-capabilities perspective deals with “how to develop extant 
resources and operational capabilities?” (Schneider and Spieth, 2013, p. 19). 
As in Newbert (2008), this view emphasises the need for firms to be capable of 
renewing themselves and applying new value creation strategies in a 
background of competitive challenges in potentially disruptive, volatile market 
environment. This fits with Amit and Zott’s (2010) idea of developing novel ways 
for value creation to combine a firm’s resources and capabilities.  
Finally, the strategic entrepreneurship perspective examines the question of 
“how to explore and exploit opportunities?” (Schneider and Spieth, 2013, p. 19). 
According to the same authors, it allows the simultaneous consideration of a 
firm’s internal initial situation, the external opportunity identification, and 
understanding from a firm’s particular perspective (Schneider and Spieth, 
2013). Following Foss and Lyngsie (2011), this particular view pays explicit 
attention to the entrepreneurial action of established firms. As a result, the fit 
with business model innovation comes into play as firms exposed to uncertainty 
are required to respond to changing sources of value creation by the 
reconfiguration of their established business models (Schneider and Spieth, 
2013). 
Furthermore, in transaction cost economics (TCE), value for both customers 
and firms is generated through transactions between resources and capabilities 
(DaSilva and Trkman, 2014) Thereby, TCE identifies transaction efficiency as a 
source of value (DaSilva and Trkman, 2014). In this context, transactions 
should be performed in the most efficient way to leverage value for both parties 
(Shomali and Pinkse, 2016). 
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2.4 Alignment of the business model concept and business 
model innovation with other areas  
2.4.1 Business strategy and the business model concept 
Business models cannot be seen in isolation from strategy (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Magretta, 2002). Within the literature stream dealing 
with business models in the strategy field various research papers have focused 
on the distinction between the business model concept and other strategy 
concepts (Christensen, 2001; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). Although strategy 
and business models are interlinked, the business model concept is not the 
same as corporate or product market strategy (Christensen, 2001; Zott and 
Amit, 2008).  
Business strategy plans for the future success of a business in a dynamic and 
competitive environment (Porter, 2013). In contrast, the business model 
concept can be viewed as its translation into a logical framework of economic 
value creation (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). As Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart (2010, p. 205) point out, business models can be seen as “a reflection of 
a firm’s realised strategy.” Therefore, the business model concept stands 
between strategy formulation and implementation (Zott et al., 2011) and can be 
considered as a mediator between business strategy, and the operational layer 
of the firm (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Sommer, 2012). The latter is 
regarded as the tactical part where for instance managerial choices about 
organisational structures, resources and the implementation of business 
processes are performed (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Sommer, 
2012). In contrast to business strategy, competitive elements (e.g. competitive 
barriers, inimitability, uniqueness) are not included as elements in the business 
model (Umbeck, 2009). Nevertheless, firms are able to compete through their 
business models (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010) and the business 
model represents a potential source of competitive advantage (Markides and 
Charitou, 2004). Furthermore, the focus on the customer value proposition and 
the role of the customer seems to be less pronounced in strategy literature (Zott 
et al., 2011). 
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2.4.2 Innovation and business model innovation 
As discussed, there are two ways the role of the business model fosters 
innovation. Firstly, it connects innovative products and technologies to 
commercialise a realised output in the market, and is a source of innovation in 
and of itself (Massa and Tucci, 2014; Schneider and Spieth, 2013). As Teece 
(2010, p. 186) explains “technological innovation needs to be matched with 
business model innovation if the innovator is to capture value.” So, 
technological innovation by itself does not automatically guarantee business or 
economic success as seen in business failures such as “Xerox’s” personal 
computer or “Diamond’s Rio” Mp3 player.  
Business model innovation can be regarded as a new dimension of innovation 
next to product, process or organisational innovation (Mitchell and Coles, 2003). 
Secondly, business model innovation can also be a source of disruptive 
innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 2004). We can see this in the 
examples of “Southwest Airlines”, “Apple’s iPod/iTunes” and “Dell Computers”. 
These firms have disrupted existing markets through their applied business 
models and not by technological or product innovation itself (Amit and Zott, 
2012; McGrath, 2010). 
2.5 Theory and practice of business model innovation 
Based on Massa and Tucci (2014) I will review the tools, frameworks and 
perspectives of the business model concept and business model innovation 
around their ‘synthesizing meta-framework’ (see Figure 6 in Section 2.2). This 
framework offers us a unique overall view of the different approaches to the 
business model concept, business model innovation and underlying concepts, 
which have recently been published in the Oxford Handbook of Innovation 
Management (Massa and Tucci, 2014). The article starts with business model 
narratives, then goes on to introduce business model archetypes, typologies 
and patterns. It depicts graphical frameworks and meta-models, and finishes 
with the presentation of activity systems (Massa and Tucci, 2014). Although I 
will adopt the framework of Massa and Tucci (2014), I will aim to provide a more 
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detailed overview of the different approaches than previously outlined by these 
authors. 
2.5.1 Business model narratives 
At the highest level of abstraction is a view of the business model as a narrative 
(Magretta, 2002; Massa and Tucci, 2014; Perkmann and Spicer, 2010). Bruner 
(2003) explains how narratives are a genre of text describing a sequence of 
events. Thus, business models as narratives, tell stories of how a firm creates, 
delivers, and captures value (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). Magretta (2002) 
makes use of the business model story-telling approach in giving a verbal 
description of how an enterprise works. Usually narratives have a forward-
looking character and play an important role in engendering expectations 
among different shareholders in the firm about how a business’s future will be 
(Massa and Tucci, 2014; Perkmann and Spicer, 2010).  
According Massa and Tucci (2014, p. 20) “narratives represent an important 
way in which people seek to infuse ambiguous situations with meaning and 
persuade sceptical audiences that their account of reality is believable.” In this 
way, Perkmann and Spicer (2010) have a similar point of view in suggesting 
that business models as narratives are used by promoters of new ventures to 
attract key constituents such as investors, suppliers, and potential customers. 
The authors further explain that for a firm to adapt to a business model as a 
narrative, it would mean constructing a representation of how it might succeed 
in a particular environment (Perkmann and Spicer, 2010). This is supported by 
Massa and Tucci (2014) who emphasise how business model narratives can be 
constructed by managers and entrepreneurs and used for different means. It 
can be used not only to simplify cognition, but also as a communicative device 
that could allow for the achievement of different objectives. One such objective 
could be in persuading external audiences to create a sense of legitimacy 
around the venture. 
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2.5.2 Business model archetypes 
A business model archetype is a special configuration of the business model 
elements, which have been successfully applied in various firms and industries 
(Gassmann et al., 2013). The term, business model archetype, is also 
frequently used as business model typology, type or pattern (Massa and Tucci, 
2014). In this thesis I will use the term business model archetype to represent 
business model pattern, typology or type. According to Gassmann et al. (2013), 
90% of successful business model innovations are recombinations of already 
existing business model archetypes.  
Business model archetypes are often presented with an identifying label (e.g. a 
title that identifies the business model archetype) followed with a short 
description about the core content (Massa and Tucci, 2014). This is supported 
by Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010) who state that business model archetypes 
comprise several functions, including offering descriptions of ‘role models’. A 
well-known example is the ‘Razor and Blade’ business model archetype made 
popular by “Gillette”. This is when inexpensive razors are sold to make or 
encourage customers to buy their comparatively expensive blades (Zott and 
Amit, 2010). This archetype has also been successfully applied in other 
industries where products such as printers/cartridges (e.g. “Hewlett-Packard”), 
coffee machines/coffee capsules (e.g. “Nestlé Nespresso”) or game consoles 
and software games (“Sony PlayStation”) are brought to market relying on a 
similar logic (Massa and Tucci, 2014). Another example is the ‘Freemium’ 
business model archetype, adopted by firms such as “Skype”, “LinkedIn” or 
“Adobe” (“Acrobat”). Here, the basic version of an offering is given away for 
free, in the hope of eventually persuading customers to pay for the premium 
version (Gassmann et al., 2013). 
Although there exists six recent studies on business model archetypes that 
have a general industry focus (Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Gassmann et al., 2013; 
Johnson, 2010; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Weill et al., 2005; Zott et al., 
2011), historically archetypes have been mostly related to e-business firms (Zott 
et al., 2011).  
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Gassmann et al. (2013) offer a comprehensive review of business model 
archetypes as they have analysed 250 business models that have been applied 
in different industries over the last 25 years. This resulted in the identification of 
55 business model archetypes (Gassmann et al., 2013). Similarly, Abdelkafi et 
al. (2013) have identified 49 general business model archetypes for business 
model innovation out of 200 potential business model archetypes. According to 
them, there are three different shortcomings in business model archetype 
research. These shortcomings are that business model archetypes identified by 
different authors are found to be redundant or overlapping, business model 
archetypes underlie different business model understandings, and there exists 
no recognisable logic on how to categorise the business model archetypes in a 
consistent way. This is because the identification of archetypes is frequently 
based on examples and rarely on a systematic approach (Abdelkafi et al., 
2013).  
Studying the six existing papers on business model archetypes with a general 
focus I have grouped 60 business model archetypes together that might be 
relevant to this study (see also an extract of relevant business model 
archetypes in the Appendix III). Thereby, the business model archetypes shown 
differ in their scope between the three different value types, from value creation, 
over value delivery to value capture. In Chapter 4 business model archetypes 
that have been applied with both incumbent power utility and other firms 
influenced by the German Energiewende, will be named and further analysed. 
2.5.3 Graphical frameworks (ontologies)  
Most of the frameworks used in business model research are specific to an 
industry (Lambert and Davidson, 2013). This limits replication possibilities and 
the accomplishment of a commonly accepted approach. Reflecting Sommer 
(2012), the works of Osterwalder (Osterwalder, 2004; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 
2005; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) and Johnson (Johnson et al., 2008; 
Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009; Johnson, 2010) offer an exception to these 
limitations. They provide a general, well-suited, and comprehensive basis to 
conceptualise business models as a unit of analysis for management science. 
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Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005, p. 10) derived in their business model ontology 
four business model pillars and nine different building blocks (see Table 1 
below). 
Pillar 
Business Model 
Building Block 
Description 
Product Value Proposition 
“Gives an overall view of a 
company’s bundle of products and 
services.” 
Customer Interface 
Target Customer 
“Describes the segments of 
customers a company wants to offer 
value to.” 
Distribution 
Channel 
“Describes the various means of the 
company to get in touch with its 
customers.” 
Relationship 
“Explains the kind of links a company 
establishes between itself and its 
different customer segments.” 
Infrastructure Management 
Value Configuration 
“Describes the arrangement of 
activities and resources.” 
Core Competency 
“Outlines the competencies 
necessary to execute the company’s 
business model.” 
Partner Network 
“Portrays the network of cooperative 
agreements with other companies 
necessary to efficiently offer and 
commercialise value.” 
Financial Aspects 
Cost Structure 
“Sums up the monetary 
consequences of the means 
employed in the business model.” 
Revenue Model 
“Describes the way a company 
makes money through a variety of 
revenue flows.” 
 
Table 1: ‘Business model ontology’ of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005)  
The model of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005) was derived by identifying the 
most common building blocks among business models in the literature at the 
time. The ‘product pillar’ relates to the value offering to the customer 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). The ‘customer interface’ pillar describes the 
customer and how the value offering is delivered to the customer (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2005). The ‘infrastructure management’ pillar deals with value 
creation aspects of the business model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). 
Finally, the ‘financial aspects’ pillar, focuses on the value capture aspects in 
explaining how the firm plans to make money with its business model 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). In this way the authors excluded all elements 
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related to competition and to business model implementation (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2005).  
In 2010 Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) revised the framework and named it 
the ‘Business Model Canvas’ for their practitioner-orientated book. They re-
adjusted the elements graphically and deleted core competencies and divided 
‘value configuration’ into ‘key activities’ and ‘key-resources’ (see Figure 7 
below) (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). 
 
Figure 7: ‘Business Model Canvas’ of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) 
 
Johnson et al. (2008) and Johnson (2010) have developed the ‘four box 
business model framework’ (see Figure 8 overpage). The identified business 
model components are similar to those of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), but 
grouped and valuated differently. 
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Figure 8: ‘Four box business model framework’ of Johnson et al. (2008) 
 
Johnson (2010) identifies the Customer Value Proposition (CVP) as by far the 
most important part. In contrast to Osterwalder’s value proposition building 
block, the CVP also contains the target customer and their needs (‘job-to-be-
done’), which Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005) assign to the separate customer 
interface pillar (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). Johnson (2010) does not have 
an equivalent and instead distributes the respective components on different 
dimensions including ‘key resources’. Together, with the closely related ‘key 
processes, the latter is viewed as the means to describe how value is created, 
delivered, and communicated to the customer (Johnson, 2010). The value 
capture is located in the ‘profit formula’ component, which can be compared 
with Osterwalder’s pillar ‘financial aspects’ (Johnson et al., 2008; Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2005; see Figure 9 overpage). 
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Source: Sommer (2012, p. 55) 
Figure 9: Comparison of BM elements of Osterwalder and Johnson 
The differences in the conceptions of business model ontologies by Osterwalder 
and Johnson can be explained by the differing backgrounds and the purpose of 
their works (Johnson, 2010; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). While 
Osterwalder creates his business model framework by drawing on the e-
business model literature, Johnson detaches himself from the e-business 
notion. Johnson intends to explain in his framework and indeed in his general 
work, if and how established firms should change their existing business model 
(Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005; 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). For this thesis in particular, Johnson’s work is 
important because of the perspective on how established firms can transform 
their business models (Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010). On one level 
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these business model frameworks and archetypes represent both a simple and 
practical view of the business model concept. However, at the same time, they 
are somewhat superficial, missing descriptive depth and well-grounded 
theories. (Massa and Tucci, 2014). 
2.5.4 Business model meta-models 
Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart’s (2010) ‘Two-stage competitive process 
framework’ can be seen as a meta-model that goes beyond the business model 
ontology of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005) and the business model framework 
of Johnson et al. (2008). While these frameworks have shortcomings based on 
their descriptive character and their inability to cover all dynamic aspects 
associated with the activities of a particular business model, business model 
meta-models may help to overcome this difficulty (Massa and Tucci, 2014). 
Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart’s (2010) framework explains the linkage 
between strategy, the business model concept, and tactics. They state (2010) 
that strategy corresponds to higher order choices, including the selection and 
design of business models and strategic contingencies through which the firm 
will compete in the market. Hence, the business model concept is the direct 
result of strategy (Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart, 2010). Tactics however, 
map to the operational layer and include the remaining competitive choices 
given by the employed business model of the firm (Casadesus-Massanell and 
Ricart, 2010). Business models can be conceptualised and represented based 
on choices and consequences as two different sets of business model elements 
(Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart, 2010). Therefore, choices concern policies, 
assets, and governance structures (Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart, 2010). 
Policy choices can be characterised as courses of action that the firm adopts for 
all aspects of its operation, for example, “Ryanair’s” decision to use secondary-
airports as a way to reduce costs. Asset choices are decisions about tangible 
resources such as “Ryanair’s” choice to use only “Boeing 737-800” planes and 
governance choices are structures of contractual arrangements, for example, 
“Ryanair’s” choice to lease aircrafts from “Boeing” instead of buying them 
(Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart, 2010).  
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Casadesus-Massanell and Ricart (2010) emphasise that the particular set of 
choices a firm makes about policies, assets, governance, and their associated 
consequences, determine the firm’s business model. 
2.5.5 Business model activity-systems 
The activity-system perspective of business model innovation encourages 
researchers and managers to consider what goes on within the ‘black box’ of 
activities. It also suggests possibilities for gaining a deeper understanding of the 
activities within the business model architecture (Zott and Amit, 2010). Zott and 
Amit (2010) describe the firm’s business model activity-system as a holistic 
system of interdependent activities centred on a focal firm, including those 
activities conducted by the nominated firm, its partners, vendors or customers. 
Moreover, the activity-system enables the firm, in emphasising a system-level 
design in co-operation with its partners, to create and capture value (Zott and 
Amit, 2010).  
Activity system designers need to consider two sets of parameters: design 
elements as the infrastructural logic of a business model architecture (including 
content, structure, and governance elements), and design themes for creating 
greater value (including novelties, lock-ins, complementarities, and efficiencies) 
(Zott and Amit, 2010). The activity-system framework of Zott and Amit (2010) 
provides insights into business models by giving business model innovation a 
language. The development of concepts and tools highlighting business model 
innovations are seen by Zott and Amit (2010) as a key managerial objective.  
2.6 Managing business model innovation 
This section will draw on the existing research into the management of business 
model innovations within firms. Two types of research streams on business 
model innovations exists. One focuses on business model design and the 
entrepreneurial activity of creating, implementing, and validating a business 
model for newly formed ventures, while the other deals with business model 
reconfiguration in established firms (Massa and Tucci, 2014). 
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Within corporate practice business model innovation has been identified as a 
promising approach for firms to respond to changing sources of value creation 
in times of high environmental volatility (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). Following 
Zott et al. (2011), business model innovation can be regarded as a key to the 
good performance of a firm.  
According to Johnson (2010) business model innovation can support 
established firms in exploring new opportunities in three different ways. Firstly, 
by supporting the development of a new value proposition that would address 
an unsatisfied ‘job-to-be-done’ for existing customers. Secondly, by focusing on 
new customer segments that have been overlooked by existing value 
propositions. And thirdly, by entering entirely new industries or a new ‘terrain’. 
While doing one of the three, established firms have to simultaneously re-
deploy and use existing resources and capabilities to develop new business 
models (Schneider and Spieth, 2013). 
According to Massa and Tucci (2014) business model reconfiguration captures 
the phenomenon of how managers reconfigure organisational resources (and 
acquire new ones) to change an existing business model. Corresponding to the 
business model concept and business model innovation in general, the 
literature on business model reconfiguration in established firms is young and 
fragmented (Massa and Tucci, 2014).  
Up until now, only a few scholars have focused on business model innovation 
as a vehicle for corporate transformation and renewal (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Zhu, 2013; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Demil and Lecocq, 2010; 
Giesen et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010; Markides, 2013; 
Sosna et al., 2010). Giesen et al. (2007) present a framework for business 
model innovation in an incumbent firm with three main types. These authors 
categorise model innovation into industry, revenue, or enterprise model 
innovation (Giesen et al., 2007).  
Enterprise model innovation was already considered in the Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) study of the “Xerox’s PARC” organisation. The authors 
studied the role of business model innovation in capturing value from early 
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stage innovative technologies in the different spin-off firms of “Xerox” 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). In so doing, they discovered some of 
“Xerox’s” managers evaluated the value potential of these technology 
innovations through its prevailing dominant business model logics and failed to 
develop successful spin-offs. Others meanwhile, became successful with their 
spin-off and did so through evolving business models that came to differ 
substantially from that of “Xerox” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). The 
authors further argued that managers securely employed by large established 
firms might feel little incentive to search for alternatives outside their successful 
business models (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002).  
Moreover, Johnson et al. (2008) emphasised that established firms have 
difficulties in developing their business models because they do not understand 
their current business model well enough to know if it would help or hinder a 
new business opportunity. Additionally, they do not know how to build a new 
business model when they need it. Hence, in the past decade “only a precious 
few of the major innovations within incumbent firms have been business model 
related” (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 52). According to the authors, business model 
innovation is needed to leverage a new technology, to address a new group of 
customers or to defend the market against a successful competitor or a new 
entrant (Johnson et al., 2008, Johnson, 2010).  
Sosna et al. (2010) reflect a similar view. They found that established firms in 
particular often struggle to innovate their business models, which although still 
profitable, their future potential is likely to be undermined by changes in 
technology or the external environment. In their single-case study of a dual 
business model transformation they emphasise the importance on 
experimenting and trial-and-error-learning approaches for business model 
innovation (Sosna et al., 2010). They further underline how business model 
innovation in established firms is completely different from business model new 
designs in start-ups. They suggest this is because established firms have both 
advantages and disadvantages with the employment of existing resources and 
capabilities (Sosna et al., 2010). 
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Demil and Lecocq (2010) follow a dynamic perspective of the business model in 
arguing that business models are permanently changing in a permanent state of 
‘disequilibrium’. This lack of equilibrium is due to their complex interactions 
between their core components. This means management’s task is to ensure a 
consistent, sustainable performance of the business model in identifying the 
consequences of change in one component towards the others and on the 
overall performance of business models (Demil and Lecocq, 2010). While 
Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2013) have focused on business model 
innovation and its competitive impact, they argue firms should take into account 
the likely competitive effects before revealing a business model innovation. 
Abelkafi et al. (2013) and Bohnsack et al. (2014) focus on business model 
innovation with sustainable technologies in the electric mobility field. While 
Bohnsack et al. (2014) are looking for business model innovation with both new 
entrants and incumbents drawing on path-dependency behaviour, Abelkafi et al. 
(2013) developed a value-based framework focusing on existing business 
model archetypes useful for business model innovation in the electric mobility 
sector. Finally, Zott and Amit (2010) describe three ways how managers can 
further develop their business models, by adding new activities, by linking 
activities in novel ways, and by changing which parties perform an activity. 
2.6.1 Managing dual business model transformation 
So far, little literature exists on the management of multiple business models. 
Indeed, the overall subject lacks a theoretical foundation (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Tarziján, 2012; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Heracleous and Wirtz, 
2010; Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013; Sabatier et al., 2010). 
While practitioner-orientated studies portray successful cases of dual business 
models such as “Singapore Airlines” (Heracleous and Wirtz, 2010) or “LAN 
Airlines” (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarziján, 2012), empirical studies have so 
far only been conducted by Markides and Charitou (Markides and Charitou, 
2004; Markides, 2013). Furthermore, it is important to mention that all studies 
do not focus on dual business model transformations. The studies focus rather 
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on the management of two or more business models in parallel in one market 
(Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013). 
Porter (1996) describes the management of dual business models as a 
challenging task due to different and often incompatible value chain activities 
and underlying asset configurations from the old towards the new business 
model. When firms are running two business models concurrently, Porter (1996) 
states they risk damaging its existing business, confusing their customers, and 
alienating its various stakeholders (including its own managers). This leads to 
an overall inferior performance of the firm.  
A potential solution lies in the spatial organisational separation of different 
business models (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). Thereby, the second business model could be transferred to a separate 
unit and should be allowed to develop its own brand name, value chain 
activities, and organisational context (Bower and Christensen, 1995; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003). This view has recently been criticised with the 
key argument being firms fail to exploit synergies between both business 
models (Markides, 2013). Markides and Charitou argue that these separate 
entities have to be interlinked by several integrating mechanisms (Markides and 
Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013). As these two perspectives demonstrate, there 
is no right or wrong answer to this organisational challenge.  
In following a contingency approach and referring to the ‘organisational 
ambidexterity’ literature, Markides (2013) postulates four strategies for 
managing dual business models - a ‘separation’, ‘integration’, and ‘phased’ or 
‘temporal separation/integration’ strategy (Markides and Charitou, 2004; 
Markides, 2013). Thereby, the strategic direction is determined by making a 
judgement on how serious conflicts will be between the two business models 
and how strategically similar the new market is perceived to be to the existing 
business model (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013). Within this 
context, phased or temporal separation means that a firm starts out by putting a 
new business model in a separate business unit, but reintegrates it in the main 
business over time. Alternatively, it could start with a phased or temporal 
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integration strategy by managing the new business model in the existing 
business but separate it over time (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 
2013). In their empirical study of 108 firms that have adopted a second 
business model Markides and Charitou (2004) have identified several variables 
which can influence the success of a second business model. According to the 
authors, firms that adopt the ‘separation strategy’ will be more successful if they 
give operational and financial autonomy to their business units, but monitor the 
business strategy of the unit. Additionally, if they encourage co-operation 
between the separate business unit and the parent firm through common 
incentive and reward systems, allow units to develop their own cultures and 
budgetary systems, and allow each unit to have its own CEO who is transferred 
from inside the organisation (rather than hired from an external environment) 
(Markides and Charitou, 2004). 
In a similar way, firms that adapt to the integration strategy can be more 
successful if they treat the new business model as a new opportunity to grow 
their business as opposed to seeing it as a threat to the existing one. They will 
also be more successful if they leverage the strengths of the traditional 
business model to find ways for differentiation. Rather than imitating the 
strategies of their competitors, they approach the objective in a proactive, 
strategic manner rather than as a hasty reaction to a problem, and take extreme 
care not to suffocate the new business model with the existing policies of the 
firm (Markides and Charitou, 2004). As Markides (2013) and Markides and 
Charitou (2004) have built their research on the ‘organisational ambidexterity’ 
literature it is perhaps relevant to further examine this stream of research in the 
paragraph below. 
2.6.2 Organisational ambidexterity 
Based on Tushman and O’Reilly (1996), organisational ambidexterity refers to 
“the ability to simultaneously pursue both incremental and discontinuous 
innovation […] from hosting multiple contradictory structures, processes, and 
cultures within the same firm” (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996, p. 24). They state 
that for firms to be ambidextrous they need to simultaneously explore and 
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exploit. They emphasise organisational ambidexterity is needed for long-term 
firm survival (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). This means, the concept can be 
seen as most valuable under conditions of environmental uncertainty (O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2013). For firms to perform simultaneous ambidexterity 
successfully, O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) see the necessity to build separate 
sub-units within the organisation for exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, 
they argue that this “entails not only separate structural units for exploration and 
exploitation but also different competencies, systems, incentives, processes, 
and cultures – each internally aligned” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008, p. 192). 
From this perspective, the key to ambidexterity is the ability of the organisation 
to sense and seize new opportunities through simultaneous exploration and 
exploitation.  
Transferring this to dual business model transformation, the essence of 
organisational ambidexterity is to be found in the ability of the organisation to 
leverage existing assets and capabilities from the old business model to gain 
competitive advantage with new business models. To be successful at 
ambidexterity, managers must be able to orchestrate the allocation of resources 
between the old and new business domains.  
2.6.3 Business model innovation process 
Recent publications on business model innovation identifying a simultaneous 
consideration of process and content framing the business model concept. This 
is where a differentiation of the two is very difficult (Schneider and Spieth, 
2013). So far, most research has only focused on the importance of business 
model innovation itself (Frankenberger et al., 2013). Therefore, a structured 
approach that supports managers to systematically develop innovative business 
models for both established and start-up firms has not yet been developed 
(Bucherer, 2010; Frankenberger et al., 2013).  
The process of business model innovation can be regarded as a continuous 
reaction to changes in the environment (Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Mitchell and 
Coles, 2004), an evolutionary process (Dunford et al., 2010), a reconfiguration 
of existing business model archetypes (Gassmann et al., 2013) and an ongoing 
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learning process through experimenting (McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). 
Until recently, in scholarly literature, rather than analytical approaches, 
discovery-driven and trial-and-error-based processes have been applied 
(McGrath, 2010; Schneider and Spieth, 2013; Sosna et al., 2010).  
Recent publications on business model innovation processes have focused on 
the use of similarities between product and business model innovation 
processes (Bucherer et al., 2012), the use of similarities between innovation 
management and business model innovation processes (Frankenberger et al., 
2013), the application of scenario-techniques (Bucherer, 2010; Gnatzy and 
Moser, 2012; Pateli and Giaglis, 2005;), and the use of leadership and decision-
making tools (Smith et al., 2010). 
Teece (2010, p. 182) provides the following aggregated list of steps, firms 
should follow when innovating their business models: 
1. Segment the market 
2. Create a value proposition for each segment 
3. Design and implement mechanisms to capture value from each segment 
4. Identify and implement ‘isolating mechanisms’ to hinder or block imitation by 
competitors, and disintermediation by customers and suppliers 
Teece’s process steps are rather generic, practitioner-based and not empirically 
tested. 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010, p. 249) propose a five phase framework for the 
process of innovating a BM: 
1. Mobilise: Frame project objectives, test preliminary business ideas, plan, 
assemble team 
2. Understand: Scan environment, study potential customers, interview 
experts, research what has already been tried, collect ideas and opinions 
3. Design: Brainstorm, prototype, test, select 
4. Implement: Communicate and involve, execute 
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5. Manage: Scan environment, continuously assess your business model, 
rejuvenate or rethink your model, align business models throughout the 
enterprise, manage synergies or conflicts between models 
The different methods that are proposed for the different phases are all focused 
on the ‘Business Model Canvas’ ontology (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). In 
addition, narratives, ‘design thinking’ and ‘prototyping’ come into play 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). A theoretical foundation is not given since the 
process is derived from practice (Bucherer, 2010). 
Frankenberger et al. (2013) have developed another process model. Their ‘4I-
framework’ is based on a four-phase model of the business model innovation 
process (Frankenberger et al., 2013, p. 13): 
1. Initiation – analysing the ecosystem 
a. Players – Understanding their needs; monitoring their moves 
b. Change drivers – Identifying relevant drivers; acting upon changes 
2. Ideation – generating new ideas 
a. Overcoming the current business logic 
b. Thinking in business models 
c. Managing idea creation 
3. Integration – building a new business model 
a. Integrating the pieces (building blocks of business model) 
b. Managing partners 
4. Implementation 
a. Overcoming internal resistance 
b. Mastering complexity through trial-and-error 
Although the ‘4I-framework’ so far can be viewed as the most comprehensive 
business model innovation process model, it also displays some weaknesses. 
As regards the execution of the different process steps, the framework seems 
rather generic and descriptive. There is no description of (sub-)methods (e.g. 
PEST-analysis, gap-analysis, scenario-technique) on how to conduct the 
different process steps. Furthermore, there is no differentiation regarding 
business model innovation of established vs. start-up firms. For established 
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firms an analysis of the current business model is missing and the specific 
subject of dual business model innovation is not discussed. To start with, the 
impact of business strategy and objectives are missing. Finally, in the last 
phase, a scaling up phase could be added. Nevertheless, this framework could 
be used as a first starting point for a structured approach to business model 
innovation within this research study. 
Other scholars have put their emphasis on single elements of the different 
phases of the business model innovation process. Several studies have 
focused, for instance, on the ideation phase (Björk, 2012; Eppler et al., 2011). 
Eppler et al. (2011) evaluate various methods for collaborative idea generation 
in a business model innovation context. Björk (2012) postulates the importance 
in business model innovation processes of the individual’s input that has to be 
combined with systematic idea creation and development processes. 
2.6.4 Organisational challenges and barriers to business model 
innovation 
There exist different organisational challenges and barriers to business model 
innovation (Amit and Zott, 2001; Aspara et al., 2013; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). In 
general, within the transformation of business models, organisational inertia is a 
key challenge in response to various sources in defence of the status quo (Doz 
and Kosonen, 2010).  
Chesbrough (2010) has theoretically explored the barriers to business model 
innovation and describes two types of barriers to business model innovation in 
established firms. These are, firstly structural problems with the configuration of 
assets and secondly, resources, and processes (which may also be subject to 
organisational inertia), and cognitive barriers (e.g. the cognitive inability of 
managers to see the opportunity and to understand the value potential of a new 
business model). According to Chesbrough (2010) there are three ways to 
overcome these barriers. One is through change leadership. A second is 
through experimenting, and a third is via effectuation.  
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Likewise, Sosna et al. (2010), see three tools to overcome business model 
innovation barriers - to develop construction maps of business models, to 
transfer the authority for experimentation to innovation managers, and to 
experiment around business model innovation. They further state that 
successful business model innovation is a continuous process that involves an 
initial experiment followed by continuous reassessment and modifications to suit 
changing conditions in the firm’s environment (Sosna et al., 2010). Hayashi 
(2009) and McGrath (2010) support this, stating that barriers can be overcome 
through an experimenting process.  
Doz and Kosonen (2010) stress the notion of ‘strategic agility’ to overcome 
barriers to business model innovation, which is a firm’s capability to pro-actively 
anticipate and quickly react to unpredictable changes in its environment. They 
add to this discussion that firms have to be made more agile, something that 
can be achieved by developing three meta-capabilities. These are crucial for 
achieving ‘strategic agility’: strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource 
flexibility (Doz and Kosonen, 2010). Smith et al. (2010, p. 448) agree with this 
idea, stating effective management of complex business model transformations 
“depends on leadership that can make dynamic decisions, build commitment to 
both overarching visions and agenda specific goals, learn actively at multiple 
levels and engage conflict.” Malhotra (2000) also underlines the need to re-
conceptualise knowledge management to provide a facilitator of business model 
innovation. Santos et al. (2009) stress the importance of behavioural aspects 
through mutual engagement and organisational behaviour. According to the 
authors, business model innovation should also focus on informal organisational 
dynamics. Likewise, Markides (2013) puts forward the view that organisational 
context (a firm’s vision, culture, values, leadership, and incentives) is an 
important determinant of business model success. Also Giesen et al. (2010) 
underline how successful a business model works. Their theory is that business 
model innovation has to be adoptable and it has to be well-aligned both 
internally and externally (Giesen et al., 2010). Additionally, for control purposes, 
a systemic and continuous monitoring using sophisticated analytics is 
necessary (Giesen et al., 2010). 
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2.7 Power utility firms’ business models and business model 
innovation 
The old power utility industry’s business model, based on commodity selling 
volume i.e., the more power consumed, the higher the profit, and produced from 
self-operated centralised generation facilities, may possibly fall apart (Johnson 
and Suskewicz, 2009). Based on this change and triggered by the challenges 
arising from the increase in distributed renewable generation and supporting 
governmental policies within the German power utility industry, both the 
academic and practitioner world has started debating about business model 
renewal (Richter, 2013a and 2013b; Servatius et al., 2012).  
So far, there exists, few empirical studies on the German Energiewende 
towards a distributed electricity generation system and its impact on the power 
utility business model. There is one empirical study about the business model 
for distributed generation from the perspective of device manufacturers and 
related partners (Boehnke and Wüstenhagen, 2007). A further empirical study 
focuses on German power utilities’ business models and the potentially 
disruptive threat of renewable energies to German utility managers (Richter, 
2013a and 2013b). In a conceptional study Shomali and Pinkse (2016) have 
analysed under which conditions incumbent power utility firms will engage in 
business model innovation activities that promote the rollout of smart grid 
technologies. In doing so, they have differentiated between enabling and 
constraining effects on power utilities’ engagement in business model 
innovation and have not focused on a specific geographic region.  
Additionally, other studies focus on distributed generation investor’s preferences 
and energy policy (Loock, 2010), the direct competition of generation costs 
between old centralised and the new distributed generation technologies 
(Christensen et al., 2011), the distributed diffusion of solar PV generation 
(Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012) and organisational change based on a disruptive 
technology environment (Boscherini et al., 2012). The research studies outlined 
are mainly focused on solar PV generation, as researchers argue that the 
56 
 
current way of using solar PV constitutes a major threat to the power utility’s 
business models (Christensen et al., 2011; Richter, 2013b). 
In addition, first practitioner publications are available on the threat of distributed 
renewable generation on the power utility’s business models by strategy 
consultants (Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; Manyika et al., 2013). 
They are only conceptual and concerned with established power utility firms’ 
business model renewal based on a potentially disruptive sustainable 
environment influenced by technological advances in distributed generation 
(Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; Manyika et al., 2013). 
As mentioned earlier, Richter (2013a) has focused on the disruptive threat of 
distributed renewable generation for German utility managers. He makes 
reference to the business model concept in studying incumbent utility 
managers’ views on the effects of both large and small scale renewable 
energies on their established business models. In my opinion, his empirical 
findings that utility managers did not see distributed renewable generation as a 
disruptive threat, nor did they see the market potential (in terms of new 
business models), can be seen as an example of industry myopia (Richter, 
2013a).  
As already identified by Christensen et al. (2011), power utility managers 
regarded distributed solar PV as a competitive generation source with lower 
performance to traditional sources. These same managers did not regard it in 
the strategic context as a gateway into the emergent distributed generation and 
service market (Richter, 2013a). This view follows Christensen’s seminal work, 
where incumbent managers did also not see the potentially threat of disruptive 
technologies (Christensen, 2007; Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  
In contrast, strategy consultants underlined the disruptive threat in their 
conceptual, non-empirical studies (Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; 
Manyika et al., 2013). According to Hannes and Abbott (2013) of “Bain & 
Company”, utilities profit generation from centralised power generation 
worldwide will be reduced by 20% in 2020. In their view, utility executives need 
to understand the value chain of distributed energy and related business 
57 
 
opportunities to develop new business models (Hannes and Abbott, 2013). 
Industry managers need to develop or acquire new capabilities for the 
distributed power world and secure regulatory support (Hannes and Abbott, 
2013). The latter is still necessary since profitability is not guaranteed in many 
cases with new business model activities. Furthermore, incumbent power 
utilities need to move from centralised generation to business models that rely 
on more customer interaction, energy services and information technologies 
(Hannes and Abbott, 2013). The authors present three main opportunities for 
incumbent utilities: helping customers to generate their own energy supply 
(distributed renewable generation contractor models, e.g. rooftop solar PV 
generation), managing end-user demand for energy (e.g. demand-side 
management) and controlling the distribution and consumption of energy within 
a distributed energy network (e.g. flexibility marketing) (Hannes and Abbott, 
2013). According to the authors, in the future, power utilities need to improve 
customer loyalty and gain more customer insight (Hannes and Abbott, 2013). 
Furthermore, they need to identify new business models, e.g. integrated 
contracting around distributed renewable generation sources, and explore 
partnerships and joint ventures around the distributed energies value chain 
(Hannes and Abbott, 2013). 
Klose et al. (2010) of “The Boston Consulting Group (BCG)” underline how a 
new distributed renewable generation world causes severe challenges and 
revenue losses to incumbent power utilities. They state the distributed 
generation scenario is much more disruptive as it transforms many of the power 
utility industries’ common beliefs. According to them, power utilities need to 
develop new business models for additional revenue.  
Basing his work on a review of the business model literature and conducting 
one of the few empirical studies in this domain, Richter (2013a, 2013b) presents 
two future business models for renewable energies: a utility-sided, large-scale 
application of renewable energies and a customer-sided, small-scale application 
of distributed renewable generation. In an empirical study, he further analyses 
these two generic business models, based on a series of in-depth interviews 
with German utility managers (Richter, 2013a). He finds that incumbent power 
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utilities have developed viable business models for large-scale, utility-sided 
renewable energy generation capacity to substitute nuclear and fossil-fuel 
based power plants. Within these models they can apply traditional power utility 
performance measures, their perspective on economies of scale and the main 
elements of their old business model configuration (Richter, 2013a). At the 
same time, these incumbent power utilities lack adequate business models to 
commercialise small-scale, customer-sided distributed renewable generation 
technologies and to cope with this change. A key challenge, is they perceive no 
need for these business models, as they neither see the potential nor regard 
these technologies as a disruptive threat (Richter, 2013a). As stated, it is the 
view of the author, that utility managers' ideas on distributed renewable 
generation mark their severe disruptiveness potential.  
In a similar way to the consultant studies, Richter presents practical 
recommendations for incumbent power utilities, such as the advancement of 
utility firms from commodity providers into energy service providers (Richter, 
2013b). Moreover, the author states, power utilities are bound to their traditional 
way of business and lack the necessary business model innovation capabilities 
as to benefit from the German Energiewende (Richter, 2013a). His main finding, 
that German utility managers could not perceive a business model outside their 
prevailing business model logic, and are reluctant about business model 
innovation for distributed renewable energy generation, will be interesting to 
look at four years after his research has been conducted.  
In a similar outlook to Richter, Shomali and Pinkse (2016) have stated power 
utility firms are locked in the prevailing business model of large-scale 
generation, which has created institutional opposition against a transformation 
towards a decarbonised energy system. Furthermore, they have found that 
power utility firms do not like to disrupt their predominant, old business model, 
as their current success depends on it (Shomali and Pinkse, 2016). 
In addition, the studies of leading strategy consultants lack clarity in key areas. 
They address the disruptive threat of distributed renewable generation sources, 
in particular solar PV, for incumbent utility firms. However, for the practical 
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implications for utility incumbents it remains unclear which future business 
models will have the highest success potential and why solar PV is perceived 
as the most disruptive technology. While the studies of “McKinsey & Company” 
(Manyika et al., 2013) and “BCG” (Klose et al., 2010) do not offer any business 
model options for incumbent utilities, “Bain & Company’s” (Hannes and Abbott, 
2013) study provides first ideas on how incumbent power utilities should handle 
business model change.  
Hannes and Abbot (2013) introduce three opportunities for potential incumbent 
power utility business models: integrated contracting, demand management and 
the steering of distributed energy networks (‘virtual power plants’). In the 
contractor model, for example, power utilities could offer services such as 
planning, installation, operations and maintenance (Hannes and Abbott, 2013). 
In the case of distributed solar PV generation, power utilities could buy, install 
and maintain rooftop solar PV systems. They could lease the supply of 
electricity to their customers (Hannes and Abbott, 2013). For the practical 
implications of these ideas within incumbent power utilities, these, rather 
conceptual ideas, provide a good starting point. As they are not based on 
empirical studies and fail to provide any information on sources it is unclear if 
these concepts represent solely the initial ideas of the consultants who have 
written these articles. It is possible the articles are based on consultancy work 
on distributed energies within the power utility industry. In the context of 
consultancy firms seeking to acquire new customers, I rather suspect these 
firms have published these articles to create debate within the power utility 
industry.  
As the study of the German power utility industry by Richter (2013a) has shown, 
power utility managers see neither a disruptive threat nor potential new 
business models with distributed renewable generation. This dichotomy shows 
that research on the subject is still in its infancy. It has only started to evolve 
and requires further empirical study.  
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2.8 Summary, research gap and research questions 
Few academics (e.g. Richter, 2013a and 2013b; Shomali and Pinkse, 2016) 
and strategy consultants (e.g. Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; 
Manyika et al., 2013) have researched into business model innovation in the 
power utility industry. Germany, with the Energiewende, appears to be the 
worldwide experimental laboratory on renewable energies, energy efficiency, 
electrification and one of the world’s leading markets for renewable energy. Not 
surprisingly, most of the above-mentioned studies on business model 
innovation within this particular industry have focused on the German power 
utility industry (Richter, 2013a and 2013b).  
Richter (2013a) focuses on the necessity of business model innovation in that 
industry and power utility managers’ attitude towards the need to innovate their 
business models in the context of the challenges of the German Energiewende 
(Richter, 2013a). He discovered, that German power utility managers, when it 
comes to the application of renewable business models, are in favour of large-
scale renewable generation. The reason for this is it is fairly similar to the 
dominant logic of their traditional business models in running large-scale 
generation sources (e.g. nuclear or coal-fired power plants) as opposed to 
renewable generation (Richter, 2013a). The author does not point out possible 
ways to organise and conduct business model innovation in that particular 
industry. He also does not focus on the organisational challenges that affect 
incumbent organisations in mature industries, as they react to disruptive 
changes in their environment by seeking new business models. Neither does he 
include thoughts on a system-level perspective and on the changes concerning 
the integrated logic of the design or architecture of value creation, delivery, and 
capture mechanisms. He omits their relevant elements and underlying activities 
and resources connected to the value offering (Richter, 2013a).  
Furthermore, Shomali and Pinkse (2016) have conducted a conceptual study. 
They analysed under which conditions incumbent power utility firms will conduct 
business model innovation activities in the direction of smart grid technologies. 
The study delivers significant insights as regards the enablers and barriers for 
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business model transformation of power utility firms towards a sustainable 
energy system. However, the design of the study has not focused on the 
management of business model innovation activities and a structured approach 
towards business model innovation in these incumbent firms.  
The mentioned consultant studies have no empirical foundation and, in general, 
all follow the hypothesis that distributed renewable generation can be seen as a 
disruptive threat which eventually entails the need for business model 
innovation in the power utility industry (Hannes and Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 
2010; Manyika et al., 2013). They do not offer any thoughts on how to, in reality, 
employ business model innovation in the power utility industry (Hannes and 
Abbott, 2013; Klose et al., 2010; Manyika et al., 2013). 
Taking other industries into account, studies on business model innovation in 
established firms are also rare. These studies have tended to focus on 
prerequisites as opposed to actual organisational implementation and the 
consequences of business model innovation (Massa and Tucci, 2014; 
Schneider and Spieth, 2013, Sosna et al., 2010). In this context, dual business 
model transformation within established firms has only been studied once so far 
by Markides and Charitou (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013).  
In addition, a systematic process, including an integrative framework for 
business model innovation in an established firms’ context, is missing. There is 
no systematic process outlining the necessary steps to perform business model 
innovation in firms that have an existing business model running. The German 
power utility industry still generates billions of euro from its traditional business 
model such as the ‘pay-per-use’ business model archetype. This then begs the 
question, how much path-dependent behaviour and, with the existing business 
as the dominant logic (Bohnsack et al., 2014; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002; Chesbrough, 2010; Richter, 2013a), by locking a firm in its status quo, 
may hinder new business models to evolve?  
Furthermore, it will also be interesting to research how the benefits of having a 
stable source of income from these old business models, that can cross-
subsidise new business models, may affect the innovation of new business 
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models in that industry. As there exist only a few early studies on how to 
conduct business model innovation more systematically (Frankenberger et al., 
2013), it will be beneficial for both academia and business practice to develop a 
framework describing the process stages of business model innovation 
activities. Furthermore, it will be of value to illustrate the factors influencing 
business model innovation in incumbent firms in each phase to support power 
utility managers in innovating their firms’ business models. Here, it should be 
mentioned, that such a structured business model innovation process should 
not only be applicable for incremental business model innovations, but also for 
potentially disruptive business model innovation activities. 
This literature review has provided an overview on the different perspectives on 
the business model construct. The following aspects are important to 
summarise. Although there exists multiple portrayals of the business model in 
the literature, four main interpretations of the business model concept can be 
observed.  
The first insight can be gleaned from the understanding of the business model 
concept as a coherent entity. In this context, the business model can be 
characterised as a coherent framework (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Johnson, 2010) and a consistent and integrated picture of various components 
and levels of analysis (Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson, 2010; Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010).  
The second interpretation of the business model surrounds the logic of the firm 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). The perspectives in 
these publications vary from the logic and the activities of value creation to the 
business model as its own logic of a firm’s development and growth (Afuah and 
Tucci, 2001; Björkdahl, 2009).  
The third interpretation of the business model refers to a hypothesis regarding 
organisational contexts, for example, how customers and competitors, as well 
as revenue and costs will develop in practice (Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Dunford 
et al., 2010). The fourth and ultimate interpretation of the business model 
centres on design, in particular a firm’s design of value creation and delivery to 
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its customers, including the conversion of their payments to profit (Teece, 
2010). The designs further clarify how a firm connects with other players in the 
ecosystem to jointly create value (Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). 
Moreover, two further objectives shape the business model. It links 
technological resources with economic value (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002) and it is used to enact commercial opportunities (Amit and Zott, 2001). 
In addition, the business model literature offers mostly a descriptive account of 
entirely new (and successful) business models brought to life by start-up firms 
(Afuah and Tucci, 2001). These narratives neglect to analyse the exploratory 
process that incumbents, with long established business models, use to infuse 
life into new business models, in parallel to those already established.  
A unique and widely accepted definition in academia about the business model 
concept does not exist. The same holds true for the business model innovation 
definition, as business model innovation is built on the business model concept. 
Therefore, I have developed my own definition of the business model concept 
and business model innovation for this DBA thesis. Taking a practitioner 
perspective, I have taken into account the business model concept is a new unit 
of analysis, centred on activities to create, deliver, and capture value and 
nestled between the firm and its network of exchange partners. In this context, 
the discipline of business model innovation comes into play when there is a 
change in the integrated logic of the design or architecture of value creation, 
delivery, and capture mechanisms and their relevant elements and underlying 
activities and resources (either internal or external) connected to this. 
I have further portrayed how the business model and business model innovation 
have been employed independently in three main areas: technology and 
innovation management, business strategy, and entrepreneurship - largely in 
the e-business domain. Thereby, scholars have put their emphasis on different 
foci depending on their individual research objectives within these areas. These 
have also not been interconnected. Or as Zott et al. (2011), remarked, to date, 
research into the business model concept and business model innovation is 
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separated into three thematic silos with little overarching connections between 
these silos.  
Moreover, I could determine common ground when it comes to the different 
elements or building blocks of business models. Here, well-known business 
model scholars like Osterwalder and Pigneur (2005, 2010) and Johnson (2011) 
still employ different terminology, but essentially consider the same main 
elements or building blocks of business models.  
Concerning business model innovation, the reasoning behind many business 
model innovation studies seems to be based around a rationale or argument on 
the general need for a business model innovation research stream. They do not 
call for the processes or consequences of business model innovation to be 
looked at. As these studies offer reasons for the eligibility of business model 
innovation they are rather conceptual than empirical.  
The business model concept and business model innovation as a new unit of 
analysis have their roots in other fields such as marketing, innovation 
management, organisational behaviour, and business strategy. As business 
model innovation seems to be a broad field, it is important to narrow down the 
core focus of this DBA thesis to the management of business model innovation 
of established firms influenced by German Energiewende. As the German 
Energiewende is largely influencing all German power utility firms with its three 
domains (distributed renewable generation, energy efficiency and electrification) 
and is based on regulatory change, new technologies, and changing customer 
behaviour, it is the ideal research target for studying business model change 
within an established industry. 
Furthermore, as organisational aspects appear important for this research, the 
theoretical construct of organisational ambidexterity can be helpful and should 
be applied within this study.  
On the industry-level, research has been mainly conducted focusing on new 
business model designs with start-ups in the e-business sector, although 
recently, a few publications on business model reconfigurations within 
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established firms in the manufacturing, ICT, media, airline, or retail industries 
have been introduced. As stated, empirical studies on business model 
reconfigurations in the German power utility industry have not been conducted 
(as known to the author). In this context, this thesis aims to primarily investigate 
business model innovation in established power utilities.  
Additionally, this thesis will also look at the business model innovation activities 
of new entrants within the evolving German Energiewende industry. These 
clean-technology (“clean-tech”) start-up firms will be researched to identify key 
findings in business model innovation activities. This knowledge will be 
beneficial for incumbent power utility firms. Accepting that clean-tech start-up 
firms might have first-mover advantages with certain business model innovation 
activities, e.g. aggregator and flexibility marketing business models, incumbents 
may learn from them.  
Moreover, this thesis intends to develop a systematic approach to analyse, 
design and implement new business models in parallel to those existing 
business models up and running within the German power utility industry. 
Based on the motivation for this thesis and the analysis of current research 
gaps, three leading research questions have been identified. The first question 
includes one subquestion. 
1. How do established and start-up firms manage business model 
innovation influenced by the German Energiewende? 
 
This thesis wants to explore how business model innovation is managed and 
organised in incumbent power utility and clean-tech start-up firms from a 
manager’s perspective. Particularly with established power utility firms, it wants 
to analyse how these firms approach dual business model transformation. 
Following the business model framework of Teece (2010), it will explore the 
business model innovation activities within the areas of value creation, value 
delivery and value capture. It will further analyse what incumbents can learn 
from start-up firms. 
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1.1. What factors impact business model innovation in these firms from a 
managers’ perspective? 
In this domain the thesis wants to explore the factors that impact business 
model innovation in these firms and how organisations react to incremental and 
potentially disruptive changes influenced by German Energiewende, from a 
management perspective. In so doing, this analysis follows the framework of 
Teece (2010) looking at value creation, value delivery and value capture.  
2. How can managers overcome challenges to business model 
innovation in these firms? 
As the existing literature has drawn on various challenges firms confront when 
innovating their business models, this work will analyse the specific barriers to 
business model innovation, considering both incumbent power utility and clean-
tech start-up firms. It will further offer recommendations on how to overcome 
these barriers within the particular Energiewende industry and organisational 
context.  
3. How can business model innovation be approached more 
systematically to help incumbent managers perform business model 
innovation in a more structured way? 
Within this thesis a comprehensive and structured framework for business 
model innovation applying potentially disruptive technologies will be developed. 
The model will encompass the different stages of business model innovation. 
Although key learnings from start-up firms will be integrated, the framework will 
be designed for established firms. In doing so a system-level, broader value-
network perspective from the sustainability research stream will be considered. 
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3 Chapter: Methodology 
The following chapter outlines the approach to the study and how it was 
conducted, paying particular attention to the philosophical perspective, research 
design, data collection and analysis. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion on the limitations of the approach and the steps that could be taken 
to address these limitations.  
3.1 Philosophical perspective 
Here I set out my own views on the nature of the world. It is essential these 
beliefs are as clearly explained as possible to ensure my understanding of the 
nature of reality fits with the research design. The research design should then, 
in turn, be congruent with the underlying topic being studied. Furthermore, my 
underlying epistemological commitment is essential to how I investigate my 
research question and how I evaluate the output of my research. 
As a social researcher, a key issue to address is whether I consider a single 
reality exists in the world that can be discovered, or, whether I allow many 
realities based upon individual perceptions (Blaikie, 2007; Creswell, 2013; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Gray, 2009). Following this, is the related question 
of the role of the researcher in the study - do I view myself as a detached 
observer with no impact on the outcome of the study, or as an involved actor 
collaboratively shaping the research findings? Against these starkly contrasting 
ontological and epistemological positions, authors (e.g. Blaikie, 2007; Creswell, 
2013; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Gray, 2009) have mapped assumptions 
about ways of inquiring into the nature of the world. These assumptions are 
broadly termed as positivism, rationalism, realism, interpretivism and 
constructionism. Of these philosophical perspectives, my natural inclination is 
towards post-positivism and an epistemological realist position (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000). This is grounded in my education, scholarly training as a 
business student and managerial behaviour, which is based on having to take 
rational decisions. Following Creswell (2013), post-positivism takes a rather 
scientific approach to research, which views inquiry as a series of logically 
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related steps. Moreover, post-positivism believes in multiple perspectives from 
participants rather than a single reality and espouses rigorous methods of 
qualitative data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013; Johnson and Duberley, 
2000).  
I consider this to be my ontological position because of the approach I am 
taking to my research subject, which provides the ‘window’ for me to make 
ontological positioning explicit. For us to understand human behaviour in 
organisations, we must gain access to those actors’ subjective interpretations of 
reality (‘verstehen’) (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). Thus, for me as the 
researcher, objectivity as a regulatory ideal and theory-neutral observational 
language are pre-suppositions for conducting this research analysis. Also I 
believe there is no completely bias-free inquiry even though I attempted a 
distinction between myself as the researcher conducting the investigation and 
the subject being investigated. In doing so, I have sought to keep my 
predominant knowledge as an industry practitioner out of the data collection and 
have aimed to collect the information in a bias-free way. Furthermore, I have 
written a reflective journal within the data collection and analysis phase of the 
study to prevent researcher bias. 
My research question examines: “How do established and start-up firms 
manage business model innovation influenced by the German Energiewende?” 
This question tacitly assumes there are mechanisms and procedures that can 
be identified to explain this phenomenon. The post-positivist epistemology is 
congruent with this approach as my aim with this research is to generate 
knowledge about the ways in which both incumbent and start-up organisations 
perform business model innovation within the German Energiewende.  
3.2 Research design 
This research is seeking to address the question: “How do established and 
start-up firms manage business model innovation influenced by the German 
Energiewende?” The impact of the German Energiewende on business model 
change is chosen as a focus of this research because Germany is considered 
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one of the world’s leading markets for renewable energies and its 
transformation of the electricity sector towards sustainable technologies is 
currently in process (see also Section 1.2). As the influence of the phenomenon 
of German Energiewende on the performed business models is of great 
importance and as research of business model innovation in the power sector is 
still at an early stage (Richter, 2013a), a qualitative, exploratory research design 
is considered suitable for examining areas about which little is known (Gray, 
2009). 
As a methodology, the case study design was chosen as case study research is 
particularly appropriate for new topic areas and such phenomenon-driven 
research questions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
2009). According to Yin (2009), a case study is defined as an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Case 
studies describe current reality based issues und interpret them from the 
background of the empirical research design (Yin, 2009). Such research can 
develop theory, grounded in rich, empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009), in this case, conducting an explorative study of 
the characteristics of business model innovation, influenced by the German 
Energiewende.  
The German Energiewende is an ongoing transformative process where 
experts do not yet know how the new market design and value chain 
configuration will finally look like and which players will succeed. Based on this, 
it is essential to select a research design that allows views from different 
perspectives. In this case, on one side, the incumbent power utilities’ and on the 
other, the so-called clean-tech start-up firms’ perspective. Thereby, incumbent 
power utility firms, in general, deal with business model reconfigurations, while 
start-up firms are engaged in business model design. For both disciplines 
(business model reconfigurations and business model designs) the functional 
area of business model innovation can be regarded as a subset performed both 
in incumbent and start-up firms (Massa and Tucci, 2014). 
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Conducting research with incumbents and start-up firms promises a novel 
research approach in this domain. It has the potential to produce fruitful results 
on business model innovation influenced by the German Energiewende, which 
are valuable and relevant for researchers, industry practitioners and policy 
makers. This holds true particularly set against the background that a 
successful transition of the power sector into a low-carbon energy system could 
be accelerated from the market-side. This would be the case if consumers have 
freedom of choice which energy-system they want to opt for and if established 
firms face competition from within and outside their inherent industry. Thereby, 
clean-tech start-up firms that are in favour of this and follow the track to build 
new business models for a low-carbon power system, could be seen as 
architects or accelerators of new business model designs.  
The resulting possibility of industry business model disruption could demolish 
industry boundaries. This disruption could eventually change the existing value 
configuration of the incumbent power sector based on centralised, large-scale 
generation towards a small-scale distributed system, based on distributed 
renewable energies, energy efficiency, future grids and customer 
empowerment. While the main driver of the German Energiewende initially was 
based on the regulatory regime through feed-in-tariffs, it could eventually shift 
towards an Energy Transition 2.0 new market design. This new market design 
could become much more market-driven, based on changing business models 
performed around digital, decentralised and decarbonised technologies. In this 
way, the German Energiewende creates a fundamental business model 
challenge for power utilities. 
In the wake of this, the central units of analysis for the data collection and 
analysis section are business model innovations of both incumbent and start-up 
firms. It also includes business model transformations on a corporate level in 
incumbent power utility firms. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out, as this is a DBA thesis, this research 
study is finally interpreting the data from the incumbent’s perspective placing 
large emphasis on the implications for managerial practice. As commented on 
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before, the initial managerial problem focuses on the established power utility 
industry and how business models can be transformed towards a distributed, 
low-carbon energy system. As a consequence, Chapter 6 will focus on the 
incumbent power utility firms and their business model transformation. 
This study is seeking to induct theory from the collected field data, and is 
adopting Eisenhardt’s (1989) strategy for developing theory from case study 
research, in particular: 
“[…] Theory-building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no 
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test. Admittedly, it is 
impossible to achieve this ideal of a clean theoretical slate. Nonetheless, 
attempting to approach this ideal is important because preordained theoretical 
perspectives or propositions may bias and limit the findings. Thus investigators 
should formulate a research problem and possibly specify some potentially 
important variables, with some reference to extant literature. However, they 
should avoid thinking about specific relationships between variables and 
theories as much as possible, especially at the outset of the process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536).” 
As noted in the previous chapter, the literature review identified potential areas 
for examination and in this way focused the research. It did so in helping to 
facilitate data collection and avoid information overload as the study is looking 
for cross-case applicability (Miles et al., 2014). Therefore, the research design 
follows an inductive approach as the literature review provided very few 
theoretical constructs against which empirical data can be compared. Following 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) advice, I tried to avoid thinking about specific impacts of 
theoretical constructs on the research question.  
It is important to note that the research process between data collection and 
analysis was not approached sequentially. It was rather performed as an 
iterative, cyclical process of data collection and theorising, which will be further 
described in the analysis section.  
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3.2.1 Multiple-case study 
This research is concerned with business model transformation influenced by 
the German Energiewende and business model innovation activities within this 
transition, either based on business model reconfigurations with industry 
incumbents and business model new designs with start-up firms. Case studies 
were chosen based on the qualitative, exploratory design of the research and 
the post-positivist position adopted.  
A multiple-case study, made up of two cases – an incumbent power utility 
industry case (“incumbent case”) and a clean-tech industry start-up case study 
(“start-up case”), was chosen as a research method. As these cases are 
contrasting in nature - business model reconfigurations (incumbent) and new 
designs (start-up) - after an in-case analyses, a comparative case analysis will 
be conducted (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). The cases selected 
were limited to German-based firms as this research is solely concerned with 
the German Energiewende.  
Given the qualitative nature of the research and the inductive approach adopted 
as the primary data collection method, semi-structured interviews with top tier 
managers from incumbent and entrepreneurial firms were carried out. 
3.2.1.1 Sample selection: incumbent power utility case study 
The entire power utility industry consists of 1,309 utility firms (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2016). Based on Richter (2013a), four categories of power utility 
firms exist in the German market. These power utilities are identified based on 
size and scope: multinational utilities, the ‘big four’, regional utilities and large 
and small local utilities. These categories concur with the view of most 
practitioners in the industry. As incumbents are defined as the largest firms in a 
certain industry, and as business model innovation is regarded as a rather new 
area for these firms (Danneels, 2004; Richter, 2013a), this study focuses on the 
‘big four’ multinational (MNU) and the regional power utility firms (RPU). These 
power utilities are vertically-integrated and cover large parts of the industry 
value chain. As they all run large-scale generation models they have been 
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adversely affected by the German Energiewende and are under pressure to 
reconfigure their business models. As a result of this pressure they will be the 
firms which initially have to adopt sustainable business models. 
In total, the two groups of MNUs and RPUs include 13 power utility firms. With a 
total revenue of €116 billion in 2015 these firms accounted for approximately 
70% of the German power utility market (Statista, 2016a; Statista, 2016b; VKU, 
2016b). These firms also have a strong influence within the German power 
utility industry, dominating the largest industry business association “BDEW - 
German Association of Energy and Water Industries”. Furthermore, when it 
comes to new market designs or innovations, these firms are usually role 
models for the other large and small local power utilities. As the smaller firms 
have neither the resources nor capabilities for business model innovation, they 
will adapt to the new business model and follow these firms after a period of 
time has gone by. 
As the adopted qualitative research approach does not allow for the derivation 
of statistically relevant information, the selection of firms in the two categories 
was conducted following the approach of Yin (2009). This allowed for the 
coverage of the widest possible spectrum of business model innovation within 
the incumbent power utility industry.  
The power utilities were identified through internet research, consultation of 
industry experts, and personal contacts. For the selected firms, it was important 
they have at least conducted one business model innovation outside their core 
business activity, which could be used as a reference for this research.  
The specific technology areas where business model innovation has been 
conducted will be introduced in the data collection section later in this chapter. 
Table 2 presents the nine firms participated in the incumbent power utility case 
study. 
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Category incumbents 
Revenues in Germany (2015) 
Interviewed power utilities 
Revenue  
(in € bn) 
   1. Multinational utilities 
(> €10 bn) RWE AG 26.3 
 
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG 21.2 
 
E.ON SE 19.4 
 
Vattenfall GmbH 16.4 
   2. Regional utilities 
(€1 bn - €10 bn) EWE AG 7.8 
 
MVV AG 3.4 
 
RheinEnergie AG 2.3 
 
Mainova AG 2 
 
ENGIE Deutschland AG 1.7 
   
Table 2: List of participating incumbent power utilities 
 
3.2.1.2 Sample selection: clean-tech start-up case study 
According to an “Ernst and Young” (2011) study, clean-technology ventures are 
firms that produce a range of innovative products, services or solutions that 
optimise the use of finite and renewable natural resources for long-term 
commercial and environmental sustainability. This is supported by Pernick and 
Wilder (2007) who state that a clean-tech firm delivers any product, service, or 
process that delivers value using limited or zero non-renewable resources 
and/or creates significantly less waste than conventional offerings. 
Clean-tech firms help to protect the environment by facilitating the increased 
use of clean energy and environmentally friendly solutions. Thereby a wide 
variety of technologies fall into this sector, ranging from renewable energies 
(e.g. solar PV and wind) to green transportation (e.g. electric vehicles and their 
charging infrastructure), green buildings (e.g. energy efficiency, distributed 
storage and smart home appliances) and future grids (e.g. smart grids, virtual 
power plants). As stated before (see also Section 1.2), the above-mentioned 
areas are consistent with the three pillars of the German Energiewende 
(Ecosummit, 2016; Transatlantic Climate Bridge, 2015). 
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The majority of clean-tech start-up firms were identified and recruited at the 
“Ecosummit Berlin Conference” in May 2015. As stated on “Ecosummit’s” 
website (http://www.ecosummit.net), “Ecosummit” is one of “Europe’s leading 
smart green innovation and impact conference for start-up firms, investors and 
corporates” with conferences in Amsterdam, Berlin and London.  
Before potential start-up firms were approached personally during the 
conference, all firm ‘elevator pitch presentations’ were attended. Firms were 
evaluated on the following criteria: firstly, major business activity in the German 
market, secondly, early or late stage start-up phase, thirdly, technology field 
applied and fourthly, level of business model innovation. The classification of 
early and late stage start-up was differentiated by revenue figures. Early stage 
start-ups are firms with a revenue per year < €2 million and late stage start-ups 
are firms with an annual revenue > €2 million. 
As previously mentioned, the specific technology areas where the business 
model innovation has been conducted will be introduced in the data collection 
section in this chapter.  
Table 3 depicts the nine participating firms in the clean-tech start-up case study. 
Category Start-up 
Revenues in Germany  
Interviewed clean-tech start-ups Founded 
   1. Early stage start-up 
(< €2 m) GreenPocket GmbH 2009 
 
ubitricity Gesellschaft für verteilte 
Energiesysteme mbH 
2008 
 
  
2. Late stage start-up 
(> €2 m) Greenergetic GmbH 2012 
 
Grundgrün Energie GmbH 2011 
 
Kiwigrid GmbH 2011 
 
LichtBlick ZuhauseKraftwerk GmbH 2009 
 
Sonnen GmbH 2010 
 
tado° GmbH 2011 
 
Thermondo GmbH 2012 
   
Table 3: List of participating clean-tech start-up firms  
 
76 
 
3.3 Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews with top tier managers responsible for business 
model innovation were used to discover detailed information on the initiation, 
ideation, integration and implementation of the new business models. Given the 
qualitative nature of the research and the inductive approach adopted this was 
the primary research method. As Burgess (1991) notes, the interview is “the 
opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up 
new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts 
that are based on personal experience (Burgess, 1991, quoted in Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012, p. 131).” 
Semi-structured interviews are said to offer a very flexible technique suitable for 
small-scale research (Blaikie, 2007). Due to its open-ended nature, semi-
structured interviews provide researchers with an opportunity to probe beyond 
the answers provided by informants, and thus, enter into a conversation with the 
interviewee (Gray, 2009). Furthermore, this technique allows informants to 
answer more on their own terms, and as such, provides a reasonable degree of 
freedom as regards to the information they convey (Blaikie, 2007). This 
approach has an exploratory character; as new issues will evolve during the 
data collection phase that I have not been aware of. In addition, a survey 
element has been integrated into the interview protocol, in which respondents 
were asked to evaluate the changes to the value chain of the incumbent power 
utility industry. 
These above mentioned aspects fit perfectly with the chosen paradigm of post-
positivism.  
3.3.1 Participants of the study 
I have interviewed 24 top tier managers and continued to interview them until no 
new information was forthcoming. Therefore, saturation point had been reached 
and no new viewpoints have emerged from that date. The interviews were split 
into the two cases. On both the incumbent power utility firm and the clean-tech 
start-up firm-side, 12 interviews were carried out.  
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The majority of top tier managers belonged to the management board. Overall 
the study could recruit 10 Chief Executive Officers (CEO), three Chief Marketing 
Officers (CMO), two Chief Innovation Officers (CIO) and nine directors or senior 
vice presidents - either responsible for corporate development or innovation.  
Face-to-face interviews, in a one-to-one setting, were the preferred method for 
collecting information. This intimate setting provides a discrete atmosphere and 
additional non-verbal information that can help shape data interpretation. This 
method was not possible in six instances and telephone interviews were 
arranged: five of the six interviews were not possible because of time 
constraints and because the interviewee was not in the country. All personal 
interviews have been conducted at the managers’ offices in the different firms, 
so that observations within each firms’ head office could be made. Within the 
observations, it was interesting to analyse if and what kind of renewable 
technologies were employed within the firms’ buildings. Furthermore, it was 
interesting to analyse what impression the firm has made towards an innovative 
corporate culture in terms of clothing and employee behaviour. 
The interview schedule for incumbent power utility firms’ managers is 
summarised below in Table 4 and for clean-tech start-ups firms’ managers in 
Table 5. 
Category Function Date Location 
Incumbent       
Multinational A 
CEO 25.06.15 Munich 
Director of Innovation 07.05.15 Essen 
Multinational B 
CEO 21.05.15 Essen 
CEO 29.07.15 Essen 
Multinational C 
CIO 11.09.15 Cologne 
Division Head of Connected Home 26.05.15 Cologne 
Multinational D CEO 06.05.15 Berlin 
Regional A Director of Product Management 20.07.15 Telephone 
Regional B Director Corporate Development 27.05.15 Cologne 
Regional C Director of Innovation 28.05.15 Telephone 
Regional D CMO 06.05.15 Berlin 
Regional E Director of Innovation 11.08.15 Frankfurt 
Table 4: Interview schedule with incumbent power utility firms 
 
 
78 
 
Category Function Date Location 
Start-up       
Early Stage A CEO 28.05.15 Cologne 
Early Stage B CEO 31.08.15 Berlin 
Late Stage A CEO 04.05.15 Düsseldorf 
Late Stage B CMO 03.07.15 Telephone 
Late Stage C 
CIO 07.05.13 Hamburg 
SVP Research & Development 07.05.13 Hamburg 
SVP Innovation 07.05.13 Hamburg 
SVP Corporate Development 07.05.13 Hamburg 
Late Stage D CEO 30.07.15 Telephone 
Late Stage E CEO 07.08.15 Telephone 
Late Stage F CMO 07.08.15 Telephone 
Late Stage G CEO 21.08.15 Berlin 
Table 5: Interview schedule with clean-tech start-up firms 
Respondents have been approached personally at conferences or by 
telephone. After they had signalled their interest in the study, they were sent an 
official letter from the university explaining the research concept and design. 
Approximately three to five days after the letter was sent the potential 
respondents received a follow-up phone call. This recruiting process resulted in 
more than 80% of the addressed top tier managers agreeing to take part in the 
study and with the scheduling of an interview date. 
All interviewees were assured the information would be treated in confidence 
and only used for the purpose of research. They were emailed the subtopics of 
the interview questionnaire ahead of the meeting. All interviewees were happy 
for the discussion to be recorded.  
A frequent challenge with all interviewees was getting them to talk about the 
business model innovation and the underlying initiation, ideation, integration 
and implementation processes in specific detail. Many did not follow a 
consistent business model innovation process and had the tendency to move 
into storytelling mode. As the interview schedule progressed, the interviews 
became more fruitful as I focused the interviewee’s responses by asking for 
more specific examples related to the research question. 
The deployed technologies in the business model innovations of the 
participating firms were consistent with the technologies of the three pillars of 
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the German Energiewende. The technologies applied in the business model 
innovations within incumbent power utility firms were: in six incidents distributed 
renewable generation and storage, in one incident connected home, and in one 
incident, a ‘mobile payment application’ for electric vehicle infrastructure. 
Furthermore, in four incidents, firms did not focus on a specific technology but 
rather were engaged with the business model transformation on the corporate 
level. The applied technologies of the different business model innovations and 
business model transformations of incumbent power utility firms are 
summarised below in Table 6. 
Category Business Model Innovation 
Incumbent   
Multinational A 
Business model transformation on corporate level 
Distributed solar PV generation 
Multinational B 
Distributed CHP generation for large customers 
Distributed generation for residential customers 
Multinational C 
Business model transformation on corporate level 
Connected home 
Multinational D Business model transformation on corporate level 
Regional A Distributed solar PV storage 
Regional B Mobile payment app for electric vehicle charging infrastructure 
Regional C Distributed solar PV generation and solar PV battery storage 
Regional D Business model transformation on corporate level 
Regional E Distributed Power-to-Heat storage model 
Table 6: Applied technologies in BMI of incumbent power utilities 
 
The clean-tech firms employed similar technologies as incumbents in their new 
business model designs. While four start-ups were engaged with distributed 
renewable generation and storage, two start-ups focused on connected home 
technologies, one on electric vehicle charging infrastructure and one was busy 
with demand response and virtual power plants (VPP). The applied 
technologies in clean-tech start-up business models are summarised in Table 7 
overpage. 
 
 
80 
 
Category Business Model Innovation 
Start-up   
Early Stage A Connected home technology and software provider 
Early Stage B Electric vehicle charging infrastructure provider 
Late Stage A E-Business platform for distributed renewable technologies 
Late Stage B Connected home eco-system provider 
Late Stage C Distributed renewable generation 
Late Stage D Distributed solar PV battery storage  
Late Stage E E-Business platform for distributed renewable technologies 
Late Stage F Eco-system for distributed renewable technologies 
Late Stage G Demand response and virtual power plant technology 
Table 7: Applied technologies in BMI of clean-tech start-up firms 
Prior to the conducted interviews, the research design was piloted. The pilot 
study was conducted with “Lichtblick”, a green-electricity pioneering firm in 
Hamburg. This firm developed a new venture for distributed renewable 
generation in 2009. In doing so, the general structure for the interview 
questionnaire was tested with four top tier managers. Afterwards, the general 
structure and specific questions of the interview questionnaire were improved.  
Concerning the differentiation of both cases, “Lichtblick”, was a very suitable 
pilot study. The reason it was suitable for a pilot study was because the parent 
firm had been founded in 1998 and the new corporation was set up in 2009. 
The firm can therefore be regarded as a hybrid. Hence, the firm will be allocated 
to the clean-tech start-up case as it is seen as the clean-tech pioneer in 
Germany. It has no vertically-integrated structure and the subsidiary focus firm, 
on whom the pilot study has focused, was not founded before 2009. 
As noted in Table 8, nine incumbent power utility firms and nine clean-tech 
start-up firms participated in this study. A total of 24 respondents were 
interviewed over a period of 28 months resulting in 32 hours of material. Twelve 
of the respondents were corporate, incumbent power utility interviewees and the 
remaining 12 were start-up interviewees. The gender mix of interviewees was 
22 males and two females. According to a recent “PricewaterhouseCoopers” 
study (2014), this mix is typical for this sector as there are only 10.1% females 
in top tier management positions. The duration of interviews ranged from 53 – 
165 minutes. On average, interviews ran for 80 minutes. 
81 
 
Data collection 
method 
Single respondent 
interviews 
Total no. firms 
participating 
18 
(9 incumbents, 9 start-ups) 
Total no. of 
interviews 
24 Mix of face-to-
face and 
telephone 
interviews 
Face-to-face: 18 
Telephone: 6 
No. incumbent 
interviews 
12 No. start-up 
interviews 
12 
Incumbent 
interviewee 
gender 
10 males /  
2 females 
Start-up 
interviewee 
gender 
12 males /  
0 females 
Data collection 
period 
May 2013 – 
September 2016 
Total material 
collected 
32 hours 
Interview 
duration range 
53 – 165 minutes Average interview 
length 
80 minutes 
Table 8: Interview statistics 
3.3.2 Data collection instruments 
One interview protocol for each case was developed. The incumbent interview 
questionnaire focused on three major issues. Firstly, an analysis of the current 
power utility market, the business models applied in that market and major 
influence factors. Secondly, a business model innovation example regarded 
from both an ex-ante and ex-post perspective. Thirdly, a vision of the expected 
business model transformation and the potentially disruptive forces behind this 
transition. The latter also included a survey element (‘value chain re-
configuration’), in which respondents were asked to quantitatively evaluate the 
changes in EBIT to each element of the power utility value chain by 2020. 
Thereby, for each element of the value chain the initial situation was valued with 
100. Respondents had to judge how this will evolve within the next five years 
and explain their choice in detail. 
The clean-tech start-up interview questionnaire focused on three major themes 
that were quite similar to the incumbent interview protocol. The first theme 
focused on was an analysis of the current market and major influence factors. 
Second, was the business model design and implementation of the new start-up 
firm, and third, an outlook on the expected business model transformation and 
the potentially disruptive forces behind this transition.  
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In addition, the study also tackled the issue of alliances between these firms, if 
a co-operation between start-up and incumbent firms was in place. As pointed 
out in the previous chapter, business models can be seen as activity constructs 
that leave the boundaries of a single firm and orbit around the firm in a network 
of partners. From this background, the alliance aspect provided the study with 
valuable insights into the co-operation between incumbents and start-ups and 
the impact these dyads had on business model innovation. The final interview 
questionnaires used for incumbent power utility and clean-tech start-up firms 
can be seen in Appendix I.  
The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed using “f5”-transcription 
software. The majority of transcripts were made by university students who 
have completed university training on transcribing. I personally transcribed five 
interviews to gain both a sense for the data and to better understand the scope 
of the work for students. All transcripts were sent to the interviewees for 
approval afterwards. 
3.4 Data analysis 
The data was analysed following Strauss and Corbin’s (2015) process of 
description, conceptual ordering and theorising. As a first step, a case history 
was written up for each of the 18 firms. Following this, audio transcripts of all 24 
interviews were entered into “NVivo” computer software and coded openly, by 
interview, resulting in 292 case-data nodes.  
In addition, complementary materials such as “PowerPoint” presentations, firm 
brochures, press releases, media articles and protocols of industry conferences 
were uploaded into the case database in “NVivo” and used to enrich the case 
data within the data analysis section.  
The first-order interview nodes were subject to a two stage analysis process. 
The first stage of the analysis process was to identify key themes in the data. 
The second stage was to evaluate how these themes were presented in each of 
the two cases. 
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3.4.1 Identifying themes 
The 292 first-order case-data nodes were grouped thematically, according to 
whether they related to the general, overarching activities (‘overarching 
process’) of business model innovation and the specific conduct of business 
model innovation focusing on value creation, value delivery and value capture 
(see Table 9 below). A process of clustering was undertaken, based on the 
instances of coding in the 24 interviews, which resulted in a total of 88 second-
order nodes. A further round of clustering led to the emergence of the final 21 
themes. These 21 themes in the four categories were further grouped into sub-
themes.  
No. 1st 
order 
nodes 
No. 
2nd 
order 
nodes 
Final coded themes 
Coded 
generic 
themes 
Coded generic 
sub-themes 
134 34  Motivation for BMI 
 Responsibility for BMI 
 Structured approach 
towards BMI 
 BMI Methods  
 BM transformation 
 Dual BM transformation/ 
organisational ambidexterity 
 Technological 
influences/disruption 
 
 Over-
arching 
process 
 Starting point 
for BMI 
 Organisation of 
BMI 
 Process of BMI 
61 21  Applied technologies 
 Regulation 
 Competition 
 Consumer demands 
 Customer relationship 
 Products/Services 
 Value 
creation 
 Market triggers 
 Customer 
value 
proposition 
 Customer 
interfaces 
74 24  Drivers for BMI 
 Organisational barriers 
 Dominant logic of the firm 
 Organisational inertia 
 Value chain structure 
 Value network/stakeholder 
groups 
 Value 
delivery 
 Key resources 
 Key activities 
 Key partners 
23 9  BM archetypes 
 Revenue generation 
mechanism 
 Value 
capture 
none 
Table 9: Thematic coding and node clustering 
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3.4.2 Cross-case construct development 
Having identified the key themes, the initial coded data set (first order nodes) 
was re-examined to evaluate the presence of these themes in the two cases 
and establish any variations in the way they were presented. To facilitate this 
case data comparison, analytic induction was used to compare constructs 
across both cases (Miles et al., 2014). This use of analytic induction enabled 
the development of generic interpretations that could be applied across cases.  
3.5 Final reflections on the research approach 
The qualitative approach for the study was selected on the basis that little 
previous research has been done on the topic. Relying on information from a 
series of semi-structured interviews produces rich data. This data could 
progress our understanding of business model innovation in incumbent and 
start-up firms influenced by the German Energiewende. 
Nevertheless, such an approach has weaknesses. One is the potential bias of 
the researcher and, the second, is the interpretive accounts of the interviewees. 
Interviews do not replicate reality, but rather, are the respondents’ 
representations of the world (Silverman, 2006). 
Furthermore, interviews are collaboratively produced accounts with the 
interviewer playing an active role (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Conducting 
multiple interviews is a way of trying to find some commonality in the 
representation of reality in each incident, but it cannot alleviate the problem 
completely. 
Similarly, the researcher is inherently biased in the data analysis, and 
unconscious preferences could direct how the information gained through the 
interviews is interpreted. In a single-researcher study such as this one, the 
effects of researcher bias are greater. All steps in the data collection and 
analysis are carried out by the same person, thus enabling bias to be 
embedded in every step. As underlined above, researcher bias has to be 
acknowledged, along with the limitations of the qualitative research method 
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selected. Nevertheless, conscious steps have been taken to mitigate this bias, 
and ensure robustness of the study. In particular: 
Data from the four interviews of the “Lichtblick”-pilot study in 2013 were 
recorded two years later and the coding structure compared to ascertain the 
level of agreement. There was an 85% match between the coded data sets.  
Moreover, initial findings from the data analysis were presented to academic 
colleagues and industry practitioners at trade conferences - thus providing 
some third-party validation of the coding and related analysis. 
Furthermore, the study has selected very large incumbent power utility firms 
(MNU firms with annual revenue > €10 billion and RPU firms with annual 
revenue > €1 billion) as one ‘sample’. Small and large local power utilities were 
not the focus of this study, although, in terms of the number of firms in the 
market, they account for more than 90% of the power utility sector (Statista, 
2016a; Statista, 2016b). As mentioned, in both large and small local firms, there 
has not been much effort to innovate the business model. These firms usually 
follow the bigger firms with a time lag. As the German Energiewende 
progresses, it will be necessary to also research into these smaller segments (in 
terms of firm size and revenues) of the power utility industry. 
I have been mindful of Yin’s (2009) four tests to demonstrate rigour in case 
study research and outline the steps taken in relationship to those criteria. 
Construct validity. This is concerned with establishing the correct operational 
measures for the concept being studied (business model transformation 
influenced by the German Energiewende). Construct validity particularly relates 
to confidence around the data gathering and analysis process. Multiple data 
sources have been accessed for data collection and clear explanations for data 
gathering and analysis have been given in this chapter. Additionally, a case 
database has been maintained using “NVivo” computer software. The results of 
the analysis are supported by detailed case evidence. Furthermore, audio 
interview transcripts were sent to interviewees for review. 
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Internal validity. This applies to both analysis of within-case data and across-
case data. Constructs within the case were validated based on the number of 
times they appeared in the data set, with particular emphasis on the constructs 
being mentioned by two or more interviewees. Data across cases was validated 
using analytic induction to ensure the final recorded construct has cross-case 
applicability. 
External validity. Given that this is a multiple-case study comprising data from 
18 firms, it is suggested the findings are generalisable to other business model 
transformation studies in similar industries. However, a larger scale study aimed 
at replicating the findings might be beneficial. 
Reliability. It is hoped that the use of the interview questionnaire, details of the 
data collection and analysis would assist another researcher to replicate the 
findings of the study. However, once again there is the issue of research bias, 
which would impact such an undertaking. 
3.6 Alternative research methods 
Given the acknowledged limitations of the research approach discussed above, 
at this point it would be beneficial to reflect on the other methods considered to 
address the research question. 
From an overarching perspective, qualitative research, which is iterative and 
enables back and forth between data collection and analysis (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012) fits to my ontological position. Thus, whilst the qualitative research 
design is clearly appropriate for this study, specific methods used, may require 
more justification.  
Quantitative data analysis methods were not considered appropriate as such a 
technique is focused on confirming previously developed hypotheses or 
propositions. Although the literature review identified individual constructs, 
which could support the research, the relationship between those constructs in 
the context of business model transformations, influenced by the German 
Energiewende, was not clear and thus propositions could not be developed. 
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Adopting qualitative analysis techniques enabled data description and 
comparison (Johnson and Harris, 2002), allowing construct patterns to emerge 
from the analysis. This means developing a theory from data, rather than 
looking for the data to confirm a priori theory. 
To enable the research phenomenon to be studied effectively, the main 
alternative to the multiple-case study that was considered was a longitudinal 
single-case study. This longitudinal single-case study would be designed ‘to 
catch reality in flight’ (Pettigrew, 1990), possibly utilising action research, or a 
form of participant observation as a method. This approach was rejected on the 
grounds that the focus of the research question is concerned with both 
incumbent power utility firms and clean-tech entrepreneurial firms influenced by 
German Energiewende. Moreover, as permanent access to a clean-tech start-
up was not given, the conducting of an action research study would not have 
been possible. Thus, a multiple-case study, utilising in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, enabled me to gather primary data and then compare those data 
within and across cases, as well as fitting into my ontological positioning. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter was intended to provide an understanding of how this research 
was approached and undertaken. Table 10 summarises below the key aspects 
of the research process. The following chapter records the findings. 
Research category Research positioning 
Philosophical stance Post-positivist 
Research strategy Inducting theory from case studies 
Research context Business model innovation in incumbent and 
start-up firms influenced by Germany’s 
Energiewende 
Study phenomenon How both incumbent and start-up firms 
(influenced by Energiewende) innovate their 
business models 
Unit of analysis  Identified business model innovations 
(incumbent and start-up firms) or business 
model transformations on a corporate level 
(incumbents only) 
Research method Multiple-case study 
Primary data collection method Semi-structured interviews 
Table 10: Key features of research design 
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4 Chapter: Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings in two case write-ups. Section 4.2 presents 
the case write-up of the incumbent power utility industry. Section 4.3 presents 
the case write-up of the clean-tech start-up firms. Direct quotations from the 
interviews and energy conferences are highlighted in italics. Both case write-
ups are structured in the same manner. 
This thesis is concerned with answering the RQ1: “How do established and 
start-up firms manage business model innovation influenced by German 
Energiewende?” As the term ‘manage’ can be viewed as quite broad, this 
means all of the case studies are about preparing an answer for RQ1. The 
same is true for the subquestion RQ1.1: “What factors impact business model 
innovation in these firms from a manager’s perspective?”. Both case studies, in 
their entirety, are concerned with preparing an answer. 
For this reason, to prepare to answer RQ1 and RQ1.1, I will analyse the 
strategic approaches towards business model innovation, the organisational 
forms of business model innovation activities and the business model 
innovation processes of incumbent power utility and start-up firms in Section 
4.2.1 and Section 4.3.1. Thereby, within the case study of the incumbent power 
utility industry I will also perform an in-case analysis to clearly point out 
differences between MNU and RPU firms in areas where activities have differed 
significantly.  
I will further show the business model innovation management activities around 
value creation, value delivery and value capture in the Sections 4.2.2 - 4.2.4 
and Sections 4.3.2 - 4.3.4 following an adopted business model framework of 
Johnson et al. (2008), Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) and Teece (2010). 
The case data was derived from three key sources: external documents, 
protocols and videos of conferences (see Appendix IV) and semi-structured 
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interviews. All data regarding the interview partners of the two case write-ups 
have been presented in Table 4 and Table 5 in Section 3.3.1. 
As the RQ2: “How can incumbent managers overcome challenges to business 
model innovation?” and RQ3: “How can business model innovation be 
approached more systematically to help incumbent managers to perform 
business model innovation in a more structured way?” build upon the findings of 
the case studies and are important for the contribution to practice, they will be 
answered in Chapter 6. As this thesis was initially concerned with the ability of 
incumbent power utility firms to transform their business models, these two RQs 
have a clear focus on incumbent power utility firms. If applicable, key learnings 
and potential success factors of the clean-tech start-up case study will be 
applied in the contribution section for incumbent power utility firms. As clean-
tech start-ups evolve overtime and might become established firms themselves, 
these contributions might eventually also be relevant for ‘established’ start-ups 
that have matured in the market. 
4.2 Case A: Incumbent power utility industry  
This case study presents the findings of the incumbent power utility industry in 
Germany. In so doing, it focuses on the German operations of large incumbent 
power utility firms, namely the ‘big four’ or MNU firms and the biggest RPU 
firms. As mentioned earlier, these firms have been chosen because they have 
already experienced business model innovation activities. Consequently, small 
and medium-sized municipal utilities have been excluded as only a few firms 
have performed business model innovation activities to date. Firms that are only 
active in the value-adding step of power supply have been also excluded. The 
reason for this is, this study has focused solely on power utility firms that are 
vertically-integrated and perform the entire utility value chain. 
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4.2.1 Overarching process 
In this section, the strategic approaches towards business model innovation, the 
organisational forms of business model innovation activities, and the business 
model innovation processes of incumbent power utility firms will be presented.  
4.2.1.1 Organisational forms for business model innovation activities in 
MNU firms 
According to the case data, this study shows that MNU firms have experienced 
dramatic changes to their business models and have already faced tremendous 
losses of profits influenced by German Energiewende within their core 
business. This is especially true within the large-scale, conventional generation 
(largely from nuclear and coal-fired power plants) value-added level over a 
rather short period of time. As these firms have the highest market share with 
large-scale conventional generation and run the biggest thermal and nuclear 
generation power plants in Germany, they were badly affected by significantly 
declining wholesale electricity prices. These prices have been determined on 
the spot market due to the extensive supply of renewables, which can be 
explained by the merit-order effect (see also Section 1.2). In this context, one 
MNU manager has pointed out the necessity for business model innovation, 
“The change in business models is a very big-bang-esque process for us 
multinational utility firms. We lose 80% of the results in our core business, which 
would, in effect, mean almost one billion EBITDA in 2020 and that is why, 
parallel to all the other efforts to improve efficiency in the core business, we 
need to have a response to new businesses.” 
German EU-commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, Mr Günther 
Oettinger, supports the need for business model change. He emphasises the 
point in more dramatic terms in explaining at the “Handelsblatt Digitisation 
Conference” in 2016 that business model transformation influenced by German 
Energiewende is, “like changing from the new to the old testament.” (Oettinger, 
2016). 
This is the context in which all MNU firms have faced the challenge to 
implement new Energiewende business model innovation in conjunction with 
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the old business model. Hence, these firms have operated very different 
business models in one organisation – business models that were incompatible 
to each other. One MNU manager described how “[...] all these developments 
lead to two worlds being mixed into one.” 
As a consequence, MNU firms have integrated the need for business model 
transformation within their corporate strategies and have made efforts to 
transform their businesses. Hence, they have developed entirely new or re-
organised their firm and organisational structures in Germany. Three out of four 
MNU firms have integrated the need for business model innovations into their 
corporate strategies: Firstly, within these corporate strategies, these firms have 
clearly defined the focused technological areas, in which they will perform 
business model innovation activities (see Table 11 below). One top tier 
manager highlighted the technological focus, "And we decided that it makes 
sense not to target everything, but to focus on some strategic topics: Big data 
and data insights, disruptive digital business models like Uber and Airbnb, 
‘smart’ in and around the house, including the Internet of Things, and urban 
concepts. This means we are looking for business models not just in the areas 
of electricity and infrastructure, but also for mobility, logistics, communications, 
etc." 
 Multinational A Multinational B Multinational C 
Focused BMI 
activities in 
corporate 
strategies 
Energy solutions for 
real estate, SME and 
industry customers 
Digital Life 
Big data and data 
insights 
Smart grid enabler 
and platform 
solutions 
Smart Cities 
Disruptive and digital 
BM (like “Uber” or 
“AirBnB”) 
Hardware for DSO 
and distributed 
storage 
Sustainable mobility 
Smart buildings and 
connected home 
New technologies for 
renewable energies 
Virtual power plants 
Urban concepts in 
the areas of 
electricity, 
infrastructure, 
mobility, logistics, 
and communications 
 Internet of things  
Table 11: Focused BMI activities in corporate strategies of MNU firms  
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These technology portfolios of MNU firms portray the future convergence of 
digital, distributed and green technologies. They also show the Energiewende 
will not only focus on electricity supply but also extend to mobility, OEM 
hardware, and information and communication technologies according to the 
respondent MNU managers. 
These corporate strategies indicate that MNU firms have developed a general 
idea about the disruptive thread of the German Energiewende and therefore 
have started these corporate transformation initiatives. At the same time, MNU 
firms have developed a clear understanding of the necessity to develop new 
business models. 
Therefore, all MNU firms have performed dual business model innovation 
activities. During this process, they have differentiated between incremental 
(exploitation of the old business model), and potentially disruptive business 
model innovation activities (exploration of new business model). 
Incremental innovations such as “Innogy Smart Home” are performed within the 
line business of MNU firms, often in product or innovation management 
departments, and usually under the corporate brand. Potentially disruptive 
business model innovations, as, for example, a peer-to-peer platform for 
distributed renewable generation, have, however, been developed outside the 
firm’s boundaries in separate business units e.g. “EnBW Inno-Campus”, 
strategic co-investments and corporate venture activities (e.g. “E.ON 
Technology & Innovation” and “Innogy Innovation Hub”) and partnerships with 
firms from outside the industry (e.g. “Innogy” and “Sonnen”). 
A special MNU firm transformational activity has been the de-merger. The de-
merger describes a business strategy in which a single business is broken into 
components. The two MNU firms “E.ON” and “RWE”, which are part of the 
German “DAX30 Index”, have conducted such de-mergers. According to the 
interviewees, they have separated their ‘future business’ around renewable 
generation, distribution system operation (DSO) and customer solutions 
business (largely sales in the domestic and SME sector) from the ‘old business’ 
around large-scale conventional generation, large-scale storage, trading and 
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wholesale business (E.ON, 2016; RWE, 2016). “E.ON’s” CEO, Dr Johannes 
Teyssen, explained: “We are convinced that it’s necessary to respond to 
dramatically altered global energy markets, technical innovation, and more 
diverse customer expectations with a bold new beginning. E.ON’s existing 
broad business model can no longer properly address these new challenges. 
Therefore, we want to set up our business significantly different.” (Shomali and 
Pinkse, 2016, p. 3830). While “E.ON” has kept the ‘future business’ with their 
parent firm and corporate brand and has introduced “Uniper” for the ‘old 
business’, “RWE” has founded “Innogy” for their ‘future business’ activities and 
has left ‘old business’ activities with “RWE” (see Figure 10 below). 
 
Figure 10: Organisational forms of BMI in MNU firms 
Two examples to organise potentially disruptive business model innovation will 
be shown in more detail in the following with “EnBW Inno-Campus” and the 
strategic co-investment approach. 
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Within the separate business unit activity of “EnBW Inno-Campus”, the MNU 
firm has developed its own innovation campus. This accelerator project is in a 
separate area outside the corporate firm where teams have the opportunity to 
work on their own start-up ideas for a certain period of time. As with venture 
capitalists in the start-up scene, they receive coaching and mentoring support 
by innovation managers. Beforehand these employees have to pitch their ideas 
in front of a special committee consisting of board members and innovation 
managers. Ideas are selected based on the featured technologies of the 
corporate strategy as the CIO responsible has explained that ideas, “[...] are 
usually digital and a platform solutions’ business. And [...] this responsibility is a 
great filter, that helps me decide, which innovation campus projects do I really 
need, which business models do they pay into and with what start-ups do they 
match.” 
If applicants are selected, they have to pass different steering committee 
‘competitions’ after each phase. The firm currently runs five to seven teams with 
around 35 employees in total working on potentially disruptive business model 
ideas in this new business unit. These business model innovation activities will 
usually mature in the market within a time frame of one to three years. Here, it 
is important to mention, that according to the CIO responsible, the firm has 
rejected its initial plan to re-integrate these business model innovations into the 
corporate organisation. The new concept is to implement the new business 
model innovation into spin-off firms. In these spin-off firms, the MNU firm holds 
equity shares and they will be also open for additional venture capitalists’ 
investments. “E.ON” runs with the “E.ON agile accelerator”, a similar initiative, 
which has also been opened to external investors. 
With the strategic co-investment in new capabilities approach, MNU firms have 
started corporate venture capitalist activities. The firms are able to invest funds 
in the range of €100-150 million for each MNU firm within the next three to five 
years in start-up firms, working in their strategic technological areas of interest. 
These investments do not only focus on Germany, but are spread worldwide.  
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In addition to these investment activities and other transformational activities, 
MNU firms have also tried to realise efficiencies within their old business model. 
With the above-mentioned de-mergers, it has been announced that efficiencies 
will be realised with the ‘old business activities’ within “RWE” and “Uniper” 
(Handelsblatt, 2016b; Handelsblatt, 2016c). Further efficiencies have been 
realised with the second-largest MNU, “EnBW”. The firm announced the 
shutdown of its entire wholesale and industrial sales business, as corporate 
executives no longer saw this business area as being profitable. (Handelsblatt, 
2016d). In addition, the fourth-largest firm, “Vattenfall Germany”, which is 100% 
owned by the Swedish state, has sold large parts of its generation and mining 
business (Handelsblatt, 2016e). It can be seen that the speed of carrying out 
these business model transformation steps is remarkable. Underlining this point 
is one respondent from an MNU firm, “Well, I believe that there was this 
dramatic change, and that the psychological stress was tangible, and that was 
only two or three years ago.” 
4.2.1.2 Organisational forms for business model innovation activities in 
RPU firms 
In contrast to MNU firms, RPU firms have experienced rather subtle changes to 
their business models. The majority of these firms do not own large assets such 
as generation plants and do not run any nuclear-power plants. Nevertheless, 
the potentially disruptive threat of Energiewende could also severely affect 
them. As an ensuing Energiewende moves from the centralised towards a de-
centralised small-scale energy world, it will also impact these vertically-
integrated RPU firms with their large distribution grids in the medium to long-
term. At the time of writing, we can already see these entities dropping slightly 
in profitability every year (see also Section 4.2.4) One respondent from an MNU 
firm, who holds equity shares in municipal power utility firms, commented,  
“When you talk to RPUs, you will hear, that a RPU doesn't need business model 
transformation, because it has a traditional business. In reality RPUs have a 
completely different problem, because the process is insidious and they lose 2-
3% EBIT every year.” 
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Another aspect is that the German Energiewende has largely taken place in 
rural areas and is now expected to enter into urban areas. As one MNU 
respondent remarked, “The next thing we will observe, [...] the Energiewende is 
coming to the cities.” As the majority of regional utilities supply urban areas with 
electricity and natural gas, they still have the Energiewende to come. 
In addition to this, most of the RPU firms have not yet implemented business 
model transformation strategies including a prioritised technological portfolio 
approach in their corporate strategies. This approach is critical with the 
disruptive threads from digital and distributed renewable generation 
technologies looming. RPU firms tend to approach strategic decisions with a 
‘herd mentality’ following a ‘bandwagon effect’. In this case, nobody wants to be 
the first responsible top tier manager to tell the firm’s municipal shareholders 
they will be affected by this disruptive thread from the Energiewende and that 
they could face severe changes to their business model (see also Section 
4.2.4). Therefore, it is worth mentioning, that according to the interviews, all 
respondent top tier managers have developed a view about these disruptive 
threads and clearly see digital and distributed renewable generation as a 
potential disruption to their business models. However, despite holding these 
views privately, they do not publicly communicate this to their stakeholders. 
As far as organisational forms of business model innovation are concerned, all 
RPU firms have internally established departments in their line business (either 
corporate development or innovation management) that deal with incremental 
business model innovation. These firms market these activities under their 
corporate brands. However, they have shown diverse initiatives with their 
activities around business model innovation of potentially disruptive business 
models. Spin-off firms or separate business units have been developed outside 
the firm’s boundaries in separate entities (e.g. “EWE EQOO”), strategic co-
investments and corporate venture activities (e.g. “EWE accelerator”) and 
partnerships with firms from outside the industry (e.g. “Beegy” and “enera”) (see 
Figure 11). Thereby the largest emphasis with RPU firms is focused on 
partnerships.  
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Figure 11: Organisational forms of BMI in RPU firms 
In the following paragraph with the partnering activities of “enera” and “Beegy”, 
two examples to organise potentially disruptive business model innovations will 
be portrayed in more detail. While the fifth largest power utility “EWE” has 
founded the incubator “enera”, “MVV”, also in the Top10 of the biggest power 
utilities in Germany, has started a joint venture, named “Beegy – Better 
Energy”, to perform disruptive business model innovation activities. Both RPU 
firms perform their business model innovation activities around a value-network 
of partners.  
“EWE” has combined a value-network of 75 partnering firms in its “enera” 
incubator. It holds a budget of €200 million and is funded by the German 
government as the biggest German Energiewende model project. It also 
performs venture capitalist activities to invest in start-up firms with an 
investment budget > €100 million. Thereby, it is important to mention, that this 
RPU firm supplies large rural areas in its inherent supply area in Northern 
Germany, which has much on-shore wind generation.  
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The other RPU firm, “MVV”, has founded its joint venture “Beegy” with “Glen 
Dimplex”, an OEM for distributed heating/CHP systems, “Greencom Networks”, 
a software firm for VPPs, and “BayWa r.e. renewable energy”, a renewable 
energies development firm for business model innovation activities around 
distributed renewable generation. 
The remaining two firms, “RheinEnergie” and “Mainova” perform incremental 
and potentially disruptive business model innovation activities within their 
corporate line businesses. It is important to underline that these firms 
themselves do not differentiate between incremental and potentially disruptive 
business model innovations. 
Even though RPU firms have professionally organised their business model 
innovation activities inside and outside their corporate organisation, it is 
important to mention the subjects of business model innovation outputs were 
identified in a rather opportunistic and random way with three out of four firms. 
According to the interviewees, these firms were usually approached by 
externals (e.g. an external consultant, an ICT/technology firm, etc.) and the 
firms have passively reacted to these approaches, which eventually have led to 
business model innovation outputs.  
Therefore, as already mentioned, they did not develop a business model 
transformation strategy with a clear focus or prioritisation on technologies and 
afterwards approach potential partners with whom they could realise these 
business model innovation activities. In this context, RPU firms face the risk to 
disperse themselves in various activities. One respondent acknowledged, “By 
the way a very important issue, that is also very important for us, [...] the firm 
has umpteen ideas, be it smart home, smart metering, electric mobility, but the 
risk is just that all the valuable resources that are there to deal with something 
like this, are dispersed over all the issues.” 
In contrast, one RPU firm has developed a clear innovation portfolio strategy, 
based on an analyses of different scenarios and has implemented a technology 
radar or early warning system for innovation diffusion. As the responsible senior 
innovation manager has stated: “We create future scenarios, we work with 
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models, we have innovation road maps, where is the world of the future 
heading. We have a clear vision of the future and building on these logical plans 
for developing the implementation of specific products.” 
As opposed to MNU firms, RPU firms are not yet active with dual business 
model transformation as they do not have the above mentioned pressure on 
their existing value chain activities. Nevertheless, they also think about first 
concepts on how to exploit the existing business models and apply cost-cutting 
measures. Concerning the latter, efficiencies are hard to achieve due to 
municipal shareholder structures and strong labour unions.  
4.2.1.3 Business model innovation processes with MNU firms 
Three out of four MNU firms follow structured processes for both incremental 
and potentially disruptive business model innovation activities. Although these 
business model innovation processes are named differently in every firm, they 
seem to be adaptions of classical stage gate processes and include start-up 
methodologies in each process stage. Depending on whether the business 
model innovation is developed in, or, outside, the corporate firm, they at least 
perform the stages of ideation, implementation and scaling up in the market. 
One respondent manager explained in detail, “And what we did, so we tried to 
map a process analogous to state of the art start-up methodology [...]. That is, 
you have a design stage for instance, in which the business model canvas plays 
a big part. You try to describe your idea via the business model canvas [...]. 
Piloting proof of concept, where it starts with lean start-up methodology, where 
you essentially have stages, to find out, can this business model even carry 
what you thought up in the market. [...]. Then at some point the market launch, 
where you find out. Can I, with this concept, I mean this is where I know, can I 
create value at the end of this process. I then try holding my ground in the 
market. Yes, can I get by in the market, yes. And that's scaling. This is where I 
create a business case, or business plan.” 
In this way, potentially disruptive business model innovation approaches (see 
also Section 4.2.1.1) have been separated from the core organisation and the 
line business in MNU firms. In the following section I will explain how MNU firms 
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perform their business model innovation activities in each process stage. As 
most MNU firms follow adaptions of classical stage gate processes, the findings 
are presented following the ‘4I-framework’ by Frankenberger et al. (2013). This 
framework is presumed as the most comprehensive business model innovation 
process framework within the literature review (see also Section 2.5.3). 
It is important to point out, all three MNU firms perform iterations in the different 
stages in order to react to changing market or regulatory conditions. One 
respondent noted that “[...] it is very important to keep in mind, we actually all 
have a number of cross-effects feedback loops, adjustments, new ideas that I 
combine, it's not a straightforward process.” 
Initiation stage:  
The initiation for a specific business model innovation activity is usually based 
on the technological portfolio strategies that adhere to the corporate strategy of 
MNU firms. In so doing, methods such as scenario technique or innovation 
radar (as regards the diffusion of innovations) are applied to steer time-to-
market effects.  
Ideation stage: 
During the ideation stage, MNU firms largely apply ‘design thinking’ and 
brainstorming methods. At this stage, all MNU firms endeavour to co-develop 
ideas with customers, universities, and network-partners. One respondent 
manager noted: “Of course, we used methods that focus on the customer, but 
especially in the ideation stage there are a lot of things, that just emphasise 
creativity, release, unblocking, creativity of employees, whereas it is very 
important that you not only try to get employees [...] to think in different 
directions, so they aren't always thinking about the current roadblocks, but in 
reverse, thinking about the opportunities. But, in my opinion, it’s even more 
efficient connecting employees with customers, with industry partners, etc. that 
have an entirely different viewpoint.” 
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Furthermore, it is important to mention that MNU firms often copy each other. If 
one MNU firm implements a new business model concept as a first-mover, then 
the other firms typically follow suit with similar business model ideas after a 
short period of time. This approach is enforced by regulation, as new business 
model concepts within the regulation framework can be limited. Here a manager 
has explained how incumbent utilities “[...] watch out what the others are doing 
very carefully. If a competitor comes up with a new business model, the others 
copy this after a short period of time, as potential new business models used to 
be limited by the regulatory framework.” 
Integration stage: 
During the integration stage, concept development takes place. This is 
augmented largely by the use of the business model canvas. At the time of 
writing, in two out of four MNU firms, internal start-up teams have the 
opportunity to attend an accelerator or start-up boot camp. Afterwards, proof of 
concept has to be achieved, which usually takes place in a pilot (e.g. 
implementation of the concept in a specific geographic area or customer 
segment) based on prototyping (‘rapid prototyping’). This means, lean start-up, 
trial-and-error learning and experimentation are popular methods in this stage. 
Within this stage, lasting up to nine months, the business model is permanently 
checked and evaluated as regards its further realisation with one respondent 
observing:  
"We follow a lean start-up approach. So we talk about one, three, six, nine 
months to get to a minimum viable product, a prototype. In between we always 
check: do we go on or do we kill it?" 
Implementation stage: 
The implementation stage entails the accomplishment of market entry. 
Resembling the above-mentioned pilot, business model innovation activities are 
usually implemented in a specific region or segment with the scaling up being 
realised later. In this phase, the greatest concern for the MNU firms is if the 
market implementation of the new business models will be realised rather in an 
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external firm (e.g. a joint venture or spin-off) or insourced in the corporate firm. 
With regards to this issue, there is a diverse range of opinions from the 
respondents. Top tier managers, in favour of joint ventures or spin-off firms, 
maintain business model innovations will instantly die if they are integrated into 
the corporate firm. This view is explained by one Chief Innovation Officer (CIO): 
“I took this picture of a small tree and said, we have this big oak tree, right, that 
is the [MNU firm] with all its history and my area is developing small trees. And 
if a small tree gets too close to the big oak tree, it doesn't stand a chance. The 
oak tree will skim off water at the roots and overshadow from above, and the 
small tree is ruined right away.” 
Others argue business model innovations have to be integrated into the core 
business as quickly as possible to reach complementarities. However, firms in 
favour of insourcing, face problems within the integration and implementation 
phases. This is highlighted by one respondent manager who explained, “on 
paper-slides we are very strong, but integration and execution are always a big 
challenge: that's where it goes awry.” 
4.2.1.4 Business model innovation processes with RPU firms 
As RPU firms have not set up clear business model transformation strategies 
within their corporate strategies it means a clear and consistent process 
towards business model innovation, particularly in the development of 
potentially disruptive business models, is still missing with all RPU firms. When 
analysing existing approaches regarding incremental and disruptive business 
model innovation activities, different levels of professionalism can be identified. 
One firm did not establish any structured business model innovation activities - 
as one manager explained, “business model innovation was more coincidental 
in the past, but not executed structurally. And that's what is missing now.”  
Another respondent, sceptical if a stage gate process like the ‘4I- framework’ 
already established in modified forms with MNU firms can be implemented 
within RPU firms, has noted: 
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“Yeah, so they [MNU firms] have a classic stage gate, if I understood correctly, 
if that means 4l, I understand, that's a valid approach. Why I take a breather, 
implementing it is a bit of a challenge, because there is no existing approach for 
such disruptive elements at any regional energy supplier at this time.” 
Another firm has established very sophisticated methods for the initiation and 
ideation stages. However, it has not yet realised any business model innovation 
activities into products and services. The reason they have not been able to 
take this step is because the responsibility of the innovation department only 
includes the initiation and ideation stage. Therefore, the execution (integration 
and implementation stages) has been organised around the product 
development department. However, this department is busy with fostering the 
firm’s commodity products and tariffs - areas belonging to the old business 
model. This department does not allocate any resources for business model 
innovation activities. 
Generally, all respondents of RPU firms have agreed that a structured approach 
in regards to business model innovation is important to overcome organisational 
barriers and to receive management’s commitment to the development of new 
business models. One respondent pointed out: 
“Experimenting and trial-and-error works very well in start-up firms. In contrast, 
incumbent power utility firms, should trust in structured processes, because it's 
easier within the organisation to break through resistance, when you carry out 
the process, and make it clear to the management board what you are doing.” 
In a similar way to MNU firms, respondents of RPU firms have underlined that 
iterations are important to achieve within the different stages. This is set against 
a background of, for example, a changing market, or regulatory conditions, if 
they would have implemented such structured business model innovation 
processes. So the management and organisational cultures would have to allow 
changes to the initial business model designs if these changes become 
necessary within these iterations. In addition, previously, business model 
innovation projects have failed after implementation. The reason for this failure 
was the project managers responsible for business model innovation did not 
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change the design of a business model concept even after the board of 
directors had initially set up a business model innovation activity. As one 
manager remarked: 
“Because the issue is, you commit to a business model design or an element at 
the beginning of the processes and then you realise during the execution that 
you should have done things differently. A start-up changes that, an incumbent 
will go through with it, whether it makes sense or not. Because the board 
approved just that, and that's it.” 
Against this background, and based on interviewee responses, iterations and 
additional decision-boards after each stage of such a process are important. If 
the potential to succeed with one business model design decreases within the 
development process, it must be also possible to adjust a business model 
innovation activity to change or even to stop a business model innovation 
activity completely. 
4.2.1.5 Section summary and outlook 
To perform business model innovations in a clear and consistent way, MNU 
firms have integrated the necessity for business model innovation, 
transformational efforts and technological priorities in their corporate strategies. 
Thus, firms also have pre-defined technological core areas of interest that 
should be applied within business model innovation activities.  
However, RPU firms have not yet embedded business model innovation into 
their corporate strategies and pre-defined technological areas of interest. 
As far as business model transformation and the exploitation of existing 
business models are concerned, both managers of MNU and RPU firms regard 
cost cutting as an important measurement to raise efficiencies. Nevertheless, 
both groups view these measures difficult to achieve in the context of strong 
labour unions and state-owned shareholder structures, particularly with RPU 
firms.  
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Business model innovation exists in various organisational forms both with MNU 
and RPU firms. Incremental business model innovation activities are largely 
performed in the line business, while in contrast, potentially disruptive business 
model innovations are not. These are either performed in separate business 
units, with corporate venture capitalist activities strategically co-investing in new 
capabilities, mainly in subsidiaries, or they are performed with partnerships in 
spin-offs. A special organisational transformation strategy with MNU firms is the 
de-merger.  
While two MNU firms have established adapted stage gate processes to 
business model innovation, RPU firms are still in the orientation phase on the 
way to a structured approach to business model innovation. Although these 
firms are in favour of a stage gate process design, they are concerned that such 
a process design overwhelms the internal organisation, which is aligned with 
the prevailing business model. This can only be overcome if RPU firms embody 
business model transformation strategies within their corporate strategies and 
initialise change management activities. 
Stage gate processes in MNU firms are performed around initiation, ideation, 
integration, implementation and scaling up phases. 
As regards the future, if there will be such a thing as an Energiewende winner 
on the incumbent utility-side, each group currently regards themselves as a 
potential winner. On the one hand, RPU firms see themselves best placed. 
They have the size to achieve economies of scale while simultaneously, in 
contrast to MNU, not owning large assets in conventional generation. An RPU 
respondent stated: “Thus the really small ones probably will have a difficult time, 
and the really large ones, that are still very asset-driven with their power 
stations. Those in between [the RPU firms], should there be winners in the 
energy sector, they will be it.” 
On the other hand, as mentioned, MNU respondents are sceptical if RPU firms 
have understood the disruptive threat of the market transformation in the 
context of their rather subtle decline. Those MNU firms see themselves in a 
good position, as their business model transition is already on its way and 
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structures are set-up accordingly. One respondent replied: “Nope, that's so 
obvious. By now, the other big ones [MNU firms] get it too, that until now always 
tried to pressure the politicians, but it's happening now. That's it, no return. 
Point of no return was passed a long time ago. And of course, we [the MNU 
firms] have an easier time than others, strategically speaking, in terms of setting 
goals as we have already developed a lot of structures for business model 
innovation.” 
4.2.2 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value creation‘ 
This section presents the findings within the value creation stage of business 
model innovation activities focusing on the customer value proposition (the 
product or service offering) and the customer interfaces. 
In addition, the relevant market triggers and boundary conditions that the 
interviewed respondents have pointed out will be presented. As regards the 
market triggers, managers of both MNU and RPU firms have expressed similar 
views. Because of this, the findings are not presented separately. 
4.2.2.1 Market triggers 
There are a number of important and influential factors for incumbent power 
utility managers to engage in business model innovation activities. These 
factors are: governmental regulation, new potentially disruptive technologies, 
changing consumer demand and engagement, and a rise in internal and 
external competition with the entry of new players into the newly evolving 
Energiewende market. 
(1.) Regulation or legislative influences 
The main influence within the power utility industry is governmental regulation. 
Governmental regulatory policies not only influence, they control business 
model concepts within the incumbent power utility industry. As one RPU 
respondent commented, "the power utility industry is not an economy or at least 
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not a real market [...]. It's defined by the legislator [...], that defines our business 
model." 
According to those interviewed, the entire phenomenon of German 
Energiewende is a manifestation of governmental policy disruption. This is 
because, so far, the main disruptive threads and the starting points for business 
model transformation were triggered from governmental regulatory policies (e.g. 
‘Electricity market design 2.0’, ‘Renewable Energies Act’, ‘European Energy 
Directive’ and ‘Nuclear power phase-out’). One MNU respondent, when 
discussing the influence of the ‘Renewable Energies Act’ said “[...] the business 
model of energy suppliers unfortunately imploded because of the issue of feed-
in remuneration from renewable energy sources. The reason why one of the 
greatest levers, i.e. the dropping of the wholesale price, opened was based on 
regulation, because the money was just shifted somewhere else, to the area of 
the renewable energy sources.” 
A further MNU respondent expressed support for this view on potential 
governmental policy disruption by the new electricity market design, “there are a 
whole bunch of building blocks that have a massive impact on that which we 
discuss as the electricity market design or electricity market design 2.0. It is 
highly political. I think, and we need to be clear on this, this is not market 
economy, but what is decisive here is political management.” 
As opposed to the usual, market-based business model innovation activities 
(e.g. new business model design of internet start-up firms), in which politics 
have little influence on products or service offerings, firms and their financing 
partners perform business model innovation in a rather independent way. 
Conversely, in those incumbent power utility firms with business model 
innovation influenced by German Energiewende, regulation has a significant 
influence. This influence can be seen as one key driver for incumbent power 
utility’s business model innovation activities. Although, some power utility 
managers also have the tendency to hide behind regulatory policies as they 
offer a welcome excuse for non-decision-making. Moreover, as these 
governmental policies have such a great influence and determine the ‘space’ for 
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business model transformation, some respondents even expressed that a 
systemic, industry-wide business model innovation has to be performed. As one 
MNU respondent stated, “because of the massive governmental policy 
disruptions with our existing business models in the scope of the Energiewende, 
we are dealing with second order business models. That is politics play a very 
active role in the structure of the new energy market design and all incumbent 
power utility firms are affected by it. Consequently, we need to systematically 
realise new business models for the energy system 2.0., that all incumbent 
players in the market need to deal with equally.”  
(2.) Technologies 
A further market trigger for all respondents has been technological influence on 
business models. The technologies mentioned include: digitisation through 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and the Internet of Things 
(IoT), distributed renewable generation and storage technologies (especially 
from solar PV), smart metering and electric vehicles. Interestingly, although 
respondent firms are vertically-integrated, respondents did not explicitly mention 
smart grids in this context. 
Respondents differentiated between technologies, that, in their eyes, will 
incrementally change business models and those so called ‘game-changing’ 
technologies, which are highly disruptive to their existing business models. 
Interestingly, RPU respondents regard digitisation as a technology that will 
incrementally change their business model. However, the MNU top tier 
managers interviewed, see a highly disruptive thread behind this technology 
and expect new digitised business models to develop around ICT and IoT 
technologies. They particularly perceive the digitalisation and distributed battery 
storage as enablers and accelerators for new offerings around distributed 
renewable generation sources with an increasing autonomy of ‘prosumers’ that 
produce their own power. As one MNU manager explained when talking about 
these key drivers:  
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“Well, we're losing sales, well from electricity contracts, well if everyone is 
installing solar panels on their roof and supplying themselves with 60-70%. 
Another disruptive element in the next years will obviously be battery storage 
[...]. Of course that is driving our business model dramatically. And if [...] the 
dynamics of digitalisation, that is also driven by such issues, it can all happen 
really quickly, depending on the speed of the innovative advancements in 
battery storage, for instance. The progress of development of the battery 
storage will be an enormously accelerating factor for the change in business 
model. And that is highly disruptive.” 
All respondents view distributed renewable generation, especially from solar 
PV, as a disruptive threat. In 2015, Germany accounted for 23% (40 GW) of the 
cumulative solar PV capacity installed worldwide (177 GW) with about 1.5 
million solar PV systems installed in Germany. While solar PV accounted for 6% 
of Germany’s electricity demand, renewable sources in total delivered about 
32% of the total net power consumption in 2015 (BMWi, 2016b; Fraunhofer ISE, 
2016; REN21, 2015). These figures, while supported by one MNU respondent 
is, at the same time, critically questioned from a business model perspective. In 
the past the solar PV has not been in their business model focus. The 
respondent went on to say that although, “the market is gigantic, there is a 
gigantic value bubble and why are we not even involved in the slightest and are 
just watching the commodity turnover decline even further?” 
In this way, the combination of distributed solar PV generation with solar battery 
storage is expected to be a game changer for market-orientated renewable 
models, as opposed to governmental policy enacted feed-in tariff models. One 
respondent noted: “Our assessment is, the battery storage will come and the 
world of energy will change again massively.” 
As a consequence, the necessity of a business model transformation from a 
large to small-scale generation regime becomes urgent. One MNU respondent 
dramatically commented: 
"It just has to be conveyed that these changes [...] are vital." 
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As one frustrated sounding RPU respondent remarked, incumbent utility firms 
have blurred the integration of distributed renewable energies so far, such as 
solar PV, into their business model, because they have “[...] snoozed on the 
Photovoltaics, not just [RPU firm], but the entire energy sector and afterwards 
we're all crying that people have this thing on their roofs and we can't even 
properly predict energy use.” 
Interestingly, although this respondent has clearly analysed this, his firm does 
not work on any distributed solar PV generation business model yet. Hence, it 
can be said that is also symptomatic for a large number of RPU firms. 
Furthermore, for continuing business model transformations around digitisation, 
these firms run the risk that the same will happen with digital business models - 
they only envision incremental changes to their business model based on these 
technologies.  
Moreover, all respondents expect the entire energy industry to become 
‘electrified’ by the German Energiewende. So, in the long-term they anticipate 
heating to be realised with electricity and not natural gas- or oil-fired sources 
anymore. 
(3.) Changing consumer demand and consumer engagement 
Changing consumer demands and an increase in consumer engagement are 
further influential factors within German Energiewende. Therefore, in recent 
years, incumbent power utilities have experienced a paradigm shift in the 
market as regards consumer behaviour towards renewable energies. In the 
past, consumer investment into renewable generation, both on a small and a 
large scale, was triggered by high subsidies with feed-in-tariffs and consumers 
fed-in all their produced electricity into the grid. However, consumers who make 
investment decisions today, plan with distributed renewable generation 
technologies to produce their own power and thus become a ‘prosumer’, a 
producer and a consumer of distributed renewable energy all at the same time. 
One respondent stated “in future scenarios we agree, there will be a ‘prosumer’, 
there will be an active role of customers in all value creation stages.” 
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In addition, the same will happen with producers who have started under the 
regulatory feed-in regime as the first distributed renewable power plants run out 
of the 20-year fixed period for feed-in-tariffs in 2020.  
The biggest distributed renewable generation technologies in Germany are 
solar PV and wind (mainly large-scale from on- and off-shore plants). 
Interestingly, the main asset owners of these facilities are not power utilities, but 
private customers and institutional investors with a market share of more than 
80% in 2012 (Trendresearch, 2013). As described by one respondent, “the 
relevant technologies are solar PV and wind. Just as issues of generation, that 
eat all the cake in the front but actually keep pushing it back. But we often times 
aren't the asset owner [of renewable generation assets] anymore, the asset 
owner is the customer, the enterprises, the farmer's association.”  
Moreover, German consumers have increasingly become more environmentally 
conscious and are developing an interest in innovative technologies. These 
consumers like the idea of becoming their own power producer. A respondent 
commented, “most consumers don't strongly focus on the return of investment 
and the profitability, but just enjoy the idea of self-sufficiency, they are tech 
savvy, they want to be pioneers, they want to shape the Energiewende.” 
Another, more dangerous development and disruptive threat to the old power 
utility business model, is the steady price decline of distributed solar PV 
generation technologies. In Germany, prices for a typical 10 to 100 kW solar PV 
rooftop-system, were up to 14,000 €/kW in 1990. At the end of 2015, such 
systems cost in the region of 1,270 €/kW (Fraunhofer ISE, 2016). This is a net-
price regression of almost 90 % over a period of 25 years and is equivalent to 
an annual compound average price reduction of 9%. At the same time, future 
prices up until 2025 are again expected to drop significantly. As one RPU 
respondent stated, “experts are talking 3 to 4 cent/kWh electricity generation 
costs in solar PV systems. Then everyone not installing a solar PV system on 
their roof would be daft [...]. So the thing is, and this is what I initially said, it is 
the starting point of a technology driven spiral [...] and then it shows good taste 
to install solar PV systems instead of roof tiles.” 
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Currently LCOE for a solar PV power plant are in the range of 10 to 12 
cent/kWh. This means, within the next nine years these prices will drop by 
approximately 75%. 
According to the interviewees, incumbent power utilities have to react to these 
new consumer demands and consumer engagement. They have to re-balance 
their business models into the service area and have to change their prevailing 
business model logic from a focus on selling as much electricity as possible to 
customers towards a partnering approach - meaning they become service 
providers. In this partnership with ‘prosumers’, the incumbent power utilities 
could offer their customers solar PV systems and an energy flat rate for the 
supply of missing electricity. The firms could also offer energy efficiency 
services (e.g. with lightning). One respondent comments “[…] it's a new value 
creation section we haven't yet had in this shape or form. Or maybe it wasn't 
there before, because you supplied the customers and were interested in the 
customer taking on as much as possible. Today we are partners to the 
customers and it's our goal to have customers use as little as possible or as 
efficiently as possible.” Further details on potential products and services will be 
provided in the customer value proposition and offering section in this chapter. 
(4.) Increasing in- and outside competition 
Within the area of the old business model (‘commodity sales’), incumbent power 
utility firms face increasing competition from four major trends: Firstly, ‘regional 
expansion of sales area’ as many municipal power utilities have expanded their 
inherent sales area to become nationwide suppliers. Secondly, there is 
competition due to international market expansion, as power utilities from 
countries outside Germany, have entered the German market, for example, the 
Danish “Dong”, the French “ENGIE”, and “Enovos” from Luxembourg. Thirdly, 
‘re-communalisation’ - as municipalities, which have formerly sold their 
municipal power utility, find their own municipal power utility once again and 
attempt to buy back the distribution grid from the successor as happened with 
“Hamburg Energie” and “Berlin Energie”. Fourthly, competition comes in the 
form of ‘industry expansion’ as firms from other industries, largely the petroleum 
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industry, have entered the market (e.g. “ista”, “Shell” and “Total”). Lastly, 
competition is arising from new independent players that have been established 
as energy suppliers after the liberalisation of the German power market, 
examples being “LichtBlick” or “Naturstrom”. 
Currently, in the German market, there are 1,190 power utility firms active within 
value-added step sales. As a result, the market is fragmented with the ‘big four’ 
power utilities only holding a consolidated market share of 36% (Eurostat, 
2016). In comparison, the UK-market is relatively consolidated with the six 
leading power utilities having a market share of 87.2% (Eurostat, 2016). 
Understandably, in this environment, the pressure on prices is very high and 
once again, digitisation could easily disrupt this business model. One 
interviewee responded to this, stating: 
“Then I would state, of course great drivers are, let's say, they're many 
competitors that push into the market, even sector rivals that emerge. I would 
especially see more and more in the sector of commodity, it's all about kilowatt 
hour times price and inevitably that will be done by a machine, it won't need an 
energy supplier anymore.” 
Currently a new industry is developing around the German Energiewende, with 
new business models evolving and many players from different industries 
entering the market. This includes the automotive industry (e.g. “Bosch”, 
“Daimler”, “BMW” with a joint-venture initiative “Digital Energy Solutions” and 
“Tesla” with “Powerwall”), ICT firms (e.g. “Deutsche Telekom” with “Qivicon” 
and “Google” with “Nest”) and distributed solar PV storage and heating-systems 
manufacturers (e.g. “Sonnenbatterie” with a ‘peer-to-peer’ community named 
“Sonnen”, “Vaillant” and “Viessmann”). In addition, power utility industry 
respondents also see the property business as being a potential outside 
competitor looking to enter the market. In this area, either insourcing (e.g. 
“Vonovia” with energy service solutions) or joint venture activities (e.g. “LEG” 
and “RWE” with “EnergieServicePlus”) have been implemented. Last but not 
least, local technicians who install solar PV systems in regional markets are 
also competing with large firms for new customers. 
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Furthermore, many clean-tech start-up firms have developed business models 
in the area of energy efficiency (e.g. “Leko homes” and “tado”), distributed 
renewable generation (e.g. “Greenergetic” and “Sonnen”), flexibility 
marketing/aggregator (e.g. “EnerNoc” and “Next Kraftwerke”) and electric 
vehicles (e.g. “eMio” and “ubitricity”). 
As all of the above-mentioned players come from different industries, neither 
the terms power utility nor clean-tech industry satisfy the complexity and 
convergence of the industry spectrum. In this context, the term ‘Energiewende 
industry’ will be introduced for future considerations around the newly evolving 
industry. 
4.2.2.2 Business model innovation activities 
This section details the applied technologies in the featured business model 
innovation activities of the interviewed respondents. In addition, following the 
sources of value creation framework by Amit and Zott (2001) and Zott and Amit 
(2013), ‘novelties’, ‘complementarities, ‘efficiencies’ and ‘lock-in’ effects are 
presented as sub-categories within the featured business model innovation 
activities. 
Applied technologies in selected business model innovation activities 
As most of the top tier managers interviewed have already performed business 
model innovation activities based on different technologies in their firms, they 
were, in general, free to choose from a set of five to six incremental and 
potentially disruptive business model innovation activities. Incremental business 
model innovation activities are referred to as business model innovations that 
are new to the firm, but (according to the viewpoint of incumbent managers) do 
not have a disruptive character as regards the old, commodity selling business 
model. In comparison, potentially disruptive business model innovations are 
regarded as activities that endanger the old, existing business model.  
As the incumbent firms apply different technologies in their business model 
innovation activities, it was interesting to examine which technologies the 
interview partners had chosen. As introduced earlier, distributed generation 
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(largely applying renewable sources) and distributed storage were the 
predominant technologies in the chosen business model innovation activities 
with five out of nine participating firms focusing on these technologies. This was 
followed by a connected home and an electric vehicle charging infrastructure 
business model innovation activity, each performed by one respondent firm. 
Interestingly, although all participating power utility firms were vertically- 
integrated, none of the respondents chose a smart grid or smart metering 
example from the distribution grid value-adding step.  
The main difference in the focused business model innovation activities within 
the interviews was their implementation status. All MNU firms have 
implemented their business model innovation activities with products or services 
into a mass market. However, only one RPU firm has implemented its business 
model innovation activity in the market, while two out of five RPU firms are still 
in the pilot stage. One firm only holds an equity share in an outsourced joint-
venture. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, distributed renewable generation, 
paired with distributed storage activities, have the highest disruption potential.  
Interestingly, respondents have chosen relatively disruptive business model 
innovation activities rather than incremental ones. The interviews highlighted 
that three out of four RPU firms have applied technologies that focused on 
distributed storage technologies.  
Although RPU firms do not have corporate strategies for business model 
transformation in place, they are focusing on the technologies with the highest 
disruption potential (see Table 12 overpage). 
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Firm BMI Activity Status 
Multinational A Distributed solar generation Implemented 
Multinational B 
Distributed generation for 
small and large customers 
Implemented 
Multinational C Connected home Implemented 
Regional A Distributed solar PV storage Implemented 
Regional B 
Mobile payment app for 
electric vehicle infrastructure 
Joint-Venture  
(only equity) 
Regional C 
Distributed solar generation 
and storage 
Piloted 
Regional D 
Distributed generation 
Power-to-Heat (storage) 
Piloted 
 
Table 12: Applied technologies in BMI activities and implementation status 
 
Novelties 
The application of a specific technology in a business model innovation activity 
does not automatically make a new business model. Therefore, the ‘novelties’, 
or the new logic behind the implemented business models was examined. The 
fundamental difference as regards the old utility-based business model, where 
power utility firms have sold electricity as a commodity to their customers, 
comes from the fact that power utility firms have started to become retailers 
around these distributed renewable generation and energy efficiency 
technologies.  
In these retail models, three out of four MNU, and one out of five RPU firms, 
have created both a new customer value proposition (CVP) and new customer 
interfaces. Here it is important to mention, these firms continue to run their 
existing utility business model in parallel. Against this background, the firms had 
to establish a new CVP and customer interfaces for the new retail business 
model while running, in parallel, a second CVP and customer interfaces based 
on the old business model (see Table 13 overpage). 
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Utility BM for selling 
electricity as a commodity 
Retail BM for distributed 
renewable generation (example) 
CVP 
Affordable and reliable electricity 
supply and easy billing;  
Additional factors with RPU: 
proximity; with MNU: strong 
brand 
Customised and convenient 
shopping; service, guarantee and 
reliability over strong brand, energy 
consulting services and after-sales  
Job-to-be-done 
Lighted and heated home or 
building; steady usage of 
different home or office 
appliances 
Technological set-up for generation 
of own power (partly independence 
of electricity supplier) 
Target 
customer 
B2C: Private households 
B2B: SME, property industry   
         and industrial customers 
Largely B2C: Private house owners 
B2B: SME and property industry 
firms 
Customer 
relationship 
Contract relationship over a 
period of 1 – 24 months 
B2C: No personal  
         relationship 
B2B: Personal relationship  
         over sales rep. 
Initial sale 
B2C: Personal relationship via 
energy consultant or technician 
B2B: Personal relationship  
         over sales rep. or technician 
Distribution 
channels 
Direct marketing (mailings, 
outbound, door-to-door), firm 
website, affiliate partners, sales 
representatives (with B2B 
customers) 
Direct marketing (mailings, 
outbound, door-to-door), firm 
website, affiliate partners, sales 
representatives (with B2B 
customers) 
Table 13 Comparison of utility and retail business models 
In comparing both incumbent power utility groups, MNU firms have the 
advantage of nationwide brand awareness. RPU firms on the other hand, 
usually offer closer proximity to their customers. In recent years, firms with their 
main markets in rural areas, still have the advantage that the target group of 
house owners for distributed renewable retail models will be greater than in 
urban areas. As the German Energiewende eventually moves into urban areas, 
this advantage will disappear in the near future. 
A downside within these retail models could potentially be the customers’ wish 
to produce their own power and, at the same time, become independent of the 
electricity supplier. In this case, the trustworthiness of incumbent power utilities 
could be questioned. A customer may not understand the incentive for power 
utilities to sell them distributed renewable generation technologies and, at the 
same time, cannibalise their electricity commodity sales. 
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Complementarities 
After the implementation of these distributed renewable generation retail 
models, power utility incumbents have tried to leverage complementarities with 
their existing corporate brands, their customer bases and their sales and 
marketing channels.  
According to respondent managers, most of the incumbent power utility firms 
have tried to leverage their existing corporate brands for the new retail activities. 
MNU firms in particular, have achieved relatively high brand awareness. 
However, environmentally conscious consumers, who aim to produce their own 
power and become, at least partly, independent of their power supplier, might 
not choose these firms as their favourite partner for distributed renewable 
generation and storage models due to the utilities’ image as environmental 
polluters.  
Managers of incumbent power utilities have also tried to achieve 
complementarities in involving their existing customer bases in new retail 
business models. Here, it is important to emphasise, the customer base of an 
incumbent power utility, both with MNU and RPU firms, is one of their most 
important assets. For instance, the two biggest MNU firms alone have a 
consolidated customer base of approximately 14 million domestic customers in 
the German electricity market.  
Paradoxically, these firms did not possess any profound customer data. The 
reason for the lack of data is, in the past, efforts to gain more customer insights 
did not happen and existing IT billing systems are restricted to billing-related 
data. Surprisingly, many firms still use their IT billing systems as their primary 
CRM software tool to keep data on their domestic customer segment (“B2C”). 
Only recently, are efforts underway to gain more insightful customer knowledge 
- as one RPU respondent observed, “this is the first transition that we've 
undergone, from the delivery point to the customer [...], from the client to the 
customer needs and now we need to go one step further, in order to really 
know, what the customer wants.” 
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In the B2C area, MNU and RPU firms target their customers via corporate 
websites, direct marketing (e.g. mailing, outbound and door-to-door campaigns) 
and affiliate partners (e.g. price comparison websites like “Verivox”). In the 
industrial, property and SME customers’ sector (“B2B”), these firms largely work 
with sales representatives who are focused on direct sales. In this area, many 
firms have already managed to develop CRM software tools.  
Overall, power utility managers see shortcomings in the marketing and sales 
capabilities of their employees. This is particularly the case with the successful 
merchandising of new distributed renewable generation business models - as 
explained by one MNU respondent, “we also learned that the typical commodity 
sales representative is incapable and scared of selling a technical product, such 
as distributed solar PV generation. Even if it's pretty easy.” 
In addition to less developed sales abilities, respondent managers also 
recognise the contradiction for a sales representative to sell, on the hand, 
electricity as a commodity, largely from nuclear and thermal generation sources, 
and, on the other hand, distributed renewable generation products. In this case, 
sales representatives have been caught in the dominant logic of the prevailing 
business model. Previously they have told their customers they do not need any 
self-produced renewables. Commenting on the problem, one RPU respondent 
said: “I would say, it is a very conflicting task to instruct a sales representative, 
who is out there in the field, to tell his customers exactly the opposite of what 
has been said to them [concerning the application of distributed renewable 
technologies] in the past.” 
Other incumbent power utilities, have transferred energy efficiency consultants, 
from a free of charge service, into a hard selling role for distributed renewable 
business models. As these people have few sales skills, they understandably 
also failed. One RPU interviewee described how these people are “[...] still 
playing the role of an energy consultant. Well and, let's just say, well, if I meet a 
car salesman that calculates the economic efficiency of a car for every 
customer, I would probably sell very few cars.” 
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As a consequence, complementarities within the marketing and sales sector 
have not yet been achieved – a fact confirmed by one respondent, "[...]  we are 
thinking of activating further distribution channels, because we can tell our 
vested or existing distribution channels are surely not the most performing." 
As this is a huge problem, many firms are currently recruiting sales employees 
from other industries such as telecommunications in order to 'buy in' the needed 
sales capabilities from the external market. 
Moreover, complementarities resulting from coherent product bundles of the old 
commodity-based business models and the new distributed renewable 
generation, electrification and energy efficiency business models have also not, 
until today, been implemented successfully. According to the interviewees, the 
few bundled products that are in the market, have been developed from a 
failure in one category, rather than on a coherent product bundling strategy. For 
instance, as connected home sales activities have not been successfully sold, 
both an MNU and a RPU firm have marketed a connected home starter kit at a 
loss for €0 together with a new 24-month electricity term contract. In addition, 
distributed renewable generation business models have also not yet been 
marketed with electricity flat rate contracts for the surplus energy supply as a 
bundled product (see the product and services section below). 
Incumbent power utility firms have not achieved complementarities of 
commodity and non-commodity (based on new business models) sales. As 
many MNU firms already carry out their business model innovation activities in 
a separate entity, incumbent managers had initial ideas to outsource all direct 
sales activities in a spin-off firm. 
As many MNU firms plan to enhance their retail business models into other 
technology fields and leverage the experience from one category to other 
categories (e.g. heat pumps, distributed storage and distributed CHP 
generation), complementarities in the area of sales could be achieved within the 
spin-off firm as well. 
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Efficiencies 
Within the featured business model innovation activities, efficiencies have not 
been realised. Implemented retail models are too small and it is too early 
regarding the status of maturity of these models to reach transaction-cost-
economies. 
Nevertheless, with transformational activities, efficiencies have been achieved 
and will further be realised, particularly within MNU firms. As already touched 
upon, one MNU firm, "EnBW" has decided to divest its entire B2B sales 
activities within the old business model ('commodity selling'). After implementing 
this radical step, the firm plans to re-focus its sales activities around the 
distributed renewable business models and municipalities. Other firms have not, 
as yet, carried out cost-cutting measurements around the customer interface. 
As two other MNU firms, "E.ON" and "RWE" have performed a de-merger, in 
which they have separated their B2B (e.g. wholesale business, industrial 
customers) from the B2C sales (e.g. domestic, SME, property industry 
customers) units, further cost-cutting in the B2B sector, to achieve efficiencies, 
are expected. One respondent noted, "the path to the future is definitely not 
easy. And it will probably be a [MNU firm] 2.0, there were cost-cutting 
programmes. There will be a 3.0 and 4.0, too, definitely. And many feathers will 
be shed on the way." 
With RPU firms both in the B2B and the B2C sales area, no efficiency 
measurements have been communicated and are also not yet expected. 
Nevertheless, with both incumbent groups within the marketing and B2C sales 
domain, it has been recognised that efforts must be made to recruit experienced 
sales people from outside the industry, effectively "buying in" much needed 
sales skills.  
Lock-in effects 
With the applied retail models, in which revenues are realised by direct sales, 
lock-in effects in the area of distributed renewable generation technologies have 
been realised with after-sales services. Hence, the same technicians, who have 
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installed the technological devices, have also conducted the after-sales 
activities.  
With the application of connected home technologies in the featured business 
model innovations, lock-in effects have been realised by using proprietary 
systems. One MNU firm has introduced a 'connected home' system, which is 
only compatible with sensors and actuators from very few manufacturers. 
Moreover, lock-in effects could be realised with different revenue models, such 
as contracting or leasing models (see also Section 4.2.4.1 'business model 
archetypes'), in which contracts run for periods of 10-15 years. 
4.2.2.3 Customer value proposition and customer-centricity  
Incumbent power utility firms have to provide a comprehensible value 
proposition with a good argument why customers should choose incumbents 
instead of clean-tech competitors, or, indeed any other competing industry with 
new Energiewende business models. Hence, this has only been partly achieved 
in recent years. According to the views of respondent managers, incumbent 
power utilities are not yet clearly positioned within the relevant set of customers.  
Furthermore, initiatives to gain customer insights have not been greatly 
developed in the past. However, in recent business model innovation activities, 
the customer has gained in significance. Managers from both MNU and RPU 
firms are concerned with understanding customer needs and creating value for 
them. As one RPU manager stated: “[...] and in the past, let's say the old [RPU 
firm] was still like that, they brought out a product and said the customer has to 
buy that now. [...] I believe we deviated very strongly from that now with this 
product, and listened to the customer, both the domestic customers and 
industrial clients of the RPU, we integrated them, saw what they needed, what 
was important to them.” 
Therefore, it is important to point out, future business models will not only be 
concerned with the consumer. The consumer, will, in fact, become part of the 
business model. All interviewees have shared the view that new small-scale, 
distributed renewable generation business models will revolve around the 
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consumer as the ‘prosumer’. One MNU top tier manager explains they, “are 
convinced that the structures of our business model are being changed 
fundamentally [...] and you can go beyond the whole value creation [...] That 
won't be large and central anymore, but decentralised and small. The customer 
[...] will become his own energy producer and the storage solutions will be local. 
The entire business so far was very centralised in the classic utility business 
model, yes [...] and that entire business will develop towards the customer. And 
the customer will be the one making the deals.” 
Consequently, one central business model transformation and change activity 
for incumbent power utility firms, is turning from a culture, in which the customer 
was, for decades, equalised with a metering point number, towards a customer-
centric corporate culture. It is, therefore, important to emphasise, that not only 
marketing and sales functions have to internalise this customer-centric 
approach, but rather, all functions have to incorporate this behaviour. The point 
is underscored by one MNU respondent, “[...] the significant difference between 
our business and the classic energy supply business. Within the classic power 
utility firm, maybe 5% of the employees are communicating with the customer. 
In our case, everyone is communicating with the customer.” 
Incumbent power utility firms have tried to achieve more customer-centricity 
within their recent business model innovation activities through crowd sourcing 
approaches. Both MNU and RPU firms, using these crowd sourcing 
approaches, have started to integrate their customers within the ideation stage. 
Nevertheless, they did state, that such crowd sourcing approaches have not 
been considered in those business model innovation activities realised in the 
past. As a result, they regard this as a key learning point to integrate the 
customer earlier in the business model innovation process. 
Respondents see the need to implement more professional big data and 
analytics functions within their firms. This is not only to provide customers with 
better solutions, but also to develop future business models based on customer 
data. In recent years, firms have conducted different internal and external 
market research activities, but have failed to install large CRM databases. 
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Interestingly, they recently started to apply more start-up like methods such as 
street surveys. They do this with their own innovation managers, who receive 
an initial feedback from customers while doing this. 
According to the interviewees, within this new retail business model area, power 
utility firms have to provide their customers with a customer value proposition, 
based around customer-centric, service-orientated and convenient energy 
solutions. Thus, they have to move from supplier to service models. As most 
firms market their new small-scale business model activities under the same 
brands as their commodity selling activities, the entire firm has to be 
transformed into a service-orientated firm. This transformation is necessary to 
provide clear and consistent branding, as two MNU managers explained, 
“Service is also really important.” 
“The future utility market is seen in the service arena.” 
As a consequence, both incremental and potentially disruptive business 
models, are affected by this transformation into the service domain. One 
negative example as regards the incorporation of customer-centric and service-
orientated corporate behaviour, is, for instance, utility firm supply contracts. In 
these contracts, all risks were passed onto the customers, as lawyers were only 
incentivised to achieve as much risk-free terms and conditions as possible for 
the power utility firm. 
Products and services applied in current business model innovations 
Respondents have portrayed products and services that can be categorised 
under six different ‘business model archetypes’ and corresponding revenue 
models: (1.) ‘retail’, (2.) ‘build and sell’, (3.) ‘white label’, ‘(4.) contracting’, (5.) 
‘subscription’ or ‘rent instead of buy/leasing’ and (6.) ‘energy solutions provider’ 
models (see also Section 4.2.4). Therefore, it is worth mentioning that, as 
already stated, two RPU firms have not launched final products or services as 
they are still in the pilot phase.  
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Products based on retail models represent the first and biggest category. In this 
category, both distributed solar PV generation, solar PV storage and connected 
home technologies are marketed.  
Within the connected home technology field, power utilities usually sell 
hardware components (e.g. sensors and actuators) and steering apps in 
product bundles based on consumer needs (e.g. energy-efficiency and 
security). While hardware bundles are sold, included steering apps are 
marketed with subscription models on a regular monthly or yearly fee.  
Within the distributed solar PV generation and storage technology field, these 
firms sell distributed solar PV generation rooftop modules, distributed solar 
storage and also bundle products (distributed solar PV generation, PV storage, 
heat pumps, installation services and visualisation application or online-tool) as 
a free of charge service. While most of these firms apply reseller models within 
this category, one RPU firm produces its own solar PV storage devices in a 
subsidiary firm. It also markets these solar PV storage devices in a white label 
model to other electricity firms.  
Both RPU pilots are concerned with rather large distributed storage models 
(‘quarter-power’ and ‘power-to-gas’). Although, until now, there are no products 
and services in place, these models will probably have no retail focus. It is more 
likely they will be integrated into large ‘quarter-power’ concepts and could be 
bundled with electricity commodity products. 
In the electric vehicle charging infrastructure category, one RPU firm has 
implemented an application service for public charging (including mobile 
payment, billing, charging station locator, etc.) and offers both a ‘white label’ 
model for other power utilities and a ‘subscription model’ for B2C and B2B 
customers. 
Products and services applied in future business model innovations 
Power utility firms’ respondents, especially from MNU firms, have also 
considered future business models and related products or services, which they 
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regard as highly disruptive to their existing business model. They particularly 
see future products or services in ‘prosumer-orientated’, ‘peer-to-peer platform’ 
models such as “Airbnb” or “Uber”, based on VPPs. One MNU top tier manager 
referred to platform models: 
"Why are we not working on something to be the Uber for the energy industry? 
It would be better to do it ourselves rather than somebody else coming along 
like Uber did, or Airbnb. We would like to be the Uber for energy." 
Another MNU respondent envisions the integration of all the above-mentioned 
technologies into platform models. He stated they, “[...] try to apply these 
qualities to the energy sector of the future: Decentralisation, self-sufficiency, 
shared resources, virtually dumping digitalisation into IT and analytics and 
therefore conducting a platform business through which you can scale. And 
those are issues that, they are taking place with electric vehicles, in VPPs and 
in connected homes.” 
Another MNU respondent acknowledged the business model relevance of VPPs 
and flexibility marketing approaches that “to create a controllable profile out of 
limitedly controllable suppliers and buyers, that you then can sell as a regulated 
profile in the market. That's a business model.” 
And last but not least, one respondent is certain about the long-term success of 
platform models in the electricity sector. He is “[...] convinced, that in the long 
run, these types of platform-models will prevail.” 
Both platform models and VPP domains are based on ‘two-sided market’ 
business models and apply distributed renewable generation paired with digital, 
largely ICT, technologies. One MNU respondent has stated that “especially 
information technology seems to be a very decisive differentiator to new 
products.” 
Furthermore, as already stated, power utility managers envision ‘quarter-power’ 
solutions, in RPU pilot projects, where entire quarters of a city will become self-
sufficient by producing and storing their own power independent of the power 
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supplier. Again, this will also be based on distributed renewable generation and 
distributed storage activities. These models provide an interesting case for 
incumbent power utility firms and their DSO subsidiaries, as these activities will 
be positioned between large-scale and small-scale, customer-sided generation 
models. 
In addition, while current applications were largely based on information, in the 
future, there will be more sophisticated apps for the connected home. These 
applications will be developed to interlink and steer home appliances and 
distributed renewable generation to help customers become more self-sufficient 
with their own power usage.  
Last but not least, power utility firms might also apply big data and data 
analytics’ models to leverage customer data business models.  
As new products or services evolve around business model innovation 
activities, managers have pointed out how unsuccessful existing products have 
to be eliminated. In the past, power utilities have established a broad range of 
products and services, but have never revised their portfolios. As one RPU 
respondent commented: “One statement our board made not too long ago, in 
the two years it has existed, it has seen many products that were introduced, 
but not one that had been discontinued. We need to get better in saying, OK, 
what old issues do we still have, that aren't actually that promising, we'll 
discontinue those.” 
4.2.2.4 Section summary and outlook 
In this value creation section, findings have been presented following the 
sources of value creation framework by Amit and Zott (2001) and Zott and Amit 
(2013) around ‘novelties’, ‘complementarities’, ‘efficiencies’ and ‘lock-in’ effects. 
One of the most important findings and key novelty is with new business model 
activities, incumbent power utility firms have established retail models alongside 
to the old commodity-selling business models. They have established reseller 
activities around distributed PV generation and connected home technologies. 
This means, complementarities have not been achieved between commodity 
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and non-commodity business model activities yet. Although existing customer 
bases and existing brands have been used to market these new models, 
complementarities with existing sales channels, particularly with sales 
representatives, have been unsuccessfully leveraged. The same is true for 
efficiencies. Although MNU firms have exploited efficiencies with the 
transformational efforts of the old business model, the featured business model 
innovations have not yet raised efficiencies. As regards lock-in effects, with after 
sales activities, or specific revenue models, such as leasing or contracting 
models, firstly, ‘lock-in effects’ have been realised. Regarding these retail 
models, in the next value delivery Section 4.2.3, the underlying activities, 
resources and partnerships for such models will be further described.  
In addition, another key finding concerning the featured business model 
activities, is how incumbent power utilities are currently changing towards a 
more customer-centric and service-orientated approach. However, clear and 
consistent customer value propositions around new product or service offerings 
have not been realised with the featured implemented business model 
innovations. Hence, incumbent power utility managers have conceptualised, but 
not implemented, such approaches around customer-centricity.  
Key market triggers and boundary conditions for business model innovation 
activities have been the (1.) regulatory influence; (2.) availability of distributed 
renewable generation and digital technologies; (3.) changing consumer 
demands and consumer engagement and (4.) an increasing in- and outside 
competition.  
While MNU firms have implemented their featured business model activities in 
the market, RPU firms have largely carried out pilot business model activities. In 
their business model innovation activities, incumbents have largely applied 
technologies with the potential to disrupt. Five out of seven firms have applied 
either distributed generation or distributed storage technologies. In this way, two 
RPU firms have realised pilot business model innovation activities similar to the 
dominant logic of these firms. The described ‘quarter-power’ storage models 
save electricity on a large-scale basis. Furthermore, incumbents have 
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presented ideas for future business models. Here they regard peer-to-peer 
platform models, flexibility marketing and aggregator models, all based on 
VPPs, as the most promising new business ideas. 
4.2.3 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value delivery’ 
This section presents the findings within the ‘value delivery’ stage of business 
model innovations focusing on resources, capabilities and value networks. 
Following Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) this section is subdivided into three 
sections: ‘key resources’, ‘key activities’ and ‘key partners’. In addition, value 
chain reconfigurations and new asset-configurations within two exemplary 
models, retail and prosumer-orientated business models, will be further 
explored within the ‘key activities’ section.  
4.2.3.1 Key resources  
Cultural change and important capabilities of resources 
In general, all respondents have agreed that a change in the firms’ corporate 
culture, from rather bureaucratic, towards a more open, entrepreneurial, faster 
and outward-orientated attitude is key for successful business model 
transformation initiatives within incumbent power utility firms. An RPU manager 
succinctly identified the key issue of successful business model innovation 
activities in these incumbent organisations, "that's a change of mentality [...]." 
When organisational capabilities have come to reside in processes, values, and 
especially when they have become embedded in culture, change can be 
extraordinarily difficult. Therefore, if these firms do not realise the cultural 
change needed, they will unlikely succeed with new business models. In 
addition, it can happen, that they never leverage complementarities within an 
ambidextrous organisation of the old, commodity-selling firm alongside new 
distributed renewable generation, non-commodity business models such as 
retail or prosumer-orientated models. This issue was brought up by one MNU 
respondent, explaining that it is “[...].in particular a challenge in incumbent firms 
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because the people's mind-set simply isn't like that. Rather everybody earns too 
much money for what they do and staying only one extra hour simply isn't 
included. And that is why these firms find it so difficult. There are thousands of 
other factors also playing a role. But I think that this change in the staff's mind-
set and the dedicated team, without them it isn't possible." 
There is debate among the respondents as regards the realisation of the 
cultural changes needed. On the one hand, incumbent power utility managers 
are sceptical as to whether this cultural change can be realised to the required 
extent within the incumbent organisations. This concern is confirmed by two 
MNU managers: 
"One's trying to achieve that simply through a mind change. Only God knows 
whether that will work." 
"So, one'll achieve a cultural change and even be able to do this, let me say, 
more innovatively, more entrepreneurially, etc. Also a bit more intensively, but it 
will never be comparable to and a huge distance from what we can see in such 
start-ups." 
On the other hand, some RPU respondents have already pointed out some 
initial successes. They approach this necessary cultural change in an optimistic 
way,  
“Yes, that is, as mentioned, also a culture change. So, I think some have 
understood and they also act accordingly. They really are acting like an 
entrepreneur." 
"I think we've become a great deal more agile and would do many things 
differently today. What I've just talked about, this would be quicker; trying things 
out, that's exactly what our CEO and also our new CSO are bringing in here a 
lot and are thus trying, yes, to change the business such that we simply try 
things out and if unsuccessful, stop them." 
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Critical success factors regarding resources for business model 
innovation 
Besides the essential cultural change within the entire corporate culture of 
incumbent power utility firms, several other key resources for the successful 
conduct of business model innovation activities within these firms should exist. 
Firstly, the executive champion as an executive sponsor is essential for 
business model innovation activities to succeed within the incumbent power 
utility organisations. This idea is supported by two MNU managers: 
"The first thing you need is strong support from your top management and we 
have it.” 
"It doesn't work without the executive champion. [...] So every topic needs 
someone at the top holding a protective hand over it." 
Usually the executive champion is a member of the board of management 
directors. This person promotes the business model innovation activity, both 
within the management board, but also within the employee body and with 
external network partners. Therefore, this person is key to smoothing out those 
obstacles that may occur when innovating business models. As one RPU 
manager stated, “a critical success factor is always the attention or support of 
the management up to the board. That's what makes it possible. You don't need 
to do anything else. If that isn't there, then don't bother." 
Secondly, employees need a new skill-set to successfully conduct business 
model innovation activities, as one MNU manager explained: 
"So, we're right at the forefront in driving, shall we say, the transformation of the 
energy industry because we also do recognise that we don't have certain 
abilities that we'll definitely need in the future. If we mean it seriously, we need a 
completely different skill set in the firm." 
This point is closely related to the above-mentioned cultural changes. According 
to the interviewed respondents, employees need more innovative capabilities, 
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creativity and ‘out-of-the-box thinking’. The respondents went on to say, the 
employees also required strategic agility, entrepreneurial spirit and speed when 
implementing business model innovation activities with time-to-market 
considerations. 
Thirdly, sufficient funding of business model innovation activities is also 
essential. Although power utility firms still generate billions in revenue with their 
vertically-integrated business model activities, as mentioned, in recent years 
their EBIT margins have suffered from losses within the value-added step 
generation. The power utility firms face challenges to allocate enough financial 
resources to business model innovation activities. This is particularly relevant 
for MNU firms, as they have followed the dominant logic of the firm to realise 
expansive large-scale projects, for decades. The MNU firms face huge 
obstacles in managing small-scale projects and as one manager has explained, 
if “[...] one isn't even big enough to achieve that, then I do, indeed, agree, then 
diversification becomes a problem. Because then all one has is nothing but 
individual rabbit droppings and no big pile anywhere. Then it doesn't make 
much sense." 
RPU firms also do not possess huge investment budgets. Their firm size (also 
in terms of revenue) limits large business model innovation spending. In this 
context, incumbent power utility firms have to focus their business model 
innovation efforts on a few promising new business models and also have to 
manage business model innovation projects more effectively. Furthermore, it is 
important that business model innovation project managers are provided with 
concrete and controlled budgets.  
Fourthly, as future business models are largely based on ICT, IoT, platforms 
and eco-systems, it means IT and data analytic resources, have become 
increasingly important. This need is underlined by one RPU manager who said 
"[...] in the future IT will be an essential factor for the success of energy supply." 
Some managers even regard the future business of power utility firms as being 
in the IT sector. One MNU manager has explained that "our CEO even says we 
therefore have to develop into an IT firm." 
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Fifthly, as the ambidextrous organisation has not yet been achieved in 
incumbent power utility firms, several managerial tasks have been mentioned 
that are seen as critical for the conduct of business model innovation activities 
for incumbent power utility managers: (1.) empowerment of employees, (2.) 
steering by clear objectives and (3.) balanced incentive systems between the 
old and new business model initiatives. These tasks are important for both 
managers and employees. In the past, objectives, allocation of resources and 
incentive systems have been in favour of the old business model. One RPU 
manager commented that this “[...] results mainly from the ideas often being 
initially stifled by linear management, that they aren't seen in the hierarchy, that 
there is no time to implement them and precisely for that one has to develop a 
framework." 
Now the key resources for the management of business model innovation 
activities have been pointed out, organisational barriers will be described.  
Organisational barriers 
Although incumbent power utility managers are able to name key resources for 
the management of business model innovation activities, they also face several 
organisational barriers, partly in the above-mentioned areas. 
According to the incumbent power utility firms’ managers, the greatest 
organisational barrier is that employees are stuck in the dominant logic of the 
firm with regard to the old business model. As mentioned, an ambidextrous 
organisation is not achieved and many of the organisations remain in the old 
business model and its associated value chain configuration. Therefore, it is 
important to underline how differing opinions exist in these firms among the 
interviewed top tier managers. On one side there are managers in charge of 
business model innovation and on the other side another group of managers 
and employees are busy with the old business model. Those managers 
involved with the old business model are especially from generation, distribution 
and secondary value-adding steps like finance, procurement and customer 
care/billing departments. Explaining the resistance within the incumbent firms 
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towards one business model innovation activity in the distributed renewable 
generation domain, one MNU manager lamented: 
"Well, the atmosphere then was maximally hostile and poor towards such new 
topics because the firm's mind-set towards the world was probably centred 
around generation and distribution but this sales topic is completely blanked out 
simply because the people have all been with the firm for a long time, and they 
think in their traditional world and have not yet understood that the energy world 
is in fact changing and for that reason we simply need new models for us to get 
the value out of it." 
While almost all interviewed top tier managers understand the necessity of a 
business model transformation and strongly support business model innovation 
activities, this is not the case for the majority of employees. A great number of 
employees, within these incumbent firms, do not see the need for new business 
models across the different value-adding steps and, instead, give support to the 
prevailing business model. Within all value-adding steps, there are both 
managers and employees that position business model innovation activities as 
“youth science competitions”. Interestingly, even two senior sales directors from 
the top management teams of MNU firms, have recently shared the above-
mentioned view at an informal energy conference talk. According to one MNU 
manager, for business model transformation, it is important to clear away the 
“dead wood”, especially within middle management. In the following statement 
one CIO of a MNU firm has described that "the change process in the heads 
then takes a long time because the preservers and the regional princes don't 
give anyone else a say in matters. In that case you have to react really 
radically." 
The cognitive constraints of these managers and employees could have 
developed for a number of reasons. Some potentially developed from the 
perspective of a career, which is based on the old business model - a fear of 
falling behind with their skill-set, losing out on future revenues and even losing 
their job. One MNU manager stated his view that incumbent utilities "[...] in 
principle [...] currently have a very trivial business. And when they now should 
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start to sell demand-response, demand-side management, electric vehicle 
integration and some sort of solar solution etc. they will all be swamped by the 
score." 
Furthermore, on the balance sheets these new business model innovation 
activities are not yet relevant. However, as seen with disruptive innovations in 
other industries, this can eventually change over time.  
In addition, these firms face challenges with the fragmented nature of the 
distributed renewable generation models. They also need the required skill-set 
to manage these small-scale models, having previously been accustomed to 
implementing large-scale models. One interviewed MNU manager reflected that 
the "competition in this area is becoming increasingly fragmented and 
completely new skills are necessary that one needs to concentrate on. Well, 
whether the utility is suited to this, that's a completely different question." 
Another MNU manager has supported this in saying that "a barrier or hurdle is 
that the firm comes from a world in which one made huge investments. Huge 
investments mean huge risk. To make sure that you don't completely louse 
them up, which in retrospect didn't help, but basically in order to potentially be 
sure, one has risk control, risk management, controlling, strategic controlling, 
financial analysis, well 100,000 people who also thing they have to add their 
shit. If I now come with my project, which is only worth €500,000, then it isn't 
exactly trivial to stop the firm from letting its complete network of people who 
are currently simply picking their nose loose on this project." 
Moreover, many incumbent managers and employees stick to existing routines, 
procedures and frameworks, based on the old business model. For instance, in 
decision-making processes, incumbent power utility managers are accustomed 
to calculating projects with a return on capital employed (ROCE) > 10% and 
usually for a period of at least 20 years. As new business models do not provide 
these firms with such ROCE figures and are rather fast moving, they do not fit 
with the existing context of these firms. Set against this background, especially 
finance and controlling managers, are rather sceptical about new business 
models. One MNU manager commented on this being an "[...] interesting topic. 
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It's a cultural topic. How in fact does the risk controller, who has just evaluated a 
gas supply contract for two terawatt hours to Mainova, evaluate the sale of 10 
KW solar PV-facility? And I continue to believe that the most important activity 
for us in the firm is to whip the new models through the firm. Of course it's 
difficult to define the value proposition. It's difficult to implement it among the 
technical staff; but the biggest challenge is to get the firm, your colleagues in 
line so that they're no longer working against it but that they support the system. 
And in my view, that's the greatest challenge we're facing." 
Another example, according to the interviewed incumbent power utility 
managers, lies in the procurement area. Within the old business model, 
procurement managers had to buy various goods in large quantities. Today, 
however, they negotiate partnering models within the new business model 
network activities. While the old procurement style can be described as rather 
abrasive, the new business model concepts require a totally different, co-
operative negotiation style. As a consequence, many procurement managers 
and employees have to change their attitude and way of working.  
Last, but not least, both sales and customer care agents at the customer 
interface, face problems with the complexity of new business models. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that some of those working in a customer facing role 
have sometimes even tried to avoid contact with customers who were involved 
with new business models. As touched upon earlier, as a consequence within 
the value creation section, power utility firms try to install new sales channels 
and hire new sales representatives for these tasks. 
Furthermore, governmental regulation and regulatory changes have played a 
key role for incumbent power utility firms concerning the conduct of incremental 
business model changes. In the past, almost all initiatives to change the existing 
business model logic have been triggered by regulatory changes. In recent 
years, incumbent power utility firms, particularly RPU firms, face the challenge 
to open themselves up to the newly developing Energiewende industry market 
with new business models. As many firms still remain with the dominant logic of 
the firm, they wait for policies from the regulator to conduct business model 
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innovation activities. In comparison, other competitors, like clean-tech start-ups, 
do not wait, but rather go for new business model initiatives. 
Moreover, and as already mentioned, many industry experts expect power utility 
firms to become IT firms or at least assume a large IT-focus within new 
business models. Surprisingly, a lot of respondents have explained they still 
observe many problems within the IT domain. Indeed, many of the presented 
business model innovation activities have been realised with external IT 
partnering firms. This is confirmed by two RPU managers: 
"And going down new paths in our case means we simply searched the market 
ourselves for an IT service provider and discussed with them our IT 
requirements and have now implemented them. And that unfortunately is, well, 
the only IT project in our area that at least runs well is the one we initiated 
ourselves and looked ourselves for an external service provider." 
"That was always what I tried to do because if we had done that with our IT, 
then one would probably have to have waited another five years and it would 
have been considerably more expensive. The theme here was quick, agile, 
good value and flexible. And unfortunately one can't exactly manage that with 
one's own firm." 
Thereby, the IT departments within the old business model area are largely 
involved with the development and operation of billing systems for commodity 
selling and the procurement and operation of hardware and software for office 
applications. In this context, many IT departments have not yet developed the 
organisational structure to get involved with business model innovation activities 
and the creation of new IT-based products or services. 
Furthermore, incumbent firms face organisational inertia. A culture of safety is 
common in these firms. This means, employees evade issues rather than 
openly admit a failure or mistake - a great challenge in business model 
innovation activities. As some respondents have explained, iterations within the 
different stages of the business model innovation processes were not common. 
This is because managers have conducted business model innovation in a 
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linear way. Once the process has started, their business model concepts have 
not been adjusted along the way, despite external circumstances having 
changed. The same challenge holds true for business model innovation 
methods like experimentation or trial-and-error learning. 
In addition, managers are conditioned to risk-averse decision-making. This 
behaviour is challenging for business model innovation activities, as results are 
usually very unclear in the beginning. In this context, before committing to what 
might be a wrong decision, line managers tend to rather not make decisions on 
the development and implementation of a business model innovation activity. 
As already mentioned, resources with innovative capabilities are necessary for 
the carrying out of business model innovation activities. Therefore, incumbent 
power utility respondent managers are missing resources with innovative 
capabilities and also experience a general lack of resources for business model 
innovation activities in their firms. This is underscored by one MNU manager 
who said that "we simply have an incredible number of balloons and balls in the 
air and the problem is that they mutually undermine the topics. Not really even 
that, but that, when someone has a topic, that he is always lacking the 
manpower to really implement it because then we have seven fantastic topics in 
the ideation phase; but the capacity I need to really make a topic big is greater 
the further down we go. And then, at some point even the two million 
consultancy budget doesn't help me any more when I don't have any people 
that can later deliver and implement it." 
As some have mentioned, their firms run too many business model innovation 
efforts at the same time. Therefore, a better coordination, or a general business 
model transformation plan, based on a corporate strategy, will be necessary, 
according to the interviewed managers.  
A further organisational barrier is seen in incentive systems. These incentive 
systems are based on the prevailing business model and are also, in many 
instances, in conflict with the new business model innovation activities. If sales 
representatives receive commodity-selling objectives, from their perspective, it 
will be counter-productive to sell distributed renewable generation models thus 
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cannibalising initial targets. The same is true for future commodity selling 
targets. Sales representatives have lost the customers’ kilowatt hours if they 
had sold, for instance, a distributed solar PV distribution and storage model to 
their customers. In this context, incumbent managers have come up with the 
idea that power utility firms have to develop new incentive systems for sales 
branches where both commodity-selling and potential retail models will be 
equally incentivised.  
As many power utility firms are still very hierarchical within the corporate 
organisation, fast decision-making and agile processes to implement business 
model innovation activities are hard to achieve. As a consequence, some MNU 
and RPU firms have reacted to this with spin-offs or joint ventures for business 
model innovation activities (see also Section 4.2.1). 
Last but not least, many managers of power utility firms are still thinking in silos. 
Managers used to think in silos in the past and with a potential reconfiguration 
of the value chain this behaviour is expected to become more extreme in the 
future. Therefore, it will be a tremendous challenge for managers to transform 
the organisation and to build new business models around the customer, where 
certain value-adding steps and branches will not be needed anymore. 
Furthermore, if managers from different divisions do not work closely together, it 
will be difficult to implement successful business model initiatives. 
All of the above-mentioned organisational barriers are summarised in Table 14 
overpage. 
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Identified organisational barriers to BMI 
First level category Second level category 
Dominant logic of the firm 
Conflict with prevailing old BM 
Cognitive constraints of managers 
Managers stick to existing routines 
and frameworks based on old BM 
Decision-making based on old BM 
IT-Systems based on old BM 
Organisational inertia 
Fear of losing out on current revenue streams 
Anxious of change 
Risk-averse decision-making 
Resources lack innovative capabilities for BMI 
General lack of resources to conduct BMI 
Too many efforts at the same time 
Incentive systems in favour of old BM 
Hierarchies restricting fast decision-making 
Thinking in silos 
Table 14: Identified organisational barriers to BMI in incumbent utilities 
 
4.2.3.2 Key activities 
In this section, the key activities within business model innovation will be 
presented. Furthermore, the reconfiguration of the value chain, based on two 
exemplary business model concepts, the present retail and the potential future 
prosumer-orientated ‘two-sided market’ business models, will be outlined. 
In general, for the conduct of business model innovation activities, firms have to 
perform market research and foresight activities to gain thoroughly grounded 
customer insights and an understanding as regards the maturity level of 
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technologies. Furthermore, more innovation and project management activities 
are key to successfully run business model innovation in these firms. As new 
business models usually orbit around the firm, strong networking activities in 
and outside the firm’s boundaries are also of great importance, as one senior 
MNU manager has stated, "partnering is not only about external partnering. It 
also means internal partnering. I’m not responsible for renewables, but if we 
need our colleagues, we can call on them." 
Lastly, for business model transformation initiatives on the firm’s corporate 
level, change management activities, especially those to carefully transform the 
corporate values to blend with the firm’s culture, are of great importance. 
Thereby, it is important to underline that change management initiatives within 
the existing organisation of the incumbent firm should be moderately 
undertaken. Drastic adjustments could also endanger existing and functioning 
business models.  
This section will also portray the value chain reconfigurations with present retail 
and future prosumer-orientated business models. These areas have been 
selected as, on the one hand, the analysed business model innovation activities 
have shown a large focus on retail business models. On the other hand, many 
thoughts and opinions of managers were expressed about future ‘prosumer’ 
business models as potentially disruptive threats. As ‘white label’, ‘contracting’, 
‘subscription’ and ‘rent instead of buy/leasing’ models have a smaller impact on 
activities, particularly the reconfiguration of the value chain, (but are relevant for 
the value capture activities within a business model innovation), they will be 
further analysed within the ‘value capture’ Section 4.2.4.  
Value chain reconfiguration: Retail business models  
The value chain reconfiguration within retail business models functions 
completely differently to the classical vertically-integrated power utility value- 
chain. Incumbent power utility firms need to manage the value chain in a totally 
different way. They must also establish the processes of a retailer around 
procurement, logistics (storage and distribution), installation services, marketing 
and sales and after sales services (see Figure 12 overpage). 
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Figure 12: Comparison of vertically-integrated and retailer value chain 
Overall, these retail models with power utility firms are still in their infancy. All 
participating power utility firms have had no prior experience in the retail field. 
Comparable to the retail industry, one of the central activities is procurement 
(e.g. partnering with manufacturer OEMs). In this way, both within connected 
home (e.g. sensors and actuators) and distributed generation activities (e.g. 
rooftop solar PV modules and converters) power utility firms buy hardware 
components from manufacturers and OEMs. As power utility firms perform 
procurement as a secondary value-adding activity in their old business model, 
in theory, complementarities could be achieved. Nevertheless, as these firms do 
not have a comparable culture to retailers and as they are used to working in 
the domestic domain, in reality, these procurement activities pose a challenge 
to incumbent utilities. This challenge particularly holds true for RPU firms 
carrying out procurement activities in an international context.  
In the next step, logistics (e.g. storage and distribution) has to be conducted. In 
a similar way to procurement, the national distribution of components (e.g. solar 
PV rooftop modules) has been a tremendous challenge for these firms. In one 
instance, one MNU firm, which has created a role as a wholesaler, has faced 
problems with logistics as they calculated based on the wrong numbers and 
planned their storage space to be much too big. In the end, they were fortunate, 
as they were allowed to flexibly change order quantities with OEM 
manufacturers.  
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Subsequently installation services (e.g. with distributed renewable generation) 
by local technicians had to be developed. Although, power utility firms run 
several networks with electricians and deploy electricians with new building 
connections in the distribution grid, those who install solar PV rooftop plants 
(so-called “Solarteure”) differ from traditional electricians. Again, new partners 
had to be acquired to perform this task. Therefore, MNU in comparison to RPU 
firms, faced a greater challenge. They had to hire solar PV technicians on a 
nationwide basis, while RPU firms, in general, often only had to operate locally. 
Consequently, marketing and sales activities have to be performed. As already 
mentioned within the value creation section, complementarities in sales have 
not been achieved for several reasons (see also ‘value creation’ Section 4.2.2). 
Furthermore, local technicians were good with installation services, but often 
failed when sales leads were transferred to them. In addition, with marketing 
activities around the connected home, retail partners like retailers for consumer 
electronics (e.g. “Saturn” or “Mediamarkt”) have also, in the past, not partnered 
with power utility firms. Furthermore, the development of e-commerce stores 
has also been a new activity for power utility firms. Within marketing campaigns, 
customers have to gain an understanding of why power utility firms are offering 
such new product categories. This is particularly valid in the case of the 
connected home technologies that were rather associated with the 
telecommunications, consumer electronics and internet industries. Distributed 
generation however, was regarded as cannibalisation with respect to the 
commodity-selling business model. 
In addition, power utilities have created bundles in product management, 
developed revenue models (‘build and sell’, ‘leasing’, ‘contracting’, etc.) and 
further organised after-sales and support services. Firstly, with after-sales and 
maintenance activities, power utility firms had to hire technical support call-
centres to provide a support hotline. Secondly, technicians that had installed the 
devices also have to be responsible for maintenance tasks.  
In summary, with retail business models, power utility firms had to establish 
almost entirely new processes and activities around an entirely new primary 
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value chain where only few complementarities could be leveraged. 
Furthermore, partner management within these co-operations has also not been 
a discipline in the past and incumbent power utility firms still face tremendous 
challenges. One MNU manager noted, "when it's a case of negotiating 
contracts, when it's a case of managing partners, purchasing any sort of 
equipment, then it really becomes increasingly brutally difficult." 
Value chain reconfiguration: Prosumer-orientated business models 
As mentioned before, industry experts consider that ‘prosumers’ will participate 
in different distributed renewable generation business models in the future. 
Therefore, they are expected to shift from a passive role as consumers of 
electricity to an active role as ‘prosumers’. In this new role, the customer is not 
only a consumer who starts producing energy and eventually becomes 
independent of the central power utility, but also plays an active part in the new 
market design. As a consequence, ‘prosumers’ carry out a central role in the re-
configured value chain and could eventually become actors at the very centre of 
these new business models. So within these new business models, the value 
chain is expected not to be linear anymore, but to be organised around the 
‘prosumer’ and a network of partners that orbit around that ‘prosumer’. In this 
case, the ‘prosumer’ could have interrelations with various actors such as 
aggregators that operate VPPs and ‘two-sided market platforms’, distributed 
system grid operators (DSO), power utility firms as suppliers for the surplus flow 
delivery of electricity and, if organised, an intelligent metering system (iMSys) 
infrastructure provider (see Figure 13 overpage). 
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Figure 13: Value network structure in ‘prosumer’ business models 
Aggregators are responsible for dealing with model optimisation for customer 
flexibility aggregation. They are used as a messenger between generation (e.g. 
both large-scale renewable and distributed renewable generation) and 
customers that offer variability in their usage patterns (e.g. refrigerated 
warehouses). Therefore, aggregators usually operate a VPP that links up 
distributed generation sources (e.g. micro-combined heat and power systems, 
solar PV rooftop and wind turbines), distributed storage devices and demand 
response (loads that can be switched off) to form an integrated network. 
Consequently, large IT capacities are needed to automatically steer VPPs 
based on algorithms. Besides demand response measurements, the linked up 
distributed generation sources can also be traded at the “European Energy 
Exchange” (EEX) or used as the so-called ‘minute reserve range’ in the 
transmission network (TSO) to enable the provision of system services. To 
collect more distributed generators for the VPP, ‘two-sided market platform’ 
business models could extend the VPP by offering ‘prosumers’ a digital platform 
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where they can join in with their generated surplus power. Therefore, the 
general idea is that ‘prosumers’ exchange their self-produced surplus electricity 
with other ‘prosumers’ or consumers over an electronic platform like “Uber” or 
“Airbnb”, which is integrated in the VPP. Currently such ‘two-sided market 
platform’ models can be regarded as simple marketing ideas. The physical 
exchange of energy quantities cannot be performed directly and it happens only 
virtually. So, as a matter of fact, the amounts will be measured within one 
accounting grid and exactly balanced. However, an exchange from one 
consumer to another of exactly the fed-in renewable sources does not take 
place.  
Lastly, ‘prosumers’ need a smart grid with an intelligent metering system 
infrastructure (iMSys). This means they have to decide if they prefer to stay with 
the DSO as their intelligent metering system provider or if they want to switch to 
a competitive metering provider. As yet, no products or services exist as this 
system has only been recently developed by the regulator. The regulator has 
obligated DSOs to build in iMSys starting in 2017. As the regulator also has 
defined price caps, a strong competition in this field for stand-alone metering 
solutions is not expected. Nevertheless, with bundling offers, competition 
around new business models in this area will eventually evolve. 
In comparison to the activities within the classical vertically-integrated value 
chain of incumbent power utility firms, incumbent firms will certainly only 
perform the highly regulated DSO market role in the new prosumer-orientated, 
distributed world. Although a power utility firm can also carry out aggregator 
models, they have to compete with players from different industries. Besides the 
DSO role, power utility firms can supply ‘prosumers’ with the surplus flow 
delivery of electricity, but only if these consumers do not receive the surplus 
flow delivery of electricity directly from their aggregator. If the aggregator 
performs this task and if power utilities have not become the aggregator, they 
will miss out on these revenues in the future. 
Key activities within these prosumer-orientated business models are: IT-
architecture developments, data analytics, energy trading and management of 
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TSO-areas, marketing and sales activities to promote platforms and to acquire 
customers that participate in VPPs. As mentioned before, IT resources in power 
utility firms, in most cases, have different skill-sets than those needed with the 
digital models outlined around distributed renewable generation. As external 
players could perform the majority of activities within this new value chain, 
power utility firms will have to solve this tremendous challenge to succeed with 
these new, potentially disruptive business models.  
4.2.3.3 Key partners  
This section highlights the key partners for the management of general 
business model innovation activities, and the outlined examples of retail and 
prosumer-orientated business models.  
Within the conduct of general business model innovation activities, power utility 
firms are largely working with IT developers, management consultancies, 
universities, and trend and market research firms. Furthermore, in particular 
with pilot activities, they also work with research-orientated institutions such as 
“Fraunhofer ISE”. All of the above-mentioned actors are involved in the process 
of business model innovation activities and help line and project managers to 
perform different business model innovation activities within the incumbent firm. 
With many of these partnerships, ties have already existed within the old 
business model area. Nevertheless, in the IT area, incumbent firms have not 
partnered with IT developers, but rather had service agreements with large 
hardware and software firms (e.g. “Microsoft”, “Oracle”, “SAP”). As these new 
business model innovation activities are largely IT-based, software and 
application developers have to be integrated early in the development of 
business model innovation activities to design prototypes. Although 
management consultancies, universities and research-orientated institutions, 
trend and market research agencies have co-operated with incumbent power 
utility firms in the past, the ways of working and the methods deployed have 
radically changed. For instance, the integration of the customer perspective 
(e.g. with ‘design thinking’ methods) is performed at a much earlier stage and 
has gained in importance. This is confirmed by one MNU manager who stated 
that it "[...] will be a completely new partnership structure, where the different 
148 
 
roles supplement each other, and they will only also be successful when they 
provide value for the customer." 
Thus methods have also changed a great deal. As business case calculations 
in the past were performed after the ideation stage, today they are rescheduled 
into the integration stage with potentially disruptive business model innovation 
activities. 
Key partners with retail business models 
As already portrayed with retail models, a very different partnering structure is 
needed. Firstly, to achieve competitive buying conditions, MNU firms have 
partnered directly with hardware OEMs for solar PV rooftop modules such as 
“Canadian Solar”, “Sharp” or “Solarworld”. They have partnerships for inverters 
like “SMA Solar Technology”, for distributed storage such as “Sonnen” and for 
connected home components such as “eQ-3”, “HomeMatic” and “Bitron Home”. 
Here, it is important to mention, MNU firms have disrupted the three-way 
system of hardware OEMs, distributors and technicians adopting the market 
role of a distributor for them. This is really a novelty, as power utility firms used 
to procure their electrical installation material from wholesalers for decades. 
Furthermore, for clean-tech manufacturers to partner with power utility firms 
with large nuclear and thermal generation sources, it was not a likely 
occurrence, as many of these firms follow an environmentally conscious 
ideology. Thus, the first partnering approaches of incumbent firms towards 
manufacturers of renewable generation were quite challenging – as 
substantiated by one MNU respondent: 
"But in the meantime, what I wanted to say with the solar PV example is, that 
when we approached the various big players, they slammed the door shut. In 
the meantime, it has simply become accepted that we really are serious about 
this and the huge advantage we bring is simply our customers. And with that 
we're attractive even for those who at the next conference have no compunction 
about ranting over the big ones but then also talking with us behind closed 
doors and developing business models and moving things forward." 
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Secondly, both power utility firms have partnered with IT and web developers to 
design monitoring apps for distributed solar PV generation, steering apps for 
connected home devices and to implement e-commerce platforms.  
Thirdly, distribution partners for logistics and storage on a nationwide-basis had 
to be organised. This was certainly an immense challenge. As one MNU 
respondent explained, "previously, we channelled energy and gas around. 
Suddenly we need someone who in the corner fields in Bavaria now dismantles 
the 3.5 KW solar PV system, places it on a lorry and takes it to Schleswig-
Holstein. A completely new challenge." 
And fourthly, power utility incumbents had to partner with local technicians for 
solar PV rooftop installation services. As a result, all interviewed power utility 
managers have agreed that for installation service within the field of energy 
services around distributed generation, a close co-operation with local 
technicians is essential. A comment from one MNU is that "in the new world, 
when we are talking about energy solutions, it isn't possible without the 
technician. That's a decisive finding. I need my own installation group. It isn't 
possible without them." 
Key partners with ‘prosumer’ business models 
As mentioned, ‘prosumer’ models are highly disruptive for incumbent power 
utility firms. As these models orbit around the ‘prosumer’, power utility firms 
have to position themselves as key partners to these ‘prosumers’. According to 
the interviewees, they have to create aggregator business models (e.g. around 
VPP and demand response technologies) that offer convincing value 
propositions to ‘prosumers’. In these aggregator or flexibility marketing business 
models, utilities in particular, have to partner with IT developers to create high 
performance steering tools for VPPs. Furthermore, in 2017 intelligent metering 
system services within the value-adding step of the distribution grid will be 
obligatory, and at the same time, competitively organised. As a consequence, 
homeowners can switch to a competitive iMSys provider and to new energy 
suppliers including aggregators who will eventually bundle flexibility marketing 
with smart metering services. From this background, incumbent power utility 
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firms have to build up strong partnerships with smart metering device 
manufacturers to achieve competitive pricing. As most VPPs will be nationally 
orientated, RPU firms in particular, might consider partnering with other local 
technicians to realise nationwide installation services for smart metering 
devices. 
In general, incumbent power utility firms are convinced that co-operation within 
the Energiewende industry is extremely important and necessary to succeed 
within the new market design -  as one MNU manager stated, 
"Because one can't achieve this alone [...] means, we also believe, that we have 
to live in partnerships. I am convinced of that." 
Furthermore, power utility firms have also started to partner with start-up firms 
in different areas. An MNU manager described how, (see also start-up case 
study B) "we offer start-ups a share in certain models. They hope that their 
business model will then continue to develop, that they can show it works." 
4.2.3.4 Section summary and outlook 
Based on Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) this section has portrayed ‘key 
resources’, ‘key activities’ and ‘key partners’ for the featured business model 
innovation activities.  
The most important finding with ‘key resources’ has been the necessity for 
cultural change and the development of employee capabilities for business 
model innovations. As long as these incumbents do not transform their 
corporate cultures, business model change will be extremely difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, critical success factors and organisational barriers regarding 
resources for business model innovation have been analysed. The critical 
success factors are: an executive sponsor from the management board, new 
skill-sets of employees with particular emphasis on innovative capabilities and 
IT/data-analytics skills, sufficient funding of business model innovation projects 
and leadership skills to successfully manage business model innovation 
activities. 
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With organisational barriers, the greatest barrier has been the dominant logic of 
the firm with its underlying prevailing business model. Furthermore, 
organisational inertia, resources with less innovative capabilities, a general lack 
of resources (with the adequate skill-set), too many business model innovation 
efforts at the same time (especially with RPU firms), wrong incentive systems, 
hierarchies and silo-thinking have all been barriers to business model 
innovation activities. 
Within ‘key activities’, core activities for the general conduct of business model 
innovation activities and value chain reconfigurations regarding current retail 
and future prosumer-orientated business models have been presented. 
Therefore, as key activities, the interviewed respondents have pointed out 
market research and foresight, innovation and project management, networking 
and change management activities. Interestingly, with future prosumer-
orientated business models, they have outlined activities around new flexibility 
marketing and aggregator approaches based on VPPs.  
Last but not least, with ‘key partners’, the same logic was followed. Core 
partners for the general conduct of business model innovation activities and 
value chain reconfigurations regarding current retail and future prosumer-
orientated business models have been presented. Thereby, the respondent 
managers have viewed IT developers, management consultants, universities 
and research-orientated institutions and trend and market research firms as 
core partners for the general conduct of business model innovation activities 
and, particularly, ‘prosumers’, manufacturers of energy systems, logistic 
partners and technicians for the implementation of business model innovation 
activities. 
In the next Section 4.2.4, the business model innovation factors impacting 
‘value capture’ will be presented. 
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4.2.4 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value capture’ 
The following section on ‘value capture’ will describe the applied business 
model archetypes, the revenue streams and cost structures within the focused 
business model innovation activities. 
4.2.4.1 Business model archetypes 
Business model archetypes have been defined as a special configuration of the 
business model elements. As shown in Table 15 the featured power utility firms 
have applied six different archetypes. All incumbent power utility firms perform 
the old, commodity-selling business model (‘utility model’) in an integrator 
approach along the vertically-integrated value chain (generation, trading, 
transmission and distribution, metering, sales and services). With this ‘on-
demand’ model, the actual usage of a service or product is metered (‘metered-
usage’). Thereby, a ‘pay-per-use’ model to generate revenues is applied. In this 
model the customer pays on the basis of what he or she effectively consumes. 
The use of electricity is metered and, according to the customer segment, is 
billed monthly or annually (Brynjolfsson et al., 2010; Gassmann et al., 2013; 
Johnson, 2010; Kley et al., 2011; Rappa, 2010; Sako, 2012). Moreover, as 
integrators, power utilities are in command of the bulk of the steps in a value-
adding process. The control of all resources and capabilities in terms of value 
creation lies with them. Efficiency gains, economies of scope, and lower 
dependencies from suppliers, ideally result in a decrease in costs and can 
increase the stability of value creation (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2007; 
Gassmann et al., 2013; Giesen et al., 2007; Anderson and Markides, 2007; Zott 
and Amit, 2010). 
Incremental business model innovation activities within the old, commodity-
selling business model are expected to move around ‘flat rate’ and ‘no frills’ 
models. As the amount of distributed generation sources is growing, the 
exploitation of the old business model could evolve around ‘flat rate’ models. In 
this case, ‘prosumers’ would pay a flat fee for the needed surplus electricity to 
the power utility firm.  
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In addition, within the B2B area, ‘no frills’ models like “Dow Corning’s Xiameter”, 
could also become the new standard in the power utility sector. In this model, 
large industrial customers would access an e-business trading platform and buy 
their needed electricity for almost zero transaction costs. 
BM archetype Firm examples 
Value chain 
perspective 
Revenue model Evolution 
Utility model 
All vertically-
integrated 
power utilities  
Integrator along 
the vertically-
integrated value 
chain 
Pay per use; pay as 
you go 
Flat rate and 
no-frills 
Retail model 
EnBW, E.ON 
and RWE/ 
Innogy 
Orchestrator of 
internal and 
external value 
chain activities 
Direct sales, rent 
instead of 
buy/leasing  
 
Build and sell 
RWE/Innogy, 
EWE (EQOO) 
Layer player 
Direct sales, rent 
instead of 
buy/leasing 
 
White label 
EWE (EQOO), 
RheinEnergie 
Layer player 
Subscription fee and 
revenue sharing  
 
Contracting RWE/Innogy Layer player 
Subscription fee and 
pay per use 
 
Energy 
solution 
provider  
n/a Orchestrator 
Contracting fees, 
pay per use, direct 
sales, leasing, etc. 
Aggregator 
with two-
sided market 
platform 
Table 15: Existing and future BM archetypes of featured power utilities  
As mentioned before, retail models have been employed around connected 
home and distributed generation technologies, applying ‘direct sales’ or ‘rent 
instead of buy/leasing’ models to generate revenues. In this case, MNU firms 
have skipped intermediaries and have directly made contracts with OEM 
hardware manufacturers (e.g. “Solarworld”). In this way, firms have adopted an 
orchestrator role and tried to focus on the core competencies within the value 
chain, e.g. sales and marketing to leverage their large customer bases. The 
other value chain segments are outsourced and actively coordinated. This 
allows power utility firms to reduce costs and benefit from the suppliers' 
economies of scale. Furthermore, the focus on core competencies could 
increase performance (Fung et al., 2007; Gassmann et al., 2013; Möller et al., 
2005; Ritala et al., 2009). One RPU firm has bought a solar PV storage 
manufacturing firm and performs a ‘build and sell’ model. 
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In the above-mentioned retail model, power utilities have also left behind their 
rather risk-averse dominant logic of the firm as they have, for instance, 
committed to certain quantities of hardware components in advance with 
supplier contracts. 
Besides retail models, incumbent firms have developed ‘white label’ models. 
These firms do not only perform retail models, particularly with domestic and 
SME customers, they also market their business model concepts following a 
‘white label’ approach to other power utility firms. The ‘white label’ producer 
allows other power utility firms to distribute its ‘white label’ product or service 
under their brands, so that it appears as if they are made by them (Chan and 
Chung, 2002; Chung et al., 2004; Gassmann et al., 2013; Gottfredson et al., 
2005). In so doing, potential partners have to pay a single subscription fee to 
enter the alliance and afterwards perform a revenue-sharing model. 
In ‘contracting’ models power utility firms’ technological expertise and 
economies of scale result in lower production and maintenance costs of a 
distributed generation device (e.g. combined heat and power or solar PV 
generation plants). These cost reductions can be passed on to the customer. In 
general, power utilities operate ‘contracting’ models. This is when the product 
remains the property of the power utilities and is operated by them. Customers 
pay them a monthly fee for the operation and, in the case of CHP, they also pay 
for the bundled natural gas supply. 
The same is true for the revenue models ‘rent instead of buy’ or ‘leasing’. Here 
also a monthly fee is generated. In the future, these models could also be 
bundled with an aggregator model. In this case, firms could pay a lesser 
monthly fee if they allow the power utility to steer their distributed generation, 
distributed storage or electric vehicle battery (‘vehicle-to-grid’) within a VPP.  
According to respondent managers with the rather disruptive business model 
innovation activities (e.g. around flexibility marketing or aggregator models), 
incumbent power utility firms would also like to become an orchestrator who 
manages the activities of the new business model around the ‘prosumer’ with 
different partners from different industries. For instance, one MNU manager has 
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provided an example of a business model innovation activity, which is currently 
processed, with partners from the automotive, software and the power utility 
industry. Power utility firms would perform a customer value proposition (CVP) 
as an energy solution provider around flexibility marketing (e.g. aggregator), 
connected home, distributed generation and electrification models (e.g. electric 
vehicle infrastructure). 
As such, as a full service provider, power utility firms could offer total coverage 
of energy products and services, consolidated around their customer interfaces. 
By becoming a full service provider for energy solutions, power utility firms can 
prevent revenue losses by extending their services. Thereby, especially MNU 
managers, regard platform business models based on aggregator models (e.g. 
VPPs and demand response) as interesting CVPs. As one MNU manager has 
noted, he is "[...] convinced that, in the long term, such platform models will 
assert themselves." 
4.2.4.2 Revenue streams 
Within the revenue streams section, the current situation along the classical, 
integrated value chain will be portrayed. Furthermore, potential revenues in 
retail and prosumer-orientated business models will be outlined. Last but not 
least, the revenue volumes of the old and new business models will be 
contrasted. 
Firstly, and in contrast to EBIT figures, incumbent power utility firms do not 
overall have a revenue problem with commodity sales. In a recent publication of 
the “BDEW”, the biggest Association of the Energy Industry in Germany, an 
increase in electricity sales revenues in the power utility industry between 2000-
2013 is documented (BDEW, 2016). Between 2013 and 2014 revenues have 
declined by 3.6% and between 2014 and 2015 they have been stable. From 
2000 to 2015 the power utilities have recorded an electricity sales revenue 
growth of 224% (see Table 16 overpage). 
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Year 
Revenues 
Electricity 
Sales  
(in €bn) 
2000 36.0 
2001 37.5 
2002 40.5 
2003 43.5 
2004 47.0 
2005 51.5 
2006 56.5 
2007 58.0 
2008 62.0 
2009 63.5 
2010 67.0 
2011 71.5 
2012 76.0 
2013 83.5 
2014 80.5 
2015 80.5 
Table 16: Revenues of power utility industry electricity sales  
Furthermore, revenue figures within the other value-adding activities of the old 
business model (e.g. generation, trading, transmission and distribution) do not 
show any significant changes. Almost all firms have shown revenue gains in 
comparison to 2014 within the field of renewable generation.  
 
(*revenue from segment Germany; **converted from SEK) 
Figure 14: Revenues of MNU firms in 2014 and 2015 
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MNU firms have recorded total revenues of €83.3 billion in 2015 (see Figure 14 
above). In comparison to 2014 revenues have increased by approximately 3%. 
RPU firms have achieved revenues of €17.2 billion in 2015 (see Figure 15 
below). In comparison to 2014 revenues have decreased by approximately 4%. 
 
Figure 15: Revenues of RPU firms in 2014 and 2015 
This analysis of the current revenue figures of both MNU and RPU firms 
underlines that new business model innovation activities will face a tremendous 
challenge to compensate for potential missing future revenues from the old 
business model. Recently, the revenue gap between the old, commodity-selling 
business model and new non-commodity business models was huge, as two 
RPU managers have explained: 
"Well, it will then move much more into this service sector, and when one now 
offers these classic energy services that we currently have, then we won't be 
making the thousand million, that's quite clear." 
"So this retail and consumer-oriented energy service business, we are talking 
there perhaps about an annual turnover of €60 million. While we are talking in 
the [...] commodity business about €3.5 billons." 
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For the current retail and future prosumer-orientated business models, 
incumbent power utility managers do not expect these business models to 
substitute revenues from the old one. As two respondents from different MNU 
firms have noted: 
"Non-commodity won't be able to absorb it. Quite simple. Non-commodity will 
not be able to make up for the loss in the commodity business." 
"I don't think that can even be compensated for by any sort of business model, 
at least not by those that I currently see, these Energiewende business 
models." 
In retail business models around connected home, distributed generation and 
electric vehicles, the revenue potential is far away from the old market volume, 
as power utility firms enter a fragmented, highly competitive market. Under 
these market conditions, they will only be available to perform certain parts of 
the value chain, taking on an orchestrator role. This is as opposed to the 
electricity value chain, in which they have had, to all intents and purposes, a 
monopoly in certain value-adding activities and have performed the entire value 
chain taking an integrator role.  
The same is true for prosumer-orientated business models. In the ideal case, 
power utility firms will perform a role as an orchestrator managing VPPs, the 
supply of surplus electricity and the intelligent metering system. As this newly 
evolving flexibility marketing/aggregator market is expected to have a 
fragmented nature with many players from different industries, the potential 
market volume for power utility firms will also not be comparable to the old 
business model.   
4.2.4.3 Cost structures 
The old business model of power utility firms was largely asset-based. 
Throughout the vertically-integrated value chain, large assets had to be built, 
operated and maintained. These assets started with large-scale power plants 
(e.g. €350 million investment for a rather small gas-fired power plant), over 
distribution grids with high maintenance costs and expensive IT-systems (e.g. 
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billing, CRM, trading systems) within the sales and trading domains. As these 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) costs were so high, in the past operational 
expenditures (OPEX) costs, especially as regards human resources, did play a 
supporting role on the balance sheet. As a consequence, these incumbent 
power utility firms have recruited many employees and, as a result, are today 
highly overstaffed. As already mentioned, within business model transformation 
initiatives, these firms have tried to leverage efficiencies and MNU firms in 
particular have run cost-cutting campaigns. In the future, “RWE” plans to further 
restructure and cut an additional 2,300 jobs. “E.ON” plans to cut €0.5 billion of 
costs with its de-merger “Uniper” (Handelsblatt, 2016a). 
In contrast, for RPU firms, which have municipal shareholder structure, such 
measurements are challenging to implement. In addition, both MNU and RPU 
firms are union-driven and have strong employee representations. As a 
consequence, for the further exploitation of the old, commodity-selling business 
model it will be very demanding to sustain the old business model by cutting 
costs. 
Looking at the integrated value chain, respondent power utility firms have 
already shut down thermal power plants, as OPEX costs were much higher than 
wholesale prices.  
Within the highly regulated distribution grid, power firms are confronted with a 
price-cap regulation. In a five-year cycle, the “Federal Network Agency for 
Electricity” audits the cost structures and sets up the power grid fees. Hence, 
cost structures are benchmarked and the regulator enforces economies.  
In the sales domain, as already mentioned, complementarities with sales 
representatives and marketing staff between the old business model and the 
new business model innovation activities have been difficult to achieve and, 
indeed, have not yet been achieved. In this context, power utility managers face 
the challenge to, on the one hand, hire new employees that have the 
capabilities to transform the business model and explore new business models, 
while on the other hand, they have to exploit the existing workforce. Currently, 
power utility firms are hiring many people from other industries to transform the 
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culture, while they keep to the existing resources within the old business model. 
Regarding cost structures, these initiatives are rather counterproductive, as 
costs are rising. 
Furthermore, the value chain reconfigurations of retail, prosumer-orientated 
business models, with contrasting value-adding steps in the direction of the old 
business model, limit the leverage of complementarities. In these cases, many 
respondent managers expect the installation of further employees including 
additional cost structures. 
4.2.4.4 Profitability 
In contrast to the development of revenue streams, incumbent power utility 
firms have experienced steep declines in profitability. With MNU firms, the 
highest decline in EBIT figures has taken place within the value-adding step of 
conventional power generation. For instance, “RWE”, in terms of revenue, the 
biggest power utility firm in Germany in 2015, has faced an EBIT decrease of 
86% between 2010 and 2015 in the area of conventional power generation in 
Germany (see Table 17 below).  
RWE: Conventional power generation – EBIT 
Year EBIT (€bn) Per cent (y/y) 2010-2015 
2015 0.54 -45% 
-86% 
2014 0.98 -29% 
2013 1.38 -55% 
2012 3.04 13% 
2011 2.70 -33% 
2010 4.00   
Table 17: RWE AG – conventional power generation EBIT 2010 – 2015 
Such a decline in this rather short time-period is tremendous and documents 
the penetrating affect of German Energiewende on this value-adding step. 
Although, the firm has increased its EBIT with large-scale renewable generation 
at the same time by 585% the realised €493 million (see Table 18 overpage) in 
2015 does not compensate for the loss of €3.46 billion in conventional 
generation.  
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RWE: Renewable power generation – EBIT  
Year EBIT (€m) Per cent (y/y) 2010-2015 
2015 493 165% 
585% 
2014 186 -5% 
2013 196 7% 
2012 183 1% 
2011 181 151% 
2010 72   
Table 18: RWE AG – renewable generation EBIT 2010 – 2015 
EBIT figures of distributed generation are expected to be much smaller in this 
area, a suggestion supported by one MNU manager: 
"But what I naturally can't live with is that it doesn't help me at all when in the 
process of generation, where currently 6 billion EBIT have already shrivelled to 
600 million for [the MNU firm]. And the end still isn't in sight. And for the 
decentral units it has grown, well when I only look at [the MNU firm] energy 
service as a ridiculously small firm, it has grown from, well, let's say 5 to 30 
million. Yes, there's a factor of 200 between those. That is the small problem." 
Other MNU firms have reacted towards this EBIT decline and have also 
implemented high profitability objectives for distributed generation, as one MNU 
manager explained: "Well, it has clearly contributed to their being an aim, which 
is now a 100 million euro contribution margin from non-commodities in 2020." 
The above-mentioned stark EBIT decline within large-scale conventional 
generation is representative for the entire MNU firms’ category. In the other 
value-adding steps, along the vertically-integrated value chain, no such 
significant movements could be recognised in Germany. Moreover, total EBIT 
figures of MNU firms are not highly informative for this analysis on the impact of 
the German Energiewende. This is because these firms operate internationally 
and have not published single German EBIT figures. 
RPU firms show a different picture. As mentioned before, RPU firms have not 
been affected in the value-adding step of large-scale power generation in the 
same way as MNU firms. In the beginning of this chapter a subtle, but steady 
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decline of these firms was mentioned. This is supported with an exemplary 
analysis of two RPU firms’ EBIT figures between 2010-2015. On the one hand, 
“RheinEnergie AG”, who has experienced an EBIT decline of 30%, and on the 
other hand “MVV AG”, who faced a similar EBIT decrease by 28% (see Tables 
19 and 20 below). 
RheinEnergie: Development of EBIT  
Year EBIT (€m) Per cent (y/y) 2010-2015 
2015 188 16% 
-30% 
2014 162 -22% 
2013 208 -10% 
2012 232 -10% 
2011 258 -3% 
2010 267   
Table 19: RheinEnergie AG – Development of EBIT 2010 – 2015 
 
MVV: Development of EBIT  
Year EBIT (€m) Per cent (y/y) 2010-2015 
2015 175 1% 
-28% 
2014 173 -17% 
2013 208 -7% 
2012 223 -8% 
2011 242 0% 
2010 243   
Table 20: MVV AG – Development of EBIT 2010 – 2015 
Thereby, these RPU firms have lost, on average, 5-6% of EBIT each year. As 
regards the substitution of these declining profitability figures through new 
business model innovation activities, most of the RPU managers are rather 
sceptical, as described by one RPU manager: 
"And even if someone implements super professionally and efficiently [...] even 
if they manage, the municipal power utility firms, they would not be able to make 
much money [with non-commodity business models] because these start-ups 
don't earn much money either." 
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Therefore, in terms of profitability, firms have to run different business model 
innovation activities. This is because managers do not judge a single business 
model innovation activity as substantial enough to compensate for EBIT losses 
in the old business model. Here, one RPU manager has explained the issue: 
"Well, the board is convinced, it isn't a secret, we basically all know that there 
won't be a new business model where one can say it'll save us." 
In general, both groups of MNU and RPU managers see the highest profitability 
in the highly regulated distribution grids. From the background of an evolving 
small-scale, distributed generation world within Energiewende, this ‘cash cow’ 
might vanish. The reason for this is potentially disruptive ‘prosumer’ business 
models will not often make use of distribution grids in the future. One 
respondent MNU manager commented: 
"When we achieve a level of consumers being 100% self-sufficient, and that will 
probably happen at some point in the future, then the biggest revenue bringer, 
namely the distribution network, will at some point disappear because the 
network then isn't there anymore because I have everything small and decentral 
[...]."  
In the next step, an outlook from the respondent managers on profitability 
figures in the future will be presented. Within the interviews, power utility 
incumbent managers were also asked to reflect quantitatively about potential 
future EBIT changes by 2020, looking at every value-adding step within the 
inherent value chain of the power utility industry (see Table 21 below). 
 
MNU firms RPU firms 
Incumbent power 
utilities overall 
Large scale conv. 
gen. 
-35% -9% -22% 
Large scale 
renewable gen. 
+3% +2% 2-3% 
Trading -16% +9% -6% 
Transmission and 
distribution 
-7% Stable -3% 
Sales and supply +9% -10% Stable 
Table 21: Potential EBIT changes by 2020 within the inherent value chain (in per cent) 
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Therefore, a large consensus has been reached between interviewed 
respondents that large-scale conventional generation will further decrease by 
22% by 2020. This is remarkable, as EBIT figures are already dramatically 
dropping according to the current EBIT analysis in this section. Interestingly, 
MNU firms that largely run conventional generation plants, expect still another 
sharp decline by 35%, while RPU firms who are not affected in the same way as 
MNU firms, expect a decline by only 9%. With large-scale renewable 
generation, power utility firms expect a slight increase by 2-3%. They argue, 
renewable generation will shift from large to small scale as regulatory decisions 
(e.g. “Renewable Energy Sources Act 2017”) make large-scale renewable 
generation less attractive for high growth scenarios. Trading will slightly 
decrease by 6%, as respondents expect revenues from trading that are 
interlinked with large-scale generation to decrease and, at the same time, 
profits from VPP activities to increase. Interestingly, MNU and RPU firms have 
different views on that. While MNU firms expect a decline by 16%, RPU firms 
expect an increase of 9%. This is reasonable, as MNU are more greatly 
affected by generation losses, while RPU firms might leverage the potential of 
flexibility marketing/aggregator models including the steering of VPPs. With 
transmission and distribution grids, respondents expect a rather stable 
development taking this five-year perspective. This is because, as this value-
adding step is highly regulated and distributed, generation models are expected 
to make a significant impact by 2025. Lastly, with sales and supply, on average, 
respondents are rather optimistic and expect a steady development. While the 
commodity-selling business model is expected to decrease and revenues of 
business model innovation activities are not yet expected to compensate the 
losses within the old business model, the respondent managers, particularly of 
MNU firms, expect further cost-cutting measurements and see a potential 
increase by 9%. MNU managers expect this value-adding step to decline, as 
they do not see the same potential with cost-cutting measurements as 
comparable to MNU firms in their entities. 
Overall, this expert assessment predicts a further decline of EBIT figures with 
both MNU and RPU firms. As extreme cost optimisations are not possible with 
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many firms (especially RPU firms) this analysis underlines the importance to 
overcome the challenges to business model innovation.  
4.2.4.5 Sections summary and outlook 
In this ‘value capture’ section, the applied business model archetypes have 
been presented. Incumbent power utility firms have applied three different value 
chain-orientated business model archetypes: integrator, orchestrator and layer 
player models. While the integrator model is applied within the old business 
models, orchestrator and layer player models are applied with business model 
innovation activities.  
Moreover, the utility business model, with the old business model, ‘retail’, ‘build 
and sell’, ‘white-label’, ‘contracting’, ‘energy solutions provider’ and 
‘subscription’ or ‘rent instead of buy’/’leasing’ models (with business model 
innovation activities) are performed as business model archetypes.  
This research has clearly pointed out that power utility firms face a profitability 
problem. While one exemplary MNU firm has lost 86%, or, in absolute figures 
€3.46 billion of its EBIT within the conventional generation domain between 
2010 and 2015, two exemplary RPU firms have experienced a steady EBIT 
decline of 5-6% each year between 2010 and 2015. Thus, until 2020, MNU 
managers expect further decreases by 35% (22% in total) in the conventional 
generation domain. At the same time, they do not see substitutional effects from 
new non-commodity business models. Indeed, the expected revenues from the 
non-commodity field are in the millions, while in the past, commodity revenues 
from the old business model generated several billion euro.  
Concerning cost structures, power utility firms had operated in a largely asset-
based business with high CAPEX in comparison to rather low OPEX structures. 
In this context, human resources did not play a major role on the balance sheet 
and these firms have built up large numbers of employees over the last 
decades. Recently, they have started to carry out cost-cutting exercises to 
reduce their employed staff, due to overstaffing. These efforts, to gain on 
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efficiencies, have been largely realised with MNU firms, while RPU firms, with 
their municipal structures, did not yet make any redundancies. 
In the section to follow, the clean-tech start-up case study will be portrayed. As 
this thesis, on the whole, is taking an incumbent perspective, a large emphasis 
has been on the learning from the business model innovation activities of these 
clean-tech start-up firms for power utility incumbents.  
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4.3 Case B: Clean-tech start-up firms 
This case study presents the findings of the clean-technology (“clean-tech”) 
start-up firms. It has focused on clean-tech start-ups that have developed new 
business model designs influenced by Energiewende in the technological areas 
of distributed renewable generation and storage, flexibility marketing (e.g. VPPs 
and demand response), energy efficiency and electrification (e.g. electric 
vehicle infrastructure).  
4.3.1 Overarching process 
In this section, the starting point towards business model innovation, the applied 
technologies within business model innovation in this clean-tech area, the 
business model innovation processes and organisation of business model 
innovation activities of clean-tech start-up firms will be presented.  
4.3.1.1 Environmental awareness of founders 
Almost all founders of clean-tech start-up firms have an impetus for sustainable, 
green business models and the decarbonisation of the energy industry. This 
ideological background is a key driver for the founders of clean-tech start-up 
firms. One founder has explained that “idealism and environmental awareness 
play an outstanding part.” 
Coming from this background of environmental awareness, commitment and 
motivation levels are much higher for these clean-tech new business model 
designs. This is identified by one founder, “[…] it is possibly much easier, 
because the intrinsic motivation is much higher, if you are this kind of guy. It 
gives you a boost if you know that you do the things you do not only for making 
cash, basically, but that they also exist in a context of commitment. Which gives 
you the feeling that you do it not only for yourself and the employees but also 
because you know that you do the right thing. In my view, this can be very 
motivating, which is to say, it is possibly easier to do something meaningful.” 
At the same time, it is important to note, all interviewed founders have not been 
eco fundamentalists. Rather, they have an intrinsic motivation to do something 
168 
 
positive for the environment and, at the same time, gain profits with innovative 
and sustainable business models in an evolving Energiewende industry. 
Moreover, some founders have developed a great fascination for clean-
technologies, such as solar PV generation and storage. This passion for these 
new technologies was the key motivation for them to found their new firm, 
explained by one founder that “it wasn’t the motivation of the founders to say: 
Let’s do something with sustainability. From the beginning to the present day, 
the whole foundation was based on a true fascination and enthusiasm for 
photovoltaics, storage technologies and the question, how it is possible to 
increase their share?” 
Furthermore, the sustainable orientation of clean-tech start-ups has also 
boosted their attractiveness for environmentally-conscious employees. As start-
up firms are naturally not able to pay high salaries, these sustainability issues 
have facilitated recruiting activities with new employees and aided long-term 
employee retention. In this regard, one founder has explained that “as a start-
up, we have to react to the market in a disruptive, agile and much faster way. 
This we can only achieve with highly motivated employees. You cannot buy this 
with money. Money is a matter of hygiene, but true motivation is intrinsic, 
namely to contribute to the plan of a sustainable energy supply system.” 
In summary, although all founders have an interest to generate profits with their 
business models, they are also driven by a high motivation for sustainability 
issues and clean-technologies that goes beyond making money. Thereby, both 
founders and employees are driven by the will to become game changers as 
regards a sustainable, decarbonised and distributed energy systems from the 
background of environmental awareness and an interest in green technologies.  
4.3.1.2 Applied technologies with clean-tech start-up firms 
Clean-tech start-up business models apply the core Energiewende technologies 
in the areas of distributed renewable generation and storage, flexibility 
marketing/aggregator models (e.g. VPP and demand response), energy 
efficiency (e.g. connected home) and electrification (e.g. electric vehicles) (see 
Table 22 overpage). 
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Distributed gen. 
and storage 
Flexibility 
marketing 
Energy efficiency Electrification 
DZ-4 EnerNOC/Entelios alpha.one eMio 
Greenergetic Greencom Networks awaju The Mobility House 
Lumenaza Grundgrün Greenpocket ubitricity 
Powervault Kiwigrid Leko Homes Unumotors 
Powerwall – The 
Tesla Homebattery 
LichtBlick 
SchwarmDirigent 
Rockethome  
Younicos Limejump tado  
Sonnen Next Kraftwerke Thermondo  
Sunfire Tempus Energy   
Sungevity NL    
Table 22: Core technologies of selected clean-tech start-up firms 
Although these featured start-ups have implemented business model 
innovations in the same technology categories, most of them offer different 
business model concepts. For instance, in the category of distributed renewable 
generation “Greenergetic” offers an e-commerce platform for distributed 
renewable generation technologies - marketed to power utility firms as a ‘white 
label’. Meanwhile “Sonnen”, in its core business, manufactures and sells solar 
PV battery storage devices to domestic customers (see also ‘business model 
archetypes’ in the ‘value capture’ Section 4.3.4.1). 
In this way, the different categories, are, already to some extent blurred and 
might become even more blurred in the future. Start-ups, for instance, which 
have worked with retail models selling distributed renewable generation and/or 
connected home technologies will, for example, offer flexibility 
marketing/aggregator or platform models. This also has to be regarded in the 
context of the German Energiewende, in which different industries are going to 
converge into an evolving Energiewende industry – a process currently 
happening and one which will continue to be ongoing process. For instance, the 
start-up “Sonnen”, who initially started as a manufacturer for solar PV storage 
batteries, recently announced a new community peer-to-peer platform for 
‘prosumers’ to buy and sell surplus power units in a VPP. 
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4.3.1.3 Business model innovation process 
First of all, all researched firms, with the exception of one entity have built their 
start-up firms following a ‘greenfield’ approach. This is critical, as they could 
openly innovate their new business model designs. They did not have to 
consider any existing structures or prevailing business model concepts that 
might have hindered them in their decision-making. 
All interviewed start-up firms did not apply a structured business model 
innovation process. However, they have unconsciously performed stage gate 
processes, which are similar to the process of the ‘4I-framework’. This included 
initiation, ideation, integration, implementation and scaling up stages. Hence, 
they did not intentionally go through the different stages and might not have 
included all of them. As one founder has explained that "[…] I would say, we 
went through the first two phases of the Stage-Gate process informally, so to 
speak. We did not pay much attention to the exact phase we were in." 
Moreover, the process of building the start-up firm and developing the new 
business model design has to be seen as an interlinked, highly interchangeable 
business model innovation activity. In this way, founders have performed many 
quick iterations within the different stages. They are experimenting with the 
business model concept to find out what will work and adapting their strategy to 
changing regulatory and market conditions (e.g. customer demands and 
competition). The preferred method has been a trial-and-error learning 
approach, a method mentioned by all founders in the interviews. Other 
methods, such as lean start-up, design thinking and visual approaches like the 
business model canvas, have been mentioned less. In addition, the early 
involvement of potential customers has been important for all start-up 
interviewees. 
The following quotes highlight the predominant thinking in this area:  
“No, first you need a conceptual design. We had covered this right at the 
beginning by visual approaches like the Business Model Canvas to have 
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something to work with. The rest was done with models of market attractiveness 
and follow ups. And of course the iteration process.” 
"Well, there were many meetings, also strategy sessions as the development 
moved ahead, but effectively, in a start-up the first months are pretty much trial-
and-error. It's just looking what is working and what is not." 
Initiation and ideation stages 
In almost all instances the founder or the founding team have developed a 
vision and a general idea of the new business model design before business 
model innovation activities have been started. As a consequence, both the 
initiation and ideation phase has been mostly completed in the ‘minds’ of the 
founder or the founding team, as one founder remembered, "I didn't put much in 
writing. A little bit, yes, but the most part was just in my head." 
In only one instance, both founders approached their business model innovation 
activity in a conceptual way and carried out brainstorming sessions around the 
different layers of the business model canvas.  
Furthermore, most of the firms have developed entire new business model 
designs, in which they have adapted business model archetypes from other 
industries, while two start-ups (“Greenpocket” with “Opower” and “Greenergetic” 
with “Sungevity”) have adapted already existing business models from the North 
American market. 
Integration and implementation stages 
Within the integration and implementation phases, many start-up firms have 
developed a prototype, which has been presented and marketed to potential 
customers. In this way, the early interaction with potential customers in the new 
business model design is a key activity for all founders, as two founders 
explained: 
"We possibly have a different approach than many others. At our house 
business models are actually developed from practical experience." 
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“We try to be close to it and take up the impulses which the market reflects and 
gives back to us. The good thing about this is that you know exactly what will be 
a real success and what not. So you don’t run into danger of over engineering 
and developing things which are too expensive and nobody buys them or there 
is no demand for it.” 
In most of the respondent firms, until the completion of an early pilot phase with 
a prototype, the team of founders worked in very small design teams (usually 
only the founder’s team with external IT developers) on the successful 
development of the business model. As one respondent has explained: “[…] 
nothing is more important than the iteration between the market and the start-
up. That’s why the design team has to be as small as possible in this particular 
phase, in order to gather all possible expertise for this process. This is the key 
to success.” 
In the implementation phase, all respondent founders have also successfully 
pitched for funding with seed stage venture capitalists (VCs). To receive funds 
within this first investment round, firms had to present a consistent business 
model, business plan and, ideally, first customer contracts as a proof of 
concept. One founder commented, "in fact, we only got the seed-funding 
because we had a viable business model." 
With the initial external funding, the start-ups generally have finished their 
products or services (e.g. production of hardware components and/or 
implementation of IT-architecture, systems and applications), hired their first 
employees and moved on from the pilot stage to implementing the business 
model in the market. In most of the respondent firms, the implementation phase 
lasted between 6–12 months. One start-up has allocated two years for the 
implementation, but has also acquired an EU research project, which has 
sponsored the development of their electric vehicle infrastructure project. 
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Scaling up 
After the implementation phase, start-up firms have started to scale up and to 
grow and reach economies of scale. Usually, to acquire the resources for 
scaling up, they started the second investment round with VCs to pitch for 
additional funds. 
In the entire process of business model innovation, the role of VCs is significant. 
Their importance extends beyond simply funding, but also for the coaching and 
mentoring of the founders. Furthermore, VCs accelerate the development of 
start-up firms, as they set ambitious goals for founders, thereby pushing them to 
their limits. One founder commented that when venture capital has been 
transferred into the start-up firm, "then you've got the pressure to grow. We 
simply didn't grow evolutionary, otherwise we would probably be 12 and not 30 
today. No, we grew on anabolics. We had a lot of pressure." 
4.3.1.4 Organisation of business model innovation 
As mentioned before, the process of building the start-up firm and developing 
the new business model design has to be seen as an interlinked, highly 
interchangeable business model innovation activity. As these researched start-
up firms did not build on an existing organisation in the initiation, ideation, 
integration and to some extent in the implementation stages, the founders have 
performed the initial founding and business model innovation activity 
themselves. After the implementation and scaling up stages, a workforce has 
been established. Nevertheless, business model innovation was still largely 
organised with one of the founders and according to the size of the start-up firm 
in a few instances with corporate development managers. 
Leadership and professional background of founders 
All interviewed founders emphasised the need for strong leadership skills with 
founders or the founding team in a start-up firm.  
As regards the prior professional experience of the founders, the interviewees 
had diverse backgrounds. All interviewed founders already had a professional 
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background with several years of work experience. While one half of the 
interviewees had prior experience with start-ups (largely as founders or VCs), 
the other half worked as consultants or lawyers and had a strong interest in self-
fulfilment, exemplified in the quotes below. On the one hand, some founders 
have already had experiences as serial entrepreneurs, as one founder stated, 
“for me it’s the sixth start-up experience, my co-founder has done one start-up 
yet. We both seem to be driven by the motivation to do something new, to build 
something up. With a product of which we said: That’s cool, that’s what the 
world needs.” On the other side, some founders have developed their start-up 
motivated by a desire for self-fulfilment in their work life. As one founder 
explained, “none of us has started as a serial entrepreneur. Instead it was a 
major step into self-realisation. We decided to finance ourselves for one year, 
until we got venture capital or an angel investment.” 
Furthermore, the interviewees emphasised the need for complementary skills 
within the founder’s team. This is not surprising as in the development stages 
the founders themselves did almost all jobs. 
4.3.1.5 Section summary 
In this section the environmental awareness, a keen interest in clean-
technologies and the vision to position themselves in an evolving industry of 
pioneers has been presented as a starting point to business model innovation 
activities with clean-tech start-up firms. Therefore, this interest in sustainability 
issues has not only led to strong motivation and commitment from the founders, 
but also boosted the attractiveness for employees to work for such firms with 
their green business models.  
All business model innovation activities (with the exception of one firm) have 
been carried out using a ‘greenfield approach’. Hence, start-up firms have not 
been limited by existing structures and prevailing business models.  
Founders have informally followed a stage gate process logic in business model 
innovation processes. In this way, as the main methods, start-ups performed 
quick iterations in a trial-and-error learning approach and involved customers in 
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early process stages with prototypes with pilot activities. Hence, the early 
integration of potential customers has been a critical success factor for these 
entities as the business model success has largely depended on customers’ 
willingness to buy the product or services. 
In addition, all business model innovation processes were conducted and 
organised by the founders themselves. As these founders have had to perform 
very different tasks, complementary capabilities and leadership skills within the 
founders’ team also played an important role. 
Within the implementation stage, all start-up firms have involved angel or VC 
investors and successfully raised funds to scale up their start-up businesses. 
Thereby, within ‘investor pitches’, clear and consistent business models have 
been very important to persuade business angels and VCs to invest. Clean-tech 
start-ups have applied all Energiewende technologies such as distributed 
generation and storage, flexibility marketing/aggregator models around VPPs 
and demand response, energy efficiency (particularly with connected home 
technologies) and electrification with electric vehicle infrastructures. 
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4.3.2 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value creation’ 
Within the ‘value creation’ section, important market triggers and the customer 
interface will be portrayed. The presentation of the customer interface is 
subdivided into customer value proposition and products, and customer 
relationships including key segments and sales channels. 
4.3.2.1 Market triggers 
Start-up respondents identified several key market triggers in the newly evolving 
Energiewende industry with converging industries and an entirely new value 
chain. They identified changing customer habits along with enabling 
technologies and regulation. In the following section, replication of general 
aspects concerning the market triggers of the incumbent power utility case 
study will be avoided. Moreover, only new perspectives of the start-up 
respondents will be portrayed. 
(1.) A newly evolving Energiewende industry 
Start-up respondents have outlined a newly evolving Energiewende industry 
with players from different industries, who will eventually converge within this 
newly developing industry. Thereby, start-up firms do not regard the 
Energiewende value chain in a linear, but rather in a value-network-orientated 
way orbiting around the ‘prosumer’. As one founder stated, “as a software firm, 
it is difficult to pin down the core target group. The reason is: We find ourselves 
in the middle of an extreme change, caused by the Energiewende that affects 
the whole energy industry. The trend goes to decentralised, prosumer-oriented 
models.” 
As regards future Energiewende key players, start-up firm founders have 
regarded the automotive industry, property industry, energy system 
manufacturers and consumer electronics OEMs (including tech giants such as 
“Apple” and “Google”) as industries that might succeed in the newly evolving 
Energiewende industry (see Table 23 overpage). 
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Industries Firm examples 
Automotive 
Bosch, Digital Energy Solutions (BMW/ 
Viessmann), Daimler and Tesla Powerwall 
Housing/property 
Bilfinger, Deutsche Wohnen, Hochtief, ista, 
LEG, Techem, Urbana and Vonovia 
Energy system manufacturer OEMs 
Glen Dimplex, SMA Solar, Solarworld, 
Vaillant and Viessmann 
Consumer Electronic OEMs/ICT 
Apple, Nest (Google), LG Electronics, 
Samsung Electronics and Sharp Electronics 
Table 23: Key players in the newly evolving Energiewende industry 
Firstly, start-up firms regard the automotive industry to be a potential winner in 
German Energiewende as they expect electric vehicles to play an important role 
with ‘vehicle-to-grid’ activities. In this way, each electric vehicle could both 
become a storage device for demand response and a VPP for supply activities. 
Secondly, the housing and property industry and related service partners will be 
an enabler for transferring the Energiewende into the urban space. This is 
because they own and have access to thousands of buildings in cities and 
suburban areas. With the rollout of smart metering technologies, it is expected 
the housing and property industry will itself takeover the liberalised market role 
as a smart metering provider. As a consequence, they will install gateways in 
every building, which could be exploited for other Energiewende uses. 
Thirdly, energy system manufacturer OEMs such as distributed solar PV 
generation technology producers (e.g. “Solarworld”) might extend their business 
models in the direction of energy services such as flexibility marketing/ 
aggregator models with VPPs. As they have distributed technologies already 
installed in the field, they have to connect existing devices with intelligent 
software or market new products or services in hard- and software bundles. 
Fourthly, consumer electronics champions and technology giants such as 
“Apple”, “Google” or “Samsung” are expected to develop interesting value 
propositions around energy services based on data-driven models. However, it 
is currently unknown which technologies and business models they do have in 
their R&D pipelines. Currently “Nest”, for instance, has not been implemented in 
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the German market and a product named “Google powermeter” has been taken 
off the market due to failed ROCE expectations. 
Although most start-ups co-operate with power utility firms (see also Section 
4.3.3 ‘value delivery’), they have not mentioned these power utility firms. This, 
according to start-up managers, is because this industry is focused on large-
scale generation and sticks to the linear value chain. As a consequence, they 
see them rather on the other end of the spectrum, as one founder has assumed 
that power utility firms "[…] will be the big losers of the Energiewende. Only few 
of them will be left if their business models do not change dramatically." 
(2.) Changing consumer demand and engagement 
Customer-centricity is essential for start-up firms, as all of their business models 
are highly customer-driven. In distributed generation models, the consumer as a 
‘prosumer’, in the middle of a value-network, is already regarded as a reality for 
start-ups. Hence, in many incidents, the ‘prosumer’ reality has become part of 
the start-up’s business model. To reach economies of scale, start-up firms use 
data analytics and data-driven models to better service their customers. 
Furthermore, all start-ups put emphasis on building direct relationships with 
customers to benefit from up and cross selling potentials. 
(3.) Enabling technologies 
Technologies are regarded as an enabler for business model innovation 
activities. Some business model innovation activities have just recently become 
possible for start-up firms in the context of large technological price decreases. 
This also holds true in the same way for distributed renewable generation 
technologies, as for software tools and for IT hardware developing kits such as 
the “Raspberry Pi”, which has been used for ‘rapid prototyping’ with start-ups 
such as “tado”.  
In their business model innovation activities, the following technologies have 
been applied with featured start-up firms: three start-ups have applied energy 
efficiency and flexibility marketing technologies based on VPPs, two start-ups 
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have applied distributed generation technologies and one start-up firm has 
applied electrification technologies for electric vehicles (see Table 24 below). 
Firm Category Technology applied 
Greenergetic Distributed Generation 
White label e-commerce platform for 
distributed generation technologies 
Greenpocket Energy Efficiency 
Data-driven software as a service for 
smart metering and smart home 
Grundgrün Flexibility marketing Virtual power plant (VPP) 
Kiwigrid 
Distributed Generation 
Flexibility marketing 
Software solutions/Gateways; 
Virtual power plant (VPP) 
LichtBlick 
SchwarmDirigent 
Flexibility marketing Virtual power plant (VPP) 
Sonnen Distributed Generation 
Distributed solar PV storage 
manufacturer and community platform 
tado Energy Efficiency 
Smart technology to optimise home 
heating systems (soft- and hardware) 
Thermondo Energy Efficiency 
Heating installer using a digital platform 
to configure heating systems 
Ubitricity Electrification 
Mobile metering for electric vehicle 
charging infrastructure 
Table 24: Applied technologies with participating clean-tech start-up firms 
 
(4.) Regulatory or legislative influences 
In general, regulation has been a very important trigger for all start-up firms as 
the German Energiewende is largely based on regulation. Regulation has 
affected start-up firms’ business models in multiple ways. On the one hand, 
regulation did not play any role and on the other hand some start-ups have 
been greatly influenced by regulation. Sometimes the start-ups themselves 
have even tried to significantly influence regulation for their own benefit. 
Therefore, all start-ups regard regulation as an important driver for either 
destroying or enabling business model concepts. 
The first group of start-ups tried to keep their distance from regulatory 
influences. For instance, “Thermondo” has established the biggest heating 
system installer in Germany using a digital platform to configure heating 
systems. “Tado” has developed a smart technology to optimise heating systems 
in a house or flat. Both energy efficiency business models are little affected by 
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regulatory policies. “Kiwigrid” has started with a ‘software-as-a-service’ model 
and offers monitoring and energy optimisation software for distributed 
generation systems. “Greenergetic” has developed a ‘white label’ e-commerce 
platform for distributed generation systems co-operating with incumbent power 
utility firms. These two firms are indirectly affected by regulatory policies, as the 
regulatory regime influences sales of distributed systems through custom duties 
(e.g. custom duties for Chinese solar PV modules) and subsidies for distributed 
generation systems (e.g. Renewable Energy Sources Act). As one founder 
explained, "[…] it was our conscious decision not to enter a regulated market. 
But to completely move in an unregulated market along with plant 
manufacturers, connectivity, visualisation and optimisation." 
The second category, with “Sonnen”, a solar PV battery storage-manufacturing 
model is highly affected by regulation, as direct subsidies really stimulate the 
domestic retail market. 
With the third group, regulatory policies can be said to be hanging over them 
like the “sword of Damocles”, as these business models are highly influenced 
by regulation. Flexibility marketing/aggregator business models (e.g. 
“Grundgrün”, “LichtBlick SchwarmDirigent”) are dependent on positive 
regulatory outcomes as regards their evolving role between TSOs, DSOs, 
energy suppliers, ‘prosumers’ and customers. As a consequence, these start-
ups work closely with policy makers to define the new market role according to 
their business model requirements. As one founder explained, it “[…] means 
regulation is something like a variable for us. Not like in ‘let’s give it a try and 
see what happens’, we actually contributed to some of them. There are 
particular regulations with paragraphs that go back to us.” 
The same holds true for “ubitricity”, an electric vehicle charging infrastructure 
provider who developed a mobile metering system. “Ubitricity’s” market success 
is highly dependent on the regulatory outcome and the requirements at the 
interface with the DSOs. As these processes are still ongoing, the outcomes are 
open and investments in these business models can be regarded as a future 
bet.  
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Lastly, “Greenpocket” has a long lasting experience of a high dependence of its 
business model on regulatory policies. The firm started in 2009 as a data 
analytics-driven software firm, providing visualisation software for smart 
metering devices, and has adapted the successful North American business 
model of “Opower”. The firm acquired 17 utility firms within its first year. 
Subsequently it faced severe challenges as the expected regulatory, policy-
driven, smart metering roll-out, was not executed. The founder was critical 
saying, “in Germany, we have the situation that the applicable law of 2010 is not 
compulsory to the present day. In principle, the whole business model, the basis 
on which Greenpocket once has been founded, is obsolete. Hence we don’t 
grow. We have been stagnating in this core business sector for three years 
now.” Only recently, the German government announced a partial smart 
metering rollout starting in 2017. 
This shows start-up firms are largely affected by regulatory measures. As the 
start-up firms have the ability to quickly adapt with changing business models to 
a changing environment, they have tried to make the best of it. As mentioned, 
trial-and-error learning methods and quick iterations are common in this sector. 
Smart metering software start-up “Greenpocket”, for instance, started to market 
connected home and visualisation software for SME and industrial customers. 
This response was instead of only keeping to the initially planned smart 
metering data-driven business model.  
4.3.2.2 Customer value propositions and products or services 
Considerable efforts have gone into the development of strong customer value 
propositions with business model innovation activities within all start-up firms. 
As the success of start-up firms largely depends on customers’ willingness to 
buy the product or service, novelties play a significant role with start-up firms. In 
addition, and as previously mentioned, start-ups approach business model 
innovation in a very customer-centric way, with an early integration of the 
customer in the development of products or services. In this way, three start-
ups have developed products and services that were, at the time of launching 
completely new to the market.  
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Novelties 
“Tado” has developed a smart technology to optimise heating and air 
conditioning systems, resulting in “tado” sometimes being called the “Nest” of 
Europe. A smartphone application controls the heating with a smart thermostat 
and controls the air conditioning system with a smart AC controller connected 
by a ‘retrofit’ hardware box to the central heating or AC system. The learning 
systems automatically regulate the temperature in the home in an energy 
efficient way. Depending on the habits of its residents, with a flagship geo-
location feature, meaning “tado” knows when someone has left home or is 
returning, it adjusts the heating or air conditioning accordingly. Therefore “tado” 
is a much deeper tech play than a smartphone and location-based control of 
one’s home’s heating and cooling systems alone. The start-up technology 
includes the ability to modulate heating, rather than simply switching the boiler 
on or off. It can also monitor the health of a house’s heating system remotely, 
sending diagnostics to a maintenance firm or technician. In the future “tado” and 
its customers could be enabled to opt into ‘demand response’ schemes so that 
a home’s heating and cooling systems are utilised where possible outside of 
known peak energy times with the DSO. 
“Ubitricity” provides infrastructure solutions for electric vehicles. Rather than 
installing metering and communication technology inside every single charging 
point, it equips its customers with their own portable charging device, in which 
the electricity is measured and billed. The charging device can be linked to a 
mobile phone. While it is in use accessing the mobile network, the intelligent 
charging device is used to access the power grid. In this way, the central idea is 
to charge power from renewable energies wherever customers choose to park 
their electric vehicle. The founder has summarised the CVP in the following 
way, "Electricity on the go just like at home - without extra costs." As the mobile 
smart metering infrastructure comes at a very attractive price, it might also be 
applied with distributed renewable sources in the future. 
Start-up “Sonnen”, initially started to offer an intelligent solar PV battery storage 
system. Recently, the firm has started the first community platform for 
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‘prosumers’ in Germany, where self-produced, distributed renewable energies, 
are exchanged by ‘prosumers’ with their peers. In this way, the platform is 
managed like a VPP and all ‘prosumers’ are connected in a network. The 
business model is reflected as highly disruptive, as ‘prosumers’ are able to 
become independent of power utility suppliers and electricity prices per kilowatt-
hour in the community are usually less expensive than the prices of power utility 
firms. 
“Greenergetic” and “Thermondo” have transferred an existing “bricks and 
mortar” product into the digital area in offering e-commerce platforms as a 
novelty for energy systems and in leveraging efficiencies within the entire 
supply chain. While initially “Thermondo” has established a platform for 
domestic customers, “Greenergetic” markets their e-commerce platform for 
distributed energies as a ‘white label’ model to power utility firms. 
“Thermondo’s” CVP is based on its convenience model. Home owners enter 15 
data points about their current heating system and their future needs. An 
algorithm matches the customer requirements with solutions and provides 
quotes in real time. Furthermore, “Thermondo” uses software that sends 
diagnostics of the heating system directly to a maintenance firm. As a 
consequence, this monitoring can prevent break-downs and reduce costs with 
service intervals.  
“Greenergetic” offers a full-service for power utility firms to market the online 
sales of distributed renewable generation and storage technologies via their 
websites. As “Greenergetic” also manages the entire digital and analogue 
supply chain, power utility firms only have to provide customer leads from their 
websites. The founder of “Greenergetic” described his product in the following 
statement: “Apparently, our product is the web portal, because it enables the 
public utility to make a product available to their customers via online services. 
But behind that web portal stands the original product, a solar PV system that is 
installed on the customer’s rooftop. This is our actual product. The portal is just 
a means to an end.” 
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“LichtBlick SchwarmDirigent” and “Grundgrün” have developed business 
models for flexibility marketing. As a number of firms already exist for flexibility 
marketing, firms such as “Next Kraftwerke”, “EnerNOC” or the UK-based 
“limejump” and “Tempus Energy”, a first-mover advantage with one of these 
firms is hard to establish. Nevertheless, the respondent start-up firms offer a 
novel product or service category for ‘prosumers’ and customers with demand 
flexibility. As aggregators, they provide customers with price reductions in 
demand response models and generate additional revenues from VPPs. They 
share these revenues with producers of distributed renewable generation 
facilities. 
Last but not least, “Kiwigrid” and “Greenpocket” started out initially as ‘software-
as-a-service’ firms in the B2B area. “Kiwigrid” initially provided distributed 
renewable generation technology firms with monitoring software solutions. 
Recently, they have developed a number of hard- and software tools to enable 
firms (such as the automotive industry, manufacturers of energy systems and 
power utility firms) to operate in a VPP. In so doing, they want to become one of 
the leading platforms or eco-systems for the distributed energy world, as one of 
the board members explained: 
"That's how an agile development works. You formulate an objective, a goal you 
want to achieve. Right from the start our aim was to become the main platform 
for energy. In the future, we want to become one of the top three platforms for 
energy in the world." 
As already mentioned “Greenpocket” has started with software monitoring 
solutions for smart metering. As the smart metering rollout in Germany has 
been postponed since 2010, they diversified into connected home and energy 
efficiency software for multi-sited firms such as supermarket chains. 
Complementarities 
In the founding stage, the researched start-up firms deployed complementarities 
with different professional and academic backgrounds within the group of 
founders.  
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After the implementation, three start-up firms have leveraged complementarities 
in the sales sector with their co-operation partners. As mentioned before, with 
“Greenergetic”, the sales approach via the power utilities’ website is grounded 
in their ‘white label’ business model concept. In addition, with the ‘software-as-
a-service’ models of “Kiwigrid” and “Greenpocket”, license fees for software 
packages have depended largely on the actual sales volume of bundled 
products of their customers, on which they did not have any influence. 
Interestingly, all three above-mentioned firms have clearly chosen a B2B setting 
to avoid large marketing spendings for brand building and governance. 
Aggregator, “LichtBlick Schwarm Dirigent”, who already had an existing green 
electricity supply business model with its parent firm has, interestingly, 
consciously abandoned the German green pioneer to leverage 
complementarities with existing commodity sales representatives. Moreover, it 
has developed a separate sales organisation for its new business model. All 
other start-up firms did not build on any complementary activities with sales. 
By incremental business model innovation activities after the initial launch of the 
start-up firms, many start-ups have leveraged complementarities. For instance, 
“Sonnen” has started its new community-based business model with their own 
solar PV battery storage customers. “Greenergetic” has initially marketed its 
new energy service portal with its distributed solar PV generation power utility 
customers.  
Efficiencies 
As many start-ups have followed the lean start-up approach, products and 
services were launched into the market early and quick iterations were 
performed based on customer feedback. In general, all start-up firms tried to 
leverage efficiencies and allocate resources accordingly. Particularly start-ups 
that co-operate with incumbents could use their rather low OPEX as an 
argument in their sales pitch. One founder explained, "our business model is 
interesting for partners of power utilities also from the OPEX point of view, 
because wage costs are much lower with start-ups." 
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In a more specific case, one founder has explained the downsides of this trend, 
as, in his firm, interns have worked on corporate strategies due to resource 
scarcities. As a consequence, his firm has invested in inadequate products and 
services and spent large parts of the product development budget. 
Lock-in effects 
All featured business models of clean-tech start-ups firms have developed lock-
in effects. With ‘software-as-a-service’ and the ‘white label’ models of 
“Greenpocket”, “Kiwigrid” and “Greenergetic”, customers face high switching 
costs as initial set-up fees and integration costs have already been payed. 
Moreover, once customers have invested and installed the equipment and 
software systems from “Sonnen”, “tado”, “Thermondo” and “ubitricity”, they 
might avoid the effort to change if these systems function as expected. 
Therefore, these firms generate lock-in effects, for instance, with after sales 
services. Lastly, but equally important, flexibility marketing suppliers such as 
“Grundgrün” and “LichtBlick SchwarmDirigent” realise lock-in effects through 
contractual relationships. 
4.3.2.3 Customer interfaces  
As all of the start-up firms have developed business models based on digital 
technologies, the retail customer relationship is largely not a personal one. 
Domestic or SME customers access the smartphone application or website and 
start transactions with the featured firms. As one founder explained, within the 
“[…] customer relationship, the customer is in contact with us virtually every 
day. More than 90% of our devices work online and the customer interacts with 
us via smartphone or browser by means of an online platform. […] That way he 
receives from us information, software updates, prognoses, weather and profit 
forecasts and I don’t know what else.” 
Furthermore, start-up firms co-operate with many distribution partners in the 
sales domain, as one founder explained, his firm has developed partnerships 
with: “[…] many sales partners. Basically, the distribution runs online via our 
website, then in the retail sector via suppliers of consumer electronics, energy 
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suppliers and the telco industry (which is called solutions business). It’s all a bit 
more than the classical ‘let’s drop it onto the market and see what happens’, it 
includes co-branding and possibly a separate hotline support. The fourth 
distribution channel are the technicians. Electricians and heating installers who 
subscribe to our firm and sell our products.” 
In contrast to “Apple iTunes” or other digital business models that are performed 
exclusively in the digital realm, many clean-tech firms, in the value delivery 
process, personal contact (e.g. with technicians installing solar PV rooftop 
modules) needs to happen. 
Furthermore, with ‘white label’ and ‘software-as-a-service’ models in the B2B 
context, the founders usually conducted the direct sales activities until the 
scaling up.  
In addition, quick iterations within trial-and-error learning methods have 
benefited from these digital approaches, as immediate responses with online 
marketing channel activities have been obtained. 
4.3.2.4 Section summary 
In this section key market triggers, CVP and products and services and 
customer interfaces have been presented.  
Hence, key market triggers and boundary conditions for business model 
innovations have been helping to develop a newly evolving Energiewende 
industry with converging industries and an entire new value chain, changing 
customer habits, enabling technologies and regulation. The CVP with products 
and services has been presented following the framework of Amit and Zott 
(2001) and Zott and Amit (2013) around novelties, complementarities, 
efficiencies, and lock-in effects. Thereby, start-up firms have come up with 
novelties within their product and services that are entirely new to the industry. 
In one incident, complementarities with the existing business model have been 
prevented. So, although the firm has already established a sales staff with the 
commodity-selling business, a separate sales force has been implemented in a 
spin-off firm with the new business model.  
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Lastly, customer interfaces are performed on an entirely digital basis with the 
core business models. With sales channels, these featured clean-tech start-ups 
have established many co-operations with different distribution partners. 
4.3.3 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value delivery’ 
This section presents the findings within the ‘value delivery’ stage of business 
model innovations, focusing on ‘key resources’, ‘key activities’ and ‘key 
partners’.  
4.3.3.1 Key resources  
In general, all start-ups have faced a permanent scarcity as far as resources are 
concerned. They have been both short on funds and understaffed. In contrast to 
the USA, Germany does not have a long venture capital financing tradition and 
investors are usually somewhat risk-averse. Symptomatically, the largest 
German incubator is “Rocket Internet”. The firm largely adopts successful 
business models from overseas to reduce the risk of business model failure. As 
a consequence, with these new and rather risky clean-tech business models, 
financing budgets in comparison to North America are rather low, as one 
founder explained, "it's not like in the United States, people here are not willing 
to risk €40 million of venture capital just to have built up such a joint some day 
in the distant future. If you receive €4-10 million here, this is already quite 
something." 
According to the interviewees within start-up firms, the following resources and 
capabilities are of utmost importance: firstly, the continuous ability of 
employees’ responding in an agile way to changes in the business model. 
Secondly, IT-programming skills as regards the development of architectural 
solutions, such as, ecosystems that integrate and connect both ICT and IoT 
technologies, are key capabilities within employee skill-sets. Thirdly, as all start-
ups are focused on growth, marketing and sales capabilities are also very 
important. Fourthly, depending on the level of network activities within the 
business model, partner management activities, negotiation and project 
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management skills are essential. Finally, operational tasks require the full-
commitment of employees in operations – as it is here where customers most 
often judge service quality. 
Besides the employee functions outlined above, the composition of a 
complementary employee body that matches to the firm’s agility, its 
entrepreneurial spirit and its culture is also critical. As one founder explained, “it 
is important that you bring together the right people. The team is extremely 
important, of course. Especially if you are still incredibly small and you have to 
rely on people who give all their passion and enthusiasm for an idea and who 
bring in the necessary competences to quickly develop a business. This is a 
very big challenge for the team and above all for the management if you plan to 
double every year. That, of course, is an issue.” 
Furthermore, as already mentioned with the composition of the founder’s team, 
the relevant professional experience of employees in a comparable 
environment is of great importance. As one founder has pointed out, they “[…] 
have tried to find the right people who have already some experience in this 
business. There was an IT manager who’d built up B2B online portals for ‘white 
labels’ before and so on. It’s important to get the right people who have already 
done that in the past. If we went into it like virgins, well, it would have come to a 
miserable end.” 
Moreover, start-up firms have focused on delivering key value creation activities 
of the business model concept with their own resources. For instance, heating 
installer “Thermondo” has recruited their own technicians to install various 
heating systems on a nationwide basis. Therefore, the firm has developed a 
sophisticated incentive and promotion system to be able to recruit and retain 
these technicians. This point was made by the founder: 
“Therefore what I offer has to be more attractive than what someone has got so 
far. It has something to do with getting ahead, with self-determination, with 
prominence, also with modernity, and it has something to do with entrepreneurs 
as part of an enterprise.” 
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4.3.3.2 Key activities  
In general, important for all start-up firms as regards ‘key activities’, is the speed 
to market with business model innovations and underlying products and 
services. As a consequence, start-ups implement new business models or 
evolutionary changes to existing business models in the market in a very early 
stage of the process, following the above-mentioned trial-and-error learning and 
quick iteration approaches. Based on this, a key activity for start-ups, is the 
permanent ability to change. Other key activities, according to line functions, are 
IT development and operations of large IT architecture and systems, sales and 
marketing with early customer interactions in the founding stage and partnering 
with others (see also Section 4.3.3.3).  
Additionally, with the implementation of the business model, many start-up 
founders have invested their own money in prototypes of hardware equipment 
and software tools. This confirms how another key activity in the founding stage 
is taking risks - as one founder explained, "effectively, [we] have put nearly a 
quarter of a million into it ourselves, plus our salaries. This can be considered 
as opportunity cost." 
With their business models, in its early market implementation, many start-up 
firms have consequently focused on a narrowed down, focused role. As far as 
limited resources are concerned, this approach helped these firms to get started 
in the Energiewende market. Interestingly, almost all firms have expanded their 
business models after they had established their initial business model 
concepts. One founder commented that they “[…] have developed from a mere 
software shack to a system integrator." This also documents the agility and 
entrepreneurial spirit inherent in these firms.  
Besides the enhancement of business models and product portfolios, many 
start-up firms have also scaled up their business by expanding internationally. 
For instance, “Sonnen” has entered the North American market with its solar PV 
battery storage technologies and “tado” has stepped into selected European 
markets, including the UK. 
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Finally, with “ubitricity”, legal undertakings have played an important role as the 
firm has patented their mobile metering technology. As both founders have 
studied law, this activity has been conducted within the firm. For the 
safeguarding of the business model concept’s uniqueness, the protection of 
core technologies by a patent can be seen as crucial. 
4.3.3.3 Key partners  
Angel investors and venture capitalists 
The first category and the most important partners for start-up firms are 
investors such as angel investors or VCs. As all respondent start-ups are 
technology-driven and founders usually have a limited budget, the funds to 
implement and scale up a start-up firm are provided by angel investors or VCs. 
These angel investors or VCs are largely located in Germany.  
Angel investors are most often individuals who want to help other entrepreneurs 
get their businesses off the ground and earn a high return on investment (ROI). 
VCs are institutional investors who largely want to finance technology, 
biotechnology and clean-tech start-ups. Firms such as “Earlybird”, “High-Tech 
Gründerfonds” or “Target Partners” provide funding in exchange for equity 
stakes in start-up firms. In so doing, VCs generally invest in different start-up 
firms, do not spend more than €10 million and do not buy more than 50% of 
equity in a single entity. Lately, many MNU firms such as “E.ON”, “Innogy 
Venture Capital” (“RWE group”) and Czech “Inven Capital” (“ČEZ”) have also 
entered the venture capital stage as corporate VCs.  
If start-ups are doing well, they go through seed, early and later stage 
investment rounds until an initial public offering (IPO) might be initiated. 
VCs are demanding and intensely monitor start-up firms based on pre-defined 
objectives and financial targets. In this context, in one way, founders give up a 
substantial amount of freedom as regards strategic and business model 
decisions. To illustrate this point, in one incident, the founders wanted to 
develop a new business model alongside the existing business model. The VCs 
did not approve; as the founder explained: “resources were a big issue all the 
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time. From the circle of shareholders, no one ever said: I feel like putting three 
million in here, because I think it’s great, come on, just find five people and 
carry out the business completely on your own. No one ever said that. The risk 
was too high, but over time there was some venture capital of course.” 
The interviews also revealed how founders, in addition to pure financial help, 
also gain broad ranging support and coaching from VCs to accelerate their 
start-up firm. In addition, the inter-coordinated objectives between VCs and the 
founders, help start-ups to follow clear and consistent targets and prevent the 
dissipation of energies within the firm as a whole. 
IT developers 
Secondly, in the implementation stage of the business model innovation activity, 
many start-up firms co-operated with freelance IT developers to develop 
prototypes of the software tools and hardware equipment. The outcomes of 
these co-operations have been key to the later development of the start-up. 
Initial customer acquisitions and the seed investor round have been conducted 
with these prototypes.  
Technology manufacturer OEMs 
Thirdly, particularly as regards the business models of “Greenergetic”, 
“Sonnen”, “tado”, “Thermondo” and “ubitricity”, the integration of hardware 
equipment and technologies from OEM manufacturers has been an integral part 
of the value performance of their business models. Therefore, start-up firms 
partnered with international manufacturers, which are largely located in Asian 
countries. 
Technicians 
Fourthly, with the business models of “Thermondo”, “Greenergetic” and the core 
solar PV storage business of “Sonnen”, the integration of technicians as 
equipment installation partners is a primary partnering activity in their business 
models. Interestingly, “Thermondo” performs these activities with their own 
technician staff, while other firms are partnering with local technicians. As most 
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of the business model activities are performed digitally, this customer touchpoint 
is crucial for these firms. The entire service level is judged by the appearance 
and work quality of these technicians. Furthermore, it is a challenge to find the 
right technicians to partner with. Due to the economic upswing in Germany in 
recent years, technicians are in high demand with over-full schedules. In 
addition to this, start-ups offer novel products or, at the very least, novel 
processes. Many of these independent technicians have rather a traditional 
mind-set and follow the dominant industry logic. A good illustration of this is 
“Sonnen”. When they initially started with its novel distributed solar PV storage 
business model, they found it a challenge to find technicians to partner with. 
Indeed, the majority of technicians would not work within the new systems and 
store surplus electricity with a battery storage device, thereby creating 
problems. 
Incumbent power utility firms 
Lastly it is worth noting how many start-up firms are partnering with power utility 
firms. The motivation for this strategy is the same with all start-up firms: On one 
side they wish to gain access to incumbent power utilities’ huge customer bases 
and on the other side, from a start-up perspective, the considerable financial 
strength of power utilities is attractive. Start-ups are realising profits with the 
power utilities or, in some cases, are even funded by power utility firms (e.g. 
“Greenergetic” with “RWE”, “Sonnen” with “ČEZ”, “Thermondo” with “E.ON” and 
“ubitricity” with “EDF”). With this approach, the start-up founders regard 
themselves as opportunistic. They make no secret of their critical view as 
regards the future of incumbent power utility firms, highlighted by a founder who 
bluntly commented that he did not “[…] need them. At this point I am an 
opportunist. So what, I sell a couple of hundred boxes more, the turnover 
comes in quite handy, it makes me happy. Moreover, it contributes to the big 
picture when homes in Germany switch to decentralised supply. I like that. I go 
for it. And if [MNU firm x] runs the supply, so be it, but in the long term it will be 
certainly no partner. Because you cannot do business with a dead body, 
however at present it still works. I’m not a crusader about this. I don’t say: Get 
rid of the power utilities, they should be banished! I don’t need to say that, 
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because they will banish themselves. I am not a fanatic about this. I just want 
the customer to understand that it makes sense to use renewable energies, and 
if [MNU firm x] is the delivery boy in place, this is fine for me.” 
In addition, some start-ups have even taken advantage of RPU firms to sponsor 
the initial soft- or hardware equipment development, having co-operated in a 
pilot activity. Subsequently the start-up has sold to the power utility firms’ 
competitors. One respondent founder has explained that his firm “[…] just went 
through the development together with three power utility partners. All three of 
them paid a high six-digit figure and involved themselves deeply in our 
development. Speaking honestly, they paid money so that they can help us to 
build our portal.” 
Not surprisingly, all start-up firms have strong views on the imminent demise of 
power utilities through the Energiewende. One founder commented 
dramatically, "[…] they're already dead, they just didn't get it yet. It already 
smells of decay." 
Accordingly, start-up firms have a critical view on both the management and the 
capabilities of the employee body of incumbent power utility firms to transform 
their business model. One founder reflected on the management saying that, 
"the corporate groups are not being run entrepreneurially, they are being 
managed. They are being managed by a debt-avoidance culture instead of a 
culture that takes chances to make things better." 
Another founder, talking about employee culture and its inability to innovate, 
expressed his concerns: “Think of this type of employee, and I mean no harm, I 
have nothing against these people, but if you have a mass of employees who 
has been guided into a certain ideological direction for many years, how you are 
going to innovate? You cannot imagine a climate that is more hostile to 
innovation.” 
When considering the timing of the imminent demise of incumbent power utility 
firms, the founders of the start-ups still give them several years, as these firms 
are expected to have reserve funds. With this in mind, one founder assumed 
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“[…] that the energy suppliers will lose their business bases. They will not 
simply crash within three years, because these firms have massive reserves 
from the past, but you only need to have to look at their figures. Currently, they 
slip off towards zero in free fall. It’s not that one of them, or only a few perform 
that way, they all perform that way. Momentarily, they head straight to zero and 
will go down further.” 
4.3.3.4 Section summary 
This ‘value delivery’ section has presented the ‘key resources’, ‘key activities’ 
and ‘key partners’ for the management of business model innovation activities 
within clean-tech start-up firms. 
As far as ‘key resources’ for business model innovations are concerned, start-
up firms have faced an ongoing scarcity of resources. In this context, the 
composition of the founders’ team and employee body with complementary 
skill-sets has been of great importance to realise efficiencies. Therefore, the 
employee body has needed a specific capability skill-set. Of particular 
importance is the agility of employees to perform quick iterations, IT 
development, partnering, as well as marketing and sales skills. Interestingly, 
one firm insourced technicians for the installation service of distributed heating 
systems. They identified this as an important value-adding step in aiding a 
quality delivery and a key activity that should not be performed by externals. 
In looking at ‘key activities”, the most important finding has been that clean-tech 
start-up firms have started small and focused. They have performed very 
focused value-adding steps during the initial implementation of their business 
models. After these first business models have been successfully implemented 
in the market, they have been enhanced with further value-adding steps and 
business model innovation activities around these initial models. 
With ‘key partners’, the most important partner or stakeholder group has been 
angel investors and VCs. These groups have funded the scaling up of clean-
tech start-ups’ business models. The ‘key partners’ section also explores co-
operations between clean-tech start-ups and incumbent power utility firms. 
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Returning to the start-ups and their co-operation with power utility firms, they 
have done this in three ways. Firstly, they have been financed by MNU firms’ 
corporate venture activities. Secondly, they have co-operated with them on new 
business model innovations to gain access to their customer base and relative 
financial strength. Thirdly, they have realised sales with power utility firms and 
thus have generated profits. Although they have realised different forms of co-
operation with the power utilities, they have viewed them critically to the point of 
predicting their future demise.  
The next section analyses the ‘value capture’ of clean-tech start-up firms. 
4.3.4 Business model innovation management factors impacting 
‘value capture’ 
The following section on ‘value capture’ will show the applied business model 
archetypes, the revenue streams and cost structures with the clean-tech start-
up firms featured.  
4.3.4.1 Business model archetypes and revenues 
The featured clean-tech start-ups have applied 10 different business model 
archetypes and each start-up performs on average three to four business model 
archetypes (see Table 25, p. 198). As a result, most of the start-up firms 
interviewed, have already spread the risk and generated revenues from 
different business model archetypes. 
“Sonnen” performs a ‘peer-to-peer’ (‘P2P’) business model archetype as a first-
mover in Germany, which connects ‘prosumers’ on a digital platform. This 
means, individuals can use the “Sonnen” platform to “exchange” self-produced 
surplus power with their peers. The revenue model behind that approach is to 
collect subscription fees and to gain a share on platform revenues. Additionally, 
“Sonnen” buys missing power supply on the spot market and gains additional 
profits from a traditional ‘pay per use’ model.  
Closely linked to the ‘P2P’ model, is the ‘two-sided market’ business model 
archetype in which a few start-up firms have already connected ‘prosumers’ 
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with customers with a flexible demand structure in a VPP. The revenue logic 
behind this model is to gain profits on the arbitrage effects with little to no 
transaction costs. The reason for this is these interactions are performed by 
algorithms trading in a machine-to-machine set-up. 
Besides these extremely novel platform models, start-up firms have started to 
gain revenues with ‘digitisation’ and ‘software-as-a-service’ business models. 
With the ‘digitisation’ business model archetype, two start-ups have transferred 
a ‘bricks-and-mortar’ product category (‘energy systems’) into the digital area. 
While both firms use e-commerce platforms to market their products or 
services, “Thermondo” has established their own brand to directly target 
domestic customers. “Greenergetic” meanwhile, combines the above-
mentioned archetypes with a ‘white-label’ approach, targeting power utility firms. 
In so doing, revenues are generated through direct sales, subscription fees and 
revenue sharing. In addition, “Greenergetic” concentrated all their distributed 
solar PV generation assets in one separate firm, which also could be sold in an 
asset deal to an investor. In addition, the ‘build and sell’ model has been used 
as another business entry model archetype to found the start-up firms of 
“Sonnen” (with distributed solar PV battery storage), “tado” and “ubitricity”. 
Using this archetype, these firms generate revenues from ‘direct sales’ and ‘rent 
instead of buy’ revenue models. 
Based on these foundational business model archetypes, the featured start-up 
firms have established complementary business model patterns to generate 
additional revenues. Thus, ‘leveraging customer data’, ‘white-label’ and ‘self-
service’ archetypes have been combined with the above-mentioned business 
model patterns by different start-up firms. Last but not least, start-up firms have 
created lock-in effects. This is because a possible migration of software tools or 
‘white-label’ products and services would create high switching costs for 
customers - as one founder explained: 
“Besides, at present, the main value of [start-up firm] is its consistency and 
reasonably happy business relationships with important incumbents who rarely 
change. That is one of our big values.” 
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Business model 
archetype 
Firm examples 
Value chain 
perspective 
Revenue model 
Build and sell 
Sonnen, tado and 
ubitricity 
Layer player 
Direct sales and rent 
instead of buy 
Digitisation 
Greenergetic and 
Thermondo 
Orchestrator 
Direct sales, 
subscription fee and 
revenue sharing 
E-Commerce 
Greenergetic and 
Thermondo 
Orchestrator 
Direct sales, rent 
instead of buy/leasing 
Leverage customer 
data 
Greenpocket, tado 
and Thermondo 
Layer player 
Provisions for selling it 
to third parties  
Lock-In 
Greenergetic, 
Greenpocket, 
Kiwigrid and Sonnen 
Orchestrator 
and layer 
player 
Direct sales, rent 
instead of buy/leasing, 
subscription fees and 
revenue sharing 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) Sonnen community Orchestrator 
Subscription fee, pay 
per use and profits on 
arbitrage 
Self-Service/ DIY tado Layer player Direct sales 
Software as a 
service 
Greenpocket and 
Kiwigrid 
Layer player 
Subscription fees and 
revenue sharing 
Two-sided markets 
Grundgrün, Kiwigrid, 
LichtBlick Schwarm-
Dirigent, Sonnen 
and ubitricity 
Layer player 
and 
orchestrator 
Profits on arbitrage 
White label 
Greenergetic, 
Greenpocket, 
Kiwigrid and Sonnen 
Layer player 
and 
orchestrator 
Subscription fees and 
revenue sharing 
Table 25: Business model archetypes of clean-tech start-up firms 
 
4.3.4.2 Cost structures and profitability 
As mentioned, start-ups follow the lean start-up approach. Organisational 
structures and business model innovation processes are kept slim. In addition, 
start-ups are cost conscious, avoiding long lead times for business model 
innovation activities including product and service designs. Any spending not 
necessary for the expansion of the start-up firms is generally avoided. 
Nevertheless, with all the researched start-up firms, costs exceed revenue, with 
all firms facing high technology investment costs as well as costs for scaling up. 
For instance, electric vehicle mobile meter start-up firm “ubitricity” has had €3.3 
million in development costs in 2015. As a consequence, the profitability figures 
of all interviewed firms are in the red (see Table 26 overpage). 
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Clean-tech start-up 
Net loss for the year 2014 
(in €m) 
Net loss for the year 2015 
(in €m) 
Greenergetic 1.179 n/a 
Greenpocket 0.937 0.463 
Grundgrün 4.058 n/a 
Kiwigrid 0.731 2.320 
LichtBlick 
SchwarmDirigent 
n/a n/a 
Sonnenbatterie/Sonnen 6.411 n/a 
tado 7.129 n/a 
Thermondo 1.826 n/a 
ubitricity 1.663 2.173 
(Source: Bundesanzeiger, 2016) 
Table 26: Annual statement of accounts of clean-tech start-up firms 
 
With this in mind, it is important to mention that with start-up firms such 
developments are not unusual and break-even is often expected after a five-
year period. In the next step these sections’ findings will be summarised. 
4.3.4.3 Section summary 
This ‘value capture’ section has presented the applied business model 
archetypes, the related revenue streams, cost structures and profitability of 
clean-tech start-up firms. According to the interviews the featured clean-tech 
start-ups have at least 10 different business model archetypes with ‘build and 
sell’, ‘digitisation’, ‘e-commerce’, ‘leverage customer data’, ‘lock-in’, ‘peer-to-
peer’, ‘self-service/DIY’, ‘software-as-a-service’, ‘two-sided market’ and ‘white 
label’ in place. In so doing, clean-tech start-ups have generated revenues from 
‘direct sales’, monthly or yearly subscription fees, provisions or revenue sharing 
and ‘leasing’, or ‘rent instead of buy’ models. The dominant value chain 
perspectives have been layer player and orchestrator models. Here, most firms 
have started as a layer player and later have progressed to orchestrator 
models. 
Each clean-tech start-up has developed three to four business model 
archetypes to generate revenues from different business model activities. As far 
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as profit is concerned, all clean-tech start-ups remain in the red. This is not 
unusual as break-even is expected to be achieved after five years at the 
earliest. 
The next section will summarise this chapter.  
4.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter outlines the results of the empirical research conducted on both 
case studies. The results are displayed, according to Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(2009), in two separate case write-ups. To allow for comparison, both case 
write-ups were structured in the same way. 
In each write-up the findings were initially described in the context of the 
‘overarching process’. This means focusing on strategic approaches, the 
organising of business model innovation activities and the applied business 
model innovation processes. In the next step, the findings portray the business 
model management activities around ‘value creation’, ‘value delivery’ and ‘value 
capture’ following a business model framework adopted from Johnson et al. 
(2008), Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) and Teece (2010). After each section a 
short section summarising key findings has been provided. 
The following chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the key differences 
between the management of business model activities and factors impacting 
business model innovation activities in incumbent power utility and clean-tech 
start-up firms. It also illustrates the theoretical link to other studies in this 
business model innovation area. 
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5 Chapter: Discussion 
5.1 Case comparison incumbent power utility and clean-tech 
start-up firms 
The following section portrays the key differences in incumbent power utility and 
clean-tech start-up firms. Here, important differences are presented around the 
‘overarching process’, ‘value creation’, ‘value delivery’ and ‘value capture’ 
following the structure of the two case write-ups. Table 27 at the end of Section 
5.1 summarises the key differences in the two case studies. In Section 5.2, the 
key learnings of start-up firms for incumbent power utility firms will be 
presented.  
5.1.1 Key differences in clean-tech start-up and incumbent power 
utility firms 
This study’s findings show how incumbent power utility and clean-tech start-up 
firms approach business model innovation in distinctive ways. Additionally, a 
convergence of business models of incumbent and start-up firms has not been 
discovered. As business model innovation in most incumbent power utility firms 
is still in its infancy and, as the German Energiewende is still an ongoing 
process, this may change over time. 
A further significant finding has been clean-tech start-up firms are 
Energiewende forerunners as far as the transformation towards more 
sustainable technologies is concerned. These clean-tech start-up firms have 
developed business models that are novelties to the industry and have provided 
customers with sustainable alternatives to the energy supply based on the 
conventional sources of incumbent power utility firms (e.g. “Sonnen” or 
“LichtBlick ScharmDirigent”). This is remarkable, as these firms have lacked the 
resources to sustain a process of experimenting and trial-and-error learning 
around business model innovation over a longer time period. 
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5.1.1.1 Overarching process 
Regarding the general set-up for business model innovation activities, start-up 
and incumbent power utility firms face differences in their general starting points 
in terms of their path-dependencies and initial motivations for business model 
innovation. In addition, their most important stakeholder groups differ in the way 
they organise themselves according to the scope of business model innovation, 
process structures and organisational responsibility for business model 
innovation. In the following section the above-mentioned areas will be further 
developed and analysed. 
First of all, from the outset, incumbent power utility and start-up firms face very 
different situations before conducting business model innovation activities 
influenced by German Energiewende. Most incumbent utility firms have 
operated their prevailing business model for more than 130 years. Based on 
this long-standing, old business model they have established large 
organisations with thousands of employees. These behemoths are built around 
a vertically-integrated value chain including generation, trading, transmission, 
distribution, sales and metering. Thereby their investment scope has focused on 
long-term technological investments, such as large-scale power generation 
plants or power grids. With these structures, incumbents have, for a long time, 
held a natural monopoly in important parts of the value chain (e.g. large-scale 
generation, transmission and distribution grids) and have also earned high 
profits. Within this context, both management and employees have prospered. 
Understandably, these people are still in favour of this dominant business model 
logic, based around large-scale generation and a vertically-integrated value 
chain. Indeed, from their perspective, their careers, job routines and 
organisational cultures are based on following the logic of this business model. 
As fits to this path-dependent behaviour, employees and management exhibit a 
strong resistance to changing their business model and instead view business 
model innovation activities rather sceptically throughout the organisation. 
In stark contrast to this, clean-tech start-up firms have begun their initial 
business model innovation activities from scratch, based on a greenfield 
approach. Hence, no prevailing business model with its underlying resources, 
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activities, value chain configurations and existing brands has restricted their 
initial business model innovation activities. Without the constraints of 
incumbents towards business model innovation, start-up firms have performed 
quick iterations with early customer involvement and interactions. They have 
based their direction on experimenting and trial-and-error learning approaches 
to ‘straighten out’ their business models. It is important to note however, that 
overall, clean-tech start-up firms have had less to lose in the initial set-up 
stages. They were free to experiment with their business models accordingly. 
Secondly, the initial motivations and decision framing of clean-tech start-ups 
and incumbent utilities for business model innovation influenced by German 
Energiewende have differed considerably. With incumbent firms, Energiewende 
is regarded as a disruptive threat. In the context of declining profitability based 
on Energiewende, incumbent firms are forced to perform business model 
innovations around digital, decentralised and decarbonised technologies, which, 
at least partly, should substitute for losses from the old business model. In 
contrast, clean-tech start-up firms consider Energiewende as a great 
opportunity to position themselves and to gain market share in a newly evolving 
industry. 
Thirdly, Energiewende is largely associated with sustainable technologies and 
the transformation of large-scale power generation based on nuclear and 
thermal sources towards a world of distributed renewable generation. 
Therefore, with start-ups being environmentally conscious and having an affinity 
for sustainability and clean-technologies, both founders and employees have 
made a great impact on conducting business model innovation activities in this 
field. They continue to make an impact on the general performance of start-up 
firms after implementation, as both founders and staff are extremely motivated 
by working for a “good cause”. As these firms are extremely committed to these 
issues, they also have secured a high level of trustworthiness with their 
customers. 
In contrast to this, incumbent power utility firms, have, for a long time, been 
perceived as environmental polluters from nuclear and thermal, mainly lignite, 
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power generation. As a consequence, they face a lack of credibility with 
sustainable and eco-friendly technologies. Consumers may question their 
motivation for moving to more sustainable and green energy sources 
questioning if it is out of choice, or, if they are forced by Energiewende to do so. 
Fourthly, the demands of stakeholders within incumbent power utilities and 
clean-tech start-up firms differ. On one hand, angel investors or venture 
capitalists are the most important stakeholder group for start-up firms. They not 
only fund these firms, but also drive management and employees hard to 
realise pre-determined objectives. On the other hand, MNU firms are publicly 
listed on the stock market and have to satisfy their shareholders, while RPU 
firms are largely owned by municipalities that follow a more political rather than 
an economic agenda. This results in start-up firms facing great pressure, with 
their ongoing existence in the hands of powerful financial investors. This is in 
contrast to the MNU firms who have to report to their shareholders, with 
decision-making mainly influenced by the largest of these shareholders. Hence, 
in general, the will of shareholders does not threaten the existence of these 
MNU firms. On the contrary, RPU firms, with their municipal shareholder 
structures, have faced the least pressure so far. Nevertheless, this will change if 
profitability continues to decline and dividends that subsidise, for instance, local 
public transport, will further decrease. 
Fifthly, as regards the organisation of business model innovation activities and 
its influence within the organisation, incumbent and start-up firms perform 
different approaches. While in every one of the featured clean-tech start-up 
firms, business model innovation is conducted by the founders (or at least one 
member of the founding team), management board members (e.g. CEOs or 
CMOs) within incumbent firms, have mainly acted as executive sponsors for 
business model innovation activities. Hence, either top tier managers (first or 
second management level) or project managers have been responsible for 
conducting business model innovation activities. 
Sixthly, the scope of business model innovation activities has also varied 
between incumbent and start-up firms. While most incumbent power utility firms 
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have conducted different business model innovation activities in parallel, start-
ups have performed their business model innovation activities in a very focused 
way and in a sequential mode. In so doing, start-up firms have started to 
develop business model archetypes with the highest revenue potentials first. 
They have later diversified and reduced risk with the development of further 
business model archetypes. In contrast, RPU firms in particular, have dispersed 
their energies and largely performed activities that did not go beyond pilot 
activities. Only the biggest RPU firm, which is, in terms of revenue closer to 
MNU than to RPU firms and largely affected by the German Energiewende (with 
large quantities of on- and offshore wind generation in Northern Germany) has 
already successfully implemented a new business model. 
Seventhly, although all incumbent utility firms have understood the need for a 
structured approach towards business model innovation, such business model 
innovation processes were only applied within three MNU firms. In contrast, a 
structured business model innovation approach was desirable for start-up 
founders, but not necessary, as founders themselves have conducted the initial 
business model innovation. In these incidents, founders worked closely 
together, not needing to strictly adhere to a business model innovation process 
framework. Interestingly, all start-up founders have unconsciously followed an 
innovation stage gate process related to the ‘4I-framework’ innovation process 
presented in the literature review. With the scaling up of start-up firms, within 
the context of potentially increasing organisational complexity, the introduction 
of a structured business model innovation process might also become desirable 
for these firms. RPU firms did not apply any structured approaches to business 
model innovation as yet, but also see the strong need to implement and follow 
such processes in their organisations. 
Lastly but nevertheless important to mention, start-up firms have performed 
many quick iterations based on experimenting and trial-and-error learning 
approaches with business model innovation. This has continued until the firms 
have realised the optimal business model design according to boundary 
conditions and stakeholder groups. In contrast to this, incumbent power utility 
firms have implemented a business model concept that has been initially 
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approved by the management board and independent of changing boundary 
conditions. 
5.1.1.2 Value creation 
As regards ‘value creation’, the three major differences with clean-tech start-up 
and incumbent power utility firms have been the focus on customer-centricity, 
the implementation of products or services that are novelties to the industry and 
the handling of regulatory policies (especially Energiewende policies). They are 
further explained below. 
Incumbents and start-up firms experience huge differences concerning their 
focus on customer-centric approaches. A key activity for clean-tech start-up 
firms’ success is the diligent focus during the entire business model innovation 
process on customer-centricity. In the initiation and ideation phases, an early 
interaction with customers has already taken place within all researched start-
up firms. In so doing, experimenting and trial-and-error learning approaches 
have been used, as mentioned before, until a strong customer value proposition 
is established in interactions with customers. 
In contrast, incumbent power utility firms have not yet focused on the 
establishment of strong customer value propositions. With their business model 
innovation activities, they are rather focused on overcoming internal 
organisational barriers than establishing customer interactions. Although, they 
have performed market research activities, this is different to start-up firms who 
acquire their first customers within the concept stage of their business model 
innovation activities. This again is tied to the dominant logic of these incumbent 
firms who held regional monopolies in the sales area for a long period of time. 
In this context, customers, in the past, have just been a ‘metering point number’. 
Only recently, customer-centricity and customer insight has gained 
management’s attention, but strong CVPs and large CRM-databases are still 
missing in these firms and the transformation towards a customer-orientated 
approach with more service-orientated models is still on its way. Here it is 
important to mention, that the incumbent utilities’ largest asset is their large 
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quantities of customers with each of the interviewed firms serving more than 
500,000 customers. 
Furthermore, with the implementation of products or services, all start-up firms 
have implemented their offerings in the market, while RPU firms especially 
have, in three out of five cases, not left the pilot activity. In addition, start-up 
firms’ products or services are novelties to the market. They have even 
implemented certain technologies (such as VPPs and community platforms) as 
first-mover products or services in the market, of which incumbent power utility 
managers have spoken as potential future products and services. 
Another important and influential factor for business model innovation in both 
case studies has been regulatory policies. Interestingly, clean-tech start-up and 
incumbent power utility firms handle regulation very differently. Clean-tech start-
up firms practice two different approaches. They either avoid regulatory 
influences with their new business model designs or they seek to influence 
regulatory policies to their own advantage and adapt their business models 
quickly to new regulatory circumstances.  
In contrast to this, incumbent power utility firms have, for a very long time, not 
appreciated German Energiewende is imminent and inevitable. Following 
“Fukushima” and the governmental decision for the nuclear-power phase-out, 
the incumbents have attempted to influence politics for the revision of these 
policies. As their efforts have remained unsuccessful, they have denounced the 
legislator for developing regulatory policies that threaten their old business 
model. In so doing and in contrast to clean-tech start-up firms, they have lost 
significant time in innovating their business models. Rather, they have allocated 
resources on working against Energiewende than actively creating it. 
5.1.1.3 Value delivery 
As regards ‘value delivery’, the major differences with clean-tech start-up and 
incumbent power utility firms have been the availability of resources, the use of 
capabilities, particularly, innovative capabilities for business model innovation, 
incentive schemes and approaches towards IT and partnering activities. 
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Firstly, and most importantly, the key difference between clean-tech start-up 
and incumbent power utility firms is the availability of resources. On the one 
hand, start-up firms have few resources. According to the interviewees, the 
availability of employees and financial budgets is always limited. As mentioned, 
clean-tech start-up firms must focus their activities to apply the utilised capacity 
of resources with a very high effectiveness and carefully target their funds in 
projects. On the other hand, incumbent power utility firms have still used profits 
from the prevailing business model to cross-subsidise new business model 
innovation activities. Nevertheless, as these profits are decreasing, they face 
limited financial budgets in the future. Furthermore, with existing human 
resources, complementarities have not been reached with incumbents, 
especially regarding sales employees. Start-up firms have realised 
complementarities with incremental business model innovation activities. 
Secondly, employees of clean-tech start-up and incumbent firms have diverse 
innovative capabilities. While clean-tech start-ups have generally engaged 
innovative, agile, entrepreneurial and adventurous, people incumbent utilities 
have rather employed bureaucratic, silo-thinking, hierarchically organised, 
indecisive and risk-averse management and staff. As a consequence, the pre-
requisites for business model innovation are with the clean-tech start-ups, 
rather than with, the incumbent firms. Incumbent power utility firms have little 
ability to innovate their business models in their parent firms. Therefore, it is 
important to mention that there exists a huge difference regarding the general 
ability to innovate and the ability to innovate business models. According to the 
interviewees, incumbent utility firms already face difficulties in innovating their 
products or services. As business model innovation has a much higher 
interdisciplinary character, which is hard to achieve from the background of silo-
thinking branches, it is a very challenging, if not impossible activity for these 
incumbent utility firms within their parent entities. 
Thirdly, a further difference is the incentive and employee retention schemes. 
Clean-tech start-up firms offer strong incentives through equity shares and 
various and quick career opportunities depending on individual performance for 
all employees, while incumbents particularly pay their top tier managers a large 
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variable bonus if a business model innovation activity has been successful. As a 
consequence, with clean-tech start-ups, all employees have the chance to 
participate in a business model success (which has to be seen equally to the 
start-ups’ success), while incumbent power utility firms largely give incentives to 
top tier management levels. If the business model innovation fails, incumbent 
firms’ employees generally have the chance to stay in their existing role or to 
move to another job, while start-up employees will eventually lose their job if the 
business model innovation activity fails and the start-up has to shut down. In 
this context, clean-tech start-up firms’ employees face a much higher incentive 
that the business model innovation will be successful and probably will do a lot 
to sustain the start-ups’ business model success. 
Fourthly, all interviewees have drawn attention to the importance of IT 
development and partnering within this newly evolving Energiewende industry. 
Here it is evident, clean-tech start-up and incumbent power utility firms 
approach these activities in very different ways. For the clean-tech start-up 
firms, IT as ‘IT solution architecture’ is one of the most relevant activities for 
business model innovation. Indeed, in most cases, this approach is an integral 
part of their business model concept. The same holds true for networking and 
co-operation. Most of the clean-tech start-up firms’ business models work with a 
network of partnering firms. In contrast to this approach, the IT function in 
incumbent power utility firms, works with huge billing systems such as “SAP IS-
U” and it largely administers office applications. In this case, without doubt, the 
IT function is not appreciated as an important part of business model innovation 
activities or future business model concepts. Furthermore, incumbents, having 
historically performed all activities themselves, do not have a background in 
partnering. They rather followed a vertically-integrated value chain construction 
within their integrator business model archetype. 
5.1.1.4 Value capture 
As regards ‘value capture’, there are two major differences between clean-tech 
start-up and incumbent power utility firms. These differences lie in the 
application of business model archetypes regarding revenue models and the 
profitability aspect of value chain configurations. 
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Firstly, clean-tech start-up firms have applied diverse business model 
archetypes. They have created a portfolio of business model archetypes, 
applying at least three different business model archetypes in each firm. 
Incumbent power utility firms, however, largely follow one dominant business 
model archetype. In comparison to incumbents, clean-tech start-up firms have 
attacked the established players using radically new business models. As 
touched upon, start-up firms apply business model archetypes, such as ‘two-
sided market’ or ‘peer-to-peer’ platform models, as first movers in the 
Energiewende market. In contrast, these business model archetypes are 
regarded rather as future business models for the incumbent power utility firms. 
Furthermore, these firms are using business model archetypes such as 
‘leverage customer data’ that essentially remain inaccessible for incumbent 
utility firms with their municipal shareholder structures that demand high privacy 
standards and policies. As a consequence, incumbent power utility firms have, 
so far, not embraced the innovative business models deployed by their 
challengers.  
Secondly, with value chain related business model archetypes, clean-tech start-
up firms largely apply layer player and, in part, orchestrator models with 
incremental business model innovation activities. Power utility incumbents on 
the other hand, apply the integrator model within their vertically-integrated value 
chain and orchestrator and partly layer player models within new retail models. 
Thirdly, although most clean-tech start-ups have followed a lean start-up 
approach as regards profitability, they have not, as yet, generated any profits. 
Meanwhile incumbent power utilities have been confronted with declining 
profits, imploding with the nuclear and thermal generation value-adding step. 
However, with the other value-adding steps (especially with distribution grids) 
incumbent power utility firms are still generating, from a start-up perspective, 
enormous profits.  
Concerning efficiencies, on the incumbent side they have only been achieved 
with MNU firms. These firms have already performed substantial transformation 
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activities (e.g. de-mergers of the utilities “E.ON” and “RWE”). The following 
Table 27 summarises below the key differences in the two case studies. 
 
Area 
Incumbent power utility 
industry 
Clean-tech start-up 
sector 
O
v
e
ra
rc
h
in
g
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 
Starting point for 
business model 
innovation activities 
 More than 130 years of 
old and prevailing BM 
 Large existing 
organisations, which 
are partly overstaffed 
and built around a 
vertically-integrated 
value chain 
 Highly asset-driven with 
investment scope of > 
20 years and an 
inflexible asset-
configuration 
 
 Greenfield approach 
(no prevailing BM, 
existing resources, 
brands) 
 Highly technology-
driven (largely based 
on IT and clean-
technologies) 
Decision framing on 
Energiewende 
 Energiewende is seen 
as a disruptive threat 
and a declining 
profitability puts 
pressure on utilities and 
makes BMI activities 
necessary to transform 
power utility firms 
towards a digital, de-
centralised and de-
carbonised energy 
world 
 
 Energiewende is 
seen as an 
opportunity to build a 
start-up firm in a 
newly evolving 
industry around 
digital, decentralised 
and decarbonised 
technologies 
Sustainability focus 
and environmental 
awareness 
 Environmental harm/ 
pollution of prevailing 
BM based on large-
scale generation from 
nuclear and thermal 
(e.g. lignite) sources 
 Environmentally 
conscious and high 
affinity for clean-
technologies of 
founders 
 High motivation to 
work for a ‘good 
cause’ of both 
founders and staff 
Important 
stakeholders 
 Multiple shareholders 
with publicly listed MNU 
firms and municipalities 
with RPU firms 
 RPU firms in particular 
do not face intense 
pressure as most 
municipal shareholders 
follow a political rather 
than an economic 
agenda 
 Angel investors and 
VCs provide 
resources to 
accelerate growth, 
but also drive 
founders and 
employed staff to 
realise pre-defined 
objectives 
 Pressure as start-ups 
need resources of 
VCs for growth 
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Responsibility for 
business model 
innovation 
 Interdisciplinary project 
team (members from 
different areas of the 
organisation with 
different actors in 
different stages of BMI 
process 
 Project manager or line 
manager of first or 
second management 
level responsible for 
BMI activity 
 Board members only 
perform passive role as 
executive sponsors 
 Initiation, ideation, 
integration and 
implementation with 
founding team 
(complementary 
skills) of initial BMI 
and founding activity 
of start-up firm 
 After implementation 
or scaling up stage 
founders keep BMI 
responsibility 
Scope of business 
model innovation 
activities 
 Perform BMI in a 
parallel mode (focus on 
many activities at the 
same time) 
 Strategic approach 
towards BMI activities 
only with MNU firms 
(based on corporate 
strategy) 
 Perform BMI in a 
sequential mode (one 
activity at a time) 
Structured business 
model innovation 
process 
 Three MNU firms have 
implemented structured 
approaches towards 
BMI; no structured 
approaches with RPUs 
 All managers underline 
necessity to perform 
BMI activities following 
a structured process 
 No structured 
approaches to BMI  
 With small size start-
up firms, a structured 
process is desirable, 
but not essential as 
founders perform BMI 
activities in a small 
team 
Application of 
experimenting and 
trial-and-error learning 
approaches 
 A BM concept, which 
has been initially 
approved will be 
implemented 
independently of 
boundary conditions 
within parent firms 
 BMI based on 
experimenting and 
trial-and-error 
learning approaches 
with quick iterations 
dependent of 
boundary conditions 
V
a
lu
e
 c
re
a
ti
o
n
 
Customer value 
propositions (CVP) 
and customer-
centricity 
 Customers have just 
been a ‘metering point’ 
number in the past 
 Only recently customer-
centricity has gained in 
importance, but strong 
CVPs with new 
products or services 
are still missing in 
many firms 
 Start-ups 
consequently follow 
customer-centric 
approaches (early 
involvement of 
customers within BMI 
activities) and strong 
CVPs 
 Products and 
services are novelties 
to the market 
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Realisations of 
business model 
activities 
 The biggest five power 
utility firms have 
realised their BMI 
 Only one out of five 
RPU firms has 
implemented a BMI 
activity and the other 
firms only have 
conducted pilot 
activities 
 All products or 
services have been 
implemented 
 Some BMs are 
already in the market 
with start-up firms 
that have been 
regarded as future 
offerings with 
incumbents 
Regulation and 
legislative influences 
 Incumbents “blame” 
regulatory aspects for 
putting challenges on 
their BM, but emphasis 
rather the negative than 
the chance for new 
BMs behind these 
market changes 
 Start-ups have looked 
for areas that are at 
least affected by 
regulation or if 
regulatory aspects 
are relevant they tried 
to highly influence 
regulation through 
lobbying approaches 
V
a
lu
e
 d
e
li
v
e
ry
 
Resources for 
business model 
innovation activities 
 Profits from prevailing 
BM are used to cross-
subsidise new BMI 
activities 
 Complementarities with 
existing staff have not 
been achieved 
(especially with sales) 
 
 Start-up firms have 
scarce resources 
 Complementarities 
have been achieved 
with incremental BM 
activities 
Capabilities 
 Lack innovative 
capabilities 
 Bureaucratic, silo-
thinking, hierarchical 
organised, indecisive, 
risk-averse 
management and staff 
 Innovative, agile, 
entrepreneurial and 
adventurous 
management and 
staff 
Employee retention 
and incentives  
 Monetary incentives 
largely top tier 
managers; rather fixed 
income for employees; 
 If BMI activity has 
failed, employees have 
stayed with incumbent 
firm (“job guarantee”) 
 Strong incentives 
through equity 
shares, various and 
quick career 
opportunities 
 If start-up fails high 
risk of losing one’s 
own job 
IT 
 The IT function in 
incumbent firms works 
with large billing 
systems and mainly 
administrates office 
applications 
 Start-ups perform IT 
(“solution 
architectures”) as the 
most relevant activity 
with BMI 
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Partnering 
 Incumbents do not 
have a long history with 
partnering as they used 
to perform everything 
themselves in their 
vertically-integrated BM 
 Network-activities 
with start-up firms are 
part of the BM 
concept as most BMs 
orbit around a 
network of partnering 
firms 
V
a
lu
e
 c
a
p
tu
re
 
Dominant business 
model archetypes 
 Utility (pay-per-usage) 
 Recently retail model 
 Build and sell, two-
sided markets, peer-
to-peer, leverage 
customer data, white 
label, software-as-a-
service 
Organisation of value 
chain  
 Integrator with 
vertically-integrated 
value chain 
 Partly orchestrator and 
layer player with new 
retail models 
 Layer player, partly 
orchestrator with 
incremental BMI 
activities 
Profitability  
 Declining profitability 
(imploding with 
conventional 
generation value-
adding step) 
 Efficiencies have been 
achieved with MNU 
firms 
 No profitability (at 
least in the first three 
to five years) 
 Lean organisation 
Table 27: Key differences between incumbent and start-ups firms 
 
5.1.2 Key learnings from clean-tech start-up for incumbent power 
utility firms 
Experimenting and trial-and-error learning approaches with start-up firms 
This research has shown that clean-tech start-up firms have the ability to 
innovate their business models based on experimenting and trial-and-error 
learning approaches. In this way, clean-tech start-up firms have initially begun 
with business model innovation in response to Energiewende and have 
planned, designed, tested and re-tested alternative business model variants 
until they have found the one that best suits their stakeholders’ and their own 
objectives. In these business model innovation processes, start-ups have 
involved potential customers at an early stage. This successful approach 
towards business model innovation, based on experimenting and trial-and-error 
learning approaches with quick iterations is supported by previous academic 
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studies on business model innovation (Chesbrough, 2010; McGrath, 2010; 
Sosna et al., 2010). This approach is succinctly described by Chesbrough 
(2010, p. 356), who argues business model innovation “is not a matter of 
superior foresight ex-ante – rather, it requires significant trial and error, and 
quite a bit of adaptation ex-post.” Therefore, Sosna et al. (2010) have explicitly 
taken an incumbent’s perspective towards business model innovation that has 
been triggered by external influences. The ability of an organisation to perform 
business model innovation with these approaches is a critical success factor 
and must also be transferred to the incumbent power utility industry. 
Responsibility for business model innovation and dynamic perspective of 
founders 
Closely related to the above-mentioned issue, clean-tech start-up founders 
have performed business model innovation themselves and have taken and 
maintained a dynamic perspective throughout the process. As already pointed 
out by Sosna et al. (2010), the resilience and commitment of founders have 
been additional critical success factors for business model innovation. Following 
the implementation of new business models, founders themselves have largely 
remained responsible for business model innovation activities. The successful 
implementation of business model innovation with incumbent firms demands the 
full engagement of top tier management. This means the management, 
particularly board members, such as the CEO or CMO, have to become more 
personally involved rather than merely acting as executive sponsors to business 
model innovation approaches. 
Customer-centricity and early customer involvement in business model 
innovation activities 
Business model innovation has been conducted with clean-tech start-ups 
intensely following customer-centric approaches. First of all, customer value 
propositions have been based on products or services that were novelties to the 
market. This is supported by Amit and Zott (2001) who have stated that within 
start-up firms, novelties can be regarded as main sources of value creation. 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) have gone a step further in supporting this and view 
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the novelty aspect of start-up business models as a ‘dominant logic’ in itself. 
Bohnsack et al. (2014) see novelties as an essential factor in creating a 
legitimacy and general customer acceptance for their new business model 
designs. Secondly, potential customers have already been involved in the 
initiation and ideation stages of the business model innovations. Start-up firms 
have been able to perform as many quick iterations with alternative business 
model variants as needed, until they have found a solution that best suits their 
customers. This approach demands an innovative, entrepreneurial and agile 
organisational culture and can be seen as another critical success factor that 
has to be transferred to incumbent firms. 
Organisational culture based on innovative capabilities 
Clean-tech start-up firms have built up organisational cultures with distinct 
innovative capabilities. These capabilities are very much needed as these firms 
are permanently adapting their business models to a newly evolving 
Energiewende industry. At the same time, they are sequentially developing new 
business models to scale up their revenue generating potential and 
simultaneously trying to reduce the risk of failure. This need for innovative 
capabilities, in reference to incumbent power utility firms, is also supported by 
Richter (2013a) whose key finding has been that incumbent power utilities lack 
innovative capabilities desperately needed to transform existing business 
models. As a consequence, incumbent firms have to develop more innovative 
capabilities and must overcome their cultural resistance towards innovation. 
Opportunity framing concerning the German Energiewende 
Start-up firms have framed the transformation of the energy industry towards a 
newly evolving Energiewende industry as an opportunity. Markides and 
Charitou (2004, p. 28) support this strategy stating that, “when the organisation 
is ready to actually create a new business model to exploit the new market, it is 
better to look at it as an opportunity.” As this is clearly the approach taken by 
start-up firms that began with a ‘greenfield approach’, it could eventually 
become a critical success factor for incumbent firms. These firms can regard 
such an external trigger as either an opportunity or threat. 
217 
 
5.1.3 Section summary 
Following the structure of the case study write-ups, in the first step, this section 
has presented the key differences in clean-tech start-up and incumbent firms. 
Following this, the key learnings of the clean-tech start-ups’ approach to 
business model innovation for incumbent firms have been described and linked 
to existing studies within the business model innovation area. In the following 
section, the key findings of the two case study write-ups and the theoretical link 
that illustrates the findings to other studies in the business model innovation 
area will be presented. 
5.2 Discussion of findings 
5.2.1 Case A: Incumbent power utility firms 
Disruptive threat of German Energiewende 
As with many previous studies, this research has presented how incumbent 
power utility firms face a severe crisis with their established business model 
(Helms, 2016; Kungl, 2015). The old utility business model, based on 
maximising the scale of power generation applying thermal generation sources 
has already seen a significant decline in profits. It will be further attacked by the 
rise of new business models influenced by the German Energiewende, largely 
based on distributed renewable generation. These results are consistent with 
those of other studies and suggest that the utility-based business model is at 
risk (Fox-Penner, 2010; Lehr, 2013; Richter, 2013a; Shomali and Pinkse, 2016).  
A new finding in this study has been the clearly stated view from interviewed 
managers of power utility firms that the German Energiewende is a disruptive 
threat to their existing business model. They have also recognised and in a few 
cases, already realised, the need to create new business models around small-
scale, distributed renewable generation. Moreover, they regard business model 
innovation and transformation activities as essential.  
218 
 
In contrast to this, in a similar industry study with German incumbent power 
utility managers by Richter (2013a), empirically conducted in 2011, the 
interviewed managers stated they do not regard the rising of renewable 
energies as a disruptive threat to their business model. They went on to say that 
they also did not see the need to develop new business models around small-
scale, distributed renewable generation. Clearly, within a period of four years, 
this view has dramatically changed. As the German Energiewende has been 
further shaped and developed by various triggers, it has caused a severe crisis 
for the old business model of the power utility firms. The sustained progress of 
the Energiewende in Germany, has, without doubt had an impact and changed 
the perspective on the German Energiewende as a disruptive threat to the 
incumbent power utility managers. This, in turn, has changed their perspective 
as regards the need to respond to business model innovation activities. 
Therefore, firms severely affected by Energiewende, such as MNU firms with 
their starkly declining profitability with large-scale conventional power 
generation capacities, have already realised higher business model innovation 
efforts than most of the RPU firms. Furthermore, firms operating in geographical 
territories that have a higher share of renewable energies with large wind 
generation capacities, found particularly in rural areas in Northern Germany, 
have also responded with greater business model innovation efforts.  
In summary, an interesting finding has been how business model innovation 
efforts correlate with how severe the old business model of the incumbent utility 
firm has been affected by the Energiewende. Therefore, relevant parameters 
have been the quantity of renewable production capacity in incumbent utilities’ 
supply territories and the quantity of conventional production capacity of the 
power utility itself. Hence, large differences according to renewable production 
capacities have existed based on geography, for example, the northern 
territories with large wind generating capacities. It is also an important factor if 
the power utility’s supply territory is located in a rural or urban area. For 
instance, “EWE” the biggest RPU firm, largely supplies rural areas in Northern 
Germany with large wind generation capacities. These renewable generation 
capacities are largely not owned by the power utility firm, and is therefore 
severely hit by Energiewende. 
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The present findings seem to be consistent with other studies that found a 
severe crisis can provide a strong impetus to initiate business model 
transformation activities for incumbent firms (Sosna et al., 2010). 
Organisational barriers – particularly dominant logic of the firm, 
organisational cultures and lack of capabilities to innovate business 
models 
With the featured business model innovation activities, only MNU firms and the 
biggest RPU firm have successfully implemented new business models. The 
other RPU firms meanwhile have not yet left the piloting stage. Therefore, 
incumbent power utility managers have faced several organisational barriers 
with the management of business model innovation activities. 
First of all, incumbent power utility firms’ organisations as a whole have been 
trapped in the dominant logic of the prevailing commodity-selling business 
model. While the interviewed managers have seen the necessity for business 
model transformation and have been engaged with business model innovation 
activities, large parts of the organisation have not joined in. These areas of the 
organisation did not share the idea of a business model transformation towards 
customer solutions centred around decarbonised, decentralised and digital 
business models. They preferred to remain with their established business 
model, based around large-scale conventional generation and a vertically-
integrated value chain.  
This path-dependent behaviour has occurred in a number of industry studies 
before (Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough, 2010; Christensen, 1997; Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1995). These studies highlighted how central elements of business 
model innovations may often conflict with the more traditional configurations of 
a firm’s assets. Furthermore, they showed incumbent managers are likely to 
resist business model innovation activities that may threaten their ongoing value 
for the firm. Amit and Zott (2001) and Christensen (1997) have discovered 
managers do, in fact, recognise the correct business model. But, similarly to this 
study, business model innovation activities face resistance due to conflicts with 
the prevailing business model and its underlying value chain configuration and 
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asset allocation - all supporting the prevailing business model. The findings of 
this study further corroborate the ideas of Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), 
who argue the success of established business models strongly influences the 
dominant logic of the firm. The dominant logic of the firm, weights the 
information that subsequently gets routed into, or filtered out, of corporate 
decision processes. In this study, the interviewed managers have explained 
such decision processes in relation to expected financial results, risk-
management and marketing and sales activities.  
This finding is also in agreement with Richter’s (2013a) findings, which showed 
that moving away from the dominant logic of the firm has been a challenge for 
German incumbent power utility firms. In his study about business model 
innovation activities around renewable generation technologies, he discovered 
conventional power plants have been partially substituted with large-scale 
renewable power generation capacities. They fit perfectly into their vertically-
integrated value chain and dominant logic of the prevailing utility-based 
business model of incumbent power utility firms (Richter, 2013a). Hence, power 
utility firms have left the main elements of their business models largely 
unchanged.  
Additionally, all interviewed managers did not expect the new business models 
to substitute the EBIT losses of the old business model. While MNU firms have 
lost billions with collapsing conventional power generation, new business 
models are expected to generate only a few million in profitability. This 
surprising result may be explained by, how on one hand side, managers of 
incumbent power utility firms have already experienced the demise of certain 
elements of the utility-based business model. But on the other hand, the 
dominant logic of the firm prevents them from seeing the opportunity of 
Energiewende and the possibility to capture value from new revenue sources. 
Secondly, and in strong support of the above-mentioned point, the lack of an 
innovative culture in the existing organisational culture of incumbent power 
utility firms might be a major challenge to successful business model innovation 
activities. A number of reasons exists for this. Reasons deeply grounded in the 
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DNA of these incumbent power utility firms. The organisational cultures of the 
old business model were based on risk-averse decision-making, bureaucratic 
mentalities, strong hierarchies, silo-thinking and the management and long-term 
planning of large-scale projects (e.g. large-scale, conventional power plants, 
transmission and distribution grids, large billing systems). As a consequence, 
many employees were deeply rooted in these systems, resulting in a 
nervousness around any business model transformation activities. The 
employees feared the loss of future revenues and of losing their value in the 
firm and marketplace. As strongly supported by Chesbrough (2010) and 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002), a change in the organisational culture 
can be regarded as essential in transforming business models. The authors 
pointed out the general challenge of dual business model innovation for the 
entire organisation. They highlight the specific ability of middle managers to 
promote business model transformation for the well-being of the organisation as 
a whole even though their own career might be jeopardised. 
Thirdly, incumbent power utilities lack innovative capabilities for business model 
innovation activities. This finding is strongly supported by Richter (2013a) and 
Wassermann et al. (2015), who have stated that utilities lack the business 
model innovation capabilities to successfully master the fundamental changes 
of German Energiewende. In addition, this study has shown that incumbent 
power utilities’ employees need additional skill-sets and capabilities around IT, 
networking, partnering and particularly marketing and sales skills for the 
successful conduct of new business model activities. 
Leadership and executive sponsor 
A critical success factor for the successful realisation of business model 
innovation activities has been the strong support of an executive champion, 
ideally from the management board. However, interestingly, as long as this 
person cleared the way within the organisation for the responsible line or project 
manager in charge of business model innovation, it was of no consequence if 
they were a CEO, CMO or a general manager of a specific business area. This 
is supported by Sosna et al. (2010, p. 400), who stated, “if a leader with 
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significant or complete decision power is committed to business model 
experimentation, the chances for success are significantly increased.” Similar to 
this, Chesbrough (2010) views CEOs of small firms, or general managers of 
specific businesses, as the ideal people to lead the change process during a 
business model innovation. 
Retail business models as novelties  
With the featured business model innovation activities, a key finding in this 
study has been how incumbent power utility firms have largely become retailers 
with new business models around distributed renewable generation, distributed 
renewable storage and connected home technologies. Interestingly, the 
respondent power utility managers have not themselves appreciated this reality. 
In the interviews, they described the new value chain configuration and the 
underlying activities, but never represented these activities as retailer activities. 
Although they had to perform an entirely new value chain as a retailer using an 
orchestrator model, they have tried to leverage complementarities with their 
existing brands, large customer bases, finance, controlling, procurement and 
marketing and sales resources. Therefore, this study has shown, with sales 
representatives in particular, incumbent power utility firms have failed to realise 
complementarities. The sales representatives have been unable to sell 
distributed renewable generation technologies, particularly solar PV and solar 
storage alongside their commodity-selling business. Therefore, sales vice 
presidents and other managers within the sales areas have been opponents to 
new business models. Indeed, they have rather perceived cannibalisation 
threats and channel conflicts at every turn. This behaviour can be correlated to 
previous explanations regarding the dominant logic of the firm (Amit and Zott, 
2001; Chesbrough, 2010; Christensen, 1997). 
In addition, with other secondary functions, such as finance, controlling and 
procurement, there have been conflicts. Here, this new retail business model 
has also not fitted in with the dominant logic of the firm. As a consequence, with 
these new business models following an ‘integration strategy’, an ambidextrous 
organisation in the parent firms of power utilities has not been achieved 
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(Markides and Charitou, 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Interestingly, 
while incumbent firms explained these ex-post business model innovation 
activities, they also admitted their firms have changed their organisational forms 
of business model innovation for current activities from integration towards 
separation strategies, which will be discussed in the following paragraph.  
Separation strategies with organisational forms for business model 
innovation  
As regards the organisational forms of business model innovation, there are 
multiple activities going on, particularly within MNU firms. This may indicate how 
seriously the disruptive threat of Energiewende has come to be regarded by 
power utilities’ managers. While MNU firms have developed business model 
portfolio strategies based on incremental and disruptive technologies within 
their corporate strategies, RPU firms did not strategically approach business 
model innovation within their corporate strategies yet. 
Superordinately, in 2016, the two MNU firms, “E.ON” and “RWE”, have split 
their parent firms into two separate entities. In these huge business model 
transformation efforts, these utilities have decided to refocus their business 
models on renewable energies, distribution grids, and customer solutions. 
Additionally, they have separated these activities from the old business model 
around conventional power generation. This transformation is currently 
underway and not yet completed. 
In general, business model innovation activities have been performed in parent 
firms, separate business units, in spin-off firms and joint-ventures with partners. 
Additionally, a special form of business model innovation has been corporate 
venture capitalist activities, in which the five biggest incumbent utility firms have 
strategically co-invested in new capabilities of start-up firms (see also Figures 
10 and 11). 
Overall, this thesis documents how the management of business model 
innovation activities in MNU firms have been in favour of a separation strategy. 
RPU firms meanwhile, have largely kept the new business model activities 
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integrated in the parent firm. As most of these RPU firms have not as yet 
strategically approached business model innovation, it has to be underlined that 
these firms have rather maintained the status-quo. In these circumstances, their 
approach will not be further discussed. 
Many proponents for such a separation strategy of MNU firms exist in the 
literature. Markides and Charitou (2004, p. 24) argue that “separation is the 
preferred strategy when the new market is not only strategically different from 
the existing business but also when the two markets face serious trade-offs and 
conflicts.” This is particularly the case with the newly evolving Energiewende 
industry where large-scale conventional power generation is substituted by 
renewable generation sources and a vertically-integrated value chain 
configuration is replaced by layer player or orchestrator value chain 
configurations around decarbonised, decentralised and distributed, prosumer-
orientated renewable generation models. As this transition has a disruptive 
character, various scholars are in favour of a separation strategy. They argue 
that potentially disruptive business model innovation activities should ideally be 
performed in a separation of the old business model and its underlying value 
chain (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2013; Porter, 2013). As regards 
the organisational barriers already highlighted above, according to Markides 
and Charitou (2004) the separation strategy within the incumbent power utility 
parent firms prevents the new business model from suffocating. This is because 
the new unit is able to develop its own organisational culture, processes and 
strategy without interference from the old business model and its underlying 
value configuration.  
Structured business model innovation processes 
Although all interviewed utility managers have seen the critical need to perform 
business model innovation following a structured process, only one MNU firm 
has managed to achieve this. Frankenberger et al. (2013) initially developed a 
process model for business model innovation, named the ‘4I-framework’, based 
on the insights of 14 cases from different industries. This framework comprises 
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the necessary steps to achieve business model innovation. There have, so far, 
been no research studies based on the application of such a process framework 
in practice.  
This study has followed a stage gate innovation process perspective to gain 
insights into the important stages within the business model innovation activities 
of incumbent power utility firms. In so doing, this study has shown that with 
business model innovation in established firms, the ‘4I-framework’ has its 
shortcomings. Hence, after the implementation stage, the scaling up and 
potential ex-post integration phases to leverage complementarities, for instance, 
in a ‘phased integration strategy’ (Markides and Charitou, 2004), have been 
missed. In the initiation phase, the link to existing corporate strategies with pre-
defined technology portfolios for business model innovation have also been 
missed. In the following Chapter 6, an integrative business model innovation 
framework for incumbent power utility firms will be presented. As stated by 
Dörner et al. (2011) and Helms (2016) this is regarded as a significant 
development. Incumbent power utility firms need to follow a structured approach 
to overcome barriers to business model innovation.  
Bandwagon effects  
Observing the power utility industry, closely related to path-dependent 
behaviour and the dominant logic of the prevailing business model, bandwagon 
effects are widespread. As regards the development of business model 
innovations, many incumbent power utilities have been vigilant and have closely 
monitored the initiatives towards business model innovation in other incumbent 
power utilities. The latter is an important aspect. These incumbent power 
utilities have not adopted business models from other industries, rather they 
have remained fixed to their own industry. After first-movers, it was largely the 
MNU firms who implemented business model innovation activities. Many other 
utilities then followed with ‘me-too’ strategies. This ‘crowd behaviour’ or ‘herd 
mentality’ has resulted in different implementation ‘waves’ of technological 
products and services such as recent connected home devices (so-called 
“smart home”) and electric vehicle infrastructures. Earlier examples were seen 
226 
 
in “heating system contracting” and the organisational installation of energy 
consulting troops around energy efficiency measurements. Thereby smaller 
firms have adopted the strategies of bigger incumbent power utility firms after a 
period of time. Even with the transformation activities of two MNU firms, “RWE” 
has adopted “E.ON’s” strategy. They have split the firm into a new business 
model with renewable energies, distribution grids and customer solutions and 
an old business model with conventional generation capacities. These activities 
emphasise the risk-averse decision-making structures and the lack of innovative 
capabilities present in many incumbent power utility firms. They further account 
for the influence of regulation on these power utility firms. These firms are 
similarly influenced by regulatory policies and react to them with the same 
strategies. At the same time, industry associations, management consultants 
and different industry networking events facilitate the transfer of knowledge and 
spread of new ideas within the power utility industry. 
As mentioned above, big incumbent power utility firms are largely externally 
influenced by politics and their organisational cultures. The power utilities 
however, particularly RPU firms, also seem to be political within their internal 
organisations. Hence, the vague responses of some interviewees. Therefore, it 
must be noted, these responses emanate from the predominant management 
culture in these firms. The respondents have the feeling, whether real or 
imagined, they are less vulnerable if they hedge their answers. 
Moreover, on several occasions within the interviews, incumbent power utility 
managers had a tendency to finger point and blame third parties, rather than 
actively tackle a challenge themselves. For instance, for a long time they have 
ignored the challenge of the Energiewende, hoping a new government 
administration will withdraw it. When they finally accepted the inevitability of 
Energiewende, they began to denounce regulation rather than developing new 
strategies and new business models. 
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5.2.2 Case B: Clean-technology start-up firms 
In Section 5.1.2 the following five key learnings from the clean-tech start-up 
case study for incumbent power utility firms have been presented: (1.) 
experimenting and trial-and-error learning as central approaches within 
business model innovation activities, (2.) top management’s responsibility for 
business model innovation and the dynamic perspective of founders, (3.) 
customer-centricity throughout all business model innovation activities, (4.) the 
availability of innovative capabilities in the organisation and (5.) framing 
Energiewende as a positive opportunity. In this section, these findings already 
presented, will be complemented with additional findings from this case write-
up. 
Environmental awareness and high interest in sustainable technologies 
This study has shown that clean-tech start-up firms have been driven by 
environmental awareness and a strong passion for sustainable technologies in 
both founders and employees. This intrinsic motivation to work for a “good 
cause” has been a key driver for business model innovation’s success in these 
firms. Furthermore, this ‘mind-set’ has also positively influenced customer 
interactions as regards the firms’ trustworthiness and credibility. These findings 
are supported by previous publications on the development and management of 
sustainable business models (Bocken et al, 2014; Sommer, 2012). 
In addition, start-ups have viewed Energiewende as an opportunity. They have 
framed this shift in the energy landscape as an excellent chance to position 
themselves in a newly evolving industry. This perception has been an important 
driver for business model innovation, as already mentioned in Section 5.1.2. 
(Markides and Charitou, 2004). 
Barriers and constraining effects to business model innovation  
Similar to previous findings, one of the greatest challenges for clean-tech start-
up firms in this case study has been the lack of resources (Baker and Nelson, 
2005; Bohnsack et al., 2014).  
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As start-ups had no revenue streams from existing business, the funding of 
business model innovation (and the initial set-up of the start-up) has been a 
challenge. They had to unearth creative ways to finance their business model 
innovation activities and operations. As a consequence, and in line with existing 
findings, clean-tech start-up firms have only pursued one business model 
innovation at one point in time. They were unable to sustain experimenting and 
trial-and-error learning approaches over a long time period (Bohnsack et al., 
2014; Sosna et al., 2010). In addition, angel investors and venture capitalists 
have been important drivers for start-up market success. On the other hand, 
they have pressurised founders to grow revenues quickly and stop initial 
experiments with business model concepts. As in previous findings, these 
investors have evaluated the investment opportunity based on business models 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). 
No cognitive constraints of a dominant business model logic 
Clean-tech start-up firms have faced no cognitive constraints to fit new 
Energiewende technologies into existing business models. Therefore, they have 
developed completely new business models following a ‘greenfield approach’ 
and have performed many quick iterations within their experimenting and trial-
and-error learning approaches. This finding is supported by Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) who stated start-ups are less constrained in the evaluation 
of alternative business models and are more flexible in adjusting their business 
model to a changing market context. 
Moreover, most of the clean-tech start-ups’ business models have had a 
radical, in certain cases a disruptive character. This finding is supported by 
Sosna et al. (2010) who have identified new entrants are flexible in pursuing 
radical business models.  
Customer value propositions and novelties 
Similar to other studies, a key finding has been that novelties have been the 
main source of value creation with clean-tech start-up firms (Amit and Zott, 
2001; Bohnsack et al., 2014). For Prahalad and Bettis (1986) this is a special 
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kind of ‘dominant logic’ itself, as start-ups are expected to create novelties for 
their customers as a main source of value creation. Clean-tech start-up firms 
have developed novelties such as ‘two-sided market’ or ‘peer-to-peer’ platform 
business models. In these models, distributed renewable generation capacities 
have been combined in a large VPP and marketed against the flexibility of 
customers with demand response benefits. These business models, already 
implemented by start-ups, have been evaluated by incumbents as future 
business models – business models that, in the meantime, are hard to achieve. 
This is supported by Bohnsack et al. (2014) who have described start-ups as 
the reason for a radical departure from established business models in an 
industry. In other business model innovations, start-up firms have transferred a 
‘bricks-and-mortar’ model into the digital area. For instance, they have created 
e-commerce platforms to market distributed solar PV rooftop or energy efficient 
heating system technologies.  
Hence, clean-tech start-up firms have bundled new products and services in 
unique ways. They have engaged non-traditional partners and targeted new 
customers, such as ‘prosumers’ in distributed generation models. 
Customer-centric approaches, with the creation of strong customer value 
propositions (CVP) have played an important role in the featured business 
model innovations. Start-ups’ success has largely depended on the 
attractiveness of their offerings for customers and the customers’ willingness to 
buy. Therefore, they have involved potential customers at an early stage of the 
business model innovation process. This is supported by Bohnsack et al. (2014) 
who have stated that novelties with start-up business models are essential to 
create legitimacy and an acceptance of customers. In so doing they challenge 
the dominant market presence of incumbent firms. 
5.2.3 Section summary 
In this section the key findings of the two case study write-ups have been 
theoretically linked to other studies in the business model innovation domain. 
Both presentations of case write-up findings have focused on the exposure of 
Energiewende (disruptive threat vs. great chance), barriers and limitations and 
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customer value propositions and novelties. In addition, with the findings of the 
incumbent power utility case study, the role of the executive sponsor, 
bandwagon effects, organisational forms and structured processes for business 
model innovation have been presented. 
Overall, the findings clearly show how the newly evolving Energiewende 
industry is pursuing different business models than the classical utility-based 
business model of incumbent power utility firms.  
In addition, the findings suggest managers of incumbent power utility and clean-
tech start-ups firms approach business model innovation in distinctive ways. 
While start-ups have been the main source of key novelties in business models 
that were partly new to the world, incumbents have adopted retail models that 
have been new only to the power utility industry. 
Within the Energiewende, several contingent events occurred influencing the 
development of incremental and potentially disruptive business model 
innovation. These events include: regulation, changing consumer demands and 
engagement, new technologies and increasing internal and external 
competition.  
Nevertheless, at this point in the Energiewende, the arguments of other 
scholars regarding a convergence of incumbent and start-up business models 
over time cannot be confirmed (Bohnsack et al., 2014). Most likely the 
transformation process of Energiewende towards distributed renewable 
generation business models is too much in an early stage. 
Therefore, incumbent power utility firms cannot be regarded as likely candidates 
to push innovative Energiewende business models and to drive change towards 
sustainable technologies. They remain paralysed in the dominant logic of their 
prevailing utility-based business model. Their main objective in business model 
innovation, has been to reinforce their competitive position, to find cost 
efficiencies and to leverage existing complementary assets. In all of these areas 
they have failed to achieve their aims. Furthermore, the bandwagon effect and 
several organisational barriers, particularly the lack of innovative capabilities for 
231 
 
business model innovation have hindered their business model innovation 
abilities. Moreover, and in contrast to earlier findings, sustainable technologies 
within the Energiewende are attractive to the market and furthermore, 
consumers support German Energiewende (Johnson and Suskewiez, 2009). 
Finally, it is crucial to mention, the presented findings are highly tentative, as the 
Energiewende is an ongoing process and still in its infancy. In the next section, 
the contribution and implications including the presentation of a business model 
innovation framework will be presented. 
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6 Chapter: Conclusion and contributions 
6.1 Introduction 
This final chapter presents the interpretation of the cross-case analysis and is 
structured into five parts. 
Section 6.2 introduces the contribution to theory of this study by presenting the 
‘BMI-6-framework’. This adds by developing a new process framework for 
business model innovation in established firms, that is, firms still generating 
revenue from an existing business model.  This process is built through a 
continuous comparison of cross-case findings and existing literature and 
presents a starting point for future research. 
Section 6.3 presents the contribution to practice. The research findings have 
been applied to business practice, based on the model of Van de Ven (2007). 
The process of transferring research into practice will be shown and practical 
recommendations based on the research findings will be presented. The 
process has built on and extended initial contributions to the various challenges 
associated with business model innovation in an incumbent firm. It does so by 
providing a comprehensive list of those challenges and subsequent solutions on 
how to overcome these constraints. Furthermore, it has built on the wisdom 
acquired from the clean-tech start-up firms involved in this research and has 
transferred key success factors to incumbent firms. Finally, it will provide an 
outlook on viable business models for the newly evolving Energiewende 
industry summarising the findings from the clean-tech start-up and incumbent 
power utility case studies. 
Section 6.4 provides a summary of the research limitations and Section 6.5 
concludes with an outlook for potential future research. 
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6.2 Contribution to theory 
Figure 16 overpage presents the new business model innovation process 
framework ‘BMI-6-framework’. It is the aggregation of all findings from this study 
and in particular, will answer RQ 3: “How can business model innovation be 
approached more systematically to help managers of incumbent firms perform 
business model innovation in a more structured way?” Therefore, it clearly 
points out how managers of incumbent firms can approach business model 
innovation more systematically. 
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Figure 16: ‘BMI-6-framework’ 
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6.2.1 Initiation  
The initiation phase can be described by a process which closely scans and 
monitors any impulse for business model innovation in the focused technology 
areas. It looks for those elements integrated into corporate strategy in a 
permanent interplay with contingent events in the surrounding ecosystem. Thus, 
the corporate strategy’s desired business model technology portfolio provides a 
general direction as regards the focused technology areas for business model 
innovation. If contingent events within the ecosystem are advantageous and the 
conditions necessary are provided, then the ideal starting point for the 
deployment of the focused technologies in business model innovation activities 
is achieved.  
This research has shown how the ecosystem is comprised of regulation, 
technologies, consumer demands and internal and external competition. These 
influential factors in the ecosystem will be further described below. 
Regulatory policies 
This research also identified that clean-tech start-up and incumbent power utility 
firms have dealt in different ways with the influence of governmental regulation 
on their business models. Start-ups have actively shaped regulatory policies to 
best fit with their business models, or, have focused on areas, in which 
regulation has had little or no influence. Meanwhile, incumbent power utility 
firms have regarded regulatory policies (particularly concerning the German 
Energiewende) as being in a state of constant flux. Due to this perception of 
uncertainty, on the whole, they lacked confidence and did not implement new 
business models. The incumbents, insecure as regards adjustments based on 
the adoption of regulatory policies, failed to innovate business models at an 
early stage. In addition, they did not secure a good point of departure in this 
newly evolving Energiewende industry.  
This process framework suggests incumbent power utility firms identify the 
relevant drivers for their business model innovations and actively shape them 
(e.g. through the work in industry associations such as the “BDEW - German 
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Association of Energy and Water Industries” or “bne Association of Energy 
Market Innovators”). If regulatory changes occur, the process suggests these 
firms should adapt their business models quickly to these new circumstances 
and proceed with their new business model designs. 
Technologies 
The results of this investigation show that firms have ideally developed a 
desired business model technology portfolio within their innovation and long-
term corporate strategies. Therefore, firms should closely scan and monitor the 
level of maturity and industry adoption of these focused technologies into 
business models with the development of a technology radar system. 
Implementation of this so called ‘technology radar’, should allow firms to 
distinguish between ‘hype’ surrounding initial technology triggers, from those 
commercially viable technologies, applicable for business model innovation. It 
should also reduce the risk of erroneous technology investment decisions taken 
too early in the technology lifecycle.  
In so doing, firms should ideally transfer technologies into business models just 
before their maturity level reaches mainstream adoption and technologies start 
to take off into the wider market. 
Consumer demands 
The findings of this study have shown that customer centricity and customer 
insights have a great impact on successful business model innovation. As a 
consequence, incumbent power utility firms should strive for more customer 
insights and gain a better understanding of definite customer needs. In addition, 
they should closely scan and monitor the behaviour of ‘prosumers’ and potential 
new prosumer-orientated business models (as their ability to produce their own 
power is highly disruptive to incumbent firms). All these activities are closely 
related to the ideation phase. In this phase, it is crucial to gain a thorough 
understanding of customer and non-customer needs and to apply ‘customer 
journey mapping’ methods. These are critical activities for the initial design of a 
customer value proposition for the new business model design. 
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Internal and external competition 
This study has shown that a new industry is developing around the evolving 
Energiewende and consists of different players from other industries, for 
example, automotive, ICT/Internet, consumer electronics, energy system 
manufacturers or clean-tech start-ups. For this reason, it is important that power 
utilities widen their industry perspective towards the Energiewende industry. 
This process recommends to incumbent power utility firms to closely scan and 
monitor new business models. They should determine the underlying business 
model archetypes of these players and strive for quick adoption of those 
successful business models.  
To sum up, foresight activities and better anticipation of these above-mentioned 
contingent events in the ecosystem are important to respond quickly with 
business model innovations or business model adoptions to changes in the 
ecosystem. Therefore, incumbent power utility firms might have to invest in new 
capabilities. Furthermore, it is strongly recommended to collaborate with 
universities, research institutions and research-related firms that deliver 
technology-related insights and anticipate adoption and innovation diffusion. 
The initiation phase can be performed in the parent organisation or in an 
outside subsidiary. The responsible organisational function should be with 
innovation management or corporate development. It is recommended that 
these functions ideally report directly to the CEO. 
6.2.2 Ideation  
In the ideation phase, it is important incumbent power utility firms achieve ‘out-
of-the-box thinking’ to challenge and overcome the dominant logic of the 
prevailing utility-based business model. This research has shown how, clean-
tech start-up firms applying a ‘greenfield approach’ and incumbent power utility 
firms having outsourced their business model innovation activities to an external 
environment, have been more effective with business model innovation. In this 
context, this business model innovation process proposes to build an external 
environment for business model innovation activities correlating to a start-up 
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accelerator. This environment should provide business model innovation teams 
with office space, funding and mentorship. 
In approaching ideation for new business model designs, an important aspect is 
the way in which internally recruited business model development teams follow 
a holistic approach. This involves, straight from inception, focusing on business 
models and leaving ‘product thinking’ behind. To succeed, teams should 
specifically have innovative capabilities for business model innovation and 
should be driven by an entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, they should be 
composed of an interdisciplinary team with complementary skill-sets 
comparable with start-up founding teams.  
Following the findings of this research, firms focusing on business model 
innovation have largely applied the ‘design thinking’ method. In this step, 
incumbent firms should strongly focus on a customer centric approach. Initial 
customer insights from the initiation phase will be further enriched with data and 
subsequently interpreted. This implies, that it is essential for business model 
innovation teams to gain first hand customer experience. It is important 
therefore, for teams to communicate with customers and non-customers 
personally rather than outsourcing this task to external market research 
agencies. Interpretations should be based on ‘design thinking frameworks’ such 
as ‘customer journey mapping’, in which customer experiences, including their 
frustrations, pain points and areas not being addressed by current offerings and 
business models are identified. Based on this, business model ideas should be 
developed on how to capitalise on these opportunities. Therefore, visual 
methods such as the ‘business model canvas’ of Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) can be applied. 
After initial ideas have been developed, they should again be discussed with 
potential customers. In addition, if partners are necessary to perform a part in 
the business model innovation activity, then initial ‘sparring’ initiatives with 
potential partnering firms should take place.  
Following this stage, the first decision board has to be held. Therefore, a 
committee of appointed top tier managers (ideally with the participation of 
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management board members) has to decide if the business model innovation 
activity can be transferred into the next stage, if it needs more iterations and 
has to be further adjusted or if it has to be stopped immediately. 
6.2.3 Installation  
In the installation phase, in particular, the business model elements will be 
aligned, a prototype will be built and a pilot for proof of concept will be 
performed. In addition, an executive sponsor for the business model innovation 
will be appointed. At the end of this stage, an additional decision board will 
decide on the next steps. Therefore, at this stage, a business case should be 
prepared. 
This study has shown that an executive sponsor is a critical success factor for 
business model innovation activities in incumbent firms. She or he drives 
support and helps to overcome limitations. Ideally this person is recruited from 
the management board. This study has also shown that this person should 
become actively involved and should facilitate business model innovation 
beyond the usual steering committee activities typically carried out by these top 
tier managers. In these circumstances, incumbent power utility firms might 
install a new position of ‘chief transformation officer’ or ‘chief innovation officer’ 
on the management board. Therefore, it follows that this person should ideally 
lead the decision board. This process suggests appointing such a person as an 
executive sponsor after the ideation stage has been realised.  
The central objective of this stage is to align the different elements of the new 
business model design. Following Johnson et al. (2010), the central elements in 
this process are the CVP (target customer, job-to-be-done and offering), key 
resources (people, technology, products, equipment, channels, partnerships 
and brand), key processes (rules, metrics and norms) and profit formula 
(revenue model, cost structures, margin model and resource velocity). This 
study has further shown that the clean-tech start-up firm “ubitricity” has 
successfully applied for patents for their innovative electric vehicle mobile 
metering technologies. To realise a competitive sustainable advantage, this 
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process stipulates the assessment of a potential application of patents within 
the business model innovation process. 
In the next step, a prototype should be developed to carry out a pilot activity for 
proof of concept. Pilot activities could be defined based on a special target 
group, geographical region, or, in an ideal circumstance, performed with open-
minded and friendly existing customers.  
Business model innovation teams are greatly encouraged to experiment and 
perform trial-and-error learning approaches throughout the business model 
innovation activity and particularly within the pilot activity. In so doing, this 
process suggests that learnings are quickly converted into business model 
adjustments. 
After pilot activities have been realised, another decision board has to be 
scheduled. This means a detailed business case calculation has to be 
presented. It is strongly recommended that decision boards leave path-
dependencies and do not judge the new business models based on the ROCE 
figures of the old, utility-based business model. Again, the decision board has to 
decide if the business model innovation activity can be transferred into the next 
stage, if it needs more iterations and has to be further adjusted or, if it has to be 
stopped. If the decision board decides to transfer the new business model into 
the realisation phase, then it also has to be determined if the business model 
innovation has an incremental or a radical breakthrough (potentially disruptive) 
character. According to this classification, two different options emerge for the 
implementation stage: (1.) Implementation - in a spin-off firm or separate 
business unit with radical breakthrough business model innovations that have a 
potentially disruptive character or (2.) Realisation - in the parent firm’s 
organisation with incremental business model innovations.  
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6.2.4 Implementation  
In the implementation stage, the design stages are finished and the market 
realisation begins. In the next step, the underlying processes for option one 
(‘founding of spin-off firm or separate business unit’) will be presented.  
Founding of spin-off firm or separate business unit  
This research has shown the dominant logic of the prevailing utility-based 
business model has caused several constraints after the implementation of new 
business models in the parent firm, especially with potentially disruptive 
business model innovations. In this process, radical breakthrough business 
models, which have a disruptive character, and are based on a different 
underlying asset configuration, should be performed outside the parent firm. 
Depending on the diverseness of the new towards the old business model, 
incumbent firms’ managers have to decide on the level of separation. Based on 
this research, the author recommends implementing the new business model in 
a separate firm. If transition efforts have further exploited the old business 
model and organisational cultures have been transformed, new business 
models could also be implemented in a separate business unit. 
Moreover, the roll-out should be managed deliberately on a step by step basis. 
In the beginning, the piloting activities could be extended to other target groups, 
geographical regions or existing customers. 
This research has shown that start-up firms have different co-investors. In 
contrast to this approach, with the implementation of new business models in 
spin-off firms, incumbent power utility firms could also search for strategic co-
investors (e.g. other power utility firms, partnering firms, venture capitalists). In 
this case, they could spread the risk and might also gain additional expertise 
and knowledge for the spin-off firm. 
A key activity and a critical success factor for the new business model in this 
process stage is to master complexity through experimenting and trial-and-error 
learning approaches. As this research has shown, business models should be 
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managed as dynamic constructs. Based on contingent events and experiences 
with customers and key partners, these spin-off firms have to perform quick 
iterations and ensure that learnings are converted into business model 
adjustments.  
Although business model innovation has been implemented externally, in this 
process, firstly complementarities with the parent firm should be leveraged. 
Potential complementarities could be existing brands, marketing and sales 
channels (e.g. corporate website) and specific overhead functions. Therefore, it 
is most important that spin-off firms do not squander their agility due to 
interventions from the parent firm. 
Implementation in parent firm 
Incremental business model innovations have a similar asset configuration to 
the old business model. The process suggests their implementation has to be 
fulfilled within the parent organisation. In this case, complementary assets can 
be leveraged and efficiencies, based on the existing business model, can be 
further exploited. It is critical therefore, to overcome internal resistance and the 
dominant logic of the prevailing business model. Key decision makers have to 
provide a tangible commitment as regards the availability of resources and their 
support for the business model effort. In addition, change management 
activities should convince the organisation of business model change.  
The greatest challenge within the incumbent organisation will be to achieve an 
understanding and support for the necessity of experimenting and trial-and-error 
learning methods. On the one hand, the organisation needs innovative 
capabilities to perform iterations and adoptions to the business model and, on 
the other hand, both managers and employees need to become more resilient. 
For incremental business model innovation, the process is finished after the 
implementation stage. However, incumbent power utility firms are obliged to 
perform further iterations and adoptions of the business model due to 
contingent events. 
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This research has shown that clean-tech start-up firms go through different 
investment rounds to receive additional resources. Similarly, after the 
implementation stage, a further decision board will decide on the provision of 
further resources for the spin-off firm to scale up the new radical breakthrough 
(potentially disruptive) business model. If a strategic co-investment has been 
acquired at this stage, the decision board will be extended towards the strategic 
co-investors.  
6.2.5 Inflation – Scaling up 
In the inflation or scaling up stage, spin-off firms should increase market share 
and market penetration, and at the same time, grow their organisations. This 
research has shown that clean-tech start-up firms have initially introduced one 
business model and have developed further revenue streams applying 
additional business model archetypes later on. Similar to this and depending on 
the offering, the process recommends that spin-off firms develop further 
business models around the initial offering and/or expand into new geographical 
regions or market segments. Therefore, the creation of further business model 
types helps to mitigate the risks involved. 
In the first step, the new business model should be scaled up, applying new 
sales and marketing channels, including new partners from this area to increase 
market penetration and eventually increase market share and revenue. 
Thereby, it is of great importance, to develop the organisation in parallel to this 
growth scenario in order to prevent quality and service problems. With the 
recruitment of new employees, it will also be necessary to establish clear 
decision structures and processes within the spin-off organisation.  
Although the organisations of spin-off firms have grown in this stage, it is of 
great importance that these organisations remain agile. They should further 
apply experimenting and trial-and-error learning approaches to react to 
contingent events and should continuously adapt their business models 
accordingly. 
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6.2.6 Integration  
In the integration stage, a merger of the spin-off and the parent firm should be 
carried out. Following Markides and Charitou (2004) and their concept of a 
phased separation strategy, after a certain period of time it might be a good 
opportunity to minimise the disruption created from the conflicts between both 
firms and to merge the spin-off with the parent firm. This could be the case, 
when the new business model will eventually have become the new industry 
standard and, at the same time, transformation initiatives with the old business 
model have been successfully realised.  
In this process, equity shares of potential co-investors have to be bought back 
by the incumbent power utility firm. Furthermore, a potential merger gives these 
firms the opportunity to leverage complementary assets and to raise 
efficiencies. 
 
6.3 Contribution to practice 
This section presents the contribution to practice. It is based on the academic 
model by Van de Ven (2007) as one model through which to transfer research 
into business practice. It comprises of four stages: problem formulation, 
research design, theory building and problem solving. All stages include 
challenges that have to be examined when transferring research into practice. 
This section portrays each step of the model to make this research relevant for 
professionals. It also answers RQ 2: “How can managers overcome challenges 
to business model innovation in incumbent power utility firms?” 
6.3.1 Problem formulation 
As explained by Van de Ven (2007), different perspectives have to be 
acknowledged when transferring research into practice. In this research, the 
problem formulation considered both an academic and a professional 
perspective, and as this is a DBA thesis, stressed rather the professional 
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perspective. The research domain of business model innovation has been an 
under-researched field, focused mainly on the antecedents of the business 
model concept. Scant research has taken place into the true impact of business 
model innovation from a managerial perspective in an industry transformation 
influenced by an external trigger such as the German Energiewende. So far, 
only one empirical study exists in this particular industry. The study by Richter 
(2013a), analysed business model innovation and the adoption of renewable 
energy technologies in German power utility firms. An empirical study by Sosna 
et al. (2010) analysed business model innovation in an established firm from a 
different industry that has been triggered by a severe external crisis. 
From a professional perspective, three core business challenges were identified 
contributing to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, incumbent power 
utility firms are highly affected by the German Energiewende that transforms a 
system based on large-scale conventional generation in the direction of 
sustainable technologies. This transition has already caused severe problems 
as regards the profitability of the old, utility-based business model (especially 
with an imploding large-scale conventional generation). Also, incumbent power 
utility firms have held only minor market share with renewable generation 
capacities. Secondly, these large firms find it a challenge to perform business 
model innovations, while, at the same time, the old business model is still 
generating revenue and must continue to operate. Thirdly, as they have little 
innovative capabilities for business model innovation and lack innovative 
organisational cultures, they have to implement organisational strategies and 
processes to enable themselves to perform business model innovation activities 
in the first place. As the key challenge is that incumbent power utility firms lack 
innovative capabilities and are rather slow in developing business models for a 
newly evolving Energiewende industry, this research was extended to clean-
tech start-up firms. The reason for extending the research to these start-up 
firms stems from them having recently developed new business models. These 
new business models were and remain novelties in the industry and it is key to 
derive key learnings from this area for incumbent power utility firms and to 
enrich this research with an additional perspective. So in linking both cases, 
several business perspectives have been created. 
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The overall aim of this research has been to provide managers of these 
established power utility firms with solutions on how to successfully perform 
business model innovation activities and to overcome challenges and 
organisational barriers relating to this objective. 
6.3.2 Research design 
Van de Ven (2007) has stated theory building as being a second step in 
transferring theory into practice. As this study followed an exploratory approach 
and aimed to build theory based on the conducted research, the research 
design has not been communicated before the interviews. The participation rate 
and the high involvement of interviewees ensured the practical relevance of this 
study. 
6.3.3 Theory building 
The core objective of theory building is to develop novel conceptual models or 
frameworks which help to answer a pre-defined problem. In this case, the study 
aimed to gain a thorough understanding about the beneficial and limiting factors 
of business model innovations in incumbent power utility firms and develop 
organisational approaches and a process framework for business model 
innovation to overcome limiting factors. 
The motivation in this instance, was the author’s personal experience with the 
conduct of business model innovation activities within a large incumbent power 
utility firm. This experience generated the idea to develop a process framework 
for business model innovation activities for such incumbent firms. The 
deduction, as a second step of theory building, was completed with the adoption 
of the initial business model innovation process framework ‘4I-framework’ of 
Frankenberger et al. (2013) in Chapter 2. Here, the process design was 
discovered as being invalid for incumbent power utility firms influenced by an 
external trigger such as the Energiewende. The induction was conducted by 
creating the cross-case analysis and the presentation of the process framework 
(‘BMI-6-framework’) for business model innovation of established firms in 
Section 6.2. 
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6.3.4 Problem solving 
In this case the author had to consider the professional as well as the academic 
stakeholders. For the professional stakeholders (top tier managers of incumbent 
power utility and founders of clean-tech start-up firms), the results of the study 
were presented. The academic audience can find the practical 
recommendations in the following section. 
6.3.5 Practical recommendations 
This section presents 13 practical recommendations derived from the findings of 
this research study.  
6.3.5.1 Alignment of corporate strategies and business model portfolio 
strategies (‘business model innovation portfolio’) 
First of all, this study provides empirical evidence for the need to treat business 
model innovation not only as an isolated activity, but also in developing a 
business model innovation portfolio strategy aligned with the firm’s innovation 
and long-term corporate strategy. According to this study, those incumbent 
power utility firms, which have previously defined areas of interest for business 
model innovation within their corporate strategies, have then been more 
successful with business model innovation activities. With this in mind, the 
author recommends the alignment of pre-determined business model portfolio 
strategies (e.g. based on the deployment of relevant technologies) and the 
update of corporate strategies within the firm’s strategy process. In so doing, 
the amount of potential business models based on the technological fields of 
scope should be aligned with the general availability of resources. This study 
has shown that relevant business model areas of interest have been developed 
around technologies for renewable energies, distributed storage, smart building 
and connected homes, big data and data insights, smart grids and platform 
solutions and sustainable mobility. 
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6.3.5.2 Organisational forms for the development of business model 
innovation activities and the implementation of new business 
models 
The investigation of suitable organisational forms for the successful 
development of business model innovations has shown that a differentiation 
between incremental and more radically breakthrough (potentially disruptive) 
business model innovations is essential. The findings suggest that incremental 
business model innovations should be performed in the parent firm. In this case, 
after implementation, complementarities and efficiencies can be realised and 
the old business model can be further exploited.  
This research has further shown that radical breakthrough and potentially 
disruptive business model innovation activities should be performed in an 
environment outside the parent firm.  
The evidence from this study suggests that potentially disruptive business 
model innovations are maximally affected by the dominant logic of the utility-
based business model when conducted within the parent firm. In this context, 
the author recommends incumbent power utility firms to create either a separate 
business unit, or a spin-off firm, as an innovation hub outside the boundaries of 
the parent firm – a distinct area where potentially disruptive business model 
innovations can be developed. This innovation hub should be managed by the 
person responsible for business model innovation in the incumbent firm, ideally 
the ‘chief transformation’ or ‘chief innovation officer’. In addition, for each 
technological subject area within the business model portfolio strategy, there 
should be one responsible business development manager within the business 
model innovation team.  
Furthermore, it is critical the innovation hub as an accelerator or incubator for 
new business model ideas is geographically separated from the parent firm. 
Following the ‘BMI-6-framework’ for business model innovation activities within 
the ideation phase, the business model innovation activity should be transferred 
from the corporate firm into the innovation hub. The responsible team for the 
business model innovation activity should be kept as small as possible and 
should be released from their function and activities in the corporate line area. 
The results of this investigation have shown, that after implementation, the new 
potentially disruptive business model should be organised in a separate 
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business unit, or ideally in a spin-off firm. Thus, path-dependencies and limiting 
factors based on the dominant logic of the utility-based business model can be 
circumvented. An alternative to a spin-off could be a joint-venture activity, in 
which activities around new business models can be bundled with different 
partners. The findings of this study have indicated this is appropriate if partners 
who are interested in a firm partnership or an equity sharing deal and perform 
an important part of the new business model are involved early.  
6.3.5.3 Implementation of structured business model innovation 
processes 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is how incumbent 
power utility managers have seen a strong need to perform business model 
innovation activities following a structured business model innovation process 
framework like the ‘BMI-6-framework’. This has been presented in this chapter. 
One of the issues emerging from this finding, is the implementation of such a 
process framework within the incumbent organisation. It is clear how vital the 
initial support of top tier managers, on an interdisciplinary basis, is needed over 
time to garner support across the entire organisation. In addition, managers 
should develop an understanding about the essential need to perform iterations 
between the different stages to adapt the new business model to contingent 
events. 
6.3.5.4 Application of experimenting and trial-and-error learning 
approaches with business model innovation activities 
 
The second major finding was how the featured clean-tech start-up firms have 
been very successful with business model innovation initiatives – in particular 
those applying experimental and trial-and-error learning approaches and 
performing quick iterations between the different stages of the business model 
design process. These results match those observed in earlier studies 
(Chesbrough, 2010; McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). This has important 
implications for incumbent power utility firms when creating an environment for 
business model innovation activities, in which experimenting and trial-and-error 
learning approaches can be applied. As far as incumbents’ organisational 
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cultures are concerned, with the general lack of innovative capabilities, 
hierarchies and silo-thinking within the corporate organisations, it will be a 
challenge to implement such business model innovation methods in the parent 
firm. Nevertheless, if these procedures are made transparent before the 
business model innovation process starts, responsible managers will not be 
accused of failure. Indeed, application of these approaches and the necessary 
iterations, will rather be seen as an important element of the business model 
innovation process. As is the recommendation of the author to conduct radical 
breakthrough and potentially disruptive business model innovations outside the 
parent firm, experimental and trial-and-error learning approaches should be 
applied in a similar way as with start-up firms. 
6.3.5.5 Installation of an executive sponsor for business model innovation 
within top management level 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study has been how the 
conduct of successful business model innovation activities within incumbent 
power utility firms categorically requires an executive sponsor from the 
management board. In relation to this ‘executive sponsorship’ in an incumbent 
firm, the responsibility for business model innovation within clean-tech start-up 
firms has been in the hands of one of the founders or the full founding team. 
Based on these findings, the author recommends that senior executives have to 
play an active role with business model innovation activities. Hence, ideally an 
existing management board member (e.g. CEO or CMO) or specially created 
position (e.g. ‘chief transformation officer’ or ‘chief innovation officer’) should 
take over responsibility for the business model innovation activity. If resource 
scarcity prevents such a procedure, at the very least, it requires senior, top tier 
managers, to be responsible for the conduct of business model innovations. 
Members of the top management team can more easily adapt to a leading role 
by internally promoting the business model innovation activity and can manage 
to overcome limiting factors. 
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6.3.5.6 Customer centricity and early customer involvement in business 
model innovation activities 
The investigation of the clean-tech start-up case has shown that customer 
centricity and early customer involvement has been important for the successful 
conduct of business model innovation activities. As a consequence, the author 
recommends an increase in customer centricity in incumbent power utility firms. 
Incumbent firms should gain customer insights through market research, focus 
on an earlier involvement of customers in the development of new business 
models and create more value for their customers. These results are consistent 
with those of other studies and suggest incumbent power utility firms should 
create more service-orientated models around energy services and increase 
their marketing and sales capabilities within their organisations (Helms, 2016; 
Kindström and Ottosson, 2016). 
6.3.5.7 Creation of customer value propositions around novelties 
The evidence from this clean-tech start-up case study suggests the creation of 
customer value propositions around product and services that are novelties 
(e.g. ‘two-sided market’ flexibility marketing or platform business models based 
on VPPs), are important to achieve a USP and thus acquire new customers. At 
the same time, this study has shown how incumbent power utility firms have 
created business model innovations that are new to the power utility industry, 
but not novelties to the outside world. Hence, their new business models (e.g. 
retail models) have not created customer value propositions based on novelties, 
but rather, tried to base their success on the leverage of complementarities, 
such as, existing customers, marketing and sales channels, and corporate 
brand. 
The author advises incumbent power utility firms to strive for the development of 
radical breakthrough and potentially disruptive business model innovations and 
to break the dominant logic of the prevailing utility-based business model. As 
mentioned in Section 6.3.5.2 of this chapter, newly developed organisational 
firms will help to achieve such business models. Furthermore, it is 
recommended they scan and monitor the newly evolving Energiewende and 
associated industries to detect ‘winning’ business models based on sustainable 
253 
 
technologies (‘business model innovation radar’) early on and quickly adapt to 
new business model archetypes. In so doing, relevant industries could be clean-
tech, automotive, ICT/Internet, consumer electronics or energy system 
manufacturer OEMs. 
This outside perspective should also prevent bandwagon effects that are solely 
based on the power utility industry. 
This study has shown there are several new business models in existence. One 
such model for example, is the ‘two-sided market’ flexibility marketing/ 
aggregator, another being the ‘peer-to-peer’ community-based platform 
business model, neither of which have so far been adopted by incumbent power 
utility firms. Although incumbent power utility firms have the technological 
abilities to develop a VPP, they have so far lacked the innovative capabilities for 
business model innovation to build such business models.  
6.3.5.8 Build up new skill-sets, particularly innovative capabilities 
The third major finding to emerge from this study has been that incumbent 
power utility firms lack innovative capabilities for business model innovation 
activities. This result is consistent with other studies (Helms, 2016; Richter, 
2013a) and suggests these firms have to build up new employee skill-sets 
around innovative capabilities. In addition, the empirical findings in this study 
have provided a new understanding of the importance of IT for power utility 
firms. Some of the industry respondents have even sketched a transformation 
of these firms from the energy into the ICT sector. While IT will play a major role 
for new business model activities, incumbent power utility firms lack IT 
development skills. Their IT activities so far, were all based on the dominant 
logic of the utility-based business model. This resulted in the firms focusing on 
the administration of large IT billing systems (e.g. “SAP IS-U”), but not on the 
development of an IT architecture solution, based on the nexus of soft- and 
hardware technologies around new business models.  
In addition, this study has shown that incumbent power utility firms have lacked 
marketing and sales capabilities with the promotion of non-commodity business 
254 
 
models and, on the whole, were not able to leverage complementarities in this 
area.  
Moreover, as partnering activities become increasingly important, the 
networking skills of employees also have to be strengthened. In these 
circumstances, it is strongly recommended, incumbent power utility firms should 
invest in and strengthen their innovative, IT, marketing and sales and 
networking capabilities. This means, there may be an opportunity to circumvent 
this problem by recruiting new employees with these required capabilities from 
the external market. 
6.3.5.9 Transformation/exploitation of old business model 
This research has shown that the interviewed incumbent power utility managers 
regard the German Energiewende as a disruptive threat to their utility-based 
business model and its underlying vertically-integrated value chain and asset 
configuration. It was also shown that the old utility-based business model 
already faces severe pressure influenced by Energiewende. The large-scale, 
conventional generation value adding step of incumbent power utility firms, has 
been severely affected by the transition towards sustainable technologies.  
The evidence from this study suggests incumbent power utility firms need to 
increase efficiencies to sustain their old business model. These efficiencies 
might be realised by digitisation and the internal and external automation of 
processes. However, as a consequence of digitised processes, lay-offs are 
inevitable to reduce overhead costs. These firms could, for instance, automate 
their commodity energy trading and wholesale activities through a web-based 
platform.  
Furthermore, the results of this research supports the idea of performing 
change management activities with existing organisational cultures to overcome 
the dominant logic of these firms. In addition, top tier managers in these firms 
could conduct job rotations to prevent silo-thinking. Middle management roles 
could be restructured with managers acting as change agents to help the 
organisation overcome factors acting as constraints to business model 
transformation.  
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6.3.5.10 Re-define industry perspective towards Energiewende  
        industry  
Another significant finding to emerge from this study, is that a new industry 
around the German Energiewende is currently evolving (introduced in this study 
as the Energiewende industry). Interviewed respondents see the convergence 
of clean-tech, automotive, ICT/Internet, consumer electronics and energy 
system manufacturing industries in this Energiewende industry. In these 
circumstances, it is recommended incumbent power utility firms re-define their 
industry perspective towards the Energiewende industry. As other industries 
have experienced in the past, incumbent firms from former monopolistic 
systems, need to change their industry perspective early on. It is important they 
adjust to the new environment before being confronted by new, and often, 
unexpected competitors. It is encouraging to compare this for instance with the 
‘marketing myopia’ study of Levitt (2004) on the US railway industry. The 
railway industry, at that time, viewed itself as solely being in the railway 
business - unable to widen their industry perspective towards the whole 
transportation industry. In so doing, they managed to sleepwalk through the 
development of individual transportation with cars and the rise of the aviation 
industry. 
6.3.5.11 Re-position brand into sustainability area 
The study has confirmed that Energiewende is clearly associated with 
sustainable technologies. In addition, clean-tech start-up firms’ founders and 
employees are environmentally conscious and have a passion for sustainable 
technologies. As a consequence, these firms enjoy a high level of 
trustworthiness and credibility with their customers. In stark contrast to this, 
incumbent power utility firms face a lack of credibility with sustainable business 
models. The perception, established over a long time period, is as 
environmental polluters, associated with nuclear and thermal power generation. 
Bearing this in mind, it is recommended to slowly re-position incumbent power 
utility firms and their corporate brands into the sustainability area. In so doing, it 
is important these firms do not simply practice ‘green washing’, but are able to 
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substantiate their sustainable propositions with concrete measurements and 
activities rooted in the sustainable domain. 
6.3.5.12 Increasingly focus on external partnerships 
This study has found, in general, external partnerships are important for 
business model innovation activities influenced by the German Energiewende. 
Under these conditions, it is recommended for incumbent power utility firms to 
build up external partnerships with universities, research institutions and firms 
from in and outside industries. As regards the development of new business 
models, incumbent power utility firms should conduct a strategic assessment 
before the business model innovation activity. This assessment should consider 
which activities can be performed by the power utility and which need to be 
outsourced to partners. Afterwards, it is recommended to involve potential 
partners early in the set-up of new business models and to consider what form 
of cooperative activity will best suit the configuration of the new business model. 
6.3.5.13 Strategic co-investment in new capabilities (start-ups) as  
        corporate venture capitalist  
This study has shown that the five biggest incumbent power utility firms have 
developed corporate venture capital activities and have strategically co-invested 
in new capabilities of start-up firms. In this way, each incumbent firm has 
established corporate investment budgets of between €100 – 150 million. The 
investment focus has been aligned with the business model technology portfolio 
strategies of their corporate strategies. As this seems to be an appropriate 
strategy to diversify the business model innovation activities, it is a strategy also 
recommended to other incumbent power utility firms. Therefore, it is critical 
incumbent power utility firms avoid intense day to day involvement in the start-
up business and its operations, but rather, see it as an equity investment. In 
addition, they should try to cooperate with the start-ups to facilitate their growth 
and to be able to learn from them. 
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6.3.6 Section summary 
This section conveyed the empirical findings into relevant recommendations for 
business practice. It was based on the model of Van de Ven (2007), which has 
been applied to transfer research into practice.  
The ‘BMI-6-framework’ is the aggregation of all findings in this study and has 
added a new conceptual model to theory. It has also strong relevance for 
practitioners, as it helps to approach business model innovation in established 
firms in a more structured way. It can be applied for both incremental and 
potentially disruptive business model innovations. 
Furthermore, 13 practical recommendations for incumbent power utility firms 
have been presented. These recommendations aim to help these firms 
overcome limiting factors to business model innovation. 
6.4 Research limitations 
The methodology of conducting a multiple-case study based on qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews has proven well-suited for the purpose of gaining 
initial insights into the issue of business model innovation influenced by German 
Energiewende. Nevertheless, the findings are subject to at least three 
limitations.  
Firstly, as the German Energiewende is still in its infancy and will continue for 
decades, this research was, therefore, conducted over a relatively short period 
of time. In order to clearly analyse business model innovation influenced by 
German Energiewende, the case studies need to be analysed over a much 
longer period of time. In this regard, the results must be regarded as highly 
tentative. 
Secondly, within the incumbent power utility case study, this study has only 
researched the forerunners in respect of business model innovation in this 
industry. It has provided full coverage of MNU firms and portrayed half of the 
RPU firm category. Small and medium sized municipal power utility firms have 
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not been the subject of this inquiry, as they have, as yet, rarely conducted 
business model innovation activities. It was also shown that only one half of the 
featured business model innovation activities within RPU firms have up until 
now at least, left the piloting stage. As a consequence, this study does not 
provide a general status on business model innovation of the entire power utility 
industry, but rather highlights latest developments.  
Thirdly, the results of this investigation have shown that regulatory policies, 
particularly regarding the German Energiewende, greatly influence business 
models and business model innovation activities. In this context, findings are 
not easily transferable into other industries. However, similar developments 
regarding energy transitions might occur in other countries and findings have 
cross-border applicability. 
6.5 Future research 
The findings provide the following insights for future research. Firstly, future 
research is worth carrying out into the transition of organisational cultures in 
incumbent power utility firms. A suggested focus is how to overcome path-
dependent behaviour and develop innovative capabilities for business model 
innovation.  
Secondly, the question of the drawn out time period of the German 
Energiewende is an intriguing one. This issue could be suitably explored in 
applying a longitudinal research design with the conducting of interviews at 
various intervals over a longer time period.  
Thirdly, the research within the incumbent power utility industry should be 
extended to small and medium sized municipal power utility firms. These firms, 
it is worth noting, have the largest share in the German power utility industry. 
Fourthly, this research has shown the newly evolving Energiewende industry 
comprises of different industries including, automotive, clean-tech, consumer 
electronics and ICT/Internet. As regards business model archetypes in the 
Energiewende industry, it would be interesting to analyse these business model 
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archetypes throughout this newly evolving industry. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to study sustainable business model archetypes in international 
contexts of other liberalised energy markets. 
Fifthly, this research has shown the conduct of strategic alliances and 
partnerships are crucial activities within business model innovation activities in 
an industry in transition such as the Energiewende. A future study exploring co-
operation within business model innovation activities would be of great interest 
and value.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Questionnaires  
 
1. Interview guideline BMI with incumbent power utility firms 
Introduction 
 Introduction (background information: person, university, DBA thesis) 
 Recording of interview 
 
 Areas of interest: 
1. Analysis of current business model and influential factors 
2. Example of business model innovation activity (ex-ante) 
3. Example of business model innovation activity (ex-post) 
4. Outlook 
 
 Definition business model/business model innovation: 
 
 
I. Analysis of current business model and influential factors 
 
Intro1 Let us talk about your current business model. With what activities do 
you earn money? 
 If multiple business models are performed, which is your core 
business model, with which you generate the biggest profit shares? 
Intro2 Which factors have the most important influence on your business 
model? 
 Which factors have had the biggest influence? Which factors had the 
least influence? 
Intro3 From the background of the above mentioned influences. Will your 
business model also generate enough profits in order to satisfy 
shareholder requirements in the future (next five years)?  
 If no, what is the reason for that? 
Intro4 If we look at your current value chain configuration. How would you 
evaluate the changes to each value-adding step? 
 Base level 100 points for each value-adding step  
  
Value chain of power utility firm 
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Business model innovation  
 
BMI 1 Please provide an example of a business model innovation that has 
triggered bigger organisational changes within your firm? 
 Did the new business model 
unlock new revenue streams for 
the firm? 
Did the new business model 
sustainably change existing 
revenue streams?  
BMI 2 Did the new business model require additional or different value-
adding steps? 
 Did you re-configure your value chain? If yes, how did you re-
configure it? 
 
 
Business model innovation process 
 
BMI 3 What made you perform the business model innovation activity?  
BMI 4 Did you follow a structured process with the business model 
innovation activity? 
 If ‘yes’: 
Please sketch each step of the 
business model innovation 
process  
If ‘no’: 
How did you approach the 
business model innovation 
project? What stages did you 
pass through? 
Presentation of 4I-innovation framework 
BMI 5 If you apply the above sketched 4I-innovation framework on your 
approach to business model innovation. 
What have been the most important influential factors in each stage of 
the 4I-innovation framework? 
 How did these factors have affected business model innovation? 
Have there been any barriers? If yes, please explain the barriers in 
more detail? How did you overcome these barriers? 
Have there been any beneficial factors?  
BMI 6 Which persons have been involved in the different stages? 
 Who has initiated the business model innovation? Has there been a 
corporate sponsor? 
Who was in charge of the ideation stage? 
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Who has managed the integration phase? 
Who has finally implemented the new business model? 
BMI 7 Did you apply specific methods within each stage of the business 
model innovation activity? 
 Which methods would you have liked to apply in the different process 
stages of the business model innovation activity? 
BMI 8 Have external partners been involved in the business model 
innovation activity? If yes, which role did they play within the business 
model innovation activity?  
 How did it go? 
BMI 9 We have already talked about your current business model. How did 
the parallel operation of the old business model influence the 
business model innovation activity? 
 Have there been any challenges? If yes, how did you approach these 
challenges? 
Did you apply any resources from the old to the new business model?  
BMI 10 How could you perform business model innovation (even) more 
effectively? 
 Example: Applying any business model archetypes from different 
industries 
 
Organisational implementation of business model innovation 
 
Ex-Ante 
 
ORG 1 Please tell me about any organisational changes that have been done 
in order to successfully implement business model innovation in the 
organisation? 
 Which structural changes have been done? 
Did you develop any new organisational units for business model 
innovation? 
Have there been any changes to management? 
Have there been any changes to incentive systems? 
Who was part of the change management process? 
ORG 2 Did your firm provide enough resources for the business model 
innovation activity? 
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 How many employees?  
Did your firm hire any new employees? Did you integrate externals 
(e.g. consultants) in the process? 
ORG 3 Did the (project) team have the right capabilities and competences for 
the business model innovation activity? 
 Have capabilities and competences been developed? 
ORG 4 How would you have described the innovation culture of your firm 
before the business model innovation activity? 
ORG 5 Which strategic role did the business model innovation have for your 
firm? 
 (1.) Incremental vs. (2.) radical vs. (3.) securing survival of firm 
 
 
Ex-Post 
 
BM 1 How did the organisational implementation of the business model 
innovation go? 
 What worked out well? What has been problematic? 
Did you experience any barriers? If yes, how did you overcome these 
barriers? 
How have changes applied to the organisation? 
(What worked out fine? What has been challenging? What has 
worked different than expected before?) 
How has the business model innovation activity affected corporate 
culture and specifically influenced the innovation culture of the firm? 
BM 2 What factors have had an important influence on the implementation 
success of the new business model in the organisation? 
BM 3 How did the co-operation with external partners go? 
 Did the implementation of the new business model have met the 
expectations of partners? 
BM 4 Did you leverage any synergies between the old and the new 
business model? 
BM 5 In the retrospective: How successful would you evaluate the business 
model innovation? 
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 What have you learned from the business model innovation? 
If you could: What would you improve of the new business model and 
its organisational integration? 
BM 6 Which effects did the business model innovation have on your target 
market? 
 Cannibalisation, expansion, expansion with new customer 
segments… 
 
 
Outlook 
 
FU 1 How should incumbent power utility firms align their business model 
innovation activities for the future? 
FU 2 Where do you vision your future market? 
 And how could you ensure a sustainable competitive advantage for 
the future? 
Do you also envision potentially threats from external competitors?  
 
Last question 
A 1 Do you have anything to add?  
Do we have forgot anything that is important in this research context? 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  
Can you provide any other documents? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Organisational aspects: 
 Further procedures 
 Management summary of key findings after thesis completion 
 Note exact time of interview end  
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2. Interview guideline BMI with clean-tech start-up firms 
Introduction 
 Introduction (background information: person, university, DBA thesis) 
 Recording of interview 
 
 Areas of interest: 
1. Market and influential factors 
2. Business model/business model information 
3. Co-operation with power utility firms 
4. Outlook 
 
Market/influential factors in founding stage of start-up 
 
Intro1 What made you build up your start-up firm? 
Intro2 Which factors have influenced the formation of your start-up firm? 
 Which factors have had the biggest influence? Which factors had the 
least influence? 
Which influence did the regulatory framework (“Energiewende”) have 
on the formation of your start-up firm? 
Which influence did specific technologies (e.g. digitisation, distributed 
renewable generation) have on the formation of your start-up firm? 
Intro3 Have there been any beneficial factors within the formation stage? 
 
 
Business model/business model innovation  
 
Business model (ex-post) 
 
BM 1 What is your business model? 
 What are the central activities you earn money with? 
BM 2 Do you perform your business model in an overarching value-network 
of partners or do you perform your business model within the limits of 
your firm? 
BM 3 What differentiates your business model regarding traditional 
offerings within your target market? 
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 Have you re-configured the value chain in comparison to traditional 
offerings within your target market? 
Which impact does your business model have on your target market? 
Customer value proposition: Product/Services, Customer 
Segments, Relationship? 
Value creation & delivery: Key activities, resources, channels, 
partners, technologies? 
Value capture: Cost structure, revenue streams? 
BM 4 What impact did sustainability aspects have on the initial set-up of 
your business model? 
BM 5 Do you focus on a single business model or do you perform multiple 
business models at the same time? 
BM 6 How are you financed? 
 Venture capital vs. own funding? 
 
Business model innovation (ex-ante) 
 
BMI 1 How did you organise the development of the business model?  
 Did you know right from the start how your business model design will 
be or did the business model evolve over time? 
What kind of resources did you apply before and after the business 
model innovation activity? 
BMI 2 Did you follow a structured process with the business model 
innovation activity? 
 If ‘yes’: 
Please sketch each step of the 
business model innovation 
process 
If ‘no’: 
How did you approach the 
business model innovation? What 
stages did you pass through? 
Presentation of 4I-innovation framework 
BMI 3 If you apply the above sketched 4I-innovation framework on your 
approach to business model innovation. 
What have been the most important influential factors in each stage of 
the 4I-innovation framework? 
 How did these factors have affected business model innovation? 
Have there been any beneficial factors?  
282 
 
BMI 4 Have there been any barriers in each stage? 
 If yes, please explain the barriers in more detail? How did you 
overcome these barriers? 
BMI 5 Which persons have been involved in the different stages? 
 Who has initiated the business model innovation? 
Who was in charge of the ideation stage? 
Who has managed the integration and implementation of the new 
business model? 
BMI 6 Did you apply specific methods within each stage of the business 
model innovation activity? 
 Which methods would you have liked to apply in the different process 
stages of the business model innovation activity? 
BMI 7 Have external partners been involved in the business model 
innovation activity? If yes, which role did they play within the business 
model innovation activity? 
 How did it go? 
BMI 8 Have there been any challenges regarding the integration of 
sustainability issues within the business model innovation activity?  
BMI 9 How could you perform business model innovation (even) more 
effectively? 
 Example: Applying any business model archetypes from different 
industries 
 
 
Co-operation with incumbent power utility firms 
 
 
EVU 1 How do you evaluate the innovative capabilities with incumbent 
power utility firms? 
 What are the most important barriers with these firms? 
EVU 2 What has to change with incumbent power utility firms in order to 
become more innovative? 
 In which areas do you view critical success factors with incumbent 
power utility firms? 
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Outlook 
 
FU 1 Where do you vision your future market? 
 And how could you ensure a sustainable competitive advantage for 
the future? 
FU 2 How do you envision the future co-operation with incumbent power 
utility firms in the next 10 years? Will clean-tech start-ups and power 
utility firms still live in a peaceful co-existence or will clean-tech start-
up firms eventually take over the place of power utility firms? 
 
Last question 
A 1 Do you have anything to add?  
Do we have forgotten anything that is important in this research context? 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  
 
Can you provide any other documents? 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Organisational aspects: 
 Further procedures 
 Management summary of key findings after thesis completion 
 Note exact time of interview end  
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Appendix II: Original quotations in German language and 
English translation 
 
Incumbent power utility case study  
  
Original German quote English translation 
  
“Geschäftsmodellwandel läuft so Big-Bang-
mäßig für uns multinationale EVUs. Im 
Kerngeschäft verlieren wir 80% unseres 
Ergebnisses, was so viel bedeutet wie in 
2020 fast eine Mrd. EBITDA. Und deswegen 
müssen wir neben allen Effzienzan-
strengungen im Kerngeschäft auch eine 
Antwort auf neue Geschäfte haben." 
“The change in business models is a very 
big-bang-esque process for us multinational 
utility firms. We lose 80% of the results in 
our core business, which would, in effect, 
mean almost one billion EBITDA in 2020 
and that is why, parallel to all the other 
efforts to improve efficiency in the core 
business, we need to have a response to 
new businesses.” 
    
“[…] wie der Wechsel vom alten zum neuen 
Testament.” 
"[…] like changing from the new to the old 
testament." 
    
"Es ist natürlich so, dass diese ganzen 
Entwicklungen dazu geführt haben, dass da 
plötzlich zwei Welten in einer Welt gemixt 
waren.” 
"[...] all these developments lead to two 
worlds being mixed into one." 
    
"Und wir haben uns auf strategisch wichtige 
Felder konzentriert: Big data und data 
insights, disruptive digitale Geschäftsmodelle 
wie Uber und Airbnb, smarte Themen im und 
um das Zuhause, wie das Internet der Dinge 
und urbane Konzepte.  D. h. wir schauen uns 
nicht nur Geschäftsmodelle im EVU-Bereich 
an, sondern auch in den Feldern Mobilität, 
Logitisk, IKT, etc."  
"And we decided that it makes sense not to 
target everything, but to focus on some 
strategic topics: Big data and data insights, 
disruptive digital business models like Uber 
and Airbnb, ‘smart’ in and around the 
house, including the Internet of Things, and 
urban concepts. This means we are looking 
for business models not just in the areas of 
electricity and infrastructure, but also for 
mobility, logistics, communications, etc." 
    
“ [...] und die sind meistens alle digital und 
das ist meistens auch immer ein Plattform-
geschäft. Und [...] diese Verantwortung ist ein 
super Filter, der mir hilft zu sagen, welche 
Campusprojekte brauche ich eigentlich, die 
auf welche Geschäftsmodelle einzahlen und 
welche Startups passen dazu." 
"[...] and they are usually digital and a 
platform solutions’ business. And [...] this 
responsibility is a great filter, that helps me 
decide, which innovation campus projects 
do I really need, which business models do 
they pay into and with what start-ups do 
they match." 
    
“Also ich glaube, dass es da so eine 
dramatische Veränderung gegeben hat und 
der Leidensdruck wirklich greifbar geworden 
ist, dass ist gerade mal zwei, drei Jahre her.” 
"Well, I believe that there was this dramatic 
change, and that the psychological stress 
was tangible, and that was only two or three 
years ago." 
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“Wenn Sie mit einem Stadtwerk reden, 
werden Sie hören, dass ein Stadtwerk so 
etwas nicht braucht, denn es hat ja ein 
angestammtes Geschäft. Dabei hat ein 
Stadtwerk noch ein viel größeres Problem, 
weil der Prozess schleichend ist und es jedes 
Jahr 2-3% EBIT verliert.” 
"When you talk to RPUs, you will hear, that 
a RPU doesn't need business model trans-
formation, because it has a traditional 
business. In reality RPUs have a 
completely different problem, because the 
process is insidious and they lose 2-3% 
EBIT every year." 
    
“Das ist jetzt das Nächste was wir sehen […]. 
Die Energiewende wird demnächst auch in 
die Stadt kommen.”  
"The next thing we will observe, [...] the 
Energiewende is coming to the cities." 
    
"Übrigens ein sehr wichtiges Thema, was 
auch für uns sehr wichtig ist, […] das 
Unternehmen hat zig Ideen, ob das jetzt 
Smart Home ist, Smart Meter, 
Elektromobilität und das Risiko ist einfach, 
dass die wertvollen Ressourcen, die 
überhaupt dafür da sind, sich mit sowas zu 
beschäftigen, dann auf die ganzen Themen 
zerstreut sind.” 
"By the way a very important issue, that is 
also very important for us, [...] the firm has 
umpteen ideas, be it smart home, smart 
metering, electric mobility, but the risk is 
just that all the valuable resources that are 
there to deal with something like this, are 
dispersed over all the issues." 
    
"Wir machen eben Zukunftsbilder, wir 
arbeiten mit Modellen, haben einen 
Innovations-fahrplan, wo geht die Welt der 
Zukunft hin. Also haben hier ein klares 
Zukunftsbild und darauf aufbauend sind 
logische Erschließ-ungspläne, dass man 
dann einzelne Produkte auch umsetzt.“ 
"We create future scenarios, we work with 
models, we have innovation road maps, 
where is the world of the future heading. 
We have a clear vision of the future and 
building on these logical plans for 
developing the implement-tation of specific 
products." 
    
"Und was wir gemacht haben ist, wir haben 
also versucht diesen Prozess analog zu 
State of the Art Startup-Methodik abzubilden. 
[…] Das heißt, hier haben Sie zum Beispiel 
eine Konzeptphase, wo der Business Model 
Canvas eine große Rolle spielt. Also hier im 
Prinzip sagen sie, oder versuchen sie ihre 
Idee nochmal zu beschreiben an Hand des 
Business Model Canvas […] Pilotierung 
Proof of Concept, wo sie im Prinzip, also ab 
hier gehts los mit Lean Start-up, wo sie im 
wesentlichen diese Phasen haben, um 
rauszufinden, trägt dieses Business Model, 
was sie sich ausgedacht haben im Markt 
überhaupt […]. Dann kommt irgendwann die 
Markteinführung, wo sie im Prinzip 
rausfinden. Kann ich mich mit dem Ansatz, 
also hier weiß ich, ich kann ein Wert schaffen 
am Ende dieses Prozesses. Hier versuche 
ich dann mich im Markt zu behaupten. Ja, 
kann ich auch im Markt durchkommen, ja. 
Und hier sind sie dann in der Skalierung. An 
der Stelle mache ich ein Business Case bzw. 
ein Business Plan." 
"And what we did, so we tried to map a 
process analogous to state of the art start-
up methodology [...]. That is, you have a 
design stage for instance, in which the 
business model canvas plays a big part. 
You try to describe your idea via the 
business model canvas [...]. Piloting proof 
of concept, where it starts with lean start-up 
methodology, where you essentially have 
stages, to find out, can this business model 
even carry what you thought up in the 
market. [...]. Then at some point the market 
launch, where you find out. Can I, with this 
concept, I mean this is where I know, can I 
create value at the end of this process. I 
then try holding my ground in the market. 
Yes, can I get by in the market, yes. And 
that's scaling. This is where I create a 
business case, or business plan." 
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“Aber es ist ganz wichtig im Hinterkopf zu 
behalten, wir haben eigentlich eine ganze 
Reihe von Querwirkungen, Feedbackloops, 
Adjustierungen, neue Ideen, die ich 
kombiniere, das ist jetzt kein ‘straight forward’ 
Prozess.” 
“[...] it is very important to keep in mind, we 
actually all have a number of cross-effects 
feedback loops, adjustments, new ideas 
that I combine, it's not a straightforward 
process.” 
    
“Wir haben natürlich sehr kundenzentrierte 
Methoden angewendet aber gerade so in der 
Ideation Phase gibt's auch eine ganze Reihe 
von Dingen, die einfach auf die Kreativität, 
also Freisetzung, Entblockierung, Kreativität 
von Mitarbeitern abheben, wobei ganz 
wichtig ist, dass man eben nicht nur versucht 
Mitarbeiter […] auf neue Denkspuren zu 
setzen, dass die also nicht immer nur drüber 
nachdenken was gerade ihre Hindernisse 
sind, sondern umgekehrt in Chancen denken.  
Aber noch viel effizienter ist das aus meiner 
Sicht, wenn man Mitarbeiter mit Kunden 
zusammenbringt, mit Industriepartnern etc., 
die einfach eine ganz andere Sichtweise 
haben.” 
"Of course, we used methods that focus on 
the customer, but especially in the ideation 
stage there are a lot of things, that just 
emphasise creativity, release, unblocking, 
creativity of employees, whereas it is very 
important that you not only try to get 
employees [...] to think in different 
directions, so they aren't always thinking 
about the current roadblocks, but in 
reverse, thinking about the opportunities. 
But, in my opinion, it’s even more efficient 
connecting employees with customers, with 
industry partners, etc. that have an entirely 
different viewpoint.” 
    
"Wir schauen uns genau an, was die 
Anderen machen. Wenn einer mit einem 
neuen Geschäftsmodell kommt, dann dauert 
es nicht lange, bis er kopiert wird. Das hängt 
übrigens auch mit dem regulatorischen 
Rahmen im EVU-Bereich zusammen, der die 
Dinge etwas einschränkt." 
“[...] watch out what the others are doing 
very carefully. If a competitor comes up with 
a new business model, the others copy this 
after a short period of time, as potential new 
business models used to be limited by the 
regulatory framework.” 
    
"Wir arbeiten mit einem Lean-Start-up-
Ansatz. In der Regel reden wir über drei, 
sechs, neun Monate bis wir ein Prototyp 
haben. In der Zwischenzeit überlegen wir, ob 
wir weiter-machen oder die Entwicklung 
einstellen." 
"We follow a lean start-up approach. So we 
talk about one, three, six, nine months to 
get to a minimum viable product, a 
prototype. In between we always check: do 
we go on or do we kill it?" 
    
"[…] habe ich dieses Pflänzchenbild 
genommen und gesagt, also wir haben die 
große Eiche ja, das ist [Firma X] mit ihrer 
Historie und mein Thema ist ja eigentlich 
Pflänzchen zu entwickeln. Und wenn ein 
Pflänzchen zu nah an der Eiche ist, dann hat 
es sowieso schon mal keine Chance. Die 
Eiche nimmt unten Wasser weg, die Eiche 
nimmt oben Licht weg, das Pflänzchen ist 
sofort platt." 
"I took this picture of a small tree and said, 
we have this big oak tree, right, that is the 
[MNU firm] with all its history and my area is 
developing small trees. And if a small tree 
gets too close to the big oak tree, it doesn't 
stand a chance. The oak tree will skim off 
water at the roots and overshadow from 
above, and the small tree is ruined right 
away." 
"Über Folien sind wir da stark, aber die 
Herausforderung: Integration und Execution, 
da scheitert es immer." 
"On slides we are very strong, but 
integration and execution are always a big 
challenge: that's where it goes awry." 
    
"Also Geschäftsmodellinnovation war eher 
sehr zufallsbedingt in der Vergangenheit, 
aber nicht strukturiert abgearbeitet. Und das 
ist das was uns fehlt." 
“Business model innovation was more 
coincidental in the past, but not executed 
structurally. And that's what is missing 
now.” 
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"Ja also die [MNU Firmen] haben einen 
klassischen Stage Gate, wie ich das richtig 
verstehe, wenn es 4I heißt, kann ich 
verstehen, ist ein valider Ansatz. Warum ich 
tief durchatme, also den zu implementieren, 
stellt eine gewisse Herausforderung dar, weil 
es das zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt für so 
disruptivere Elemente keinen gelebten Kanal 
bei keinem regionalen Energieversorger 
gibt." 
"Yeah, so they [MNU firms] have a classic 
stage gate, if I understood correctly, if that 
means 4l, I understand, that's a valid 
approach. Why I take a breather, 
implement-ting it is a bit of a challenge, 
because there is no existing approach for 
such disruptive elements at any regional 
energy supplier at this time.” 
    
“Das Experimentieren und Trial-and-Error in 
Startup-Firmen sehr gut funktionieren. Und 
im Kontrast, angestammte Energieversorger 
eher auf strukturierte Prozesse gehen, weil 
es das einfacher macht in der Organisation, 
die Widerstände zu durchbrechen, wenn man 
ein Prozess verfolgt, den man auch dem 
Vorstand klar macht, was man da tut.” 
“Experimenting and trial-and-error works 
very well in start-up firms. In contrast, 
incumbent power utility firms, should trust in 
structured processes, because it's easier 
within the organisation to break through 
resistance, when you carry out the process, 
and make it clear to the management board 
what you are doing." 
    
“Weil die Problematik dahingehend ist, man 
legt sich bei seinen Prozessen irgendwann 
zu ganz Beginn auf ein 
Geschäftsmodelldesign oder ein Element fest 
und stellt dann während der Abwicklung des 
Projektes fest, man hätte es ganz anders 
machen können oder sollen. Ein Startup 
verändert das, ein Großkonzern zieht das 
durch, ob es Sinn macht oder nicht. Weil man 
hat das vorab vom Vorstand genau so 
genehmigt bekommen, und das war's.” 
“Because the issue is, you commit to a 
business model design or an element at the 
beginning of the processes and then you 
realize during the execution that you should 
have done things differently. A start-up 
changes that, an incumbent will go through 
with it, whether it makes sense or not. 
Because the board approved just that, and 
that's it.” 
    
"Von demher werden wahrscheinlich die 
ganz Kleinen Schwierigkeiten haben und die 
ganz Großen, die noch sehr stark Asset-
getrieben sind mit ihren Kraftwerken. Da 
zwischen drin, wenn es Gewinner im 
Energieversorgungs-bereich überhaupt 
geben sollte, werden die Gewinner sein." 
“Thus the really small ones probably will 
have a difficult time, and the really large 
ones, that are still very asset-driven with 
their power stations. Those in between [the 
RPU firms], should there be winners in the 
energy sector, they will be it.” 
    
“Ne, das ist so klar. Jetzt habens ja 
mittlerweile auch die anderen Großen 
kapiert, die ja bisher immer versucht haben 
Druck auf die Politik auszuüben, aber das 
Ding das läuft jetzt. Da gibts nichts mehr, 
kein No Return. Point of No Return ist lange 
überschritten. Und da tun wir uns jetzt 
natürlich strategisch, was die Zielsetzung 
angeht, einfacher als andere." 
"Nope, that's so obvious. By now, the other 
big ones [MNU firms] get it too, that until 
now always tried to pressure the politicians, 
but it's happening now. That's it, no return. 
Point of no return was passed a long time 
ago. And of course, we [the MNU firms] 
have an easier time than others, 
strategically speaking, in terms of setting 
goals as we have already developed a lot of 
structures for business model innovation.” 
    
"Die Energiewirtschaft ist keine Wirtschaft 
oder zumindest kein richtiger Markt […]. Der 
ist definiert durch den Gesetzgeber […], der 
unser Geschäftsmodell definiert." 
 "The power utility industry is not an 
economy or at least not a real market [...]. 
It's defined by the legislator [...], that defines 
our business model." 
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"Ich will mal so sagen, das Geschäftsmodell 
des Energieversorgers ist durch das Thema 
der regulierten Einspeisevergütungen von 
Erneuerbaren leider Gottes in sich 
zusammengefallen. Der Grund, warum uns 
der größte Hebel, nämlich das Absinken des 
Wholesale Preises aufgetreten ist, ist ein 
regulatorisch bedingter, weil einfach schlicht 
und ergreifend das Geld woanders 
hingeshiftet wurde, nämlich in den Bereich 
der Erneuerbaren." 
"I'll say it like this, the business model of 
energy suppliers unfortunately imploded 
because of the issue of feed-in 
remuneration from renewable energy 
sources. The reason why one of the 
greatest levers, i.e. the dropping of the 
wholesale price, opened was based on 
regulation, because the money was just 
shifted somewhere else, to the area of the 
renewable energy sources.” 
    
"Da gibt's eine ganze Reihe von Bausteinen, 
die massiven Einfluss auf das haben was wir 
heute häufig unter diesem Strommarktmodell 
oder Strommarkt 2.0 diskutieren, Ist 
hochgradig politisch. Ich glaube, da muss 
man schon ganz klar sagen, das ist nicht 
Marktwirtschaft, sondern das ist Politik-
management was da entscheidend ist." 
“There are a whole bunch of building blocks 
that have a massive impact on that which 
we discuss as the electricity market design 
or electricity market design 2.0. It is highly 
political. I think, and we need to be clear on 
this, this is not market economy, but what is 
decisive here is political management.” 
    
“Durch den massiven Eingriff der Politik in 
unsere bestehenden Geschäftsmodelle im 
Rahmen der Energiewende haben wir es hier 
quasi mit einer Geschäftsmodellinnovation 
zweiter Ordnung zu tun. D. h. die Politik spielt 
eine sehr aktive Rolle bei der Ausgestaltung 
des neuen Strommarktdesigns und alle 
angestammten EVU sind davon betroffen. 
Als Konsequenz gilt es, neue 
Geschäftsmodelle für das Energiesystem 2.0 
systemisch zu realisieren, mit denen sich alle 
incumbent Player im Markt gleichermaßen 
auseinander-setzen müssen.” 
“Because of the massive governmental 
policy disruptions with our existing business 
models in the scope of the Energiewende, 
we are dealing with second order business 
models. That is politics play a very active 
role in the structure of the new energy 
market design and all incumbent power 
utility firms are affected by it. Consequently, 
we need to systematically realise new 
business models for the energy system 
2.0., that all incumbent players in the 
market need to deal with equally.”  
    
“Also da gehen ja Absätze bei uns weg, also 
aus Stromverträgen, also wenn die Leute 
sich eine Solaranlage auf’s Dach stellen und 
sich selbst zu 60-70% versorgen. Ein 
weiteres disruptives Element natürlich wird in 
den nächsten Jahren sein, das Thema 
Batterie-speicher [...] Das treibt natürlich 
unser Geschäftsmodell dramatisch. Und 
wenn [...] die Dynamik der Digitalisierung, die 
solche Themen natürlich auch sehr stark 
treibt [...], kann das alles wahnsinnig schnell 
gehen, je nachdem wie schnell die 
innovativen Fortschritte zum Beispiel bei 
Speichern sind. Der Entwicklungsfortschritt 
des Speichers wird einen enorm 
beschleunigenden Faktor für die 
Veränderung der Geschäftsmodelle sein. 
Und das ist hochgradig disruptiv.” 
“Well, we're losing sales, well from 
electricity contracts, well if everyone is 
installing solar panels on their roof and 
supplying themselves with 60-70%. Another 
disruptive element in the next years will 
obviously be battery storage [...]. Of course 
that is driving our business model 
dramatically. And if [...] the dynamics of 
digitalisation, that is also driven by such 
issues, it can all happen really quickly, 
depending on the speed of the innovative 
advancements in battery storage, for 
instance. The progress of development of 
the battery storage will be an enormously 
accelerating factor for the change in 
business model. And that is highly 
disruptive.” 
    
“Der Markt ist ja riesengroß, ist ja ein Riesen-
Value Bubble und warum beteiligen wir uns 
eigentlich nicht im Geringsten daran und 
gucken nur eigentlich zu wie unser 
“The market is gigantic, there is a gigantic 
value bubble and why are we not even 
involved in the slightest and are just 
watching the commodity turnover decline 
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Commodity Absatz deswegen weiter sinkt?” even further?” 
    
"Unsere Einschätzung ist, der Speicher wird 
kommen und wird die Energiewelt nochmal 
massiv verändern." 
“Our assessment is, the battery storage will 
come and the world of energy will change 
again massively.” 
    
"Man muss halt einfach vermitteln, dass 
diese Veränderung [...] überlebensnotwendig 
ist." 
"It just has to be conveyed that these 
changes [...] are vital." 
    
"Wir haben Photovoltaik verpennt, nicht nur 
[Firma X], sondern die gesamte Energie-
wirtschaft und nachher schreien wir dann, 
dass Menschen so ein Ding auf dem Dach 
haben und wir können überhaupt nicht mehr 
den Energieverbrauch mal anständig 
prognostizieren." 
"We snoozed on the Photovoltaics, not just 
[RPU firm], but the entire energy sector and 
afterwards we're all crying that people have 
this thing on their roofs and we can't even 
properly predict energy use." 
    
“Im zukünftigen Weltbild sind wir uns einig, 
wird‘s ein Prosumer geben, es wird eine 
aktivere Rolle von den Kunden geben in allen 
Wertschöpfungsstufen.” 
“In future scenarios we agree, there will be 
a ‘prosumer’, there will be an active role of 
customers in all value creation stages.” 
    
"Die relevanten Technologien sind PV und 
Wind. Einfach als Erzeugungs-themen, die 
hier vorne immer den Kuchen weiter 
wegfressen und ihnen eigentlich nach hinten 
schieben. Nur das wir halt oftmals nicht mehr 
der Asset Owner [der erneuerbaren 
Erzeugungstechnologien] sind, sondern, 
dass der Asset Owner der Kunde, das 
Industrie-unternehmen, der Bauernverband 
ist."  
“The relevant technologies are solar 
photovoltaics and wind. Just as issues of 
generation, that eat all the cake in the front 
but actually keep pushing it back. But we 
often times aren't the asset owner [of 
renewable generation assets] anymore, the 
asset owner is the customer, the 
enterprises, the farmer's association.”  
    
“Die meisten Kunden gucken gar nicht so 
stark auf die Rendite und auf die 
Wirtschaftlichkeit, sondern die finden das, 
einfach diesen Gedanken toll sich zum 
Großteil selbst zu versorgen, die sind 
technikaffin, die wollen Vorreiter sein, die 
wollen Energiewende mitgestalten.” 
“Most customers don't strongly focus on the 
return of investment and the profitability, but 
just enjoy the idea of self-sufficiency, they 
are tech savvy, they want to be pioneers, 
they want to shape the Energiewende.” 
    
“Da reden die von 3-4 Ct./kWh 
Stromgestehungskosten bei PV Anlagen. 
Dann wäre ja jeder blöd, der keine PV 
Anlage sich aufs Dach schraubt und von 
daher […] Also das Ding ist und das ist was 
ich anfänglich gesagt hab, es beginnt eine 
technologiegetriebene Spirale […] und dann 
gehört es einfach zum guten Ton dazu statt 
Dachziegeln PV-Anlagen draufzubauen.” 
“Experts are talking 3-4 cent/kWh electricity 
generation costs in solar PV systems. Then 
everyone not installing a solar PV system 
on their roof would be daft [...] So the thing 
is, and this is what I initially said, it is the 
starting point of a technology driven spiral 
[...] and then it shows good taste to install 
solar PV systems instead of roof tiles.” 
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“Das ist sozusagen ein neuer Wertschöpf-
ungszweig, den wir bisher nicht in der Form 
gehabt haben. Oder den man in der 
Vergangenheit vielleicht nicht gehabt hat, 
weil da hat man ja den Kunden beliefert und 
war daran interessiert, dass der Kunde 
möglichst viel abnimmt. Heute sind wir der 
Partner des Kunden und unser Ziel ist es, 
dass der Kunde möglichst wenig oder 
möglichst effizient verbraucht.” 
"So to speak, it's a new value creation 
section we haven't yet had in this shape or 
form. Or maybe it wasn't there before, 
because you supplied the customers and 
were interested in the customer taking on 
as much as possible. Today we are 
partners to the customers and it's our goal 
to have customers use as little as possible 
or as efficiently as possible." 
    
“Dann würde ich schon sagen, großer Treiber 
sind natürlich, sagen wir mal, sind viele 
Wettbewerber die in den Markt drängen, 
auch Branchenmitbewerber die reinkommen. 
Ich würde gerade im Commodity Bereich 
immer mehr, das geht ja nur noch um 
Kilowattstunde mal Preis und das macht 
perspektivisch eine Maschine, da braucht’s 
keine Energie-versorger mehr für.” 
"Then I would state, of course great drivers 
are, let's say, they're many competitors that 
push into the market, even sector rivals that 
emerge. I would especially see more and 
more in the sector of commodity, it's all 
about kilowatt hour times price and 
inevitably that will be done by a machine, it 
won't need an energy supplier anymore.” 
    
"Das ist ja der erste Wandel, den wir 
durchgemacht haben, von der Abnahmestelle 
zum Kunden zu kommend [...], vom Kunden 
zum Kundenbedürfnis und jetzt müssen wir 
halt noch eine Stufe weitergehen, dass wir 
wirklich wissen, was der Kunde wirklich will.” 
“This is the first transition that we've 
undergone, from the delivery point to the 
costumer [...], from the customer to the 
customer needs and now we need to go 
one step further, in order to really know, 
what the customer wants.” 
    
"Wir haben aber auch gelernt, dass der 
normale Commodity-Vertriebler nicht in der 
Lage ist und total Angst davor hat, ein 
technisches Produkt wie PV-Dachanlagen zu 
verkaufen. Auch wenn es ziemlich einfach 
ist." 
“We also learned that the typical commodity 
sales representative is incapable and 
scared of selling a technical product, such 
as distributed solar rooftop PV generation. 
Even if it's pretty easy.” 
    
"Aber ich sag' mal, es ist eine ziemliche 
Herausforderung einem Vertriebler zu 
verklickern, der da draußen in der Fläche 
unterwegs ist, dass er jetzt seinen Kunden 
auf einmal komplett was Anderes als bisher 
[über den Einsatz dezentraler erneuerbarer 
Energien] erzählen soll." 
“I would say, it is a very conflicting task to 
instruct a sales representative, who is out 
there in the field, to tell his/her customers 
exactly the opposite of what has been said 
to them [concerning the application of 
distributed renewable technologies.] in the 
past.” 
    
"Aber ein Großteil eben, ja ist immer noch so 
in dieser Rolle des Energieberaters und, 
sage ich mal, na ja, also wenn ich jetzt ein 
Auto-verkäufer habe der einem Kunden erst 
mal die Wirtschaftlichkeit von einem Auto 
vorrechnet, dann würde ich wahrscheinlich 
wenig Autos verkaufen.” 
"But a great deal is still playing the role of 
an energy consultant. Well and, let's just 
say, well, if I meet a car salesman that 
calculates the economic efficiency of a car 
for every customer, I would probably sell 
very few cars.” 
    
"Wobei wir uns schon Gedanken machen 
weitere Vertriebskanäle zu aktivieren, weil wir 
einfach merken, unsere angestammten oder 
unsere bestehenden Vertriebskanäle sind da 
sicherlich nicht die performantesten.” 
"Although we are thinking of activating 
further distribution channels, because we 
can tell our vested or existing distribution 
channels are surely not the most 
performing." 
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“Einfach ist der Weg in die Zukunft da 
bestimmt nicht. Und das wird bestimmt ein 
[Firma X] 2.0, Kostensenkungsprogramm 
geben. Es wird auch noch ein 3.0 und 4.0 
geben, bestimmt. Und da werden noch viele 
Federn auf dem Weg gelassen werden.” 
"The path to the future is definitely not easy. 
And it will probably be a [MNU firm] 2.0, 
there were cost-cutting programmes. There 
will be a 3.0 and 4.0, too, definitely. And 
many feathers will be shed on the way." 
    
"[...] und früher, ich sag mal die alte [Firma] 
ist noch so gewesen, die hat da was 
hingestellt, ein Produkt hingestellt und hat 
gesagt, das muss der Kunde jetzt kaufen [...].  
Sind wir jetzt bei dem Produkt, glaube ich, 
sehr stark von abgegangen und haben stark 
auf den Kunden, sowohl auf den Endkunden 
als auch auf Stadtwerkekunden gehört, 
haben die mit eingebunden, geguckt was 
braucht ihr, worauf legt ihr Wert, was ist für 
euch wichtig.” 
“[...] and in the past, let's say the old [RPU 
firm] was still like that, they brought out a 
product and said the customer has to buy 
that now. [...] I believe we deviated very 
strongly from that now with this product, 
and listened to the customer, both the 
domestic customer and the industrial clients 
of the RPU, we integrated them, saw what 
they needed, what was important to them.” 
    
"Ja, weil wir davon überzeugt sind, dass sich 
die Strukturen unseres Geschäfts 
fundamental verändern werden [...] und da 
kann man eigentlich über die ganze 
Wertschöpfung gehen [...] Das wird alles 
nicht mehr zentral groß sein, sondern 
dezentral klein. Der Kunde [...] wird eigener 
Stromproduzent sein und auch die 
Speicherlösungen werden lokal sein. Das 
ganze Geschäft, das war halt bislang in dem 
klassischen Utility Geschäftsmodell sehr 
stark zentral, ja [...] und dieses ganze 
Geschäft das wird sich zum Kunden 
entwickeln. Und der Kunde wird künftig der 
sein, um den sich das Geschäft dreht.” 
"Yes, because we are convinced that the 
structures of our business model are being 
changed fundamentally [...] and you can go 
beyond the whole value creation [...] That 
won't be large and central anymore, but de-
centralised and small. The customer [...] will 
become his/her own energy producer and 
the storage solutions will be local. The 
entire business so far was very centralised 
in the classic utility business model, yes [...] 
and that entire business will develop 
towards the customer. And the customer 
will be the one making the deals.” 
    
"Also, der ganz signifikante Unterschied 
zwischen unserem Geschäft und dem 
klassischen Energieversorgungsgeschäft. In 
dem klassischen 
Energieversorgungsgeschäft haben vielleicht 
5% der Mitarbeiter Kontakt zum Kunden 
gehabt. Bei uns hat jeder Kontakt zum 
Kunden.” 
“So the significant difference between our 
business and the classic energy supply 
business. Within the classic power utility 
firm, maybe 5% of the employees are 
communicating with the customer. In our 
case, everyone is communicating with the 
customer.” 
    
“Service ist auch super wichtig.”  "Service is also really important.” 
    
"Die Zukunft der Energieversorgung liegt im 
Servicebereich." 
“The future utility market is seen in the 
service arena.” 
    
"Warum arbeiten wir nicht daran, dass Uber 
der Energiewirtschaft zu werden? Es ist 
besser, wenn wir es selbst werden, als wenn 
es ein Anderer macht. Wir wollen das Uber 
der Energiewirtschaft sein." 
"Why are we not working on something to 
be the Uber for the energy industry? It 
would be better to do it ourselves rather 
than somebody else coming along like Uber 
did, or Airbnb. We would like to be the Uber 
for energy." 
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"Diese Qualitäten versuchen wir auf die 
Energiewirtschaft der Zukunft anzuwenden: 
Dezentralität, Autarkie, Shared resources. 
Digitalisierung quasi reinzukippen in IT und 
Analytic, um damit Plattformgeschäft zu 
betreiben über das man skaliert. Und das 
sind Themen wie, das findet statt in der 
Elektromobilität, das findet statt im virtuellen 
Kraftwerk, das findet statt im Connected 
Home.” 
"We try to apply these qualities to the 
energy sector of the future: De-
centralisation, self-sufficiency, shared 
resources, virtually dumping digitalisation 
into IT and analytics and therefore 
conducting a platform business through 
which you can scale. And those are issues 
that, they are taking place with electric 
vehicles, in VPPs and in connected 
homes." 
    
"Also aus vielen nur begrenzt steuerbaren 
Lieferanten und Abnehmern ein steuerbares 
Profil zu machen, was sie dann als 
geregeltes Profil am Markt anbieten können. 
Das ist ein Geschäftsmodell.” 
"To create a controllable profile out of 
limitedly controllable suppliers and buyers, 
that you then can sell as a regulated profile 
in the market. That's a business model.” 
    
"Ich bin überzeugt, langfristig werden sich 
solche Plattform-Modelle durchsetzen." 
"I am convinced, that in the long run, these 
types of platform-models will prevail." 
    
"Wir sehen insbesondere die 
Informationstechnologie als einen ganz 
entscheidenden Differentiator zu anderen 
Produkten." 
"Especially information technology seems 
to be a very decisive differentiator to new 
products.” 
    
“Also ein Satz den unser Vorstand vor 
kurzem gebracht hat war, er hat jetzt in 
seinen knapp zwei Jahren, die er hier ist, hat 
er viele neue Produkte schon erlebt die 
eingeführt wurden, er hat aber noch nicht ein 
Produkt gesehen was abgekündigt wurde. 
Müssen wir noch viel stärker drin werden, 
dass wir einfach sagen, okay wir haben jetzt 
mal was Neues und was haben wir denn an 
alten Themen die eigentlich nicht mehr so 
erfolgversprechend sind, die kündigen wir 
mal ab.” 
"One statement our board made not too 
long ago, in the two years it has existed, it 
has seen many products that were 
introduced, but not one that had been 
discontinued. We need to get better in 
saying, OK, what old issues do we still 
have, that aren't actually that promising, 
we'll discontinue those." 
    
"Das ist eine Mentalitätsumstellung [...].” "That's a change of mentality [...]." 
    
"Und ich glaube, dass ist aber insbesondere 
eine Herausforderung im EVU, weil der 
Mindset der Leute einfach so nicht ist. 
Sondern es verdient jeder viel zu viel Geld für 
das, was er leistet und nur eine Stunde 
länger bleiben ist halt nicht drin. Und 
deswegen tun sich diese Unternehmen halt 
auch so schwer. Da spielen auch tausend 
weiter Faktoren mit rein, aber ich glaube 
dass dieser veränderte Mindset der 
Mitarbeiter und das engagierte Team, ohne 
das geht es nicht." 
"And I believe, this in particular a challenge 
in incumbent firms because the people's 
mind-set simply isn't like that. Rather 
everybody earns too much money for what 
they do and staying only one extra hour 
simply isn't included. And that is why these 
firms find it so difficult. There are thousands 
of other factors also playing a role. But I 
think that this change in the staff's mind-set 
and the dedicated team, without them it isn't 
possible." 
    
„Das versucht man eben durch einen Mind-
Change hinzukriegen. Ob das klappt, weiß 
der liebe Gott.“ 
"One's trying to achieve that simply through 
a mind change. Only God knows whether 
that will work." 
293 
 
    
"Also man wird einen kulturellen Wandel 
herbeiführen können und auch dieses, sag 
ich mal, stärker innovative, stärker 
unternehmerische usw. auch so ein bisschen 
intensiver können, aber es wird nie 
vergleichbar sein und ganz weit entfernt 
davon, was wir halt in solchen Startups 
sehen." 
So, one'll achieve a cultural change and 
even be able to do this, let me say, more 
innovatively, more entrepreneurially etc. 
also a bit more intensively, but it will never 
be comparable to and a huge distance from 
what we can see in such start-ups." 
    
"Ja, dass ist wie gesagt auch ein 
Kulturwandel. Also ich glaube es haben 
einige verstanden und die agieren auch so. 
Die agieren auch wirklich wie Unternehmer." 
"Yes, that is, as mentioned, also a culture 
change. So, I think some have understood 
and they also act accordingly. They really 
are acting like an entrepreneur." 
    
"Ich glaube, wir sind schon ein ganzes Stück 
agiler geworden und würden heute viele 
Dinge auch schon anders machen, dass was 
ich gerade angesprochen habe, dieses 
schneller werden, Dinge ausprobieren, das 
ist genau das was unser Geschäftsführer und 
auch unser neuer Vertriebsvorstand hier sehr 
stark reinbringen und versuchen auch so, ja 
auch den Laden dahingehend zu verändern, 
dass wir einfach Dinge ausprobieren und bei 
Nichterfolg auch abkündigen.” 
"I think we've become a great deal more 
agile and would do many things differently 
today. What I've just talked about, this 
would be quicker; trying things out, that's 
exactly what our CEO and also our new 
CSO are bringing in here a lot and are thus 
trying, yes, to change the business such 
that we simply try things out and if 
unsuccessful, stop them." 
    
"Das Wichtigste was man braucht, ist das 
klare Unterstützung des Top-Managements. 
Und die haben wir."  
"The first thing you need is strong support 
from your top management and we have it.” 
    
"Ohne den Executive Sponsor oder den 
Executive Champion [...] funktioniert das 
nicht. Also jedes Thema braucht einen von 
oben, der die Hand drüber hält." 
"It doesn't work without the executive 
sponsor or the executive champion. [...] So 
every topic needs someone at the top 
holding a protective hand over it." 
    
"Kritischer Erfolgsfaktor ist immer das 
Management bis Vorstands-Attention oder 
Unterstützung. Nur dann geht’s. Brauchen 
sie nichts Anderes zu machen. Wenn die 
nämlich nicht da ist, dann lassen sie das 
bleiben." 
“A critical success factor is always the 
attention or support of the management up 
to the board. That's what makes it possible. 
You don't need to do anything else. If that 
isn't there, then don't bother." 
    
"Also wir treiben, sagen wir mal, die 
Transformation der Energiewirtschaft ganz 
vorne mit, weil wir erkennen ja auch, wir 
haben gewisse Fähigkeiten nicht, die wir 
aber in Zukunft, wenn wir das ernst meinen, 
brauchen wir einen ganz anderen Skill-Set in 
der Firma." 
So, we're right at the forefront in driving, 
shall we say, the transformation of the 
energy industry because we also do 
recognise that we don't have certain 
abilities that we'll definitely need in the 
future. If we mean it seriously, we need a 
completely different skill set in the firm." 
    
"Wenn man nicht man nicht mehr die Größe 
hat, um das zu erreichen, dann bin ich in der 
Tat dabei, dann wird die Diversifikation ein 
Problem. Weil dann hat man irgendwie 
überall so lauter Hasenköttel liegen und nicht 
“If one isn't even big enough to achieve 
that, then I do, indeed, agree, then 
diversification becomes a problem. 
Because then all one has is nothing but 
individual rabbit droppings and no big pile 
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irgendwo ein Haufen. Das macht dann 
weniger Sinn." 
anywhere. Then it doesn't make much 
sense." 
    
"Und ich glaube, dass die IT in Zukunft ein 
wesentlicher Faktor seine wird für den Erfolg 
in der Energieversorgung." 
"And I believe that in the future IT will be an 
essential factor for the success of energy 
supply." 
    
"Unser CEO sagt ja, wir müssen uns 
entsprechend zu einer IT Firma entwickeln." 
"Our CEO even says we therefore have to 
develop into an IT firm." 
    
"Das liegt erstmal daran, dass die Ideen oft 
erstickt werden von der Linienarbeit, dass die 
in der Hierarchie nicht gesehen werden, dass 
keine Zeit ist sie entsprechend umzusetzen 
und genau dafür muss man einen Rahmen 
schaffen."  
“This results mainly from the ideas often 
being initially stifled by linear management, 
that they aren't seen in the hierarchy, that 
there is no time to implement them and 
precisely for that one has to develop a 
framework." 
    
"Also die Stimmung damals war maximal 
feindlich und schlecht gegenüber solchen 
neuen Themen, weil halt der Mindset des 
Unternehmens an der Welt wahrscheinlich 
bei Generation und Distribution liegt, aber 
dieses Sales-Thema vollkommen 
ausgeblendet ist, weil einfach die Leute, sind 
alle lang im Unternehmen beschäftigt und sie 
denken in ihrer traditionellen Welt, haben 
auch noch nicht verstanden, dass sich die 
Energiewelt aber wandelt und nur darüber wir 
einfach neue Modelle brauchen um den Wert 
dort für uns rauszuziehen." 
"Well, the atmosphere then was maximally 
hostile and poor towards such new topics 
because the firm's mind-set towards the 
world was probably centred around 
generation and distribution but this sales 
topic is completely blanked out simply 
because the people have all been with the 
firm for a long time, and they think in their 
traditional world and have not yet 
understood that the energy world is in fact 
changing and for that reason we simply 
need new models for us to get the value out 
of it." 
    
"Der Change Prozess in den Köpfen dauert 
dann auch sehr lange, weil die Bewahrer und 
die Regionalfürsten die lassen sich da nicht 
reinreden, da müssen sie schon sehr radikal 
mit umgehen.” 
"The change process in the heads then 
takes a long time because the preservers 
and the regional princes don't give anyone 
else a say in matters. In that case you have 
to react really radically." 
    
"Aber im Prinzip haben die derzeit ein sehr 
triviales Geschäft. Und wenn die jetzt 
anfangen sollen hier demand-response, 
demand-side management, e-mobility, und 
irgendwelche Solarlösungen zu verkaufen 
usw. Die werden alle reihenweise überfordert 
sein." 
"But in principle they currently have a very 
trivial business. And when they now should 
start to sell demand-response, demand-
side management, electric vehicles and 
some sort of solar solution etc. they will all 
be swamped by the score." 
    
"Der Wettbewerb hier wird halt immer weiter 
kleinteiliger und das sind ganz neue 
Fähigkeiten notwendig, die man hier braucht, 
die so draus ziehen. Also ob das Utility dafür 
geeignet ist, ist eine ganz andere Frage." 
"Competition in this area is becoming 
increasingly fragmented and completely 
new skills are necessary that one needs to 
concentrate on. Well, whether the utility is 
suited to this, that's a completely different 
question." 
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"Eine Barriere oder Hürde ist, der Konzern 
kommt aus einer Welt, in der man große 
Investitionen gemacht hat. Große 
Investitionen heißt großes Risiko. Um 
sicherzugehen, dass du die nicht komplett in 
den Sand setzt, was nachher nicht geholfen 
hat, aber um das sozusagen potentiell 
sicherzugehen, hat man Risk Control, Risk 
Management, Controlling, Strategisches 
Controlling, Beteiligungs-controlling, also 
100.000 Leute, die meinen sie müssten mit 
dazukacken. Wenn ich jetzt mit meinem 
Projekt komme, was gerade mal 500.000€ 
ist, ist es nicht ganz trivial, den Konzern 
davon abzuhalten, sein komplettes Netzwerk 
an Leuten, die im Moment gerade mit dem 
Finger in der Nase bohren, auf dieses Projekt 
loszulassen." 
"A barrier or hurdle is that the firm comes 
from a world in which one made huge 
investments. Huge investments mean huge 
risk. To make sure that you don't 
completely louse them up, which in 
retrospect didn't help, but basically in order 
to potentially be sure, one has risk control, 
risk management, controlling, strategic 
controlling, financial analysis, well 100,000 
people who also thing they have to add 
their shit. If I now come with my project, 
which is only worth €500,000 then it isn't 
exactly trivial to stop the firm from letting its 
complete network of people who are 
currently simply picking their nose loose on 
this project." 
    
"Auch ein spannendes Thema. Es ist ein 
kulturelles Thema. Wie bewertet eigentlich 
der Risikocontroller, der vorher zwei 
Terrawatt-stunden Gasliefervertrag an die 
Mainova bewertet hat, den Verkauf von 
10KW Solar PV-Anlage? Es prallen kulturelle 
Welten aufeinander. Und ich glaube nach wie 
vor die Königsdisziplin für uns im 
Unternehmen ist, die neuen Modelle durch 
das Unternehmen zu peitschen. Natürlich ist 
es schwierig, die Value Proposition zu 
definieren. Es ist schwierig, das mit den 
Handwerkern durchzusetzen, aber die größte 
Herausforderung ist, das Unternehmen, 
deine Kollegen so auf die Spur zu bringen, 
dass die nicht dagegen arbeiten, sondern, 
dass sie das System unterstützen. Und das 
ist aus meiner Sicht die größte 
Herausforderung, vor der wir da stehen." 
"Also an interesting topic. It's a cultural 
topic. How in fact does the risk controller, 
who has just evaluated a gas supply 
contract for two terawatt hours to Mainova, 
evaluate the sale of 10KW solar PV-facility? 
And I continue to believe that the most 
important activity for us in the firm is to whip 
the new models through the firm. Of course 
it's difficult to define the value proposition. 
It's difficult to implement it among the 
technical staff; but the biggest challenge is 
to get the firm, your colleagues in line so 
that they're no longer working against it but 
that they support the system. And in my 
view, that's the greatest challenge we're 
facing." 
    
"Und neue Wege gehen in unserem Fall 
heißt, wir haben uns einfach ein, selber einen 
IT-Dienstleister am Markt gesucht und mit 
dem unsere IT-Anforderungen besprochen 
und jetzt auch umgesetzt. Und das ist, 
trauriger Weise das, so das einzige IT-
Projekt bei uns im Bereich, zumindest was 
vernünftig läuft. Ist das was wir selber 
angestoßen haben und selber einen 
Dienstleister gesucht haben." 
"And going down new paths in our case 
means we simply searched the market 
ourselves for an IT service provider and 
discussed with them our IT requirements 
and have now implemented them. And that 
unfortunately is, well, the only IT project in 
our area that at least runs well is the one 
we initiated ourselves and looked ourselves 
for an external service provider." 
    
"Das war immer mein Bestreben, weil wenn 
wir das mit unserer IT gemacht hätten, dann 
würde man wahrscheinlich noch fünf Jahre 
warten müssen und es würde um ein 
Vielfaches teurer sein. Hier war genau das 
Thema schnell, agil, günstig und flexibel. Und 
das kriegt man halt im eigenen Unternehmen 
leider nicht so hin." 
"That was always what I tried to do because 
if we had done that with our IT, then one 
would probably have to have waited 
another five years and it would have been 
considerably more expensive. The theme 
here was quick, agile, good value and 
flexible. And unfortunately one can't exactly 
manage that with one's own firm." 
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"Wir haben einfach unglaublich viele Ballons 
und Bälle in der Luft und das Problem ist 
nicht, dass die sich die Themen gegenseitig 
wegnehmen, das gar nicht mal, aber das, 
wenn einer ein Thema hat, dass ihm immer 
die Manpower fehlt, um das wirklich 
durchzuziehen, weil dann haben wir sieben 
tolle Themen in der Ideation Phase, aber 
mein Kapazitätsbedarf um ein Thema groß 
zu machen, wird nach unten hin immer 
größer. Und dann helfen mir auch 
irgendwann nicht mehr das zwei Millionen 
Berater Budget, wenn ich keine Leute habe, 
die es später delivern und umsetzten." 
"We simply have an incredible number of 
balloons and balls in the air and the 
problem is that they mutually undermine the 
topics. Not really even that, but that, when 
someone has a topic, that he is always 
lacking the manpower to really implement it 
because then we have seven fantastic 
topics in the ideation phase; but the 
capacity I need to really make a topic big is 
greater the further down we go. And then, 
at some point even the two million 
consultancy budget doesn't help me any 
more when I don't have any people that can 
later deliver and implement it." 
    
"Beim Partnering geht es nicht ausschließlich 
um externe Partnerschaften. Interne Partner-
schaften sind genauso wichtig. Ich bin nicht 
verantwortlich für erneuerbare Energien. 
Aber wenn wir die Kollegen aus dem Bereich 
benötigen, können wir sie jederzeit anrufen."  
"Partnering is not only about external 
partnering. It also means internal 
partnering. I’m not responsible for 
renewables, but we if we need our 
colleagues, we can call on them." 
    
“Wenn es dann darum geht Verträge zu 
verhandeln, wenn es darum geht die Partner 
zu managen, irgendwelche Hardware 
einzukaufen, wird es doch immer brutal 
schwierig.” 
"When it's a case of negotiating contracts, 
when it's a case of managing partners, 
purchasing any sort of hardware, then it 
really becomes increasingly brutally 
difficult." 
    
“Das wird eine ganz neue Struktur sein von 
Partnerschaften, wo sich die 
unterschiedlichen Rollen ergänzen und nur 
dann wenn sie Wert schaffen beim Kunden 
werden sie auch erfolgreich sein.” 
"It will be a completely new partnership 
structure, where the different roles 
supplement each other, and they will only 
also be successful when they provide value 
for the customer." 
    
“Aber wir sind inzwischen, worauf ich hinaus 
wollte mit dem Beispiel PV ist, als wir dann 
auf die verschiedenen großen Player 
zugegangen sind, haben die uns damals vor 
die Tür gesetzt. Inzwischen ist einfach 
akzeptiert, dass wir das durchaus ernst 
meinen an der Stelle und der Riesenvorteil, 
den wir mitbringen sind einfach unsere 
Kunden. Und damit sind wir attraktiv auch für 
diejenigen die keine Hemmungen haben auf 
der nächsten Konferenz über die Großen zu 
schimpfen aber hinter der Tür auch mit uns 
reden und Geschäftsmodelle entwickeln und 
Dinge vorantreiben.” 
"But in the meantime, what I wanted to say 
with the PV example is, that when we 
approached the various big players, they 
slammed the door shut. In the meantime, it 
has simply become accepted that we really 
are serious about this and the huge 
advantage we bring is simply our 
customers. And with that we're attractive 
even for those who at the next conference 
have no compunction about ranting over 
the big ones but then also talking with us 
behind closed doors and developing 
business models and moving things 
forward." 
    
"Vorher haben wir ja Strom und Gas durch 
die Gegend geleitet. Auf einmal brauchen wir 
jemanden, der in Eckenfelden in Bayern, jetzt 
das 3,5 KW PV-Anlage zusammenlegt, auf 
den Laster stellt und nach Schleswig-Holstein 
fährt. Ganz neue Herausforderung." 
"Previously, we channelled energy and gas 
around. Suddenly we need someone who in 
the corner fields in Bavaria now dismantles 
the 3.5 KW PV system, places it on a lorry 
and takes it to Schleswig-Holstein. A 
completely new challenge." 
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“In der neuen Welt, wenn wir da über 
Energielösungen sprechen, geht es nicht 
ohne das Handwerk. Das ist ein ganz ent-
scheidendes Learning. Ich brauche eine 
eigene Installationstruppe, ohne die geht es 
nicht.” 
"In the new world, when we are talking 
about energy solutions, it isn't possible 
without the technician. That's a decisive 
finding. I need my own installation group. It 
isn't possible without them." 
    
“Weil einer alleine wird‘s nicht schaffen (…) 
das heißt, wir glauben auch, dass wir 
Partnerschaften leben müssen, davon bin ich 
fest von überzeugt.” 
"Because one can't achieve this alone [...] 
means, we also believe, that we have to 
live in partnerships. I am convinced of that." 
    
“Start-ups bieten wir Beteiligung an 
bestimmten Modellen an. Die versprechen 
sich davon, dass damit ihr Geschäftsmodell 
weiterentwickelt wird, dass sie zeigen können 
dass es funktioniert.” 
"We offer start-ups a share in certain 
models. They hope that their business 
model will then continue to develop, that 
they can show it works." 
    
“Ich bin überzeugt. Langfristig werden sich 
solche Plattformmodelle durchsetzen.” 
"I am convinced that, in the long term, such 
platform models will assert themselves." 
    
„Also es wird viel stärker eben in diesen 
Dienstleistungsbereich gehen und wenn man 
jetzt diese klassischen Energiedienst-
leistungen, die wir jetzt heute anbieten, damit 
werden wir auch nicht die Milliarden machen, 
das ist ganz klar.“ 
Well, it will then move much more into this 
service sector, and when one now offers 
these classic energy services that we 
currently have, then we won't be making the 
thousand million, that's quite clear." 
    
“So dieses Privat- und Gewerbekunden 
Energiedienstleistungs-geschäft, da reden 
wir vielleicht über einen Umsatz von 60 
Millionen pro Jahr. Während wir im PuG-
Commodity Geschäft von 3,5 Milliarden € 
reden.” 
"So this retail and consumer-oriented 
energy service business, we are talking 
there perhaps about an annual turnover of 
€60 million. While we are talking in the 
private households and SME commodity 
business about €3.5 billons." 
    
“Non-Comodity wird es nicht auffangen. 
Ganz einfach. Non-Comodity wird nicht das 
wegbrechende Commodity-Geschäft auf-
fangen.” 
"Non-commodity won't be able to absorb it. 
Quite simple. Non-commodity will not be 
able to make up for the loss in the 
commodity business." 
    
“Das kann meiner Ansicht nach auch nicht 
durch irgendwelche Geschäftsmodelle, 
zumindest nicht durch die, die ich jetzt sehe, 
diese Energiewende-Geschäftsmodelle 
aufgefangen werden.“ 
"I don't think that can even be compensated 
for by any sort of business model, at least 
not by those that I currently see, these 
Energiewende business models." 
    
"Aber womit ich natürlich nicht leben kann ist, 
es nützt mir nix, wenn mir bei der Generation, 
in dem Fall jetzt ist das Ergebnis von 6 
Milliarden EBIT auf 600 Millionen zusammen-
geschrumpft bei der RWE. Und das Ende ist 
noch nicht erreicht. Bei den Dezentralen ist 
es mir von, also wenn ich jetzt nur mal die 
[Firma X] als lächerliche kleine Company 
anschaue, ist es von, was weiß ich, 5 auf 30 
gewachsen. Ja da ist ein Faktor 200 
"But what I naturally can't live with is that it 
doesn't help me at all when in the process 
of generation, where currently 6 billion EBIT 
have already shrivelled to 600 million for 
[the MNU firm]. And the end still isn't in 
sight. And for the decentral units it has 
grown, well when I only look at [the MNU 
firm] energy service as a ridiculously small 
firm it has grown from, well, let's say 5 to 30 
million. Yes, there's a factor of 200 between 
298 
 
dazwischen. Das ist das kleine Problem." those. That is the small problem." 
    
“Also es hat ganz klar dazu beigetragen, 
dass es ein Ziel gibt, was jetzt heißt hundert 
Millionen Euro Deckungsbeitrag aus Non 
Comodities im Jahr 2020.“ 
"Well, it has clearly contributed to their 
being an aim, which is now a €100 million 
contribution margin from non-commodities 
in 2020." 
    
“Und selbst wenn es jemand super 
professionell und effizient aufzieht [...] selbst 
wenn sie das hinkriegen würden die 
Stadtwerke, würden sie damit nicht viel Geld 
[mit Non-Commodity Geschäftsmodellen] 
verdienen, weil diese Startups verdienen ja 
auch nicht viel Geld.“  
"And even if someone implements super 
professionally and efficiently [...] even if 
they manage, the municipal power utility 
firms, they would not be able to make much 
money [with non-commodity business 
models] because these start-ups don't earn 
much money either." 
    
Also der Vorstand ist, ist ja auch kein 
Geheimnis, meinen wir im Grunde 
genommen alle, es wird ja kein neues 
Geschäftsmodell geben wo man sagt, das 
eine rettet uns.“ 
"Well, the board is, it isn't a secret, we 
basically all know that there won't be a new 
business model where one can say it'll save 
us." 
    
Wenn wir einen 100%-igen Autarkiegrad von 
den Kunden erreicht haben und 
wahrscheinlich wird das perspektivisch 
irgendwann passieren, dann fällt der größte 
Ertragstreiber, nämlich der Distribution 
Network, irgendwann weg, weil das Netz 
dann nicht mehr da ist, weil ich alles klein 
und dezentral habe [...].“ 
"When we achieve a level of customers 
being 100% self-sufficient, and that will 
probably happen at some point in the 
future, then the biggest revenue bringer, 
namely the distribution network, will at 
some point disappear because the network 
then isn't there anymore because I have 
everything small and decentral [...]."  
    
 
Clean-tech start-up case study  
  
Original German quote English translation 
  
“[...] aber das ist möglicherweise sogar 
leichter, weil man eine höhere intrinsische 
Motivation hat, wenn man der Typ dafür ist. 
Weil einem das Rückenwind gibt, wenn man 
weiß, dass das was man tut nicht nur dazu 
dient - platt gesagt - Kohle abzurocken, 
sondern dass es auch in einem Kontext steht 
zu dem man stehen kann. Und wo man das 
Gefühl hat man macht das nicht nur für sich 
und die Mitarbeiter, sondern man macht das 
auch, weil man der Meinung ist, dass das, 
das Richtige ist. Ich finde schon, dass das 
sehr motivierend ist, um das mal so zu 
sagen. Von daher ist es vielleicht ein 
bisschen leichter was zu machen, wo man 
einen Sinn drin sieht.” 
“[…] but it is possibly much easier, because 
the intrinsic motivation is much higher, if 
you are this kind of guy. It gives you a boost 
if you know that you do the things you do 
not only for making cash, basically, but that 
they also exist in a context of commitment. 
Which gives you the feeling that you do it 
not only for yourself and the employees but 
also because you know that you do the 
right thing. In my view, this can be very 
motivating, which is to say, it is possibly 
easier to do something meaningful.” 
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“Die Motivation der Gründer war nicht zu 
sagen, wir machen jetzt was mit 
Sustainability. Die ganze Gründung war ja im 
Kontext von einer bis heute andauernden 
wirklichen Begeisterung und Faszination für 
Photovoltaik und Speicherthemen und der 
Frage, wie man denn deren Anteile noch 
weiter steigern kann?”  
“It wasn’t the motivation of the founders to 
say: Let’s do something with sustainability. 
From the beginning to the present day, the 
whole foundation was based on a true 
fascination and enthusiasm for 
photovoltaics, storage technologies and the 
question, how it is possible to increase their 
share.” 
    
“Wir müssen ja disruptiv, agil und sehr viel 
schneller als Start-up am Markt agieren. Und 
das schaffen wir nur mit höchstmotivierten 
Mitarbeitern, die kriegt man nicht durch Geld, 
sondern Geld ist ein Hygienefaktor, aber die 
Motivation kommt aus der intrinsischen 
Motivation und das ist defintiv die Energie-
versorgung nachhaltiger zu gestalten.” 
“As a start-up, we have to react to the 
market in a disruptive, agile and much 
faster way. This we can only achieve with 
highly motivated employees. You cannot 
buy this with money. Money is a matter of 
hygiene, but true motivation is intrinsic, 
namely to to contribute to the plan of a 
sustainable energy supply system.”  
    
”Ich würde mal sagen in informeller Natur 
haben wir die ersten beiden Phasen des 
Stage-Gate-Prozesses durchlaufen. Aber 
nicht in dem Bewusstsein, dass wir jetzt in 
dieser oder jener Phasen sind.“ 
"I would say, we went through the first two 
phases of the Stage-Gate process 
informally, so to speak. We did not pay 
much attention to the exact phase we were 
in."  
    
“Nee, Du brauchst einmal das 
Konzeptionelle, was wir über ‚design thinking‘ 
und visuelle Ansätze wie der Business Model 
Canvas ganz am Anfang abgedeckt haben, 
um erst einmal ein Model stehen zu haben. 
Und der Rest ist dann mit ersten Modellen 
raus, die Marktattraktivät checken und 
gucken was passiert. Und dann die schnelle 
Iteration.“ 
“No, first you need a conceptual design. We 
had covered this right at the beginning by 
‘design thinking’ and visual approaches like 
the Business Model Canvas to have 
something to work with. The rest was done 
with models of market attractiveness and 
follow ups. And of course the iteration 
process.” 
    
“Also wir haben schon ziemlich viele 
Sitzungen gemacht, auch Strategiesitzungen 
und so und haben das dann entwickelt aber 
im Endeffekt die ersten Monate beim Start-up 
sind ziemlich viel Trial and Error. Und einfach 
gucken was funktioniert.” 
"Well, there were many meetings, also 
strategy sessions as the development 
moved ahead, but effectively, in a start-up 
the first months are pretty much trial-and-
error. It's just looking what is working and 
what is not." 
    
“Ich habe auch nicht viel irgendwie, bisschen 
was aufgeschrieben, aber das war wirklich 
weitgehend im Kopf.” 
"I didn't put much in writing. A little bit, yes, 
but the most part was just in my head."  
    
“Wir haben möglicherweise einen anderen 
Approach als viele Andere. Bei uns 
entwickeln sich die Geschäftsmodelle 
eigentlich aus der Praxis.“ 
"We possibly have a different approach 
than many others. At our house business 
models are actually developed from 
practical experience." 
    
”Wir versuchen da relativ nah dran zu sein 
und versuchen aufzunehmen, was die 
Impulse sind, die uns der Markt dann 
widerspiegelt und zurückgibt. Und das Gute 
daran ist, dass man genau weiß, was auch 
wirklich erfolgreich sein wird und was nicht. 
Und dass man nicht so sehr Gefahr läuft 
“We try to be close to it and take up the 
impulses which the market reflects and 
gives back to us. The good thing about this 
is that you know exactly what will be a real 
success and what not. So you don’t run into 
danger of over-engineering and developing 
things which are too expensive and nobody 
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irgendwas zu overengineeren und Sachen zu 
entwickelt, die zu teuer sind und die keiner 
kauft oder wo kein Bedarf für vorhanden ist.“ 
buys them or there is no demand for it.” 
    
“Also nichts ist so wichtig wie diese Iteration 
zwischen dem Markt und dem Start-up. 
Deswegen glaube ich, dass die Größe des 
Designteams, die so klein wie möglich zu 
halten in der spezifischen Phase, insofern 
alle Kompetenzen die man braucht dafür 
irgendwie zusammen zu bekommen sind. 
Das ist Schlüssel zum Erfolg.“ 
“Well, nothing is more important than the 
iteration between the market and the start-
up. That’s why the design team has to be 
as small as possible in this particular 
phase, in order to gather all possible 
expertise for this process. This is the key to 
success.” 
    
“Wir haben ja das Seed-Funding überhaupt 
erst bekommen weil wir ein tragfähiges 
Geschäftsmodell hatten.” 
"In fact, we only got the Seed-Funding 
because we had a viable business model." 
    
“Dann hast Du den Druck zu wachsen. Wir 
sind halt nicht evolutionär gewachsen, sonst 
wären wir wahrscheinlich 12 jetzt und nicht 
30. Sondern wir sind auf Anabolika 
gewachsen. Wir haben ordentlich Druck 
gekriegt.” 
"Then you've got the pressure to grow. We 
simply didn't grow evolutionary, otherwise 
we would probably be 12 and not 30 today. 
No, we grew on anabolics. We had a lot of 
pressure."  
    
“Für mich ist das jetzt die sechste Startup-
Erfahrung und mein Co-Founder hat auch 
schon ein anderes Start-up gemacht. 
Irgendwie was Neues zu machen, was 
aufzubauen, scheint uns offensichtlich beide 
zu motivieren und zu treiben und das in 
Verbindung mit einem Produkt, wo wir gesagt 
haben, das ist cool so, das braucht die Welt.” 
“For me it’s the sixth start-up experience, 
my co-founder has done one start-up yet. 
We both seem to be driven by the 
motivation to do something new, to build 
something up. With a product of which we 
said: That’s cool, that’s what the world 
needs.” 
    
“Wir sind alle nicht als Serial Entrepreneurs 
losgezogen, sondern sahen es als einen 
wesentlichen Selbstverwirklichungsschritt und 
planmäßig haben wir auch ein Jahr einfach 
selbst finanziert und gesagt, also so lange 
wird es brauchen bis wir Venture Kapital oder 
ein Angel Investment haben.” 
“None of us has started as a serial 
entrepreneur. Instead it was a major step 
into self-realization. We decided to finance 
ourselves for one year, until we got venture 
capital or an angel investment.” 
    
“Es ist schwer [as a software-as-a-service 
firm] die Kernzielgruppe klar zu benennen. 
Ich sag' Ihnen auch warum: Wir befinden uns 
mitten in einem extremen Wandel der 
Energiewirtschaft durch die Energiewende 
hinzu dezentralen, prosumer-orientieren 
Modellen.” 
“As a software firm, it is difficult to pin down 
the core target group. The reason is: We 
find ourselves in the middle of an extreme 
change, caused by the energy revolution 
that affects the whole energy industry. The 
trend goes to decentralized, prosumer-
oriented models.” 
    
“Ich glaube, dass die EVUs die großen 
Verlierer der Energiewende bis hin zu, dass 
es nicht mehr viele davon geben wird. Wenn 
da nicht dramatische Änderungen der 
Geschäfts-modelle passieren.” 
"I believe that EVU's will be the big losers of 
the energy revolution. Only few of them will 
be left if the business models do not 
change dramatically." 
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“Nein, wir haben uns ja bewusst nicht in 
einen regulierten Markt begeben. Sondern 
wirklich über Anlagenhersteller, Konnekti-
vierung im Feld, Visualisierung und 
Optimierung voll-kommen im unregulierten 
Markt bewusst bewegt.” 
"No, it was our conscious decision not to 
enter a regulated market. But to completely 
move in an unregulated market along with 
plant manufacturers, connectivity, 
visualization and optimization."  
    
“Das heißt also, Regulierung ist bei uns in 
gewisser Weise eine Variable, also nicht so 
erstmal gucken, ach das geht jetzt, sondern 
wir haben die teilweise auch wirklich mit 
gestaltet. Es gibt konkrete Verordnungen in 
denen sich Paragraphen finden, die wir 
erarbeitet haben.” 
“That means regulation is something like a 
variable for us. Not like in “Let’s give it a try 
and see what happens”, we actually 
contributed to some of them. There are 
particular regulations with paragraphs that 
go back to us.” 
    
Und in Deutschland haben wir die Situation, 
dass die 2010 Gesetzgebung bis heute nicht 
in irgendwas verpflichtendes überführt 
worden ist. Dadurch ist das gesamte 
Geschäftsmodell auf dem Greenpocket mal 
gegründet wurde im Prinzip obsolet. Wir 
haben kein Wachstum dadurch. Wir 
stagnieren in diesem Kerngeschäftsbereich 
seit drei Jahren. 
“In Germany, we have the situation that the 
applicable law of 2010 is not compulsory to 
the present day. In principle, the whole 
business model, the basis on which 
“Greenpocket” once has been founded, is 
obsolete. Hence we don’t grow. We 
stagnate in this core business sector for 
three years now.“ 
    
“Strom für unterwegs zum Preis wie zu 
Hause ohne Mehrkosten.”  
"Electricity on the go just like at home - 
without extra costs." 
    
“Unser Produkt ist auf der einen Seite 
natürlich das Webportal, weil es dem 
Stadtwerk ermöglicht, mit einer Online-
dienstleistung dem Kunden ein Produkt 
verfügbar zu machen. Aber dahinter liegend 
ist es natürlich das originäre Produkt, eine 
PV-Anlage, fertig installiert auf dem Dach des 
Kunden. Das ist eigentlich unser Produkt. 
Das Portal ist nur Mittel zum Zweck.” 
“Apparently, our product is the web portal, 
because it enables the public utility to make 
a product available to their customers via 
online services. But behind that web portal 
stands the original product, a PV system 
that is installed on the customer’s roof. This 
is our actual product. The portal is just a 
means to an end.” 
    
“Agile Entwicklungen funktionieren ja so. Man 
formuliert ein Ziel, wo man hin möchte. Und 
das Ziel war von Anfang an, die Plattform für 
Energie werden zu wollen. Wir wollen eine 
der Top3-Plattformen für Energie weltweit 
werden.” 
"That's how an agile development works. 
You formulate an objective, a goal you want 
to achieve. Right from the start our aim was 
to become the main platform for energy. In 
the future we want to become one of the 
top three platforms for energy in the world." 
    
“Unser Geschäftsmodell ist für Stadtwerke-
Partner auch aus OPEX-Sicht interessant, 
weil Lohnkosten beim Start-up deutlich 
günstiger sind.” 
"Our business model is interesting for 
partners of Stadtwerke also from the OPEX 
point of view, because wage costs are 
much lower with start-ups." 
    
“Naja, die Relationship Richtung Kunde sieht 
so aus, dass der Kunde mit uns virtuell jeden 
Tag Kontakt hat. Weil die Geräte die wir 
haben, sind zum überwiegenden Teil, zu über 
90% online und der Kunde interagiert mit uns 
über eine Onlineplattform entweder über 
seinen Browser oder über sein Smartphone 
“Well, as to the customer relationship, the 
customer is in contact with us virtually and 
every day. More than 90 per cent of our 
devices work online and the customer 
interacts with us via smartphone or browser 
by means of an online platform. […] That 
way he receives from us information, 
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[...]. Kriegt von uns Informationen, 
Softwareupdates und Prognosen, 
Wettervorhersage basierte Ertragsprognosen 
und was weiß ich was alles.” 
software updates, prognoses, weather and 
profit forecasts and I don’t know what else.” 
    
“Wir haben viele Vertriebspartner. 
Grundsätzlich vertreiben wir direkt über 
unsere Website, dann im Retailbereich über 
Consumer-Electronics-Händler, über EVUs 
und TelKo-Unternehmen (das nennt sich 
SolutionBusiness), das ist halt alles was ein 
bisschen über das klassische auf den Hof 
stellen hinaus geht. Da machen wir dann Co-
Branding und ggfs. eine eigene Support-
Hotline. Und der vierte Vertriebskanal sind 
die Installateure. Elektro- und Heizungs-
installateure, die sich bei uns anmelden und 
dann eben vertreiben.” 
“We have many sales partners. Basically, 
the distribution runs online via our website, 
then in the retail sector via suppliers of 
consumer electronics, energy suppliers and 
the telco industry (which is called solutions 
business). It’s all a bit more than the 
classical “Let’s drop it onto the market and 
see what happens”, it includes co-branding 
and possibly a separate hotline support. 
The fourth distribution channel are the 
technicians. Electricians and heating 
installers who subscribe at our house and 
go out for sales.” 
    
“Wir haben nicht wie in den USA Leute, die 
bereit sind hier 40 Millionen Euro Venture 
Capital reinzugeben, um dann irgendwann 
mal so eine Bude hochgepämpert zu haben. 
Wenn hier 4 – 10 Millionen Euro reinfließen, 
dann ist das schon viel.” 
"It's not like in the United States, people 
here are not willing to risk €40 million of 
venture capital just to have built up such a 
joint some day in the distant future. If you 
receive €4 to 10 million here, this is already 
quite something." 
    
“Wichtig ist, dass man es schafft, die richtigen 
Leute zu finden. Das Team ist natürlich auch 
extrem wichtig. Gerade dann, wenn man 
noch unglaublich klein ist und wo man darauf 
angewiesen ist, dass jeder für die Idee brennt 
und auch die Kompetenzen hat, die man 
braucht um so ein Unternehmen schnell zu 
entwickeln. Weil die Herausforderung für das 
Team und vor allem Dingen auch das 
Management sind wirklich hoch, wenn man 
sich jedes Jahr verdoppeln will. Und das ist 
ein Thema.” 
“It is important that you bring together the 
right people. The team is extremely 
important, of course. Especially if you are 
still incredibly small and you have to rely on 
people who give all their passion and 
enthusiasm for an idea and who bring in the 
necessary competences to quickly develop 
a business. This is a very big challenge for 
the team and above all for the management 
if you plan to double every year. That, of 
course, is an issue.” 
    
“Wir haben halt die richtigen Leute oder 
versucht die richtigen Leute darein zu holen, 
die sowas schonmal gemacht haben. Also wir 
hatten einen IT-Leiter, der schonmal Online 
Portale, B2B Portale aufgezogen hat, auch 
White Label fähige und sowas alles. Das ist 
wichtig, sich da die richtigen Leute zu holen, 
die das schonmal gemacht haben. Wenn wir 
wirklich komplett jungfräulich da rein 
gegangen wären, das wäre wahrscheinlich 
übel gewesen.” 
“We have tried to find the right people who 
have already some experience in this 
business. There was an IT manager who’d 
build up B2B online portals for white labels 
before and so on. It’s important to get the 
right people who have already done that in 
the past. If we went into it like virgins, well, 
that would have come to a miserable end.” 
    
“Also muss das, was ich biete attraktiver sein, 
als das was er bisher hatte. Das hat was mit 
Aufstieg zu tun, das hat was mit 
Selbstbestimmung zu tun, das hat was mit 
Prominenz zu tun, das hat was mit Bedarf 
nach Modernität zu tun und das hat was mit 
“Therefore what I offer has to be more 
attractive than what someone has got so 
far. It has something to do with getting 
ahead, with self-determination, with 
prominence, also with modernity, and it has 
something to do with entrepreneurs as part 
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Unternehmer im Unternehmen zu tun.”  of an enterprise.”  
    
“Im Endeffekt haben wir selber eine knappe 
viertel Million reingesteckt plus unsere 
Gehälter. Das sind ja auch Opportunitäts-
kosten.” 
"Effectively, we have put nearly a quarter of 
a million into it ourselves, plus our salarys. 
This can be considered as opportunity 
costs."  
    
“Wir sind von einer reinen Softwarebude zum 
Systemintegrator geworden.” 
"We have developed from a mere software 
shack to a system integrator." 
    
Wir hatten dabei absolut ein 
Ressourcenthema. Und aus dem 
bestehenden Gesellschafterkreis hat keiner 
gesagt, ich packe jetzt hier mal drei Millionen 
zusätzliches Geld rein, weil ich glaube, dass 
das super ist, macht ihr mal, baut hier mal 
fünf Leute auf und zieht das mal komplett 
separat durch. Keiner. Das war halt nicht, die 
Unsicherheit war zu groß, die VCs haben 
doch hier schon viel investiert. 
“Resources were a big issue at all. From 
the circle of shareholders no one ever said: 
I feel like putting three million in here, 
because I think it’s great, come on, just find 
five people and carry out the business 
completely on your own. No one ever said 
that. The risk was too high, but over time 
there was some venture capital of course.” 
    
“Ich brauche die nicht. Ich bin Opportunist an 
der Stelle jetzt. Ich verkaufe halt ein paar 
hundert Kisten mehr, den Umsatz kann ich im 
Moment gut gebrauchen, da freue ich mich. 
Außerdem trägt es zum Großen und Ganzen 
bei, Haushalte in Deutschland auf dezentrale 
Versorgung umzustellen. Das finde ich gut. 
Da stehe ich voll drauf. Und wenn es im 
Moment [MNU firm x] macht, freut mich das, 
aber langfristig gesehen ist das sicherlich 
kein Partner. Allein schon, weil man mit 
Leichen kein Geschäft machen kann, aber im 
Moment geht das noch. Aber ich bin da kein 
Glaubenskrieger. Ich bin keiner der sagt, die 
EVU’s gehören alle weg, ich will die 
abschaffen, das muss ich auch gar nicht 
sagen, weil die schaffen sich von selber ab. 
Ich bin da wenig fanatisch. Also was ich will 
ist, dass der Endkunde versteht, dass ein 
Verbrauch von Erneuerbaren Sinn macht und 
wenn [MNU firm x] derjenige ist, der an der 
Stelle der Paketträger ist, dann soll mir das 
auch recht sein.” 
“I don’t need them. At this point I am an 
opportunist. So what, I sell a couple of 
hundred boxes more, the turnover comes in 
quite handy, it makes me happy. Moreover, 
it contributes to the big picture when homes 
in Germany switch to decentralized supply. 
I like that. I go for it. And if [MNU firm x] 
runs the supply, so be it, but in the long 
term it will be certainly no partner. Because 
you cannot do business with a dead body, 
however at present it still works. I am no 
holy warrior about this. I don’t say: Get rid 
of the energy suppliers, they should be 
banished! I don’t need to say that, because 
they will banish themselves. I am not a 
fanatic about this. I just want the customer 
to understand that it makes sense to use 
renewable energies, and if [MNU firm x] is 
the delivery boy in place, this is fine for me.” 
    
“Wir haben ja jetzt sogar die Entwicklung mit 
den drei power utility Partnern gemacht. Also 
die haben alle drei einen relativ hohen 
sechsstelligen Betrag bezahlt und sind dafür 
ganz tief in die Entwicklung mit uns 
eingestiegen. Also eigentlich, böse 
gesprochen, haben die Geld dafür bezahlt, 
damit sie uns helfen unser Portal zu bauen.” 
“We just went through the development 
together with the three power utility 
partners. All three of them paid a high six-
digit figure and involved themselves deeply 
in our development. Speaking evil, they 
paid money so that they can help us to 
build our portal.”  
    
“[…]  aber die sind schon tot, haben es nur 
noch nicht geblickt. Da liegt schon 
Verwesungsgeruch in der Luft.” 
"[…] but they're already dead, they just 
didn't get it yet. It already smells of decay." 
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“Die Konzerne sind nicht unternehmerisch 
geführt, sondern sie werden gemanagt und 
sie werden gemanagt in einer Kultur, der 
Schuldvermeidung nicht in einer Kultur des 
Risiken eingehens zum besser machen.” 
"The corporate groups are not being run 
entrepreneurially, they are being managed. 
They are being managed by a dept-
avoiding culture instead of a culture that 
takes chances to make things better."  
    
Und wenn sie diese Art von Mitarbeiter, und 
ich mein das gar nicht böse, ich habe nichts 
gegen diese Menschen, aber wenn sie so 
eine Masse von Mitarbeitern haben, die noch 
dazu über Jahre ideologisch in eine Richtung 
verortet wurden, wie wollen sie da 
innovieren? Es ist das innovationsfeindlichste 
Klima, was sie sich vorstellen können. 
“Think of this type of employee, and I mean 
no harm, I have nothing against these 
people, but if you have a mass of 
employees who has been guided into a 
certain ideological direction for many years, 
how you are going to innovate? You cannot 
imagine a climate that is more hostile to 
innovation.” 
    
Und ich glaube, […] dass den 
Energieversorgern ihre Geschäftsgrundlage 
entzogen wird. Die schmieren jetzt nicht 
innerhalb von drei Jahren ab, weil die 
Energieversorgerbranche hat einfach dicke 
Rücklagen aus der Vergangenheit, aber sie 
brauchen sich ja nur anschauen, wie die 
Zahlen von denen sind. Die rutschen jetzt 
allle gerade Richtung Nulllinie und das geht 
im freien Fall. Da ist keiner oder kaum 
jemand dabei der mal so performt, sondern 
die performen alle so. Und die sind jetzt in 
der Zeit, wo sie Richtung null gehen und das 
geht noch weiter abwärts. 
“I think, […] that the energy suppliers will 
lose their business bases. They will not 
simply crash within three years, because 
these firms have massive reserves from the 
past, but you only need to have to look at 
their figures. Currently, they slip off towards 
zero in free fall. It’s not that one of them, or 
only a few perform that way, they all 
perform that way. Momentarily, they head 
straight to zero and will go down further.” 
    
“Ist übrigens ganz nebenbei auch der 
Hauptwert, den die [start-up firm] zur Zeit hat, 
dass die bestehende und einigermaßen 
zufriedene Geschäftsbeziehungen mit großen 
Incumbents hat, die so schnell nicht 
wechseln. Das ist einer der großen Werte, die 
wir haben. 
“Besides, at present the main value of 
[start-up firm] is its consisting and fairly 
satisfied business relations with important 
incumbents who rarely change. That is one 
of our big values.” 
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Appendix III: Business model archetypes applied in study 
 
Archetypes 
Case 
examples 
Description 
Digitisation Greenergetic, 
Thermondo 
This pattern relies on the ability to turn existing products or 
services into digital variants, and thus offer advantages over 
tangible products, e.g., easier and faster distribution. Ideally, 
the digitisation of a product or service is realized without 
harnessing the value proposition which is offered to the 
customer. In other words: efficiency and multiplication by 
means of digitisation does not reduce the perceived customer 
value.  
E-Commerce Greenergetic, 
Thermondo 
Traditional products or services are delivered through online 
channels only, thus removing costs associated with running a 
physical branch infrastructure. Customers benefit from higher 
availability and convenience, while the firm is able to 
integrate its sales and distribution with other internal 
processes.  
Flatrate n/a In this model, a single fixed fee for a product or service is 
charged, regardless of actual usage or time restrictions on it. 
The user benefits from a simple cost structure while the firm 
benefits from a constant revenue stream.  
Integrator  EnBW, ENGIE, 
E.ON, EWE, 
Mainova, MVV, 
RheinEnergie, 
RWE and 
Vattenfall  
An integrator is in command of the bulk of the steps in a 
value-adding process. The control of all resources and 
capabilities in terms of value creation lies with the firm. 
Efficiency gains, economies of scope, and lower 
dependencies from suppliers result in a decrease in costs 
and can increase the stability of value creation.  
Layer Player EWE EQOO, 
Greenpocket, 
Grundgrün, 
Kiwigrid, Rhein-
Energie, 
RWE/innogy, 
Sonnen, tado, 
Thermondo and 
ubitricity 
 
A layer player is a specialized firm limited to the provision of 
one value-adding step for different value chains. This step is 
typically offered within a variety of independent markets and 
industries. The firm benefits from economies of scale and 
often produces more efficiently. Further, the established 
special expertise can result in a higher quality process.  
Leverage 
Customer 
Data 
Greenpocket, 
tado and 
Thermondo 
New value is created by collecting customer data and 
preparing it in beneficial ways for internal usage or interested 
third-parties. Revenues are generated by either selling this 
data directly to others or leveraging it for own purposes, i.e., 
to increase the effectiveness of advertising.  
Lock-In Greenpocket, 
Greenergetic, 
Kiwigrid and 
Sonnen 
Customers are locked into a vendor's world of products and 
services. Using another vendor is impossible without 
incurring substantial switching costs, and thus protecting the 
firm from losing customers. This lock-in is either generated by 
technological mechanisms or substantial interdependencies 
of products or services.  
No Frills (or: 
Low-touch) 
n/a Value creation focuses on what is necessary to deliver the 
core value proposition of a product or service, typically as 
basic as possible. Cost savings are shared with the 
customer, usually resulting in a customer base with lower 
purchasing power or purchasing willingness.  
Orchestrator EnBW, E.ON, 
Greenergetic, 
LichtBlick 
Schwarm-
dirigent 
RWE/innogy, 
Within this model, the firm's focus is on the core 
competencies in the value chain. The other value chain 
segments are outsourced and actively coordinated. This 
allows the firm to reduce costs and benefit from the suppliers' 
economies of scale. Furthermore, the focus on core 
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Sonnen, 
Thermondo and 
ubitricity 
 
competencies can increase performance.  
Utility Model 
(or: Pay per 
Use; Pay-as-
you-go) 
EnBW, ENGIE, 
E.ON, EWE, 
Mainova, MVV, 
RheinEnergie, 
RWE and 
Vattenfall 
In this “on-demand” model, the actual usage of a service or 
product is metered (“metered usage”). The customer pays on 
the basis of what he or she effectively consumes. 
Traditionally, metering has been used for essential services 
(e.g., electricity, water, long-distance telephone services). 
The firm is able to attract customers who wish to benefit from 
the additional flexibility, which might be priced higher. A 
variant of this are “metered subscriptions, where subscribers 
are allowed to purchase access to content in metered 
portions (e.g., numbers of pages viewed). 
Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) 
Sonnen 
community 
This model is based on a co-operation that specializes in 
mediating between individuals belonging to an homogeneous 
group. It is often abbreviated as P2P. The firm offers a 
meeting point, i.e., an online database and communication 
service that connects these individuals (these could include 
offering personal objects for rent, providing certain products 
or services, or the sharing of information and experiences).  
Contracting 
Models (e.g. 
Performance
-based 
Contracting, 
Full-Service-
Contracting) 
RWE Innogy A product's price is not based upon the physical value, but on 
the performance or valuable outcome it delivers in the form of 
a service. Performance based contractors are often strongly 
integrated into the value creation process of their customers. 
Special expertise and economies of scale result in lower 
production and maintenance costs of a product, which can be 
forwarded to the customer. Extreme variants of this model 
are represented by different operation schemes in which the 
product remains the property of the firm and is operated by it.  
 
Rent Instead 
of Buy (or: 
Leasing) 
EnBW, E.ON, 
EWE EQOO and 
RWE/Innogy 
The customer does not buy a product, but instead rents it. 
This lowers the capital typically needed to gain access to the 
product. The firm itself benefits from higher profits on each 
product, as it is paid for the duration of the rental period. Both 
parties benefit from higher efficiency in product utilization as 
time of non-usage, which unnecessarily binds capital, is 
reduced on each product.  
Retail and 
build and sell 
EnBW, E.ON 
and RWE 
Innogy 
The traditional retailer profits by selling products and services 
directly to buyers at a mark-up from the actual cost. It 
involves multiple sales channels of distribution. Demand is 
identified and then satisfied through procurement and the 
application of a supply chain. Within the ‘build and sell’ model 
firms apply the same value chain, but are also responsible for 
the manufacturing activity 
Self-Service tado A part of the value creation is transferred to the customer in 
exchange for a lower price of the service or product. This is 
particularly suited for process steps that add relatively little 
perceived value for the customer, but incur high costs. 
Customers benefit from efficiency and time savings, while 
putting in their own effort. This can also increase efficien-cy, 
since in some cases, the customer can execute a value-
adding step more quickly and in a more target-oriented 
manner than the firm.  
Solution 
Provider 
n/a A full service provider offers total coverage of products and 
services in a particular domain, consolidated via a single 
point of contact. Special know-how is given to the customer 
in order to increase his or her efficiency and performance. By 
becoming a full service provider, a firm can prevent revenue 
losses by extending their service and adding it to the product. 
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Additionally, close contact with the customer allows great 
insight into customer habits and needs which can be used to 
improve the products and services.  
 
Subscription EWE EQOO, 
RheinEnergie 
and RWE/ 
Innogy 
The customer are charged a periodic fee, typically on a 
monthly or an annual basis, in order to gain access to a 
product or service. While customers mostly benefit from 
lower usage costs and general service availability, the firm 
generates a more steady income stream. It is not uncommon 
for sites to combine free content with "premium" (i.e., 
subscriber- or member-only) content.  
Two-Sided 
Market 
Grundgrün, 
Kiwigrid, 
LichtBlick 
Schwarm-
dirigent, Sonnen 
community and 
ubitricity 
A two-sided market facilitates interactions between multi-ple 
interdependent groups of customers. The value of the 
platform increases as more groups or as more individual 
members of each group are using it. The two sides usually 
come from disparate groups, e.g., businesses and private 
interest groups.  
 
White Label EWE EQOO, 
Greenergetic, 
Greenpocket, 
Kiwigrid, 
RheinEnergie 
and Sonnen 
A white label producer allows other firms to distribute its 
goods under their brands, so that it appears as if they are 
made by them. The same product or service is often sold by 
multiple marketers and under different brands. This way, 
various customer segments can be satisfied with the same 
product.  
Sources: Descriptions based on Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Gassmann et al., 2013; Johnson, 2010; 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Weill et al., 2005; Zott et al., 2011; mapping of firms based on 
case interviews) 
 
Appendix IV: List of analysed documents and videos 
 
Case A: Incumbent power utility industry 
 
Annual Reports and Financial Statements 2010-2015 of all participating firms 
Firm magazines 2013-2015 
Firm websites of new business model presentations 
Power point presentations with firm profiles of all participating firms 
Power point presentation with description of BMI project (MNU firm A) 
Power point presentation with description of BMI project (MNU firm B) 
Power point presentation with description of BMI project (MNU firm C) 
Power point presentation with description of BMI project (RPU firm A) 
Power point presentation with description of BMI pilot project (RPU firm B) 
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Press Release 2013-2015 of all participating firms 
Protocols of “European Utility Week 2015” energy conference 
Protocols of “22. Handelsblatt Annual Conference "Energiewirtschaft 2015” 
Protocols of “23. Handelsblatt Annual Conference "Energiewirtschaft 2016” 
Protocols of “2. Handelsblatt Annual Energy Digitisation Conference 2016” 
Sales Flyer of new business model offerings (all MNU and two RPU firms) 
 
Case B: Clean-tech start-up firms 
 
Financial statements 2013-2015 of all participating firms in Bundesanzeiger 
Firm websites of all participating firms 
Power point presentations with firm profiles of all participating firms 
Power points presentations about business model concept of “Ecosummit 
conferences” 2014-2015 of all participating firms 
Press Release 2013-2015 of all participating firms 
Videos of firm presentations about business model concept of “Ecosummit 
conferences” 2014-2015 of all participating firms 
